GOOD CITIZENSHIP

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preface by

REV. CHARLES GORE, D.D.

BOMBAY BRANCH

OF THE

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Good Citizenship

A Book of Twenty-three Essays by Various Authors on Social, Personal, and Economic Problems and Obligations

Edited by

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With a Preface by

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

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PREFACE

THIS book is intended as an appeal to Englishmen to take their citizenship more seriously. And—for all that can be said against us—where can better moral material be found to appeal to? There is a great fund of justice and goodness of heart in our countrymen, and a very general readiness to consider what is for the common good. In theory educated Englishmen mostly recognise that neither the extreme individualism of Mr. Herbert Spencer nor a thoroughgoing scheme of State Socialism is a true or practicable ideal; but between these extremes there is a great open area of "more or less," and we have not at any rate yet reached the point at which control exercised by the society over the individual or the class or group is likely to be dangerous to initiative and due self-reliance. The demand for personal liberty and freedom of personal enterprise runs so strongly in our English blood, and asserts itself so violently where they are really threatened or violated, that we need not, at least at present, have any fear on that score. We are free to consider with an open mind what on the whole will tend

to the greatest welfare of the mass of our countrymen—how on the whole we can best give to each Englishman the freest chance of "saving his soul," that is to say, in the deepest and widest sense making the best of himself (or herself), physically, mentally, and spiritually.

But the Englishman has "the defects of his quality." He is so practical that he is very apt not to think; not clearly to entertain ideals; not to contemplate the larger problems; not to consider seriously what is going on in our society at large—what is amiss and what is alterable. An Englishman often knows hardly anything and thinks about hardly anything except his own home, his own business, his own pleasure, his own place of worship. There is, then, a need to know—for example, how vast the danger is of letting our whole social life be controlled by the great financial interests, such as the liquor interest; how deep-set and perilous to all that is best among us is the corruption in commercial life; how terrible the evils of overcrowding in our great cities; how many processes of manufacture are destructive to the health of those who conduct them and their offspring; how awful the national peril from certain vices. It is those not least who are personally untouched by these things who have to be brought seriously to face them, till their imaginations become informed with the realities of the case. The individual, every individual, must face

these things; for they are not inevitable or necessary evils, at least not to anything approaching the extent to which they actually prevail. Truly

> "To the flame that ruineth mankind
> Man gives the matter, or at least gives wind."

We need to be awakened to our possibilities, and to shake off our fatalism.

Fatalism appears in a naïve form when the pious poor say of some departed member of their family, "It pleased God to take him"; though, perhaps, in fact he has died of drink, and therefore it rather "pleased" the man himself to destroy the life in this world which God ordained for him; or he died crushed by impossible conditions of life and labour, and it would be truer to say "It pleased society to put him to death." God does not do these things, or does them only by letting us reap the consequences of our wilful violations of His laws of health and brotherhood and morality.

Nor is there less fatalism among the better educated and better placed. It discourses more learnedly of laws and forces, and less of God. But it exists simply because we do not realise to anything approaching the limits of its truth, that the good or ill results of laws and forces depends upon the use we make of them. The laws and forces society has to deal with are in part mechanical and physical, and to that extent they can be controlled only by being obeyed. But in part they are simply the common tendencies

in human action, and how men tend to act depends on what sort of men they are, and what are the current ideas and personal influences which dominate their life. It depends on their practical ideals; and their ideals depend largely on public opinion, as public opinion depends largely on the ideas of social leaders.

Our social evils, then, are alterable, and alterable by individual initiation. What we want is not merely the "old gang" of social reformers, or even a new and better educated gang, but a nation more uniformly impressed by social duty and possibilities.

The poor are desperately passive and apathetic, and deplorably inert to use their powers to better their own state; sorely lacking in discernment to choose trustworthy leaders, and then to treat them well. And the rich or well-to-do are sadly apt to ignore their real duty to the society, their mother, which has dealt so bountifully with them. They do not ask themselves the question—

> "Here and here did England help me: how can I help England?—say."

We want many more individual Englishmen, each doing something steadily and perseveringly, with growing knowledge and ripening wisdom, for the bettering of the social state. And who can set limits to what might be accomplished with something like a national ideal, a national conscience, and a national effort at self-improvement?

And this book, to which I have been asked to write

a few words of preface, is a contribution to making our countrymen think. It is not intended merely to set before him certain conclusions. It appears conspicuously in the Editor's Introduction that, with great unity of design and method, and even of conclusion, the writers in the volume have their differences among themselves.[1] Social reform is still too young for it to be healthily otherwise; nor in writing this Preface can one who has not taken a part in the preparation of the volume venture to assume any further responsibility than, with all the strength of conviction he can assume, the responsibility of urging upon his fellow-countrymen and fellow-churchmen the paramount obligation of attending to the claims and duties of citizenship.

An appeal is made in this volume to churchmen from somewhat different points of view. To me it seems that to attempt to-day to conceive of the Church as the nation in its religious aspect would be disastrous to the Church and dangerous for the nation.[2]

[1] I will venture on my own account on a very small criticism of Mr. G. L. Gomme's suggestion that, among other ancient parochial bequests, those which provide for special sermons to be preached on particular days should be diverted by the Charity Commissioners to assist a national Old Age Pension Fund. This, I think, is the sort of suggestion which justly irritates religious people and prejudices them against social reformers, as if they had no regard to spiritual things. Plainly a bequest for a properly spiritual purpose, if it needs diverting at all, should be redirected to a properly spiritual end, for the Church and not for the State.

[2] But if I cannot accept the idea of churchmanship which underlies Essay iii. 9, I can at least recognise the excellence of the advice given in the essay, whether for churchmen, as I understand them, or for any religious people; and that is probably what the author most cares about.

"The free Church in the free State" is the truer ideal. But none the less the National Church has been and is so associated with the national life, as a whole and in all its parts, that its position presses upon it obligations very much wider than are involved in what is still, no doubt, its primary duty—that of ministering the word of God, or the bread of life, to those who seek and use its spiritual ministries. Beyond these there are classes and masses who are not by any spiritual choice or tradition members of religious bodies other than the Church of England, classes and masses who constitute the nation in bulk, and whose whole social and moral well-being is committed to the Church, that she may take thought and counsel and effective action to promote and secure it. The real relation of the parson's duty to his people's whole needs has not substantially altered since George Herbert wrote his "Country Parson." Still it is to the whole people as they are, or, to use his graphic phrase, as they "wallow in their own affairs"—in their homes, their factories, their places of business and pleasure, that we are debtors. But to discharge the debt in our days with any degree of efficiency we must not only have the bulk of churchmen more alive to social duty, we must not only have more individual churchmen devoting themselves to some definite form of social service, but also we must have in clergy, district visitors, churchworkers, and laity at large something more worthy of the name of social knowledge,

a clearer perception of what our social dangers are, of what the half-neglected provision is which the existing laws make to meet them, and of what are the most hopeful lines of onward movement.

There are two points in this appeal to churchmen in particular which I will venture to emphasise.

First, that we in the Christian Social Union find that in the main — with honourable exceptions, no doubt, but in the main—we have to depend upon clergy and women. For some reason, which I will not attempt to investigate, the professional men, the business men, and the "working men" are hard to enlist. Yet social service is not specially clerical business; and indeed a wish is sometimes expressed, when we do our best in this direction, that we would confine ourselves to our proper business. Well then, without stopping to discuss what is our proper business, and taking only the general intention of the phrase, may I make rejoinder that we will gladly do as is wished if in the social field the lay*men* will be a little more forward? Certainly in this matter the clergy ought not to stand for the Church. Certainly in this matter the requisite special knowledge ought to come more easily to laymen than to clergy. But as things are at present, I have reason to believe that our English experience is reproduced in this respect in America.

Secondly, the religious point of view lays it on the individual not to wait for State legislation, or some

comprehensive realisation of an ideal on a grand scale, as some Socialists frankly profess that they are waiting, but to take the initiative in acting on what he perceives to be right.

Christianity lays a stress which cannot be exaggerated on the duty of the individual not merely to think freely what is right, but to act upon what he sees. The Christian Church has lifted civil society in its whole bulk by the action of individuals buoyed up by nothing but their belief in God. Individual Christians emancipated the slave long before slavery was illegal, and Christians to-day—individual Christians in voluntary combinations—must study to use their money right, and buy their goods justly, and treat their servants and workpeople as brothers, if ever the conscience of society as a whole is to be raised to the point which can justify or make possible the action of the State. Even if the State does act without a sufficient support in the consciences of individuals, we have experience enough to show us how nugatory such action becomes. Therefore, let him awake that sleeps or theorises—and work.

CHARLES GORE.

HOUSE OF THE RESURRECTION,
MIRFIELD, *Michaelmas* 1899.

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Good Citizenship

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THESE essays on Good Citizenship are published in the hope that they may arrest the attention and stimulate the moral sense of those who, from one cause or another, have hitherto paid little heed to their duties and responsibilities as citizens. The writers have united in the hope of doing something to remove the prevailing apathy in regard to those things in our common life which are essential to *το εὖ ζην*.

Good Citizenship.

Although I have exercised a general supervision as Editor, each writer is alone responsible for his article. The bond of union has been the effort to show that a worthy citizenship must have its basis on a Christian and ethical foundation, and that all classes of men should apply their religious motives to the purposes of citizenship.

The political and economic section of this volume fitly opens with Mr. Rashdall's chapter on The General Functions of the State. As citizens we occupy a twofold relationship to that larger political whole which we call the State; for in the first place, the State is what we make it; and in the second place, whatever it is, we are compelled to obey it.

The General Functions of the State.

Now, Mr. Rashdall is not concerned to demonstrate what sort of political machine it would be best to construct if we had to set to work *de novo*, nor to study the actual working of the existing State. He is anxious that the obedience we render as citizens should be a reasonable and intelligent obedience. He is not content that we should obey if, and in so far as, we are compelled so to do, but asks and answers the question, "Why it is our DUTY to obey the State?" This question

raises a deeper one, "What is the *End* or highest good of human life?" If Mr. Rashdall's answer is accepted, the rest of his political theory follows easily; for he holds that the ethical *End* is "well-being," and that in "well-being" pleasure holds but a minor place. But, he urges, the *end* of the State cannot be different from that of its members, and since, *e.g.*, morality and religion are needed to further the well-being of a man, they cannot be beyond the purview of the State; hence there can be no theoretical limit to State interference for the general good. The State *ought* to aim at the well-being of its members, and they *ought* to obey, and in default may rightly be coerced. The exact status of the individual is a little difficult. Mr. Rashdall urges that the individual's only *right* is to "equality of consideration." To have worked out exactly what these words mean would perhaps be to have gone beyond the limits of this volume; but the individual who fears that his personality may be swamped in the crowd will be relieved to find the point strongly insisted upon, that the need of having men of the highest class, if only to direct the State, will prohibit all such interference as, by removing the stimulus of responsibility, will tend to degenerate character. Nothing thus is settled *a priori*.

Every practical question must be dealt with on its merits, but it must never be forgotten that the highest function of the State is the development of individual character. It is obvious, if the view taken of the functions of the State be the true one, that the duties of good citizenship should occupy a prominent place in the ideal of a good man, and therefore of a good Christian.

To obey the law, except in those rare instances where it is our duty to disobey it, is the most essential condition of human well-being.

Mr. Rashdall pleads for a revival among us of the old Greek enthusiasm for the State or the City. In the words of a succeeding paper by Mr. Ronald Bayne (p. 445), "all our modern life presupposes these earlier realisations of citizenship."

It is easy enough to lash people into enthusiasm for war,

and it would be a refreshing change to create in these days a new "civism" somewhat akin to that which arose among the old corporations of Italy towards the end of the twelfth century after the peace of Constance had ratified the liberties of the Italian people. In the three succeeding centuries these Italian cities exhibited a remarkable picture of public-spirited citizenship. There arose in every city churches, municipal halls, palaces, bridges, aqueducts, and public structures for every use, whose grandeur and purity of style have been the admiration and the despair of all succeeding generations. Yet all this greatness in civil life lacked the one essential which is apparently not wanting in our land to-day, *i.e.* patriotism. A united Italy was in the womb of the future—these city republics passed away because of their narrow range.

No such fate need be feared for English municipal life when the time shall come that the State itself acts on the principle that the duty and the welfare of society lie in its caring for all; so that joy, health, and happiness, upon which Canon Barnett in his paper lays stress, may become the heritage of every citizen.

Mr. Rashdall would fuse the Greek enthusiasm for the State or City, should it again spring up among us, with the old enthusiasm of the primitive Christian for the Christian Society or Church. In the great human battle for social righteousness we cannot afford to ignore the living power of religion, for it is through the social ideals of the New Testament that true progress lies. Without the spirit of Christianity, political progress will prove a delusion. Acts of Parliament by themselves are useless to make men better. The bad citizen can easily evade the law. Laws may enforce honesty in men's outward dealings, but progress will be essentially the outcome of individual development; and this development will not be merely the result of obeying the laws, but of holding fast the spirit and teaching of the religion of Jesus. A good Christian ought to be a good citizen, and a good citizen a good Christian.

Whatever measure of success social reform may have in

the twentieth century in the way of more social justice, greater leisure and comfort, and widened opportunities, no permanent and lasting strength will come to the nation in the shape of higher individual character and self-restraint unless we plant deeply and firmly our faith in historic Christianity as the root of both national and civic well-being.

Some such fusion of the spirit of churchmanship with the spirit of citizenship as Mr. Rashdall pleads for is essential to the growth among us of devotion to the social good, for the true *End* of the Church and State must ever be the same—the promotion of a true ideal of life.

The Church should be the helpmate of the State, to quicken national life as well as warn it, and be as faithful a witness before a governing people as it was in older days before a king or aristocracy.

I cannot but believe if only my fellow-citizens would take their place more effectually in the corporate life of both Church and State these social subjects which are now under discussion will, in the providence of God, as the world grows better and humanity develops higher and finer types, be more speedily settled on the lines of these moderate attainable ideals which the late Professor Jowett said are the only ones worth striving for. We have seen in this essay that the sphere of government duty extends to every phase of human life.

If this be so, and if this truth is gradually forcing its way to the front, we shall be prepared for fresh lines of cleavage in our time-honoured representative system. This is just the point which Mr. Lilley takes up in the second essay. Pointing out that modern democracy in its rapid growth is hardly conscious of itself, and claiming that democracy and socialism (at least as he would define the words) are but the same thing from different points of view, he urges that the conflict between socialism and individualism is already past, and that modern socialism is penetrated, and rightly so, with individual freedom. So too the long struggle for the abolition of political privilege has well-nigh attained its end, and there remains as the real need of the moment the enforcement of political duty. It is moral,

Democracy.

not political, reform that we now want. A national conscience must be created, and party government, with its clumsy majority votes, must go. The change may not come so quickly or so easily as Mr. Lilley hopes, and it is possible that the representation of classes and of moral ideals, which he suggests should take the place of our present parties, might make Parliament an unmanageable body, and too greatly weaken the executive. But it must be agreed that the duties of Parliament become more and more judicial, that political programmes and great constitutional questions are giving way to practical and serious efforts to arbitrate between opposing interests, and to discuss social questions with an open mind and earnest wish to administer even-handed justice to every class of society. Mr. Lilley might perhaps, in dealing with the gradual change of parliamentary function, have gone farther, and pointed out how awkward and unmanageable our British Parliament has become, whether for judicial or legislative functions. Like one of the great rivers of China, our legislation winds about seeking always the line of least resistance, now shrinking in its channel and unable to discharge its proper work, now breaking through its barriers and inundating the nation with floods of small-talk and a deposit of hasty and ill-considered legislation that by no means represents the accurate reflection of the thought and feeling of the electorate. Changing the metaphor, let us hope that a quickened civic life will insist on an improvement in the output of the legislative mill, even though it be necessary for that purpose to remodel the machinery.

The Municipality.

The article on The Municipality, by Mr. Laurence Gomme, requires no recommendation. As Statistical Officer of the London County Council, and as the author of many of its most valuable reports, he has contributed more than theoretical work to the service of the citizens of London, and is especially qualified therefore to write as an expert in the practice no less than in the theory of municipal government.

The sphere of the municipality in modern life develops rapidly, and it will not be long before all citizens, irrespective

of party, will insist on the extension of the area of municipal functions.

"The municipality is the whole body of citizens belonging to the town or city, not, as is too frequently imagined and stated, the council elected by the city to conduct their affairs." This is the position taken up by Mr. Gomme in his article. It is the old view of municipal life, which is once more destined under modern conditions to do much to ameliorate the blots on the 'scutcheon of city life.

In illustration of the probable early developments of municipal work, the control and direction of public-houses is mentioned as already becoming a practical ideal of municipal statesmen. Of late this reform, stimulated perhaps by recent licensing commissions, has secured an increasing number of adherents. If the public life of the citizens is a matter of municipal concern, certainly no reform is more urgent.

Of the problems in the minds of statesmen and philosophers, none are more important than those affecting our lives as citizens. A nation ever more and more of town dwellers, our future as a race must depend on our life in the towns, and to render this life civilised in the truest sense of the word is the work before our municipalities, and the work, therefore, of each individual citizen.

The very cumbrousness of our parliamentary machinery may prove to be not without its compensation if it hastens the devolution of powers from the central government to the local authorities, for this process not only tends to increase the progress of reform by removing the red tape that so often strangles centralised control, but what is really more important, it gives a greater sense of responsibility to municipal bodies, throws upon them the fierce light of public criticism, and attracts to their ranks the best men. This last point brings us to the kernel of the whole question.

Let Parliament freely trust the municipalities with power, the rest is a question of character. If all citizens, or even if any considerable number of citizens, will act in the spirit which it is the object of this book to inspire, they will vote for men of high character to represent them. High character in the

council will aim at, and in the long run will obtain, high character in the executive offices, a higher moral tone will prevail throughout the wide sphere of municipal control (where indeed it is still much needed), and this result will react on all the citizens, and thus work for its own continuance.

Improvement in the government and in the governed must go together; neither can move far in either direction without dragging the other with it, and the driving-wheel of all human machinery is CHARACTER.

The economic section of this volume closes with two chapters by Mr. J. A. Hobson on Capital and Labour. The same principle lies at the basis of both chapters. Put shortly, it runs thus. Neither capital nor labour, nor both together, can produce anything in any modern society except under conditions which depend on the support, and therefore involve the control, of the State. Capital and labour cannot be allowed to fight out their own battles; there is, or ought to be, a third party in the struggle, viz. the State, which must, therefore, in the long run decide the issue. Consider Capital first. Here Mr. Hobson, following writers of the Fabian School, points out the steady growth in the size of businesses, the increasing power and importance of capital relatively to labour, and the rapid passing of the control of production into the growing class of employers or *entrepreneurs*. Hence the usual socialist argument follows easily, that as businesses become bigger and bigger they will at length all merge into a few great monopolies, of which the State can easily take possession, and thus realise the socialist idea.

Capital and Labour.

But Mr. Hobson will not go so far as that. He does indeed contemplate some such "happy despatch" for the "large routine business," but he recognises that there are many industries, "perhaps even a majority," which do not display this centralising tendency, and which it will not even finally be expedient to absorb into the State.

Mr. Hobson proceeds to consider the moral question involved in capitalist production.

A "cash nexus" is taking the place of a personal one, and, especially with joint-stock enterprise, it is difficult to

apportion responsibility. Legally it is the employer who *owns* the business, but morally the workers, who have often more at stake, have collectively the *right* to choose the conditions under which they must work, so far as concerns price, time, and safety. The reason for this moral claim must be sought in the fact that labour power cannot be dealt with as a separate commodity, for it is not detachable from the person of the labourer.

On the other hand, labour movements are wrong in claiming the whole produce of labour. So long as all the capital society needs cannot be obtained without some abstinence, however easy, capital has a claim on the produce, and so too have the brains of the employer. Nor is this all, for society too has its claim.

There is no such thing as an individual product; my cook can only make a plum-pudding in dependence on the whole organisation of the empire. Profit-sharing, co-partnership, and co-operation are all, Mr. Hobson urges, good in their way in so far as they tend to produce a democratic basis to business, and they have perhaps a still higher educative and moral force.

But when you have thus made peace in one business, that business must still fight all others; and if the businesses in a trade combine, they may still rackrent all other trades. So, too, capitalist trusts do not safeguard the interests of the workers, nor those of the consumers. Even when a trades-union obtains advantages for its members, it may well be that their gain is paid for by the members of all other trades. So we are turned back from every attempt to evade the truth that "industry is social," that each trade affects all others.

Hence Mr. Hobson argues that capital is a public trust, and as an ethical law we should perhaps all agree with him, though it may be harder to follow him when he proceeds to show that the State can and should revise the terms of the trust, by, *e.g.*, stopping unearned increments and itself administering "all capital not otherwise effectively controlled."

It is not easy to see just how to set about these reforms, but what is first needed is an intelligent citizenship to appeal

to, a public opinion based on sound knowledge, on careful study, and on high moral principle.

The Housing of the Poor.

In the "Housing of the Poor" I have attempted to give a clear and readable paper on the London Housing Question. I have sought to illustrate it from evidence obtained in the poorest districts of the city, showing the facts of overcrowding, which cause so much suffering and danger to the community. I have dealt somewhat fully with the causes of the evil, and suggested remedies. The work of the London County Council is criticised, the difficulties it has to meet are considered, and a way out from one at least of these is suggested, viz., "That the present generation of ratepayers should be relieved from the obligation to pay for property of the most permanent kind which will be inherited by their successors."

Various legal aspects of the problem are discussed, and remedies to relieve overcrowding are considered.

The London Housing difficulty is vital to the interests of the citizens. It is time the Council grappled with the problem in a more vigorous manner than in the past. It is our duty to recognise our responsibility, to rouse public opinion, and especially is it incumbent on Christians to leave no stone unturned to remove from our midst so great a menace to the peace and happiness of the city.

Pensions of the Aged Poor.

Mr. Gomme deals with the method of raising the necessary funds for providing pensions for the aged poor, leaving it to experts to decide how the funds shall be administered. He advocates a drastic treatment of able-bodied men who are looking for work without any intention of finding it. If a man will not work he ought not to be allowed to beg, but should be compelled to shoulder his musket and take part in the defence of his country. This is a suggestion which has many advocates, yet the War Office will naturally oppose any scheme for attaching such a class of men to the army for reasons of discipline, and particularly at a time when the morale of the army stands high and conscription is not the law of the land.

The Bohemian element among the poor is continually recruited from the unsuccessful. It is not necessarily a discredit to fail in life. The fact, however, remains, that an army of able-bodied men lives by preying upon society, and calls for some organic reform of Poor-Law administration in some of its most elementary aspects. This must take some punitive shape. For instance, in the Poplar Union during the year ending Lady-Day 1899 there were no less than 885 able-bodied men and 676 able-bodied women, as against 834 and 677 for the preceding year.

Such facts suggest the language of the Lambeth Conference 1897, which agreed that "the wilfully idle man is out of place in a Christian community." Mr. Gomme's suggestion deserves consideration. In any case in their own interest, let alone those of society, these loafers of our cities ought to be compelled to work by the strong arm of the State.

The author of the paper then deals with his chief point, and advances the proposition that the deficiency in the funds for Pensions should come from the revenue derived from property. He shows how last century legislation detrimentally affected the poor by authorising the enclosure of common lands, for which the poor received no compensation, though they lost collective rights which had held good for centuries. These rights, which, had they been dealt with in our own time, would have been preserved for the use of the poor, passed to the landowners.

There are wide differences of opinion as to the sources from which funds are to come.

Mr. Gomme calls for a Royal Commission of experts, with instruction to produce a "council of perfection" to help forward legislation. Mr. Chaplin has proposed to reimpose the shilling tax on grain which was abolished in 1869. Liberal Unionists are already protesting against this, realising that such a tax would only result in giving the landlords an extra shilling for every quarter of corn grown at home. Mr. Charles Booth would not ear-mark any particular source for pensions. Mr. Chaplin's Commission would raise the funds from both imperial and local sources, while others

recommend the taxation of ground values. Surely there is no reason why both political parties, since both are pledged to support the movement for pensions, should not unite to solve this social difficulty.

An opening for a practical solution has been made in the Report on Old Age Pensions which cannot fail to result in legislation. When a Pensions Bill becomes law society will have done something to acknowledge its obligations to the working poor, and enable the aged to lead a more dignified and respected life; for it is as Mr. Ronald Bayne says on p. 448, "In this hard, bitter life those who live to be old are most to be pitied."

The best and most humanely administered workhouse utterly fails in home life. It kills that hope which would be stimulated by properly administered pensions. The workhouse system should be made more elastic; possibly almshouses should be created for respectable old men in connection with the Poor-Law. The workhouse system to-day does not tend to the keeping up of homes, but breaking them up.

Poor-Law.

In the essay on "Poor-Law," for obvious reasons, no attempt has been made to deal exhaustively with the subject, but rather to review some of the general principles which should govern the administration of the Poor-Law. The observations of the author ought to encourage men and women of character to serve the community in Poor-Law work. Poor-Law Guardians have honourable functions to carry out—to secure an *Honest Efficient* administration of the law and to promote the *Humane* treatment of the poor in the House.

Mr. Dodd's paper will be most useful to the general reader, because, to secure good and efficient administration in local affairs, every citizen should have some knowledge of the laws which have to be administered. Those parts which deal with current fallacies and their remedies are particularly valuable.

That out-relief may be legally given, even to the owners of property when such owners are in absolute want and the property is not immediately convertible into money, is not so

widely known as it should be. Even Relieving Officers have been known to be under the apprehension that relief could not be given in such a case. Sudden or urgent cases frequently arise in large centres of population when it is practically impossible for the Relieving Officers or Guardians to readily satisfy themselves that the case is one of genuine poverty. When any doubt arises on this point the safest course is to grant the relief on loan, and afterwards, if the circumstances of the applicant are proved not to justify relief, to recover it or charge the recipient with obtaining relief under false pretences.

Two very powerful weapons are thus placed in the hands of the Guardians to meet cases of fraud. There is therefore little excuse for refusing relief to a genuine case of poverty under the impression that the applicant is not really in want.

The relative value to be placed on the Orders and on the Circular Letters of the Local Government Board is clearly defined. Light is also thrown on that somewhat ambiguous term, "Able-bodied." A very large percentage of Officers, not to mention Guardians, labour under the delusion that persons on attaining the age of sixty years become, for Poor-Law purposes, "not able-bodied." This is surprising having regard to the fact that the Local Government Board have taken great care to declare that the only question which determines whether an applicant is or is not "able-bodied" is his or her physical and mental condition. It is obvious, says Mr. Dodd, that the conditions of employment in some industries are such as to render persons "old before their time," and therefore age would not be a safe test.

It is the duty of the Workhouse Medical Officer as well as the District Medical Officer if appointed since 28th February 1879 to report cases of dangerous infectious disease to the Sanitary Authorities; but as the author observes, this is often lost sight of, hence the desirability of the point being brought prominently to the notice of general readers and Guardians in the present paper. If the essay did not teem with other points of practical importance to Poor-Law administration,

the remarks on Tuberculosis and the warning contained in the three concluding lines would in themselves have justified its publication.

Factories and Workshops.

Miss Wilson's paper is mainly concerned with the compulsory regulation of the State or with those enforced by the trade unions, and tends to minimise the effect of all voluntary methods such as "fair lists" and Consumers' Leagues. She believes that it will be easier to raise the economic life of the community through the complete organisation of the various trades, and therefore that the energies of our citizen consumers should be utilised for this purpose. On page 188 Miss Wilson deals with some of the obvious difficulties of "white lists." It is hardly fair, however, to make these lists responsible for more than they promise to perform: they specify just what they provide, and are good so far as they go. On the same page a case is instanced of a good shop providing seats for the assistants and paying good wages and working short hours. Yet in the same building are ill-ventilated workrooms. No doubt this is inconsistent, and leaves room for further improvement; but surely if the shop assistants have gained something by the voluntary method of a fair list which has not yet been secured to them by the compulsory action of the State, that is one thing to be thankful for. And, from Miss Wilson's point of view, it might be argued that the sanitary condition of the workrooms might be left to the care of the State Inspector appointed for that purpose. With regard to the Consumers' Leagues which are briefly mentioned, it should be remembered that such leagues have hitherto not taken root in England—indeed, we only know of one, a short-lived scheme started some twelve years ago by Miss Clementina Black. In America these leagues have had an active existence for several years, and can point to definite results. But the private inspectors do not supersede the Government Inspector: they are used to support the latter or to attend to extra regulations, voluntarily accepted and not ordered by the State. The American leagues have all along been urging, and in certain cases have actually obtained, stricter Government regula-

tion and inspection; and as soon as these are adequate and thoroughly enforced, the responsibility of the league comes to an end.

Later on Miss Wilson suggests that the sale of goods of inferior quality or workmanship, though made under satisfactory conditions for the workpeople, is likely to damage the cause of reform. This is no doubt quite true wherever it exists, but any attempt to defraud or delude the public will meet an inevitable Nemesis. And the ideal consumer is not only entitled, but ought to insist on getting exactly what he wants, made, if possible, under proper conditions; but if the fair shop produces bad work or is unable to supply what is required, the consumer is free to go elsewhere.

Miss Wilson next gives a clear account of what can be done by social workers to remove some of the grievances of those who are called to factory life. It is part of every citizen's duty to see that no unnecessary checks or restraints hinder the economical and moral amelioration of factory workers. Those of us who are interested in the moral culture of the community, and who desire that women-workers should have their full legal rights, cannot do better than study this interesting and practical paper. It ought to be a matter of conscience to see that the existing laws (sacred as such to the good citizen) relating to the legal hours of labour, overcrowding, sanitation, ventilation and temperature, fencing of machinery, and observance of meal times, are duly carried out.

Miss Wilson suggests in what direction fresh legislation is called for, and describes the use of poisonous materials in certain trades. In this connection it is well to call attention to the new regulation of the Board of Works. They lay down that all articles supplied for the Public Departments, the Houses of Parliament, and such of the Royal Palaces as are under the care of the Board, shall be made with leadless glaze. If the Board of Works can do this, surely it must be possible for the trade to take concerted action to reduce to a minimum the risk of lead-poisoning. The author boldly attacks the "home work" system, by which the employing firm avoids payment of

rent and has no responsibility for the condition of places in which their work is done. In connection with "shop life," suggestions are given as to the means of pressing local authorities to appoint more shop inspectors.

The Lancet recently said, "It is a standing disgrace to a country like England that in some cases women should be compelled to stand in shops for from twelve to fourteen hours daily, with only two intervals, of half-an-hour for dinner and twenty minutes for tea, all the year round, regardless of temperature."

The last paragraph deals with the women's movement, and its key-note is organisation. Trades-Unionism develops woman's character, and makes her a better citizen.

Dr. Douglas Morrison deals in a clear and vigorous way with some of the many questions the word crime suggests.

Crime.

The importance of the subject is shown not only by the immense expense to which the community is put, but also to the magnitude of the evil, and the alarming increase of offences of a minor character, many of which, however, are proved to be more apparent than real. Dr. Douglas Morrison estimates that the administration of the criminal law alone must cost the United Kingdom, at the lowest estimate, between eight and nine million pounds a year. The author asks, "Can such a problem, looked at either morally or financially, be considered a subsidiary social question?"

The chief weapon in the hands of society for attacking criminals and suppressing crime has been, is, and must be punishment; but there is such a thing as correction, and we could do well with more of it. The character of punishment should be corrective rather than vindictive. Though much has been done in the right direction by prison reformers, we have not yet got rid of barbarity. A great deal remains still to be done, and some interesting details are given under this head. In the reign of Henry VIII. the author says a prisoner who refused to plead was pressed to death.

Such brutal methods of punishment naturally had an equally brutalising effect on the people, and did little to diminish the amount of crime. Even in this generation facts would

seem to point to the conclusion that the efficacy of mere punishment is very much over-estimated. The degrading effects of solitude and isolation, the plank bed, the insufficient food, and the irritating prison rules, make men worse than they were before. Crime is thus encouraged rather than repressed when barbarities are officially consecrated by the law of the land. It is most important that punishment should be more adapted to individual cases; the criminal should be considered as well as the crime. It is no more possible or rational, says the writer, to treat all offenders in the same way than it is to treat all sorts of diseases with the same drug. The punishment cures in one case and kills in another. As to the remedies for these various evils, we are told that a rigid, highly generalised system of prison rules is the very antithesis of that individualism upon which the reformation of the prisoner depends. Dr. Morrison endorses the opinion of Lord Kimberley and Mr. Herbert Gladstone that imprisonment, as conducted in England, "not only fails to reform offenders, but produces a deteriorating effect upon them."

Coming to the causes of crime, these are immediate and ultimate; in other words, the mystery of original sin and the opportunities it finds in human life. The far-reaching philosophy of Christ acknowledges the evil and provides means for overcoming it, while we are left, of course, to recognise the one and apply the other if we wish to live as Christian citizens.

On Christian Socialism.

Mr. George Russell's wide knowledge and experience of social politics are clearly seen in his article on "Christian Socialism." He deals with municipal housekeeping in all its varied shapes, and shows how these matters touch the health, morals, recreation, and education of the citizen. The paper is a spirited appeal for civic enthusiasm on Christian lines. The city will never satisfy Mr. Russell while there is any place left in it for viciousness of life. The Vestries are shown to have wide powers, and how these powers can be used it should be the duty of every citizen to learn. Mr. Russell is no less on familiar ground in his treatment of rural problems. The

committee of experts, whose decisions are given, have evidently considered that the development and extension of the District and Parish Councils have not responded quickly enough to local needs.

It is to be hoped that these lately constituted bodies, when their fitness for the exercise of larger powers has been demonstrated, will secure an extension of local liberties in the direction of the writer's suggestions.

Mr. Russell has no belief in that form of citizenship that desires to hinder the healthy expenditure of School Boards, and naturally sees in this connection that it is necessary the teacher should be well paid. Mr. Russell might have enlarged on the grievances of the teachers; for if they are to give their best work, they must be relieved from the worries inseparable from their present insecurity of tenure. It must no longer be in the power of the pettifogging School Board, or the irresponsible Voluntary Manager, to dismiss the teacher for reasons entirely outside his professional work. Inability to play the organ, irregular attendance at choir practice, lack of appreciation or too much appreciation of the charms of the Board Member's daughter, and such like trivialities have all been made the grounds for the dismissal of thoroughly competent teachers. Some of these cases have been successfully fought by the N.U.T., notably one at Aycliffe two years ago. Without security of tenure the Teachers' Superannuation Act passed last year will prove but a delusion and a snare to those for whose benefit it was intended. As the sanction of the Education Department is required before a teacher can be appointed, so an appeal to the same authority should be necessary before he can be dismissed.

We question if Mr. Russell is on such strong ground in urging "one free meal a day in every elementary school to ill-fed children whom we compel to learn." If the State ever does provide this meal, it must be for all or none. Why should the child of the drunkard be fed at the expense of his struggling but self-respecting neighbour? A free dinner to those children who come ill-clad and ill-fed is but too often a rate in aid of wages of a dissolute class.

The character of the parents must be taken into account if aid is given in part. In times of temporary distress the balance of advantage rests for ALL children, who care to avail themselves of it, being given one meal per day. It might weaken the parental sense of responsibility, but help in having a new generation rising up better taught and better fed than their fathers, and having therefore a higher standard of comfort. The whole of this interesting paper deserves to be read by every one who wishes to see the teachings of Christian socialists applied in our local and municipal life. It is full of suggestions, and fitly ends the section on Social Problems in this volume.

The Nation's Duties to the Empire.

The duties of citizenship in these days of Anglo-Saxon expansion cannot be confined within the four corners of the British Isles, and so "The Nation's Duties to the Empire" finds a necessary place in our collection. For suggesting this subject to me I owe thanks to Professor John Maccunn of University College, Liverpool, the author of the "Ethics of Citizenship." The problem of combining democracy at home with empire abroad has its moral side, which Mr. Reeves is well able to treat. The citizen of a self-governing colony, Mr. Reeves claims to take up, so long as Imperial Federation remains on the knees of the gods—an impartial and irresponsible position in dealing with the peculiar difficulties of the mother-country. At the same time, as a Colonial statesman he has been brought into close touch with similar problems in New Zealand. Mr. Reeves steers a middle course between two extremes. Unable to accept the "touch not, taste not, handle not" of some sensitive moralists at home, he is yet careful to advise that advance, however inevitable, should, as far as possible, be made on the lines of Nation development. He finds in little Basutoland an object-lesson for the empire at large. Mr. Reeves admits there is a seamy side to empire-building when it takes the form of forced labour, slave holding, the pernicious drink traffic, and company-promoters' land hunger. The real

greatness of our empire lies in the honest recognition by all classes of their imperial responsibilities. Unless we would ignore the mental and spiritual side of true human development we must, as a nation, face that form of human selfishness that grows rich in supplying the negro with strong drink, and protect him by legislation against the temptation of a traffic which, says Mr. Reeves, "as an obstacle in the way of anything like civilisation is only second to the slave-trade." Possibly repressive measures against those who carry on this traffic and thrive on the weakness of an inferior race will not prove a complete deterrent.

It is in the gradual elevation of the moral tone of the nation that the true remedy lies, and in this each citizen, in his zeal for humanity and the greater glory of God, may take his part. The past has made us what we are, and the shaping of the future lies largely with the present. Why should we disturb the repose of the negro races at all unless we can shield them from our vices and endow them with new vigour and life by our higher civilisation? If British rule destroys the old bases of negro life, the aim of our Imperial administrators should be to inspire confidence in British justice, while that of the missionary is to teach these races—yet children in the school of human development—those fundamental truths of religion and morality which alone serve the moral ends of life. History teaches us that man's self-education in custom and morality begins with the development of religious worship.

In the foreign mission field God has set before the Catholic Church of this age an open door, and He has bidden her go in and possess the land. Our commercial expansion, scientific inventions and methods, the higher education in heathen lands, the increased information we have obtained of the religions and languages of the world, the knowledge of geography, ethnology, biology, and technical and healing arts, all combine to give the Church a world-wide equipment for that world-wide work which F. D. Maurice, of blessed memory, said a philosophical liberalism had tried to do and failed—the assertion of a humanity in which all nations are equally partakers ("Lincoln's Inn Sermons," vol. iv. p. 46).

Our self-governing colonies are all parts of one household which one gracious Sovereign knits together with bands of love. Few realise the need of sending our best and most unselfish men to mould and shape Colonial thought in this transition time. There is a wonderful change in our day. The idea of humanity has taken possession of us. The Right Rev. C. Julius, Bishop of Christchurch, New Zealand, in a lecture this summer at Christchurch said, "The Divine ideal was again opening before our eyes in this age. There was a deep hungering after a better social life, and many in every country were giving themselves to the thoughtful and painful study of social questions, meeting the social sceptic, the easy indifferentist, and the men who said that what was sought after was impossible" (*Clarion*, 5th August 1899). Such stirring words as these show that representative Colonials are looking, indeed, upon the Divine ideal. May we take our part in helping them to secure its realisation! In doing so we shall help them onwards towards what is noblest and best in true citizenship. While our native land produces heroes whose lives are without reproach and fashioned after the "vast design" of King Arthur there can still be found the men to do the work. Our Empire does not rest upon a material, but a moral basis. "Only by making the welfare of the component parts of the Empire our primary and essential care, only, that is, by acting as trustees and not as beneficiaries, shall we be able to maintain our Empire and our position as a world-wide power" (*Spectator*, 5th August 1899). In connection with this subject my readers will do well to study carefully Mr. Hugh E. Egerton's work, "A Short History of British Colonial Policy" (Methuen & Co., 1897).

Whatever differences of opinion there may be on matters of detail in "The Nation's Duties to the Empire," it will be recognised that Mr. Reeves suggests to us sober and serious thoughts on a subject which is too often the shuttlecock of party passions and platform rhetoric.

The aim of Canon Scott Holland's paper is to show that we owe obedience to the law of the State because we are included in the State, and thus he is in agreement with the

writer on The General Functions of the State when he says that "to obey the law is the most essential condition of human well-being." Canon Scott Holland sees that each of us forms a component part of the State, which, therefore, speaks to us in our own name. In the State at its best we recognise our own conscience in its wider social scope, and this is the secret of the authority felt to be at work in and through law. Law can never go beyond what the social conscience has become prepared to authorise, and thus law is a witness to the social conception of justice which has been attained.

Obedience to the Law.

On modern industry the writer is most apposite: he sees a peril, if natural tendencies are unchecked, of an undermining of its deepest foundations. It is law, however, that may arrest this evil and sustain the standard of living at a constantly rising minimum.

Next the writer sees how urgent it is for the Church to turn her attention to Civic needs. The State asks for succour. The advance of law is arrested if the public conscience cease to grow. As one of those who are giving Christian Socialism its shape to-day, he tells us that if Socialism is ever to be an organic growth it must throw aside its artificial programme and not neglect the experience which the nation has gathered out of the Past, and has stored in its varied legislation. Would that ardent Socialists would ponder these words! Any form of Socialism that is not constructed so as to represent the reconstruction and harmonious co-operation of individual and collective interest is bound to be a tyranny. This is the view held, we think, by Dr. Stein, whom Canon Scott Holland quotes. Dr. Stein is no believer in any materialistic conception of history, but in that form of Christian Socialism which sees in the evolution of society the result of the combined operation of physical and mental needs. Law then must be adjusted to social needs and social interests till it becomes the codified expression of the modern conception of justice.

Canon Scott Holland rightly sees in this socialisation of law room for limitless advance if only it can secure a corresponding

advance in the co-operating transfiguration of conscience. Such hope he tells us lies outside the range of civil action, and can only come through the aid of spiritual and religious agencies.

The Church and Civilisation.

History has never had a grander task than to tell the story of the growth of modern civilisation and of the part the Church of Christ has taken in that growth. It may be that Mr. Powell, in trying to sketch out this story in a few pages, has somewhat unduly ignored the influence of other moral factors in the progress of the Western world, but so intimate is the part Christianity has played at every stage of progress, that society without its influence is well-nigh inconceivable. In referring to the history of the century now ending, Mr. Powell rightly directs attention to the wonderful development of Christian missions. In spite of much yielding to the enervating luxury, of some bending of the knee to the Baalim of wealth and class, of foolish and imbittered internal dissensions, the Church seems in the nineteenth century to have caught the spirit of the first, and to have again begun to obey Christ's last commandment to evangelise all nations. Our readers may think Mr. Powell's references to the social and economic evils that still flourish among us somewhat too sweeping, and we shall not all share his views—*e.g.* as to Mr. Gladstone's foreign policy, although the reference to the Transvaal must not be taken to imply any sympathy with the Boer attitude towards the Outlanders and natives since the formation of the Republic.

Mr. Powell on page 324 illustrates the failure of the so-called compulsory education by drawing attention to the fact that about one million of our scholars are absent from school every morning and afternoon. In London alone some 50,000 to 70,000 children successfully evade the Acts, and provide plenty of Hooligan material.

Until the Education Acts are made a reality, and not the sham they are at present, it is useless to compare the education of England with that of countries like Germany or Switzerland.

We shall all agree with the author as to the need of unity

in the Church of Christ as to the vast amount of work that still remains for her to do, not only abroad but at home, work that cannot be done by the secular power, nor left undone without results fatal to mankind. Nor shall we differ as to the need for Church reform if the Church, like the State, is to keep in touch with the advance of democracy. Reform is needed, and must come soon, but the path is thorny, and the goal seems far off. Yet if individual churchmen will but catch the spirit of Mr. Powell and the other writers of this book, and will remember that they have duties as citizens of this world as well as of the next, reform will come safely and speedily, and Church and State will move on together towards the goal of humanity, the kingdom of Christ. Mr. Powell's long but thoughtful and eloquent chapter well deserves careful consideration.

Morality.

The writer of "The Progress of Morality in the relations of Men and Women" affirms the nobility of Love, traces the degradation of lust, and points to those practical conclusions which are the necessary outcome of the all-pervading principle in its fullest development.

From history the writer next seeks to show that heavy penalties have followed on nations that ignore the moral law. It is Love which makes the world go round, while lust causes the fall of nations and the disruption of society. His conclusions are admirable, and he presses them into the sanctuary of the home where the principle of Love must be left to work, for law cannot penetrate that enclosure, though it may sometimes render assistance.

Men must exercise self-control. Public opinion should demand purity from all. The same standard should be set up for men as for women. Fornication is not necessary for health, and seduction is disgraceful. Other crimes against society which tend to degrade morals are touched upon.

This paper will attract wide attention. It is quite possible that the Archdeacon's facts will be disputed, and we may not all agree with his theories and conclusions; but such a frank treatment of a difficult subject is much wanted.

Mrs. Phillimore, in introducing the subject of the position of women, points out the difference between the standpoint of 1790 and that of 1890 in political science as concerns women. There is now a "more or less conscious recognition of citizenship and its responsibilities," and alongside with this development it is perhaps only natural that we should see a growth of its corresponding danger—the folly of much talking and little doing, though the "doing," as her paper shows, has been considerable too.

Women's Work.

Mrs. Phillimore, in advocating expediency as a guide in Parliamentary problems, is using the word in its proper meaning, which is, of course, "suitableness for effecting a purpose," and does not mean to imply that abstract principle is to be discarded as a motive power. Expediency can never form a motive to action, and individual members of Parliament will always find their principles will lead them to decide whether one plan or another is expedient under the particular circumstances. No great reform movement was ever started by a man without principle, and Mrs. Phillimore merely says that when Parliament has a particular question before it, it must consider how far the means proposed by the reforming side are likely to be successful in settling the question. Expediency in itself is neither good nor bad, but it may be made one or the other according to the moral principles, or lack of them, in those guided by it.

The advice given in this paper to women, that they should "cultivate more deliberation in choosing their professions," is, we fear, a counsel of perfection within the reach only of a favoured few. No doubt the factory hand, the sweat-shop worker, and the shop employee would gladly cultivate more deliberation in choosing her profession, and, having deliberated, would not choose the one she is following. But what choice has she? With all but the leisured classes there is no question of "choosing a profession." It is determined simply by the vacancies within reach of a walk or of a penny fare. But it is good advice that is given at the end of the paper—that the working woman, fighting for equal rights with men, must develop equal *esprit de corps*.

The history of Woman's Trade Unions is for the most part a sad one; showing great power of combination and intense courage and determination in the face of a crisis, but very little cohesion when the crisis is past, and when personal loss for the general gain is required in the daily life and not only on the battlefield.

But of this difficulty the Men's Unions have their tale to tell too; and unselfishness has never yet been the distinguishing mark of human nature in any age or clime, and therefore the marked progress in Women's Unions during the last few years is the more encouraging, and the strongest feeling they arouse in the observer is one of confident hopefulness.

In these days when the rich ask "What can I do to take up my task for the city?" when women leave cultured homes to live at their own charges in the midst of the poverty, struggle, and hardship of the East-End life, and to do what they can to break down those barriers of distrust which generation after generation of class prejudice have raised, in such an age our work would lack proportion without a sketch of Settlement life. The ladies' branch of the Oxford House (and I speak from some five and a half years' experience in Bethnal Green) is a quiet force for good in the drama of human life around it.

Women Workers.

The Settlement started from the Oxford House, whose clubs for men and boys may be described as "busy hives of working and playing bees." The "House" has lately bought Excelsior Hall and Baths, which marks an important step in the development of the work of the Settlement towards the religious and social uplifting of its poorer neighbours.

If the Oxford House is well known, St. Margaret's House no less deserves a wide recognition. The members who reside in the Settlement endeavour in their life and work to illustrate the principles of the Christian Social Union. They try to know something of the lives of the working women and girls in their district. They minister to the sick, feed the hungry, and generally bring their sympathy and intelligence to aid, abet, and originate any schemes that are calculated to brighten the lives, purify the morals, and cleanse the minds as

well as the bodies of their neighbours, without regard to age, race, or creed. Miss Portal says that one of the most cheering sights in Settlement life is the sturdy growth of the Resident's own character. It must be often true that women enter with narrow and self-concentrated ideas and leave far richer in true human character and sympathy, trained in self-discipline, self-respect, and self-control.

The chief work of the Residents outside the House is brought about through personal contact in numerous clubs and guilds for girls and women of all ages; while classes, games, meetings, and social entertainments are not wanting. To show their practical sympathy with the poor they keep open a country house in summer, where about twenty women and children per week can breathe the fresh air.

Miss Portal's almost futile attempt to awaken the social conscience of a factory girl, and to make her see that she was a fragment of a world-wide sisterhood, is well told. We learn a lesson from the paper of what women with fresh and strong enthusiasm are doing in this sensual and selfish age, and how they are shaping their work here and now on the lines of the highest form of Socialism, that of the Christian Social Union. One cannot but wish success to St. Margaret's House, and hope that they will soon raise the £8000 they are asking for to build a better habitation than the present house near St. John's on Bethnal Green.

The wide sphere of usefulness opened up to women administrators on Vestries and Councils is dealt with by Miss Busk.

Women on Vestries and Councils.

It is hardly to be credited, when women factory inspectors have done such good work for the State, that the Government in their London Municipalities Bill should have made women ineligible for election on the new Borough Councils.

We can only suggest a rectification of this omission at no distant future, to allow of their continuing that intelligent administration of the law which has been accomplished by women on many London Vestries.

In the last few years a large amount of a more progressive and healthy public life has come into being. This upward

movement will develop further if the BEST persons in the community come forward for public office. If the office of Vestryman, Guardian, or Councillor is degraded, it is by those whom we elect to such posts of service. If only the heads of our merchant houses and leaders in finance would throw into civic affairs the same energy they display in the world of commerce, the administration of local self-government would be strengthened, and all classes would be stimulated to higher ideals of citizenship.

Of late years more thought has been given to municipal politics through such movements as the London Citizen Sunday, the Christian Social Union, and the Christian Fellowship League, the latter of which makes it incumbent on all its members to take an active interest in civic affairs.

Miss Busk tells what has been done in the poorest district in London (St. George the Martyr, Southwark) to show the truth of Mr. Chamberlain's remark that local government "offers the widest possible field for beneficent activity." She pleads for the better regulation of staircases in dwellings, and every word she writes on the enormities of the Common Lodging House "doubles" has our cordial support. These haunts of evil, and "furnished rooms" let at 9d. per night, render certain streets in Spitalfields a disgrace to a civilised city.

On District Councils Miss Busk feels that women's work as citizens has an ensured future. This paper is well calculated to educate public opinion among women on matters of civic life.

We cannot but feel that "women workers imbued with a kindly and hopeful feeling towards their fellow-citizens" are a strength to the nation and an example for others to follow.

The Obligations of Social Service.

"He is a voter, how does he vote?" is the question with which Dr. Fry raises the first practical point under the heading of "The Obligations of Social Service." It is by no means the last. We cannot, he proceeds to argue, escape our responsibility for the slum by not seeing it. Luxury we must give up, both because it is as bad for ourselves as poverty, and because its wasted wealth is needed elsewhere.

"Each for all and all for each" should, urges the doctor, be our social creed. It is also the expression of our Christianity.

University Settlements and similar institutions will help us to pay our debts to our fellows, but whatever agency we employ, it is personal service that is needed.

Dr. Fry pleads for sweeping social reforms. He is the sworn foe of the English liquor traffic, of the millionaire, of the present rights of property, and of TRUSTS. We cannot all agree with him that "Trusts are outside morality," nor share his opinion as to the reason for Parliament refusing to raise the flash-point of mineral oils. But in social affairs our deadliest foe is apathy; better to be honestly wrong than thoughtlessly right. If only the national conscience wakes up we shall get honest men with honest hearts to settle our social difficulties, and the wisdom that lies, though sometime hid, in the multitude of counsellors, will help us to guide social evolution towards a better utilisation of productive forces and a wider distribution of wealth, so that every citizen who will work may have the means of subsistence. From the Report of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade just issued, we see the steady increase of national prosperity. During 1898 one million workers, exclusive of seamen and railway workers, have received between seven and eight million sterling in increase of wages than they received in 1896. Agricultural labourers alone, to the number of 214,297, had an increase of eightpence per head per week in 1898. In all our efforts to save the submerged tenth we must not run any danger of pauperising the nine-tenths who are not submerged, and who are enabled to lead lives of usefulness in our many-sided civilisation. Dr. Fry agrees that, even when social reform has done its best, there are evils in human character not due to environment. It is the healing of such evils, together with the sin that exists with the suffering, and the reclamation of the character of bad men, that all our contributors desire to see brought about. Such tasks are the hardest of all. They are at once the test and the glory of the religion of Jesus.

Canon Barnett has written on social politics with that inspiration which is a natural genius. His paper cannot fail to attract attention. His opening sentences will naturally not be accepted by any real High-Churchman, who holds that God Himself through Christ has founded a visible Church to which every man should belong.

Social Politics.

The paper insists on the city as the symbol of the invisible Church, which every Christian must understand. The churchman as a citizen attends to local government. He cannot keep aloof from good works. He must attempt to make his own city the representation of the city of God. The Canon evidently agrees with the author of "The City without a Church," who, on page 13 of his work, says: "To make good cities, that is for the present hour the main work of Christianity." "The perfect saint is the perfect citizen."

Amidst the sin and chaos of the working life of the city, the citizen works as an elector among electors, upon boards and upon voluntary associations, inspired by knowledge, and feeling behind him a force that never tires.

In showing the practical effect of such a conception, we are inclined to ask whether in page 415, section 4, a holy city does not include 1, 2, and 3, *i.e.* "a healthy city," "a happy city," "a grand city." The explanation of "a holy city" comes to this, that the city is to be made Christian; but we are not told how Christians are to work together in religious matters, and attain that unity which Canon Scott Holland in "The City of God," page 54, says is essential. The writer might say more clearly than he does, that if Christians would only recognise all civic virtues and aims as a necessary part of the Christian religion, their differences of creed and worship would not seem to bulk quite so largely as they do. The Canon's remark that "Guardians must not affect to be judges of desert," page 420, is liable to misconstruction. Guardians cannot, it is true, affect to be judges of desert, in the sense of granting or withholding relief; since Mr. Dodd, in page 163, rightly says, "destitution," quite apart from any question of worthiness, is alone[1] the claim to

[1] See, however, page 162 for an explanation of the word destitution.

legal relief. At the same time, since Guardians may, in most cases, at their discretion, give indoor or outdoor relief, they are implicitly empowered to discriminate between the worthy and the unworthy, &c. They thus, in practice, become judges of desert as regards the FORM of relief. We cannot for one moment allow it to be suggested as a part of the social creed of this book, "that Guardians must not affect to be judges of desert." If Guardians cannot be judges of the character of their workhouse inmates, any scheme of classification, such as was recently suggested by a Parliamentary Committee, is impossible, and the workhouse can never be made anything but hateful to the working classes.

On the Board of Guardians in Whitechapel we have always tried to make our administration contributory to character and self-help, and save the deserving poor from what our esteemed clerk calls the necessity of the enforced contribution of their neighbours, and to bring about co-operation with the organisers of voluntary charity in the district. At least one hundred pensioners of charitable associations exist in the district. The Charity Organisation Society alone have fifty-four pensioners under their care, varying from sixty-five to eighty-eight years. The additional words of Canon Barnett on Guardian work show what love and zeal must animate Poor-Law Guardians who are concerned for a happy city.

The work of the various State agencies in the city is next brought under review. As a director of social enthusiasm who has lived and worked in Whitechapel (the home of social experiment) for nearly a generation, the Canon knows full well the marvellous changes that have been brought about through their influence. In prophetic vision he sees the future of our cities depend on local government. The needs of the poor require the best and strongest form of local government, and also that men of mind and education should reside in the industrial quarters, so that they may qualify for membership of the local governing bodies. The work which radiates from Toynbee Hall has given a new meaning to the term "neighbour," and

has done not a little to create an actual and practical ideal of citizenship in East London.

On reading this paper one is tempted to ask what other school of thought than that which Canon Barnett is so capable an expounder can offer a better way to heal the wounds of those "who reside in the trenches which do for streets" in our crowded city life?

The progressive High-Churchman has a way—indeed, it is the only other one known to me—"that to be a churchman is to be an intelligent participator in a corporate life consecrated to God, and to concern oneself therefore, as a matter of course, in all that touches the corporate life—its external as well as spiritual condition."[1]

Citizenship in the Poets.

Coming to "Citizenship in the Poets," Mr. Ronald Bayne tells us, as we might expect, that such citizenship is better understood, and more largely treated, in those ages when men dwelt in walled cities, than in our times when the "freedom" of a city has almost sunk to an empty honour, very convenient to bestow on a distinguished visitor as a mark of respect, but very meaningless.

The citizen of Virgil and Horace, like the citizen of Pindar and Aristophanes, is one of the main facts of the world's history.

When English poetry emerged from the absurd unreality of the pastoral stage at the end of the last century, we begin to find some little interest shown in the real life of the commonplace citizen. Crabbe, with a heart yearning to help the poor, and with a deep knowledge of human nature, although still in the trammels of the artificial style inherited from Pope, describes life at Aldborough, his native place. We have moved forward somewhat since then. Along with Crabbe we have Blake the idealist and visionary.

Passing on from this pair who first began to move in the direction of social reform, we do not linger over the great names of Wordsworth, Byron, and Shelley, partly because their sympathies are European as well as national, and

[1] The Rev. Charles Gore, D.D., "The Epistle to the Ephesians," pp. 113, 114.

partly because they preceded "the industrial development of England, which has occasioned so many of our own peculiar difficulties."

In going on to Hood, whose "Bridge of Sighs" touches with infinite pathos one of the subjects embraced in Archdeacon Wilson's paper, Mr. Bayne misses out the Corn-Law Rhymer, Ebenezer Elliot, probably because nothing can be quoted from him of first-rate merit. But the Yorkshire poet very narrowly missed greatness, and his services to social reform were considerable. His "Corn-Law Rhymes," published between 1830 and 1836, and the deep sympathy he shows with the troubles of the poor, entitle him to a mention among those poets whose writings have helped to mould our ideals of citizenship.

Mrs. Browning, the writer says, has her "Cry of the Children" and "Aurora Leigh," one of the most considerable poems on the social ideals of the century, where "sympathy with the sufferers from every kind of social injustice throbs through every page." One line of the latter poem supplies us with a grand motto for all social work on a religious basis—

"Whoever fears God, fears to sit at ease."

Mr. Bayne clearly wishes to stop before our own day, but the early work of Tennyson might have been dealt with in his paper much more definitely. "The Princess" was published in 1847, and in "Maud," seven years later, we are told how "the poor are hovelled and hustled together, each sex like swine—when a mammonite mother kills her babe for a burial-fee—when men care only for factory, counter, and till." Still Mr. Bayne has strictly kept to his text, even if he has omitted more modern poets, such as Tennyson, Robert Browning, William Morris, &c., not to mention a host of other imaginative writers who prefer prose as the vehicle of their thoughts, and who are consequently outside our present limits. We shall all feel inclined to agree with the writer when he says, "The great poets and imaginative writers give us ideals of citizenship at once truer and kinder than those which we develop as County Councillors or Guardians."

The poets have ever guided civilisation in the past, and we need them to-day to spur us on to greater efforts in good citizenship. Since the apostle of civilisation, Homer, wrote, the richest minds of every age have been schooled, elevated, and refined by poetry.

If the ideals of to-day are to acquire a purpose and reality in the coming years, we cannot treat with neglect the office of the poet in civic life.

Lowell has told us, "Over all life broods Poesy. She is the great reformer, and where the love of her is strong and healthy, wickedness and wrong cannot long prevail."

Economic Duty of the Citizen.

Mr. Carter deals with the "Economic Duty of the Citizen" from the standpoint of the Christian Social Union (perhaps, in view of the Lambeth Report on Industrial Problems, we may even add of the Bishops of the Anglican Communion!), which has, from its commencement, devoted no little attention to this particular question. Readers of "Alton Locke" will remember what enthusiasm Kingsley threw into the campaign against "sweating," but it cannot be said that the Christian conscience of England has yet seriously considered the duty of the consumer to the workpeople who make his shirts, or his boots, or his bread. There are many difficulties in the path. The isolated consumer is practically helpless. He may ask questions of the tradesman whom he employs, to which he will probably receive suave though not always accurate answers. But apart from some definite code of rules which is public property, or the influence of some active trade organisation, there can be no security that the goods he buys have been made under proper conditions. Still, it is worth while even for a single individual to ask such questions; for they help to demonstrate the fact that many consumers want to be assured that no sweating is involved in the things they buy, and also to educate a conscience in the tradesmen themselves. For in London, no doubt, the difficulty of getting trustworthy information is greatly intensified. Yet even in the Metropolis, with its remarkably defective organisation of the various trades, some-

thing has been done. For instance, the Typographical Association has so well organised the printing trade that nearly six hundred firms have adopted a standard scale of prices; while the London branch of the Christian Social Union has published small lists of clerical tailors and coffee-houses which observe a definite code of rules. These practical results, however partial, are all tending in the right direction, and suggest what might be done if the power of the private consumer could be more effectively organised and directed. And indeed the economic influence of the consumer is required on every side. It can assist the growing zeal of factory and sanitary inspectors; it can encourage both employers and workmen to complete their organisations; and it can support the developing conscience of the tradesman himself. It is not put forward as a substitute for any of these separate forces, for which, in fact, the people directly concerned are chiefly responsible.

Mr. Carter's paper shows the useful work that has been done by the Christian Social Union in making "white lists" really effective. These lists, it should be remembered, are published by the local Trades Council, and simply give the names of those tradesmen who observe the standard regulations which have been adopted for each trade. Of course the necessity of such a list wholly depends upon the amount of preferential custom which the general public will devote to its support. But, at any rate, in certain provincial towns such lists have shown a decided tendency to grow. The tradesman will do almost anything to satisfy a single customer! And the request of a number of customers is pretty sure to be granted. The consumer thus comes in to support the tradesman in obeying the law and adopting the standard trade regulations; and if well backed up, by a lynx-eyed press and a keen public opinion, the worst evils of the sweating system would rapidly tend to disappear.

It may be well to remark that the Christian Social Union has been mainly concerned with its own members, in trying to help them to obey their own consciences; but, no doubt, it has also indirectly helped to educate public opinion. Indeed

it is probable that the work of the Christian Social Union in making itself eyes and ears to public opinion in this matter counts for more than the actual success of the codes and "white lists" which Mr. Carter chronicles, praiseworthy though these are; still from the Christian point of view, the consumer is first of all responsible for his own conscience. He wants to know that he is doing his own economic duty. And in all social affairs every single good action really tells Thus, for instance, the example of the Prince of Wales in giving orders that hot breakfast rolls should not be on the table at Marlborough House on Sunday morning has greatly helped to diminish Sunday labour in that particular trade.

In this connection it is needless to point out that the corporate action of the State, of a municipality, or of any other public body would be most efficacious. There is always the risk, no doubt, that they may be imposed upon by wily Union officials or cunning tradesmen, and the public defrauded by the creation of hole-and-corner monopolies. But this danger would exist under any circumstances; and, in fact, fraud and corruption are not unknown even under the much-vaunted system of "free competition." In the last resort the principle of *caveat emptor* may be invoked to prevent any serious abuse of the purchaser's confidence. Sensible people will insist on getting what they want, of the right quality, and at a fair and reasonable price. But the consumer has other duties; there are things that no Christian should buy. Does any reader ask what they are? Let him read Mr. Carter's paper and consult his own conscience.

Again, the Christian ought to be—we dare not say he is—a living protest against the growing luxury of our age. To see the dinners to which Christian men regularly sit down, the dresses and jewellery of Christian women, one is indeed tempted to ask, Can these be followers of the Galilean peasant, who said, "Take up thy cross and follow Me"? Let all such Christians read and consider Mr. Carter's article.

"Art in the Commonwealth" deals with a wide and difficult subject, "forcing the art instinct." It is difficult to say how far the art instinct can be forced, although the diffusion

of a liking for art is becoming daily more general, and the circle of those who share in its benefits is growing wider and wider.

Art in the Commonwealth.

Schools of Art, permanent galleries, and annual exhibitions are, as the author says, doing a little to make the realising of art more possible among the people. In spite of these aids to the diffusion of a liking for art, the art instinct is probably a spontaneous growth where conditions are favourable. That a "beautiful life" is an incentive to build a "beautiful building" is a far more certain truth than the converse proposition, a fact upon which the writer possibly does not lay sufficient stress. It is the "hothouse civilisation of the present day and the utilitarian spirit of the age," with its hard struggle to live among the poor, and the false ideals among the middle classes, and often among the higher also, that prevent the artistic instinct among the Anglo-Saxon race from reaching perfection. The Anglo-Saxon is not artistic by nature as is the Frenchman or the Italian, yet he has a certain germ of the instinct which may be developed, and the means which are being employed seem as effectual as any. William Morris was the first in the field, Charles Ashbee, the architect, and others are keeping on his work, and there are not a few Guilds, &c., which work with the idea of turning out the higher-class products of labour more intelligently applied.

At present these methods are expensive, and the products can only be bought by the wealthy. Nevertheless, art seems to be growing less and less "a perquisite of the few." Look at our national galleries and loan exhibitions. Compare the pictures in the humblest cottages with those within a cottager's means a few years ago. Photographs and "coloured supplements," often of very able pictures, replace the old grotesque scrawls. The people have as much art as they can understand, at least in the way of pictures, which need not be poor things unless they choose. There must always be a sort of work reserved for the appreciation of the few with natural discrimination and highly cultivated taste; different grades of work must meet different degrees of knowledge, since no two men are equal.

In taking groups of children round the Toynbee Easter Exhibition it is a sight worth remembering to see them looking at a canvas depicting some Napoleonic war scene, with Nelson, say, for central figure. It cannot be bad for them at a certain stage to indulge this taste any more than it is for them to read fairy stories and adventures of travel. In this practical age we all lack imagination.

A really good picture at a Toynbee Loan Exhibition always finds its admirers. From the ballot for the popular picture the general conclusion may be drawn that a picture is valued, not so much for its perfection as art, but for expression of thought and pathos of subject.

Art, after all, is to amuse, to distract, to please, to tell us what we dream of but cannot express in words, to inspire by suggesting beauties of nature and of manners and actions foreign to our own.

In the Church too, wherever the Catholic ideal has prevailed, the sense of beauty has found room for expression to stimulate all that is healthy and true in the worship of God.

If we can only get the average man and woman who, the author says, are not by nature unsusceptible to things of beauty, to care for what IS beautiful and true in art, the highest aims of citizenship will be advanced a step forward.

To get the ordinary citizen to CARE for something, no matter what, if it only rouse in him the desire to be and do something better than at present, is the one thing wanted in city life.

The spirit of the age does not tend to honour the "cottage," the "humblest occupations," the "apparently commonplace," but tends to scorn honest toil, and to strain after material benefits—ease, luxury, the power of wealth. Every one must have "prospects," and craves for excitement.

We can all do our little part to help on more artistic conditions in both home and civic matters. By learning appreciation, knowledge of good and bad in art, sympathy for the better, and a real care for beauty, we can help on the cause of art. The "Arts and Crafts," "Home Indus-

tries," "Cottage Gardens," and "Public Parks," &c., are all useful in educating the popular taste.

An excellent point in Mr. Atkinson's paper is the emphasis he lays on the necessity of directing the artistic tastes of large manufacturers, railway directors, County Councils and other municipal authorities.

We may never have a great school of art. The world is too cosmopolitan and men's sympathies too wide; but the line of great artists will not cease: poets such as Burne-Jones, philosophers such as G. F. Watts, portrait painters like Sargent.

In the above General Introduction I have tried to point out the line of thought followed by the various writers, to show that social politics are national morals, and to afford my readers material for reflection in their social obligations as citizens.

I should fail in my duty if I did not take this opportunity of expressing my warm thanks to Canon Gore for his Preface, and to the authors who have helped to build up this book. I must also thank the editor of the *Economic Review* for allowing certain parts of Mr. Rashdall's paper which had appeared in that magazine to be used in this volume.

Mr. George Russell's article reproduces in substance a paper read before the Guild of St. Matthew in 1897. The same also applies to Archdeacon Wilson's article, which was delivered as one of the monthly addresses to men in the Parish Church of Rochdale on 1st May 1892.

It was originally intended to publish this volume at five shillings, but owing to the vast increase of matter, this edition must be sold at six shillings.

J. E. HAND.

CHELSEA, *September* 18, 1899.

I

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS

THE GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

By Rev. H. RASHDALL, D.C.L.

Why is it a duty to obey the State?—Three historical answers to the question: (*a*) The theory of Divine right—illogical as usually stated—and no longer seriously maintained; (*b*) The social contract theory as developed by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau—It has no historical basis—Logically can only mean government by consent—Can a man be coerced without his consent?—To tell a man he is part of a social organism is no reason for his being a good citizen—"Consent" is either merely implicit, *i.e.* practically non-existent, or must be real, but of this there is no actual example; (*c*) Theory that duty of obedience is based on the End which the State serves—If we find no intrinsically right End of human life, no further reason needed for compelling men to follow it—Two views as to the End: (1) Hedonistic-Utilitarian; (2) Aristotelian—aiming at well-being—Second view adopted—Pleasure a part, but not chief part of well-being—This *End* of life must be the End of State too—But this view involves no particular relation of Church and State, nor any *a priori* method of promoting morality—No theoretical limit to interference of State, but each case should be decided on its merits—The only individual right of man is the "right to Consideration"—Danger of too much interference degenerating character—Character depends upon responsibility—No danger in doing for poor man what he cannot do for himself—Three main principles: (1) Individual's right to consideration; (2) State's unlimited right to interfere for general good; (3) Importance to State of individual character—How far these affect right to property—Appeal for union of Greek enthusiasm for State, and the primitive Christian ideal.

Why is it a duty to obey the state? Historically, three main answers have been given to this question, and they were perhaps the only answers which are

possible. It is worth examining them, because a true answer to the problem of political obedience will supply at the same time the best answer to the questions, What are the limits of the State's authority? and What is the duty of the individual? The three ways may be called—

(*a*) The theory of divine right;

(*b*) The social contract theory;

(*c*) The view which I may provisionally call the utilitarian theory, *i.e.* the theory that the duty of obedience to the State is based on the *end* which the State serves.

1. Firstly, there is the theory of divine right. It is a theory which has been held by some of the early Fathers, by the Ghibeline defenders of the mediæval empire against the Papacy, and by the champions of our own Stuart kings. Of course no Christian doubts that in a sense there is a divine right of government. When the duty of obedience to the State is once established, the duty may, like all other duties, be regarded as imposed by the will of God. But will the theory of divine right help us to determine what governments have a right to demand obedience, and what are the limits of that right? As soon as we try to answer that question, we either find that the theory commits us to absolute and unlimited submission to all governments, good or bad, no matter what their historical origin or their practical tendency; or it resolves itself into an arbitrary theory as to the divine right of some particular mode of selecting the governor. In the most intelligible and logical form of the theory, the divine right of hereditary monarchy holds that political power was originally vested in Adam and then descended (in accordance with the rules of the English

law of real property) in the direct eldest male line to Charles I. At the present day it would be a waste of time to examine such theories, which could only be supported by the plea of direct divine revelation, and divine revelation of a kind which a sober study of the Bible does not encourage us to expect from its pages.

2. We may pass on to the social contract theory. This theory, too, can claim much support from the writings of the Fathers, and by the eleventh century it fairly superseded the divine right theory as the orthodox or traditional theory of the Church,[1] though it was afterwards in the pages of Thomas Aquinas superseded by another. "There is a general agreement of human society that men should obey their respective kings," says St. Augustine, and the passage is quoted as giving the accepted view of the matter in the great mediæval text-book of Canon Law known as the Decretum of Gratian. According to this view, a man is bound to obey the State because he has explicitly or implicitly covenanted or promised to do so. The theory of the social contract is best known in the form or forms which it assumes in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In the writings of Hobbes it becomes the basis of a theory of pure Absolutism. Mankind was originally (according to Hobbes) a collection of independent units, in a state of perpetual war of every man with every man. In such a state of things there were no duties, and therefore practically no rights, since every man had an equal right to do or to take anything which he chose to think necessary to his own conservation. How in this state of things infants, not yet in a position to

[1] See Mr. Carlyle's article in the *Economic Review*, July and October 1895.

contract with their parents, managed nevertheless to get born and nourished and educated up to manhood, does not distinctly appear. But gradual experience of the evils of this state of things at length culminated in a mass meeting of primitive men, at which they agreed to lay down their natural liberty of doing what they liked, and covenanted to obey a sovereign, *i.e.* that man or assembly of men whom the majority should choose. Hobbes, it will be observed, is deeply conscious of the necessity for some rational justification for the despotism of a bare majority—the system which seems so obvious to the popular democratic mind of modern times. The original agreement to pass out of the state of nature and elect a ruler must, according to Hobbes, be absolutely unanimous; no one can be deprived of his natural rights save by his own consent. If he dissents, however, he remains in a state of nature outside the political society, and may therefore be lawfully killed by those who are within it. Once in the society he is bound by the vote of the majority in the choice of a ruler, just because he had himself agreed to be so bound. Once appointed, the ruler and all his successors must be absolute. Sovereign power can neither be divided nor limited. Hobbes' practical object was of course to supply a rational justification for absolute monarchy. To make the social contract theory available for this purpose, he had to saddle it with many arbitrary and inconsistent additions. It was assumed that the contract must always in actual fact take the form which happened to commend itself to the political views of Thomas Hobbes. In Locke the theory, stripped of these arbitrary restrictions, becomes the theoretical basis of English Whiggism. In Locke the power, entrusted to the

ruler is a limited authority, and must be used for the purposes for which it is given. The ruler who abuses it may lawfully be deposed by the subject. In Rousseau the social contract theory undergoes a further transformation in the interests of revolutionary democracy. Here once again the necessity is felt for the justification of majority-rule; the general rule to which the individual submits himself is (according to Rousseau, or at least to Rousseau at some moments) the absolutely unanimous will of all. And this will, though it binds, binds not always. The general will may change, and consequently no government is lawful under which the people are not assembled at frequent intervals, and asked whether they still approve of the continuance of the existing constitution and of the continued tenure of office by its existing *personnel*. How on these principles we could justify even the detention of an offender for a single night without the previous assembling of the whole nation to ascertain whether perchance the general will may not have changed since the law was passed, is a question not easily answered.

I will not attempt to examine in detail the difficulties involved in the various forms of the contract theory. Following the transformations which it undergoes as it passes from Hobbes to Locke, and from Locke to Rousseau, one feels that the idea of an actual historical contract tends more and more to evaporate. Rousseau at all events does not believe in the mass meeting of primitive men (survivals of whom he was inclined to see in the pongo and the ourang-outang); and, as he very reasonably disputes the right of primitive man to bind his posterity for all time, the question of the historical contract now

becomes of no practical importance. Criticism upon the theory from the historical point of view would therefore be superfluous. Nor would Rousseau himself have pretended that in recent times—even in the most advanced political societies of his day, in his native Geneva, for instance—any such constitution as he contemplates ever had been voted into being by such a universal suffrage as his theory postulates. The *Contrat Social* is rather a speculation as to what an ideal political society should be than a theory as to our duty towards existing constitutions. In order to subject the theory to any profitable discussion, we must disengage it from what we may call its historical accidents, and get to the real principle involved in every actual or possible theory of social contract. And the idea which lies at the bottom of the social contract view is the idea of government by consent. The individual is supposed to be born with a mass of rights and liberties which he can only be contracted out of by his own consent. A general liberty to do and say what he likes is assumed to be the normal and natural condition of human nature. All restraint or coercion from without is assumed to be an invasion of this natural liberty, and to require artificial justification—justification which, at least except in so far as it can be shown to be absolutely necessary to the maintenance of the like liberty in others, can only arise from the individual's free consent.

At the present day the theory of an actual historical contract, supposed to have taken place at some assignable moment in the past, has indeed been finally dissipated by our improved knowledge of primitive history. The fundamental idea of government by consent is, however, very far indeed from being

dead and gone. It is hardly possible to open a democratic newspaper or manifesto without coming across reasoning which implies it; while, on the other side, the rights of the individual are asserted in a way which raises the question how, upon such principles, any legislation could be justified of which the individual happens to disapprove. The social contract theory is no longer maintained by philosophers; it would hardly be defended in so many words even by popular writers. But the mode of thought out of which it sprang is as vigorous as ever. If the mind of Mr. Herbert Spencer were as sensitive to the demands of strict logical consistency as that of Hobbes or of Rousseau, it would perhaps have found a place in the "System of Synthetic Philosophy."

Let us then endeavour to fix our attention upon this fundamental part of the social contract theory—the theory of government by consent. Can a man lawfully be coerced without his own consent? If so, why? and how much? The fashionable way of disposing of such questions among superior people is by saying that society is an organism, and that the individual apart from it is a mere abstraction. I do not think that this is a mode of treatment which goes to the root of the difficulty. The social organism, in fact, threatens to become as unintelligent a catchword as the "rights of man." The idea is true enough in its way, but the phrase is in danger of serving as a mere substitute for thought. Abstraction or not, the individual has certainly got the power, if he likes, of practically isolating himself from the organism to which he owes his being, or of making it into a mere instrument of the gratification of his own desires, or of injuring it and doing a good deal towards its actual

extinction. By a combination with his fellows he could even conceivably bring the whole mighty organism to an end. If he is to use these his voluntary powers contrary to his own inclination for the conservation of the organism—if, upon occasion, he is to be ready even to sacrifice his own life to its better life—the considerations must be such as will appeal to his reason; and such considerations assuredly are not to be found in the enunciation of a bare scientific platitude about his being part of the social organism, whether the platitude be left in the physiological nakedness of evolutionary science, or be dressed up in all the metaphysical bravery of Hegelian rhetoric. Merely to tell a man that he is a part of the social organism supplies him with no reason for becoming a martyr or even a decently good citizen.

The objections to the consent view of government may perhaps best be stated in the form of a dilemma. Either (*a*) the consent is made into something so merely virtual and implicit that the worst government in the world could probably lay claim to it; or (*b*) if a real and explicit consent is required, hardly the most democratic government in existence really rests upon any such consent.

Undoubtedly the subject even of Russia or of Turkey consents to the government for fear of worse evils. It is sometimes, indeed, contended that the people are always the real depositaries of ultimate political power. If this means that no government could permanently rule a nation of which every member was prepared to submit to death or torture rather than obey it for a day longer—a mode of deliverance which really seems to be almost the only remaining hope of such a people as the unfortunate Armenians—

the doctrine is as true as it is unimportant. But in such cases people consent to the government merely in the sense in which a man voluntarily consents to give up his purse to an armed highwayman. In that sense of the term every government could claim legitimacy so long as it is not actually rebelled against. It can supply no reason against rebellion, as soon as rebellion becomes possible. If consent is to serve as a criterion of the legitimacy of a government, it must clearly be a more explicit consent than this. And it is difficult to see how such consent can be ascertained by any means except a vote.

To the ultra-democratic mind it will perhaps be no difficulty that such a criterion would deprive the Roman Empire under M. Antoninus, or the British Empire in India, of all claims to the obedience of its subjects. With whatever inconsistent reservations on behalf of extreme necessity or undeveloped peoples or the like, there are perhaps persons who would be deliberately prepared to allege that democracy is the only form of government which can possess a moral claim to obedience. To such persons it seem a self-evident law of nature that the minority should submit to the majority. To make such persons feel the logical necessity of some justification for this claim on the part of a possibly ignorant, stupid, or evil-minded majority would perhaps be an impossible task. They may possibly with more success be tackled in another way. If we are to treat the principle of "one man one vote" not merely as an obvious and practically expedient political arrangement at a certain stage of social development, but as an irrevocable law of nature, we may ask whether Nature has revealed with equal clearness any particular system of electoral

distribution—any system which shall be entirely beyond the reach of jerrymandering in the interests of a dominant faction—whether Nature has disclosed with equal self-evidence to all her chosen oracles the political rights or no rights of women, and whether the inferiority of the young man of twenty and three-quarters to his natural superior of twenty-one and a month is a no less self-evident deliverance of intuitive reason. I abstain from raising questions as to the electoral disabilities of lunatics or animals, or from asking how, in the light of Darwinism, the political equality of the bushman and the European can be maintained without bringing into the region of practical politics the enfranchisement of the ape or the bee. It is enough to have pointed out that the principle of government by consent is incapable of being reduced to an exact form. Its only really logical form is that which would insist on the actual, formal consent of each individual citizen. And even so we should have to ask why, supposing the individual to have consented to the imposition of a law, he should not be at liberty to withdraw that consent and ask for its repeal the moment that he finds himself in the hands of the police.

It will be urged perhaps, "But surely a man is bound to keep his own promises?" Why so? What moral obligation can there be on the part of the natural man in the Hobbian state of nature? If you invest the natural man with duties, why stop at the duty of keeping contracts? And if he is bound to any duties, surely a duty of contributing to social good is as obvious as the duty of keeping promises. And if a man is bound to contribute to social good, whether he has promised to do so or not, no contract is

required to justify such interference with him as will actually conduce to social good. If and in so far as government interference does not contribute to social good, no contract will give it a right to command or create a moral obligation to obey, still less a right or a duty to enforce such obedience upon others. In short, once recognise a man's moral obligations towards his fellows, and all the paraphernalia of the contract become superfluous and unmeaning.

3. Thus we are brought to the last and (as it seems to me) the only tenable view as to the basis of political obligation—the view which finds it in the end which government serves. Argument is scarcely needed to prove this view when once it is clearly stated. If man has no "end" or highest good, if there is nothing which it is right or reasonable that he should be rather than anything else, if there is no one kind of life which a man *ought* to lead in preference to any other kind, then no possible machinery of original contract in the past or of counting heads in the present can possibly create a moral obligation to obey the State or to do or abstain from doing anything which pleases us. If, however, there is an end which man is meant to serve, something which he ought to be, a kind of life which he ought to lead, then surely no further justification can be wanted for compelling him to lead that sort of life and to make it possible for other people. The fact that he does not like that sort of life is no justification for his not leading it, no reason why he should not be made to lead it by every kind of force or coercion which will actually have the effect of assisting him to do so. There can be no injustice in any kind or sort of interference which will insure a man attaining the true end of his being. If the end is the

intrinsically right and reasonable end, we need ask for no further reason why it should be pursued. The only way of justifying anything in the world is by showing that it is conducive to the true end of human life.

I have ventured provisionally to call this view the utilitarian theory of political obligation. Up to this point we may claim for that theory something like general acceptance among serious thinkers. But here we encounter a most important bifurcation of opinion. By utilitarian I have meant so far merely the view which finds the justification of government in the end which it serves. There remains the all-important question, "What is that end?" As a matter of fact the people called Utilitarians have usually maintained that the end is pleasure. How on such a view of human nature a basis can be found for any sort of moral, or any sort of political obligation, is a question which I must not stop to ask. Why, if the end of life be simply pleasure, the individual should ever trouble his head about anybody's pleasure but his own, is too large a question to enter upon here. But so far the Utilitarians are undoubtedly logical and consistent in maintaining that, if pleasure is the end of the individual, it must also be the end of the State. The exercise of State authority would then be justified exactly in so far as it tends to swell the sum of human pleasure. Such is the hedonistic-Utilitarianism view. It is a view which I reject, but which I have no time to discuss further.

On the other hand, we have the Aristotelian theory, put into a Christian form by St. Thomas Aquinas and other schoolmen, which, agreeing with the Utilitarian in basing the authority of the State upon its

tendency to promote human good or well-being, differs from it profoundly in its view as to what human good really is. Aristotle makes "well-being"[1] the ultimate end of human life; but by "well-being" he does not mean pleasure. Even happiness is a very ambiguous and unsatisfactory translation of the word. Pleasure is undoubtedly a part of human well-being. I know this is denied by some of our superfine thinkers. Yet ask them the simple question, "Of two kinds of food equally wholesome, and equally cheap and easy of acquisition, would not every rational man prefer that which gives him most pleasure, supposing the said pleasure not to interfere with the attainment of any higher good? Will he not think it rational to prefer the pleasanter both for himself and for others?" I cannot believe that the most idealistic of our friends will answer "No"; and I am quite sure that if he does his practice belies his theory. However, this is an ethical question which I must not pursue further. For myself, with Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and in fact nearly all sane thinkers, except the ancient Stoics and a few modern imitators, I look upon pleasure as a part of human good. However much superior other goods may be to pleasure, they would always be better with pleasure than without it. But there are other goods besides pleasure: pleasure is an element in that ideal life which the wise man desires for himself and for others, but it is not the highest or the most important element. Knowledge, or intellectual activity, is a higher element, but not again the highest. And, of all human goods, the highest is goodness or virtue, which for the Christian may be identified with love in its widest and fuller sense.

[1] εὐδαιμονία—translated by the Latins "Beatitudo" or "blessedness."

If such be our conception of the end of human life, we must regard it as the end of the State also. I need hardly stay to point out what a profoundly different view of the end and purpose of the State this is to the conception with which we are familiar in ordinary modern politics. And yet a moment's reflection will show how unreasonable and arbitrary it is, upon a non-utilitarian view of human good, to assign any lower function to the State's activity. If man's whole good be pleasure, then undoubtedly the State can only justify interference or excuse non-interference with his life so far as such interference or non-interference will help to attain that end for all its citizens or all mankind. But if man's life is good for something higher than pleasure, on what principle can it be contended that the State must treat him as though he were a mere animal whose sole good is pleasure? And yet such has been the general tendency of our popular political thought. In quite recent times the idea of State interference with morality has, indeed, perhaps become much more or less popular. Nobody has ever quite carried the principle of non-interference in matters of morality so far as to insist that a child shall not be taught the duty of veracity—and be taught it very dogmatically too—long before it is at all capable of understanding the philosophical basis of the doctrine, still less of doing justice impartially to the reasoning by which that doctrine has been plausibly enough assailed by latitudinarian, casuistical, or sceptical moralists. Yet, the moment that religion enters into the question, we have people telling us that that is altogether beyond the province of the State. If religion be regarded as a sort of system of assurance against posthumous risks, there might be something

to be said in favour of such a view; though even so, assuming the risks to be real and the security good, I do not quite see why the State should not help its citizens in their other-worldly efforts. To pronounce that the risks are imaginary or the assurance precarious would, of course, be a scandalous violation of the avowed principle of religious neutrality. But if religion has any effect on man's life here and now, if it is at once a means to good life, and part of the good life itself, then surely it must be impossible for the State, which is a society for the promotion of good life, to be indifferent to religion. Only on the supposition that religion has no effect upon life whatever can such indifference be logically justified. And that is a thesis which has very seldom been systematically maintained. Most of those who do not believe that religion is—at least, to some persons and under some circumstances —a help to good life, have held that it is a positive hindrance to it. Such persons are, of course, logically bound to maintain—and in practice they have (to do them justice) very generally acted on that view—that religion is the enemy of the State. Friend or enemy, indifference is equally unjustifiable. And the idea that, while in a general way religion may be deserving of the friendly patronage of the State, one religion is for State purposes as good as another, is likewise a view which will not survive the most superficial examination. For the very conception of good life which is entertained by different religions is not the same. To suppose that the moral ideal of a Mussulman, a Buddhist, and a Christian are the same is a contention so ignorant and so preposterous, that it can only be accounted for by the prevalence of that absurd limitation of view which confines the idea of morality to the

observance of a few obvious and for the most part very elementary, external, and negative rules of conduct. Nobody can be at the same time a polygamist and a monogamist; nobody can at one and the same time aim with the Buddhist at extinction, and with the Christian at increased fulness of life. The differences not merely between different religions, but between different sects of the same religion—nay, between schools and shades of thought in the same Church—relate quite as much to ethics as to theology. The moral ideal of a Romanist differs from that of a Protestant; that of the typical High Churchman to some extent from that of the typical Low Churchman; that of the Oxford movement from that of the progressive High Churchman of the present moment. If the State exists for the preservation of a certain ideal of life, it must surely care that the ideal at which it aims should be a true one. The State cannot therefore be indifferent to the religions which so profoundly affect the ideals of its citizens. The State may, of course, encourage freedom of thought as the best possible means to the discovery of truth and the promotion of religious sincerity and regard among different churches or religious communities, as all tending, in various degrees, to that "good life" which is the supreme end both of Church and State. That does not imply indifference. Indifference to questions of religion would imply indifference on questions of morality, and to make the State indifferent on questions of morality would be to give up the great Aristotelian doctrine that the State exists for the promotion of good life.

To consider the applications of this view of the State's authority to some of the pressing practical problems of the day, will be the object of the succeeding

essays. But before I conclude this purely theoretical discussion, I must, to prevent misunderstanding, make two or three explanations.

1. Firstly, the doctrine does not by itself imply any particular theory as to what should be at any particular time and place the true relations between the State on the one hand, and the Church or the various Churches which divide the allegiance of its citizens on the other. Nothing that I have said necessarily implies the existence of an established Church, or rather (to avoid the misleading idea that every Church must be either established or unestablished), what I have said does not imply that any one of the very numerous types of legal relation between the State and the one or more religious societies existing within it is necessarily at all times and in all places the true one. Each and every kind of relation between Church and State may be the right one at a particular time and place, because each and every one of them may be under a particular set of circumstances the most favourable to the good life of its citizens. A State which has no established Church is not necessarily godless; it is not necessarily indifferent to the religion of its subjects or indifferent as to what that religion should be. It may merely hold that, under given circumstances, impartiality on the part of the State as between certain bodies separated by minor differences—with the most fundamental differences impartiality must always be more or less a sham—that with regard to these minor differences the State will best promote the good life of its citizens by entire impartiality and relative non-interference. I say relative non-interference, for absolute non-interference can easily be shown to be an impossibility. The Judicial

Committee of the Privy Council has to decide questions of Buddhist ritual as often as questions of Anglican canon law. The Aristotelian theory of the State is not necessarily opposed to any particular view as to the desirable relations between Church and State at a particular time and place. The only argument which it forbids us to use in favour of disestablishment is the plea that the State has got nothing to do with religion. At the same time, I need hardly point out how very largely arguments for disestablishment, arguments against what is called denominational education, and arguments about half-a-dozen other practical questions of the kind are, as a matter of fact, arguments of the *a priori* character which ought to have vanished with the professed disappearance from public life of the natural man and all his works.

2. What has been said applies equally to any other kind of interference in matters of morality, of education, of economic organisation. How far State interference actually, under given conditions, will conduce to the growth or just distribution of wealth, to the advancement of knowledge, to the promotion of morality — these are questions which must be decided by experience—actual, specific experience, when we have it, or by prevision based upon our general knowledge of the laws of human nature and human society when specific experience fails us. It is quite consistent to maintain that the State exists to promote morality, but that at the same time it promotes it best by leaving it alone. At the same time, put in this general way, the conclusion would be something of a paradox. The great practical lesson which a true doctrine of the moral basis of State authority teaches us is this—that each question of interference or

non-interference must be decided on its own merits. We cannot absolve ourselves from the task of examining the arguments for or against any particular kind of State interference—religious, moral, economic, social—by falling back upon general *a priori* principles either for or against interference or even against interference in any one of the great distinguishable, but of course closely interconnected, departments of human life. We cannot approve or condemn any single measure by simply saying, "This would be interference with religion, or with private morals, or with economics." Of course we may by experience come to certain general conclusions as to the tendency of interference in some particular department. Such experience may lead to some general presumption against certain particular kinds of interference; but still we can never exclude the possibility that, though as a rule interference of a particular kind may be bad, under certain particular circumstances it may be good, or that, though some specific piece of interference is bad, some closely allied piece of interference may be good. We must not, with Mr. Herbert Spencer, assume that, because as a general rule Government departments are worse organised than private firms, therefore the Post-office ought to be given up; or with many Socialists affirm that, because the Post-office is a success, therefore every kind of production could be managed best or could be managed at all by State agency.

Most of the writers who argue for or against State interference, or any particular kind of interference, profess to establish, or at least to confirm, their doctrine by specific experience, but most of them are disposed to fall back on *a priori* theories much wider

than are required to support the practical conclusions which have really dictated the theories. In past times the State interfered mistakenly in certain well-known ways with trade and commerce. Hence the theory of orthodox Manchesterian politicians and economists that all State interference with economic organisation is bad. Mr. Herbert Spencer, panic-stricken at the advance of modern Socialism, has been driven to wake the natural man out of his well-earned grave. The Dissenter, holding that the Anglican establishment is a bad thing, feels it necessary to back up his view with a comprehensive doctrine that the State has nothing to do with religion—a theory on which (to its credit be it said) the nonconformist conscience has always in practice steadily refused to act. John Stuart Mill, thinking that the suppression of speculative thought by law or opinion was a bad thing, was driven into the monstrously anti-utilitarian doctrine that neither the State nor society has anything to do with a man's beliefs or private life. As regards belief this view is still popular, while the economic non-intervention theory is rapidly disappearing. It has been the object of this essay to point out that all such limitations of the State's authority are equally inconsistent with the only logically defensible view of the basis of State authority, however strong may be the experiential argument against some particular kind of interference. The State exists to promote the good life of her citizens: nothing that affects human life can she afford to treat as altogether alien to her. At the same time, her interest in the highest life of her citizens can as little compel her to any specific kind of interference as a parent can be said to be necessarily indifferent to the highest well-being of his

children, because at a certain age he declines to enforce their attendance at a particular place of worship or to prescribe the particular way in which they shall spend their pocket-money. We may even push the analogy a little further, and contend that there is a certain antecedent probability that the State ought to act on the same principle, and a certain presumption against theories which propose that the State shall treat her citizens as mere children, and not rather (if government should still in a sense be paternal) as sons and daughters past the age of school, but economically dependent upon others, are treated by sensible, far-sighted, and affectionate parents.

Thirdly, it may be objected that what I have been saying about the rights of the State ignores the rights of the individual. Does not this doctrine—that the State may interfere with the individual to any extent and in any way provided it be for the public good—ignore the claims of personality. Has the individual no rights, it may be asked, even against the State? I should reply that the rights of the State cannot really come into collision with the rights of the individual, because in the last resort these rights are simply the rights of other individuals. The rights of the State really spring from and rest upon the rights of the individual; that is to say, from the intrinsic worth or value possessed by every individual human soul an account of the capacities of a good or intrinsically valuable life which he has in him, and his consequent right to the conditions under which these capacities may best be realised. But then we can never say that any one individual has an absolute right to this or that material thing—to personal liberty, or to marry and rear a family, or to three acres and

a cow—without regard to the interests of the whole society, *i.e.* of the other individuals of which the society is composed. There are circumstances under which the enjoyment of any one of these things might be inconsistent with the rights of other individuals. If A is to have three acres of English soil, B might have to go without any; or it might be found by experience that it is better in the interests of C, D, E, F, &c., that neither B or C should be landowners at all. There is no conceivable concrete thing the enjoyment of which by an individual might not under some circumstances be inconsistent with due respect to the claims of other individuals. There is no more sacred concrete "right" than the right to life, and yet in time of war one man's life has to be sacrificed in order to save the lives of many. There is only one "right" which the State is always bound to respect: the "rights of man" ultimately resolve themselves into one solitary "right of man," *i.e.* the *right to consideration*. Every individual has at all times a right to be considered, to have his life and well-being treated with the respect which is its due. All other rights in detail may at times have to give way to the like rights of others; but the right to consideration need never have been violated; for the individual's right to consideration is not violated even when the State require him to sacrifice his life in obedience to the like right in others. The individual gets his rights when his good gets that amount of consideration which is its due and no more. We need not here try to argue the very difficult and abstract question, whether "due" consideration means that the rights of all men are to be considered as exactly equal—whether, according to the maxim of Bentham, "every one is to count for one and

nobody for more than one," or whether intrinsic superiority of intellectual or moral capacity may entitle mere individuals to more consideration than another. It may be enough to accept Bentham's formula, at least in this sense—that every one's good is to be considered as of equal importance *as the like good* of every one else. If the State treats any individual, or any minority of its citizens, large or small, as a *mere* means to the well-being of the majority, it does undoubtedly violate the rights of personality. Every citizen has the right to be treated as "an end in himself," but then so has every other citizen; every individual is thus both an ends and a means. Inasmuch as he is an end, he must always be considered; inasmuch as others are ends, there is no sacrifice which may not justly be imposed upon him as a means to the good of a larger number of individuals, provided that the one and the many each receive their due, and no more than their due, meed of consideration.

I come back to the main doctrine which it is the object of this paper to enforce. Except the right to equality of consideration, there is no right in the individual which does not spring from the demands of social well-being. So long as this principle of equality of consideration is respected, there is no possible extension of State interference which can be reasonably resisted in the name of the individual's rights. Such an admission may seem to some to lead us very far indeed in the direction of Socialism. Perhaps in some ways it does. How far State interference should be carried, how far such interference really is conducive to that general well-being which is the source and criterion of all rights, I do not know. That is a

matter which growing experience alone can determine. I should attach little importance to any surmises of mine as to the extent to which such intervention is likely to prove successful, and I should attach scarcely more importance on that subject to the guesses of any other man. But one thing must be said on behalf of the claims of the individual who is threatened on all sides by the advances of Socialism in theory and in practice. It must not be forgotten that this State, whose abstract right to interfere with any and every department of social life is so undeniable, after all consists of individuals. The success or failure of every kind of State action must ultimately depend upon the moral and intellectual qualities of the individuals who direct it. Any system, therefore, which is unfavourable to the growth of the best possible individuals can never be socially beneficial. The degeneration of the individual must inevitably lead to the degeneration of the society which is composed of individuals, and whose moral and intellectual level cannot possibly rise higher than that of the best-developed individuals within it. Now, there is a real, if remote, danger that the increase of State interference might lead to the extinction of character. Faculties that cannot be used become atrophied. If society is to be composed of persons accustomed to feel that their work in life, the time that they are to work, the food that they are to eat, the houses that they are to live in, the amusements that they have to look forward to, their comfort in old age, the future of their children, will all be provided for them entirely irrespective of any effort or exertion of theirs beyond what is implied in obeying the law and coming up to the average standard of industrial efficiency—how in such persons is character to be

developed? Character depends upon responsibility. It is no use to say that the citizen will find employment for his energies in the service of society and for his affections in the love of it. Character is developed by acts of choice; a state of things where hardly anything depends upon the choice of the individual cannot be favourable either to the intellectual or the moral development of human nature. Thus persons not educated by responsibility for the lives of themselves and their families will never be fit to direct the energies of a community. There must, therefore, be a limit to State interference in the interest of human character, no matter what success there may be in overcoming the material difficulties of the Collectivist programme. Exactly where that limit must be placed I do not, of course, attempt to decide. But meanwhile it will be enough for the guidance of our present social policy that we should observe exactly where the danger of injury to character by State intervention really begins. For the State to do for people things that they cannot possibly do for themselves has no demoralising tendency whatever. Now, with regard to most of the recently accomplished or proposed pieces of legislation which move the wrath of Individualist critics, it is admitted that this is the case. The very gravamen against such interferences is that they are artificially securing to the poor decencies, comforts, luxuries, culture, amusements, sanitation of a kind which poor men could not possibly provide for themselves—artificially putting the poor man in certain respects on a level with the rich man. The danger begins just when we begin to do for the poor man the things which the industrious, capable, reasonably self-controlled poor man can and does now do for himself

—when we teach him to think that, no matter how little trouble he may take to get work and keep work when he has got it, to earn money and not to spend it too soon, he and those dependent on him are pretty sure to be able to fall back upon a minimum subsistence, earned without labour or by casual and irregular labour subject to no really onerous or irksome conditions. I will leave it to the essayists who are to follow me to apply what I have said to concrete cases. I will only remark in a general way that the kind of demoralisation which might be apprehended from certain kinds of Collectivism is quite equally within the reach of private philanthropy. The only direct application of what I have said upon which I will venture will be to say, that in the immediate future there is far more danger of demoralising Collectivism in attempts to provide food and work for the "residuum," whether by State action or by wholesale charity, than there is in attempts to improve the wages, conditions of labour, and conditions of existence for those who are really entitled to be called the working classes.

I do not intend, however, to be led astray into any general discussion of the question of Socialism. If there were any practical lesson which I would wish to extract from the purely theoretical inquiry on which we have been engaged, it would be the inadvisability of busying ourselves overmuch at present with the question of ultimate schemes of social reorganisation. I have tried simply to lay down three principles :—

1. That the individual's only absolute right is equality of consideration.

2. That the State has an absolute right to interfere with the individual to any extent conducive to the

general good, interpreted in accordance with the principle of equality of consideration.

3. That the development of individual character is in itself of primary importance, in enabling the State to do whatever it undertakes to do—whether little or much—for the promotion of that highest well-being, or good life, for which it exists.[1]

It is obvious that, if the view which we have taken of the true end and functions of the State be the true one, the duties of good citizenship should occupy a prominent place in the ideal of the good man, and therefore of the good Christian. So long as the State was regarded as a mere public institution for the protection of person and property, it was natural that it should be assumed that a mere passive obedience to the law represented the utmost claim that it could make upon the loyalty of the citizens. Even that was not always conceded. It is strange to find a philosophic judge like Blackstone gravely laying down a distinction between things evil in themselves (*mala in se*), and things evil only because prohibited (*mala*

[1] On the strength of this last doctrine it is possible to contend that the right to property must always and everywhere be included among the rights of the individual of which the State may never deprive him. "Property is necessary as the expression of Personality." If by property is meant the permanent appropriation of some share of material wealth, it may be freely admitted that no state of society could be favourable to the development of individual character and capacity which does not recognise such an institution, in however modified a form. But Socialism (unlike Communism) is not opposed to private property, only to private *capital* or property in the instruments of production which, the Socialist contends, involve the enslavement of the non-capitalists in a way which is destructive of personality in them. Mr. Bosanquet, in his admirable essay upon "The Principle of Private Property" (in "Aspects of the Social Problem"), has insisted upon the importance of property to character, but has assumed too readily that property involves (1) the right to own the instruments of production, (2) the right of bequest.

prohibita), and maintaining that there is no moral duty to obey the law in the latter case, *e.g.* to abstain from infringements of the game laws: a man is merely offered the alternative either to obey the law or to submit to the penalty if levied. His conscience is equally clear whichever alternative he chooses to adopt. And there are many highly-respectable and even religious persons at the present day who see no harm in smuggling or evading the tax-gatherer. Truly, an appalling decline from the old Aristotelian view which regards the State or "City" as the great institution for the promotion of Virtue, and which finds in the loyal and hearty discharge of civil duties one large element in that Virtue! Partly no doubt the decline is to be accounted for by the concentration of our higher loyalties and more spiritual aspirations upon that even higher institution, the Church, which appeals more directly to the religious emotions. But the tendency to make light of the moral functions of the State in the interests of the Church is not really in the interests of either. It tends to the creation of that hard and fast distinction between things religious and things secular, which ends by degrading secular life into the pursuit of private gain, and religion into a mere desire for escaping a material hell and reaching a sensuous heaven when we die.

It is too little to say that on our view of the State it is a sacred duty to obey the law except where it is a duty to disobey it—to obey the law as the most essential condition of human well-being, except in those rare cases when the very end for which the true State exists can only be promoted by disobedience to the actual State. We want to revive among us the old Greek enthusiasm for the State or the City, and to fuse it with

the old enthusiasm of the primitive Christian for the Christian Society or Church which, by its abundant and organised charity, was not above providing for the wants of the body as well as those of the soul. Such a fusion of the spirit of Churchmanship with the spirit of Citizenship is essential to the growth among us of a true ideal of life, consisting in the devotion to a social good which includes the satisfaction of the lower or mere animal wants of human nature in due subordination to the satisfaction of the higher intellectual and spiritual needs. The true distinction between Church and State is not a distinction of *spheres* or *ends*, but a distinction of *functions* or *methods*. In the Christian the true *end* of Church and State must be the same, the promotion of the highest life. The Church is a voluntary Society of Christ's disciples for the promotion of the Christian ideal of life. If the Christian view of life be the true view, the State can only be regarded as a society for the promotion by other means of the same objects, so far as they can be promoted consistently with the two essential attributes which distinguish the State from other societies, *i.e.* that of being all-embracing (and therefore including many who only partially share its ideal), and of employing force against recalcitrant members. To suggest how that enthusiasm for humanity which it is the especial duty of the Church to kindle may be enlisted in the service of the State, or of the numerous forms of social reform and social activity which require more or less assistance from the State, will be one of the main objects of the writers who are to follow me.

OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

By Rev. A. L. Lilley, B.A.

The great national democracies of to-day, England, France, America, are face to face with a new problem in the sphere of government—The Middle Age laid the general foundations of social order—The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries concentrated that order into great national centres under absolute dynasties—The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have been occupied in transforming absolute into representative government, or in replacing the former by the latter—We inherit the political tools with which this last change has been accomplished, viz. the party system, government by a parliamentary majority—These tools are useless for the new work which democracies have to effect, viz. the preservation and development of the different interests which constitute the national life and the maintenance of justice between such of them as may be at any time in conflict—This work requires (1) a real representation in Parliament of all large well-organised national interests, and (2) an organ of government which will act as an arbiter between them when they conflict; that is to say, Parliament in England must become more and more representative of interests, and government more and more judicial in its traditions and methods—The pressure of this work which democracy wants done is already unconsciously telling upon the character both of government and of parliamentary representation—Still there is needed above everything else a fuller realisation of the nature of political duty in a modern democracy.

I

The forces of history take long to declare themselves. Their life is like the life of men. They spring from the marriage of forces that were before them. However sudden and unaccountable their coming may seem, it was the vital union of forces already there

that gave each one of them birth. They must accommodate themselves gradually through a helpless infancy to conditions against which they chafe and fret. They must make the heady mistakes of youth, must pass through the stages of assertion and defiance and revolt, before they can settle down to that mastery of the future which is theirs by right. Then at length comes the new world to which the new force is heir, the world which it is to make in its own image, which it is to mould and fashion to its own will and leave to the shaping of the forces that are to be born from its loins.

Modern democracy is such a force. It is still in the stage of growth, its preparation still proceeding, its self-mastery incomplete. For a whole century it has been passing through this stage. But the beginnings of its life lie still farther back. It was when the highly-ordered social life of the Middle Age, grown sterile through the narrowness of its local interests, was thrilled with the hope of a new fruitfulness by that great outburst of personal force which marked the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, that the embryo of social democracy first began to shape itself in the womb of time. Mediæval socialism and the individualism of the Renaissance united to shape those great national democracies whose mission, as yet only half-realised, will be accomplished during the coming century. Without that union they could not have been. Nothing can be more absurd than the attempt of the modern socialist to find his ideal in the Middle Age, except perhaps the claim of the modern democrat to trace himself back to that essentially aristocratic individualism which found its chief support and its most characteristic expression in the absolutism of

strong dynastic rulers and their still stronger ministers. Neither of these by itself accounts for the still vague aspiration which is now called socialism, nor for the still half-realised fact which is now called democracy; but the gradual interpenetration of the two does account for that single living force which holds the field of politics to-day, and which, when regarded from one point of view, is called socialism, and from another democracy.

The generation which is just passing away has been remarkable for the conflict which it has witnessed between socialism and individualism. That conflict has not been confined to the region of political theory. It has very decisively influenced the character of political action. It has been a conflict essential to the development of those national democracies to which the shaping of the immediate future is about to be entrusted. Yet essential as it was, that conflict is drawing to its close. It has accomplished its purpose. And that purpose was the bringing into clear relief the elements which constitute the modern democratic ideal, and the way in which they combine to form it. Socialism was a protest, but an essential protest, against an individualism run wild. But in so far as it regarded itself as a serious scheme overlooking or denying the necessity of individual initiative, it was a reaction and so doomed to failure. It was natural enough that it should secure, as it did in fact secure, the alliance of all those reactionary forces which hated or refused to recognise the facts established by the modern conception of liberty, and looked back with longing to the ordered social hierarchies of the Middle Age. Socialism, indeed, was puzzled by this alliance, and mutely resented it. And its resentment

proved how little it understood its own aims, how entirely out of sympathy it was with a socialism which had already existed, and had already been weighed in the balance of history and found wanting for the development of man's life—whether spiritual, intellectual, or industrial. Modern socialism proved, in short, by its resentment of reactionary alliances, that notwithstanding its provisional and quite essential protest against an unbridled individualism, it was at heart penetrated through and through with that belief in the necessity of individual freedom which is the very breath of political life to the modern world. If it needed further proofs of its own instinctive convictions, it must have found them in the fact that anarchism had in some moment of sleep sprung from its side, and that many a votary of socialist theory in one department of life was in others an anarchist pure and simple.

This is a fact which has been constantly overlooked amid the din and clash of contending ideals. Rather, perhaps, it was a fact which could not declare itself until that conflict began to abate. And so it is now for the first time just beginning to be realised that the political ideals which dominate us rest upon a frank recognition of the value of individual initiative and of social regulation, of the absolute necessity of a political system which will conserve the former and develop the latter. The work of the moment is to determine how individual power may be regulated in the best interests of society without any loss of its own special quality. That is the work which lies before the more advanced of the great national democracies.

II

What, then, is the democratic state? In what does it differ from those types of national states which have preceded it in the scale of political development? These are the questions to which it is necessary at the very outset of our inquiry to find some kind of answer. And to answer them at all satisfactorily we must confine ourselves to the essential character of the state. We must remember that when we speak of the state, we mean simply the organ of national government. Whatever the idea of national government may be, whether the idea of restraint or of liberty, the state is that which embodies and preserves that idea. Whatever the purposes of national government may be, whether the development of the national life from within, or the extension of the nation's influence and power outside its own borders, the state is that which gives effect to these purposes. Here, in its idea and in its purpose, the state under all its forms is one and the same. The difference in the character of states lies elsewhere. It consists in the different relations of the instrument of government to the national life. So long as that life remains undeveloped and immature, the governing power is to some degree outside it. The nation may acquiesce in the policy and the actions of its government, but it can hardly claim them as its own. Its acquiescence may sometimes be thorough and whole-hearted, sometimes languid or even sullen; but it remains acquiescence only. The nation is not sufficiently alive to make up its own mind on any question which affects it as a whole. Yet it dimly feels the need of a

common purpose, it thrills with the hope of a common life; and so it yields instinctively to the guidance of any power which offers a fulfilment of its hopes. It was in this way that the great nations of Europe were formed under the direction of that dynastic absolutism without which they might never have found the common life for which their history had prepared them throughout the Middle Age. But when the national life has come to a completer consciousness of itself, when it knows its own mind, and needs to assert its own will, it naturally desires to constitute its own organ of government. It cannot any longer be satisfied with an outside control, however wise and judicious. The controlling power must be within, in intimate touch with the movements of the national will and the demands of the national life. The nation which has reached this stage of development is what we know nowadays as a democracy, and its government is a democratic government.

Now there are two ways in which modern democracies have forged their special instruments of government. In some cases the end has been accomplished by a deliberate and sudden revolution, in others by that gradual and constant pressure of revolutionary method which we may call conscious evolution. In the one case the absolute forms of goverment have been overthrown, and the democratic state has been erected on its ruins; in the other the absolute system has been gradually modified, and almost insensibly, though with conscious purpose, transformed into a democratic system. But in both cases alike the change from the one form to the other, whether by immediate substitution or by gradual transformation, has been the constant problem of

modern politics. It has monopolised the whole field of political action, and determined the character of all modern political speculation. The questions of political import for the modern world have been concerned with the removal of political privilege, the extension of political rights, the gradual widening of the basis of political responsibility, the gradual adjustment of the instrument of government to the modes of expression of the national will. But such questions are rapidly losing their import, or rather their character is being gradually transformed under the stress of new needs. The methods of democratic government have been provisionally established, but with their establishment comes the discovery that the national life itself needs organisation, that the organ of free government is useless on account of the apathy and the vagueness of the national will. Accustomed to connect all political action with modifications of political machinery, the nation persists in confining itself to questions which are no longer important, or at least of a quite minor importance. And it is thus gradually excluding from all interest in politics all those who are impatient of unreal issues, and unable through their numerical impotence to resist the organised political tradition. The real need of the moment is not the abolition of political privilege —that work is practically accomplished — but the enforcement of political duty. It is not a political reform at all that is needed, but a moral one. What is called for is the creation of a national conscience, the restoration of soundness to the national life, the deepening of the need of justice in the national heart. And the possibility of all this depends upon the power which the nation has of learning its own mind, of

conceiving of its higher duties, of measuring itself by the standard of a justice which transcends the selfishness of blind instinct. In short, it is the growth of moral soundness in the national heart which can alone rescue modern democracies, relieved though they have been from the incubus of privilege, from the condemnation of political futility.

III

If, then, this is the real need of the democratic state, how is effect to be given to it? I have said that the lines of a real democratic government have been provisionally laid down. And yet there is distinctly traceable on all sides—at least among thoughtful students of politics—a certain practical distrust of these lines, a feeling that within them not much can be done which the nation ought to aim at doing. Our democracy, for instance, depends upon the party system for an expression of its will. But those who measure most accurately the possibilities of the party system are becoming more and more convinced that it is too clumsy an instrument to perform the exceedingly delicate work of giving effect to the higher aims of a democracy which aims at being just. The party system was moulded by the functions which it originally had to perform. To these functions it was admirably adapted, adapted as Nature always adapts her means to her ends. Its business was the carrying through of that process of which I have already spoken as being now practically complete—the process of uprooting privilege and planting in its stead the factors of democratic government. But quite another kind of work, a work at once more positive and more

delicate, is now entrusted to it. And naturally enough we are being forced to realise that it is wholly unfitted for this new work. How can a House of Commons which votes according to traditional and quite unreal lines of division bring its full sense of justice to bear upon delicate questions of conflicting interests between classes or sections in the nation? Tory and Radical, Liberal and Conservative, are, in presence of the problems with which statesmanship is now called upon to deal, wholly artificial and even unnatural lines of division. These are questions which are being asked on every hand, convictions which are forcing themselves on the intelligence of even the man in the street. And yet we feel that the way of meeting the changed conditions is not a mere *a priori* tinkering with constitutional change. If changes in the method of government are to come, and come they must, they ought to come naturally through the pressure of the new work that needs to be done. What is needed is a real conviction as to the nature of that work, a fuller perception of its character and its range. Let us realise the tasks which the democratic nation wants its government to accomplish. Let us set ourselves seriously to their accomplishment, and the traditional forms of Government will insensibly transform themselves into effective instruments of these duties.

Now, the real duty of a democratic government is to establish just relations between the different interests which constitute the life of the community. That is no doubt the ostensible aim of government as it exists at present. But what means has it of giving effect to its aim? The determination of where justice may lie in any particular conflict of interests, the most delicate of all tasks, is left to the clumsy vote of majorities, and

of majorities which are always being manufactured and manipulated by the shrewdness of politicians rather than by the claims of justice. Majority rule is by its very nature a tyranny as against the wishes of a minority, however small, still more so as against a minority almost as large and influential as the majority which has absolute power. And if it is so by nature, the accidents of its working have increased a hundredfold the injustice of its tyranny. That is so obvious that its only justification is its supposed necessity. It has become an article of faith with democracy that there is no other means of giving expression to the national will than by discovering the will of the majority, and admitting its divine right of government. And of course it must be at once admitted that on all foreign questions, on all questions of the policy of the nation as a whole in its dealings with other nations, there is no other way of determining the national will. But most of the questions of government in a democracy have to do with conflicts of interest within the national limits. And here it is that democracy must learn a better way of effecting its great mission of social justice. Far from majority rule being a necessity, far from its being a fundamental article of the democratic creed, it is exactly democracy, once arrived at an adequate appreciation of its mission, which will kill it. The democracy is already learning that social justice cannot be reached by haphazard majority votes. And so already, if we look closely enough at the tendencies of present-day politics, we shall find the beginnings of the transformation of the party system and majority rule.

There is, for instance, on the part of the national representatives themselves a growing impatience of

mere party obedience. Questions are continually cropping up in Parliament on which the party system is by general consent allowed to lapse. Again, there are other questions on which, in spite of every effort, it is impossible to secure strict obedience to party mandates. Cross-voting is growing more common every day, and is extending itself to all kinds of questions. The Leader of the House is not afraid to declare himself in favour of a measure which is repugnant to the general tone of mind of his party following, and publicly to deplore its hostility. Even the most irreconcilable of Radicals has the courage to oppose a measure backed by the enthusiastic support of the majority of his party, and to rejoice in a victory snatched from the jaws of defeat by the timely support of his most inveterate enemy, the House of Lords. All this is as it should be. It is simply a recognition of facts, and a recognition of political duty in the face of facts. It is a refusal to be bound by the pedantries of political divisions which have no longer any correspondence with facts. It is impossible to group all the possible solutions of intricate and delicate questions of social justice under two heads, and to compel everybody to accept all the solutions under one head or the other. The actual working of the parliamentary system is proving conclusively that even when, for party purposes, the practical policies on matters of legislation are roughly classed under two general alternatives, it is quite impossible to secure that any person will always find himself satisfied with the same set of alternatives. On one question he finds himself on one side, on another on the opposite.

But it is not among representatives only that this tendency to leave the lines of the party system is

apparent. There is exactly the same tendency in the constituencies. Here, of course, the conditions are not so favourable for revolt. Yet it is just on that account that the actual extent of the revolt is so remarkable. The appeal to the constituencies is nominally, and in theory, an appeal to the heterogeneous populations of local areas on broad general lines of public policy. Except at some crisis in the foreign relations of the nation, it is in practice nothing of the kind. It is, on the contrary, an appeal to the special interests of the different homogeneous classes which together form the constituency. Nominally the appeal of each party is one in spirit and policy, and it is addressed broadly to the heterogeneous elements of the constituency with a view to securing adhesion to the one uniform policy or the other. Really the appeal of each party is multiform in spirit, and often at variance with itself, and it is determined by the sum of the supposed wishes of the different classes of which the constituency is composed. More and more it is the opinions of classes which are being represented in Parliament, and it is only the resistance of the necessary heterogeneity of local areas which prevents that representation from becoming complete. But that very resistance is being fast modified in certain districts by the tendency, fostered by industrial necessities, of classes to settle in the same areas.

And it is not merely the interested appeals of the party system which tend to develop the system of class representation. Those classes of the community which have already acquired a due sense of their legislative needs are strenuously aiming at an adequate and exclusive representation of their own special claims. The Independent Labour Party may not as yet be a

great factor in parliamentary life, but it is at least a portent of change in the whole conception of the character of parliamentary representation. And it is not classes only, with their sense of special needs, but ideal causes also, which demand an exclusive or virtually exclusive representation. The Temperance Party may not be a power in Parliament, but it is a power which strikes terror and dismay into the hearts of parliamentary candidates. And again all this is as it should be. It is an instinctive attempt to face the facts of the case, to deal with real issues. The centres of legislative need are the great organised classes which understand the conditions of their own development, the great organised causes which express the righteous aspirations of masses of the people drawn together by a common enthusiasm. Democratic representation is just the articulate voice of those causes and classes in the great council of the nation. No artificial and traditional representation will long satisfy a democracy whose most elementary need is to foster and protect the various sources of power which unite to form it.

So far I have spoken only of the change which is coming over the spirit of representation. The work of the democratic representative is to give voice to a special need, to state the claims of justice as they are felt by a particular class. But it by no means follows that the special view of that class represents the real claims of justice. For the most part class needs arise out of a conflict of interests with other classes. Labour questions, for instance, arise from a conflict of interests between employers and employed. The adequate representation of each of those interests is an indispensable preliminary to a solution of labour

questions, but it is not in itself a solution. The fact of representation must always be supplemented by the work of government. And here again democracy requires a change, and is, less obviously indeed, but still I think perceptibly, tending to effect it. The real duty of democratic government is to arbitrate between opposing interests. Social justice is not an affair of programmes drawn up from the outside, and without any regard to the delicate interests involved. It depends more and more upon a thorough and sympathetic understanding of all the issues involved in a special conflict of interests, and a strictly judicial decision upon those issues. Of course it goes without saying that the limits within which such decisions can be given must always remain very narrow. For it is of the very nature of the decisions of government that they must be obeyed; and it is only where the legitimate development of a class is being endangered, or the natural and human interests of its members are being interfered with, that government can rightly coerce the class which threatens the danger or the interference. The preservation of a class in all its natural human rights is indeed a fundamental principle of social justice and of democratic government. It was by a true political instinct that the first essays of government in social justice were factory laws and laws regulating the conditions and the hours of work. These were the natural beginnings of democracy, the first expression of the conscience of the nation aroused to a sense of the diseases that were eating into its life. But every step beyond these mere negative protections must be justified by a very accurate knowledge of the conditions of class conflict and an absolutely judicial spirit. Such steps the democratic state may need to

take again and again, but it cannot possibly afford to take them by the rough methods of party warfare. The judicial temper of government must first have become almost an instinct. The nation must first have grown accustomed to look upon the duties of its statesmen as it does now upon the duties of its judges. It must first have gained the right to trust the decisions of the one as it is now able to trust the decisions of the other.

And it is not merely the strong and flourishing sections of the nation which demand the constant protection of democratic government. Those elements of the national life which are weak and struggling claim this protection still more as they need it the more, in so far at least as they prove themselves serviceable factors in the national well-being. Of course, if such elements were so weak as to be unable to obtain any representation in Parliament, they could not secure the protection of government or even come within the sphere of its operations. But in an assembly really representative of the national life, it would be next to impossible that any really vital part of it would remain unrepresented, would fail to find a voice to utter its needs. Even now, with our very different ideal of representation, it is doubtful if there is anywhere a vital interest unrepresented. But however feeble might be the numerical support in Parliament of the claims of any useful factor in the nation's well-being, it would still be the duty of a really democratic government to consider these claims. The democracy is dealing through legislation and government with its own life as a whole, not with a few aspects of its life which parliamentary majorities may think important. It is not so much the quantity of factitious or even

honest support which a measure may receive in Parliament which ought to weigh with a democratic government, but rather the quality of the effect which it may produce upon the national life.

Yet all this may seem a mere day-dream in view of the present condition of practical politics. Well, to one observer at least governments in England in late years seem to be growing more and more judicial in the proposals which they submit to the legislature and in their method of carrying them through. The era of magnificent programmes is gone with the era of great constitutional questions. The new questions, concerned with special developments of the national life, have to be approached in a new way. There has grown up around them no tradition of opinion. In the nature of the case no such tradition can ever be permanently established, for the simple reason that the problems which have to be dealt with are vital problems, and so are in continual flux as to their conditions and circumstances. The proposed legislation affecting them must always be tentative, experimental, provisional. Every year sees its new crop of labour legislation, and it is perfectly natural that it should, for labour legislation belongs by nature to the species of hardy annuals. This very fact of the provisional character of the new legislation, of its absolute originality in each new set of conditions dealt with, has forced upon the government responsible for its drafting something of the judicial temper. Statesmen can no longer din the general ear with the beating of the party drum, nor blow their own horn to the deafening of the nation when they introduce a great party measure. Their measures are no longer party measures in the strict sense. They are mere sober

suggestions, without any tinge of party colour, for the relief of some immediate necessity, for the healing of some intolerable sore. The judicial spirit is being forced upon statesmen by the very nature of the circumstances with which they have to deal. Again, quite unconsciously, the spirit of the arbiter seems to be asserting itself in the modern statesman's way of carrying through his proposals. It is not by chance that the modern government bill is so often a mere framework of legislation, a rough outline to be filled in by the gradual settlement of opinion during discussion in committee. The government does its special work in deciding judicially what can and what cannot be retained of the suggestions of the expert. Governments, too, begin to feel by a kind of instinct that this is the way in which to catch the House of Commons in its best moods, to humour it into doing the best work of which it is capable. The continual waving of the party flag kept prejudice, the enemy of all justice, alive. The prejudice, the tradition, the party attitude declared itself so constantly in the old legislation. It is still there, but the new type of bill very often exorcises it without members quite knowing what has happened, and the real quality of honest personal opinion finds an atmosphere in which it can live and flourish. If only it had once come to be accepted as a democratic axiom that the duty of government—at least in home affairs—was to arbitrate between conflicting interests, that the temper of government ought always to be judicial, then the House of Commons would, even under existing conditions of election, almost instinctively become a really representative assembly. The appeal to its positive quality which would be involved in such a change would inevitably

develop its political sincerity and strength. Mr. Courtney would cease to be regarded as the type of political crank, and would be accepted for what he is —the type of a sincere, well-informed, and judicially-minded statesman.

IV

Let me briefly sum up. Political duty in a democracy centres primarily in those well-organised interests which together make up the national life. The ideal of political knowledge for the ordinary citizen ought to lie in a just estimate of the importance of his class to the national welfare. And that estimate can only be made by weighing too the importance of other classes and other interests. This, no doubt, is a much more arduous ideal than that fantastic congeries of prejudices and traditions which does duty as political knowledge to-day. Still it has the advantage of being also more practical, and more likely to make us as just and fair in our political attitude as we are now in our personal relations. Until we begin to know exactly of what kind and measure of importance our class, the interests we represent, are to the whole nation, our political judgment does not exist. The first condition, therefore, of healthy political life in a democracy is the more thorough organisation of all those classes and sections which have a quite distinct life, with its needs and duties, of their own. The representation of these in Parliament is the real expression of the national will on those questions which are of vital moment. With the decadence of constitutional questions any other kind of representation is fast becoming unreal and meaningless. The

duty of government is to hold the scales of justice, judicially and apart from unreal party and traditional issues, between conflicting interests whose claims are stated with immediate knowledge by their representatives in Parliament.

It is obvious that the appeal to the old party prejudices on the one side and on the other must now cease. In their day they were not prejudices, but truths. They were the sincere expression of two vitally opposed attitudes of mind in face of constitutional problems. To-day they are prejudices, and little more. The real divisions lie athwart the apparent ones. There is many a reactionary with regard to all questions of real moment to the national life on the Radical benches. There is many a reforming spirit of the finest and justest temper amid the Tory ranks. We need perhaps a real line of division among legislators. But it is one which it might be hard to draw on the hustings. The division which is really needed for the purposes of democratic legislation is a division between those who can bring to political questions a sincere, earnest, sympathetic, and naturally fair mind, and those who cannot help importing narrowness of view and ignorant prejudice into their discussion of affairs and who naturally settle every question by a traditional formula. Any other method of division would be fruitless, for it would have to be changed to-morrow. The administration of social justice requires moral qualities, and above all the great moral qualities of judgment and large-mindedness. No political tradition will be of any avail, for its conditions vary from day to day, its demands are ever appearing in absolutely original guise. Yet this is just the work which democracy

wants done, and must somehow get done. It has not perhaps realised to the full the incapacity of its present organ of government. It has not perhaps accurately estimated the nature of the work it is setting its government to do. Yet it vaguely feels that the present system of representation is defective and unreal, that somehow it does not get represented at all, that its inarticulate or half-articulate needs seldom find expression on a political platform or interpretation in Parliament, that instead its ears are wearied with the perpetual patter of political banalities. It feels too, however vaguely, that this party system wants to force down its throat one of two solutions of every question under the sun, and to petrify all English institutions according to either a Tory or a Radical tradition, whereas its own real need is the preservation of the greatest and fullest variety of living forces —all, however unlike, swept along, with their different utilities, into the great current of the national life.

OF THE MUNICIPALITY

By G. LAURENCE GOMME, F.S.A., F.S.S.

Introduction.

1. The pausing point in municipal history: (*a*) Certain sub-branches of organised authority; (*b*) the towns must answer to the needs of the new citizens, and the nation must see that the towns have the necessary powers, and the necessary stimulus; (*c*) the municipality is the whole body of the citizens, and their needs are the measuring standards of the worth of the municipality; (*d*) the economic conditions of the Tudor period—Bishop Latimer and private enterprise; (*e*) enterprise outside the complete influences of competition may be undertaken by the municipality; (*f*) the use of the term municipal trading; (*g*) municipality does not compete with private trader, because its work not sold to the public but is wholly absorbed in the services; (*h*) is of such general utility that its establishment a necessity. The struggle between those who advocate and those who oppose the extension of municipal life must continue.

2. The will of the community: (*a*) This can only become a force when it understands the laws of good neighbourliness; (*b*) the mark left on London by the uncontrolled forces of private enterprise; (*c*) contrasts—the mediæval city and the modern city, Middlesbrough-on-Tees and Middleburgh in Walcheren.

3. The grave issues before the municipalities are the problems of citizen life: (*a*) The objector to municipal control urges with truth that municipal enterprise is unfavourable to invention and development, which are at the command of private capitalists; (*b*) the objector answered. Education the great municipal service of the future means also the education by research; (*c*) organisation of education a need of the day; (*d*) the divine gift of research should be the centre of man's religious concept; (*e*) science for the community as well as for the individual.

4. The surroundings of citizen life must be made more tolerable: (*a*) Contrasts—Brighton and London; (*b*) the direction not restriction of the public-house may lead to a complete change of citizen life; (*c*) the recreation life of the citizen a matter of municipal concern; (*d*) locomotion; (*e*) municipalities have the problem of citizen life to work out, and the great influences economic or social come within their functions.

5. Cost: (*a*) Municipal taxation does not mean payments without benefit to the citizen; (*b*) the word "profit" must be eliminated from municipal finance; (*c*) no service must be overtaxed, but every service must be adequate to the needs of the community; (*d*) the citizen does not mind taxation if he knows that in return he is getting genuine service.

Conclusion.—The ideal municipal life has quite as great issues in the interests of civilisation as many subjects more prominently in the mind of statesmen and philosophers.

STUDENTS of English municipal history know quite well that there are two very marked phases of that history: the one, and that the earlier, where the whole body of townsmen entered into the municipal life, and were represented for executive functions by a chosen council; the other, and that the later, where the municipal council looms out as the embodiment of the municipal life, and the citizen with his rights, aspirations, and needs drop back rather far into the rear.

Public thought is now at the pausing point. It cannot quite understand the feverish anxiety of municipal politicians in urging forward certain reforms or certain new developments; but, on the other hand, it is sufficiently conscious of the need there is for attention to a considerable number of matters which cry aloud for settlement. It acquiesces in a resigned, half-satisfied sort of way with the views of "moderates" or "progressives," as the opposing municipal parties have come to call themselves according to the bias of their minds in matters political; but it is nevertheless deeply, though at present silently, concerned at the obviously serious problems which are rapidly arising all around. Education is needed if the country is to keep its place in the commercial world. Old-age pensions are a necessity if the poor are to be kept decently contented to let the rich have most of the

sweets of civilised life. Sanitation, in all its improved conditions, must be kept up if life in the crowded centres is to be supported with tolerable success. Recreation, even, must be regulated if it is to be freely enjoyed by the young and the active in accordance with the practice of generations of ancestors. And so on. Every thinking person sees around him matters which are sub-branches only of these four great essentials, and which he knows quite well must be attended to by organised authority; and many thinking persons travel outside the four corners of these essentials and perceive matters already ripe for similar attention, matters rapidly becoming ripe, matters which should be forced on in the interests of the community.

In this manner there exists a conscious as well as an unconscious municipal spirit amongst us, and the point is, what is to be its directing force in the near future? I say near future only, because there is no need to inquire as to its final destiny. That is not only beyond our present scope, but indeed does not concern us, because the progress of human society is determined not by the caprice of a generation or two, but by unalterable laws which govern man in his social groups as much as in his individual person.

I cannot help believing that when this pausing point has been passed, public thought will produce a rude awakening to those who have lagged behind, whether by carelessness and indifference or by the set purpose of opposing municipal development. The people who are crowding into towns because the intellectual inactivity of the country does not any longer satisfy their awakened consciousness, are not taking that step for nothing. In addition to the

demands which will flow almost naturally from the movement, there will flow the demands formulated by the conscious need of those who have to live the life. The towns must answer to the needs of its new citizens, and the nation must see that the towns have the necessary powers, nay, the necessary stimulus. If the country by its natural beauties, natural health-giving qualities, may be neglected municipally, the towns may not. And it is this position, this "may not," which enters into the problem when the towns are concerned which calls forth the necessity for thoughtful consideration.

Now, let it be observed that the municipality is the whole body of citizens belonging to the town or city, not, as is too frequently imagined and stated, the council elected by the citizens to conduct their affairs. The area is the borough area, not the area of the council; the property is the borough property, not that of the borough council; the executive officers are borough servants, not of the council. And it is worth while remembering these simple facts, because there is much harm done by following the formulæ of speech which have grown up during the period when municipal life had almost ceased to exist. In London, for instance, the County Council is frequently spoken of as a sort of private self-seeking body with interests belonging only to it as a body, whereas in truth it is of course only the trustees of the community during its term of office. Every Londoner shares in the successes or the failures of his elected representative council.

The needs of the citizens, therefore, are the measuring standards of the work of the municipality. The bitter cry raised by Bishop Latimer and by Cardinal

Pole, when, under the Tudor rule, individualism had for the first time in English history obtained the mastery of human conduct, may well be remembered by those who now seek to ascertain some of the chief movements in the newly-awakened municipal life. It is much more helpful to gain some sort of guidance from the actual practices of mankind, especially if we can gather those practices at the point where two opposing systems were parting away from each other, than it is to study the ideal state as it has been pictured for us by Plato, Wolf, Rousseau, Kant, Sir Thomas More, and all the great members of this school of philosophy. "I marvel," said Bishop Latimer, "if any ruler can be saved"; and then he went on to give examples of the new condition of things whereby everything was to be purchased and nothing to be shared. "If the poor man be diseased, he can have no help without too much; and of ye lawyer the poor man can get no counsell, expedition, nor help in his matter except he give him too much. At merchants' hands no kinds of wares can be had except we give for it too much. You landlords, you rentreifers, I may say you steplords, you unnatural lords, you have for your possessions yearly too much. Of this too much cometh this monstrous and portentious dearth made by man, notwithstanding God doth send us plentifully the fruits of the earth mercifully, contrary unto our deserts. Notwithstanding too much which these rich men have causeth such dearth that poor men (which live of their labour) cannot with the sweat of their face have a living, all kinds of victual is so dear." This is a notable passage to explain the economical conditions of that period, but it is all summed up a page or two further on in the

same sermon: "Thus al the enhansinge and rearing goth to your priuate commoditie and wealth." This was the cry of the great bishop. He could not understand the new order of things when all his experience took him back to a past when the gain of the individual meant also the gain of the community.

There is no need to discuss Bishop Latimer further than to draw attention to the points he raises, for they are being raised anew at the present moment. Private enterprise does nothing except for gain. Where gain can be checked by the free and unfettered operation of competitive laws, competition of quality and price both, there is not much to fear. But where this condition does not obtain there is everything to fear, and the desire is gradually beginning to be formulated that municipal control of enterprises which are outside the complete influences of competitive laws should be more fully exercised than has hitherto been the practice.

I do not purpose to penetrate into the recesses of municipal policy where it touches upon economics, but no branch of it appears to me more deserving of careful attention than that which determines the range of duties falling to municipalities. The range has recently been increasing, and already opposition to this extension is being organised. This opposition has for its watchword the cry of municipal trading. Like most cries it is misleading—misleading in the direction in which the opponents of municipal life desire to strengthen their case, and like most cries it carries with it just that fragment of truth which prevents it from being destroyed. Its truth lies in the proposition that it is not good for municipalities to enter into competition with the private trader,

because the private trader must inevitably be crushed. Its falsehood lies in the application of this proposition. It is not municipal trading for the municipality to employ its own workmen to do work for any of the recognised municipal services. That is only a method of carrying on a service at the best advantage for the taxpayer, and is not in competition with the private trader because the work is not sold to the public, but is wholly absorbed in the service. Again, it is not municipal trading to undertake a service which is better undertaken as a monopoly, and is of such general public utility that its establishment is a necessity, *e.g.* tramways, telephones, and the like. This is only the performance of a service for the public good at the least possible cost to the public, and to the special advantage of no one class of the community. It is not *ex hypothesi* in competition with the private trader, and its public utility demands that it should be undertaken. Municipal trading in point of fact exists nowhere in Great Britain, and has never been advocated by any responsible authority.

With these points in mind let us note that the municipality has two kinds of functions, that of undertaking duties, and that of controlling the operations of private persons who undertake work for the community. It is very clear that in the closely packed communities of the Western world these duties must multiply, and that the struggle between those who advocate and those who oppose the extension of municipal life, must continue. But underneath the problem which has to be faced lies the all-important essential factor, the will of the community. At present that will is not clearly expressed. It halts at every turn, is influenced by every event which can be

brought to bear upon it, by every word which can be spoken, by ignorance or by passion. Municipal life in its highest sense is only possible when the will of the community has become a force, and the will of the community can only become a force when each citizen comprehends that to live the municipal life is to understand and obey the laws of good neighbourliness.

One has only to learn one's lesson from the great cities we see growing up amongst us. To walk from the gorgeous brightness of west-end London to the dim misery of southern and eastern London is to understand how the uncontrolled forces of private acts have left the capital of the Empire, and it is not good to realise that not only has all beauty been banished from our city, but nearly all comfort and cleanliness. The mediæval city was, at all events, a place of beauty, even if it had yet to learn the lesson of sanitation. The modern city, except where wealth predominates, is a place of unregarded ugliness. Railways are allowed to cut up its streets, to leave patches of unbuilt land as the refuse shoot of the neighbourhood, to present a frontage of staring hideous advertisements, to cross over roadways with bridges which seem to have been designed to offend the eye, and to do a thousand other things which help for the unbeautiful. Builders are allowed to erect any form of structure in any position, and the long row of barrack-like houses which do duty for the homes of Englishmen contrast strangely with the buildings which gave rise to proverbial conceptions of independence. Let any one who is afraid of municipal control pay a visit to Middlesbrough-on-Tees. This town has grown up during the reign of Queen

Victoria. Its municipal organisation is only twenty years' old. It is, in fact, the unrestricted result of private enterprise. And what a misery it is. Cinder heaps stalked up in millions of tons all round, mean two-storeyed brick houses doing duty for the dwelling-places of English citizens, the river and quays in the undisputed possession of iron-masters, squalid poor and petty surroundings everywhere—these are the outgrowths of private enterprise. In their midst the result of municipal control is just beginning to be seen. The first town hall, of such contemptible build as to be scarcely credible, has given way to a more handsome structure, and municipal enterprise has entered into the place. But see what there is to do there! or rather, what there is to undo. Almost everything that private capital has done for the people of Middlesbrough is bad, and before the work of the municipality can be said to have fairly begun it has got to clear the ground for operations.

Fortunately there are not many such examples as this in our island, but it is well to have before us even an extreme case, because it illustrates so entirely the position of the municipality of modern life. No mediæval town could have grown up like Middlesbrough. It would have been an absolute impossibility. Look at many of the almost deserted cities of ancient Holland, compare the English Middlesbrough of Queen Victoria's reign with its picturesque mediæval namesake, Middleburgh in Walcheren, where the signs of the old municipal spirit are shown in the still dominant town hall which, side by side with the church, represents the public as apart from the individual influence in the growth of the town, and where trading and commercial prosperity was not allowed

to blight the citizen life. Every citizen of old, as his own personal prosperity grew, loved to contribute to the prosperity of the commonweal, and it is this commonplace of ancient municipal life that makes it impossible for a Middlesbrough to represent a town of Queen Elizabeth's reign, or indeed of any reign but one belonging to the present century.

Perhaps at no time in our history has the municipality a graver duty to perform than at the present. It has not only to fight for good citizenship in almost every direction, but it has to fight for its own existence. Ever since Tudor times it has been sinking lower and lower in power and estimation, and only during the past quarter of a century has it regained somewhat of its ancient position. But it is met in these days with the opposition of those who cannot see any good arising out of municipalism, and who point with pride, and with just pride, at the products beneficial to civilisation which private enterprise has introduced. The battle is at hand.

What is really to be decided is, how are the people to live? Are they to be left in the economic struggle to sink beneath the enormous weight until they reach the municipal poor-house, where socialism is allowed to prevail so long as it is hidden from public view; or are they to be assisted in learning that civilisation is not all a matter of economics? The municipality of the future, recognising its true position in the history of the Western world, must set about answering these two questions, and answering them in the one way possible, that is to say, it must take seriously in hand as the chief municipal function the problems of citizen life.

And first of all the municipality must remove from

its path the one serious objection which exists against municipal control. It is said, and with truth, that municipal enterprise is unfavourable to invention and development, which are ever at the command of private capital. Electricity, telephones, telegraphy, steam, chemical analysis, and all the great inventions of recent years, are due to private enterprise, and their developments in the public interest are due to private capital. The municipality stepping in now would reap the advantage of past experience, but would stereotype it for the future. The objection is not one that should be neglected, nor should it be answered by the specious and somewhat cynical argument that private enterprise will not cease to work at inventions when municipalities are the purchasers instead of private capitalists, or that until municipalities control certain industries everywhere throughout the world there will always be room for the inventions of private capitalists, which municipalities can utilise whenever they are ready and perfected. The argument, indeed, can be answered from the municipal standpoint. Education is one of the great municipal services of the future. This does not mean only elementary education, technical education, secondary education, or even university education, but it means also the education by research. One of the first steps of municipal control of education should be the effective establishment of laboratories, workshops, and appliances for research in all branches of science by students and scholars whose credentials warrant their being assisted by public funds. Invention would follow far more quickly from systematic research carried on from generation to generation by schools of thought, and by successions of workers,

than it does from the chance circumstances which make it possible for private persons to enter the domains of discovery, and invention would then belong to municipal capital instead of to private capital.

The effective organisation of education is indeed one of the most pressing needs of the age, and it can only be accomplished by the municipality. The world has been content to wait for the chances which produce a Darwin, Tyndall, or Huxley, and then it closes round their work with such pressure, that the knowledge gained therefrom is almost crushed. But the divine gift of research, which man alone possesses of all creation, should be the centre of man's religious concept. To know something of the infinite has always been the creed of humanity; to search for knowledge of the unknown will in future not be merely his creed, but the active moving spirit of his life, and one of the greatest moral forces of human nature will at last have free play. There is, of course, much to be done before this can be accomplished; but much will have been done if all the opportunities of research are opened to trained and skilful scholars, scholars whose educational work will be to penetrate into the realms of the still unknown limits of natural phenomena. There will be no lack of material inventions if this could be the municipal ideal of education, no lack of improvements in all the mechanical sciences, and above all, the fearful pall now hanging round modern discovery will be lifted, and the benefits of science will then be for the community as for the individual.

But if education of this higher kind is to be the work of the municipality of the future, other things

will follow in its train. The citizen of the future will possess more of life than is permitted to him at present. Encased in his narrow and often sordid home surroundings, pursuing his bread-earning with such feverish anxiety that he cannot look around, there is not much room to live. There is barely room to utilise what is at hand. At the best he accepts what railway companies choose to offer as a means of getting to and fro, what private enterprise everywhere chooses to dole out by way of amusement, what the market happens to bring before him by way of food, of clothing, or other necessaries of life. But this is not life; not the life of the citizen Greeks, who demanded much larger shares in what the community could afford; not the life of the mediæval English citizen who demanded much larger shares in what the community considered its own. The municipality of the future will not let humble living mean absence of green trees, deficiency of light and air, and all the modern ignoble surroundings. If nature is to be got rid of because of the needs of man, there are plenty of compensating forces. Cottages and small buildings can be architecturally beautiful even as palaces and great houses aim at being. Every advantage can be taken of natural features to constitute new beauties when the old ones have to be given up. To conceive of what London might be made even at this eleventh hour is not to be endowed so much with the imagination of "the Masque" as with the municipal conception of what is needed to make the surroundings of citizen life tolerable. Every city of Europe has the feeling, if not the actual capacity, for this development. Many of our own sea-side towns spend considerable sums of money in embankments, gardens,

conveniences, and beauties of all kinds to attract the visitor, and no one argues against their action. It is only when such work is needed for the ordinary dweller, and not for the chance visitor, that objections are to the fore. Municipal enterprise at Brighton may construct a noble sea-wall, may provide well-covered and sheltered seats, public rooms for use during wet and unseasonable weather, all the luxuries, in fact, of the well-known watering-place; but municipal enterprise in London must not, without severe and well-nigh universal denunciation, attempt any one of these things for the thousands of people whose lives are always in London, and to whom Brighton as a place to visit is a dreamland afar off.

The life of the people in public is in point of fact a sphere of municipal work of almost incalculable importance. Such life may be directed into almost endless channels of good, instead of being directed into channels of untold misery. Left to private enterprise to point the road, it now finds its way into the gin-palace and the public-house, which do duty in towns for the wayside inn of the country, for the old courtyard inn of Elizabethan towns. With the new ways and the new needs new methods must be found, and in the one reform of municipal control and direction of public-houses is the means of a complete change of citizen life. Restriction is not the reform that is needed, or that would be accepted. All the cries for "Local Veto" are but the articulate expression of the need of reform. That reform must take the shape of the administration of the necessary number of public-houses by the municipality, with proper annexes for all the ordinary English recreations

associated with these places, and with good food and good drink secured to everybody.

We seem to be so little conscious of what importance to the nation at large the public life of a people is, and how easily it may be directed into channels all helpful to good citizenship if only the functions of the municipality be properly understood. If, for instance, it were possible to view from a panoramic height the movements of the people on a Saturday afternoon under present conditions the results would afford very unpleasant reflections. The visible signs are well enough. Bicycles take out hundreds of riders into the country; the cricket-field and the river answer for hundreds more. But there are still the thousands left behind. And private enterprise, under public control forsooth! directs these thousands into the countless doorways of public-houses, situated not only in the great thoroughfares, where alone they ought to exist, but in every side street and at every available corner. The directing hand of this system of modern ethics points the way for thousands of human beings, and along the channels carved by these places proceed the mournful throng. Here, indeed, is work for the municipality to do. By uprooting all the miserable dens which exist hidden from the general sight, by establishing under full municipal management proper and convenient public-houses where the sale of intoxicants could be minimised and discouraged in favour of non-intoxicants, and where recreation and rest could be provided, the stream of citizen public life could be diverted into channels which would not be a disgrace to civilisation. It would be so easy to direct the course of that stream when once the municipality

had the power, and that this power should be given with the least possible delay is a proposition which above all others seems to me worthy of the consideration of our best thinkers. We have had quite enough talk, quite enough denunciation, quite enough royal commissions. What is now needed is municipal action, and that, alas! may not come until it is once for all recognised that the public life of the citizen is a matter of municipal concern.

Already advance has been made in matters of recreation. Art-galleries, museums, public libraries, cricket-grounds, swimming-baths, and a few other facilities are finding their way into the ordinary duties of municipal life. The London County Council has gone a step farther than this, and has considered favourably the endowment of a municipal opera-house. All this is to the good. But there is so much more to be done. The happiness of the many depends upon multiplying the choice of recreation, and allowing people who congregate in cities the means of getting out of them into the open country whenever public holidays or private opportunities allow of it.

Thus the whole question of locomotion enters into the duties of the municipality. Not only the locomotion needed for business purposes, but the locomotion needed for recreation. Every one who has paid attention to this subject of late years knows how enormous has been the development. Towns owning their own tramway lines and light railways are now quite ordinary features of municipal enterprise, which in the near future are destined to have far-reaching consequences.

In a rough sort of fashion, I hope I have been

able to indicate what the municipality has to accomplish if it is really to take its place among civilised institutions. It has something more to do than to carry on the few very necessary duties which no other body can carry on. It has the problem of citizen life to work out, and all the great influences, economical or social, which affect that life come within the sphere of municipal functions. Of course such examples as I have selected for illustration do not exhaust the duties which properly fall to the municipality. There are duties for the rich and duties for the poor, duties for trade and commerce and duties for the private citizen. I should be almost afraid to undertake the task of enumerating these duties, because in point of fact they are endless. They apply in one place and not in another. They are urgent in one place and only just apparent in another. Whatever tends to make the life of a citizen more tolerable, is duty for the municipality.

It will be said that these things cannot be because of the cost, and it will be well for one moment to turn attention to this part of the question. Municipal service implies municipal taxation, but municipal taxation does not mean taxation without benefit. Most of the extraordinary services, as they may conveniently be termed, can all be made to help one another. If, for instance, the municipality provides telephones, as it should do, for the convenience of traders and business generally, and for private persons, it may properly charge for such services an amount higher than the actual cost, and the surplus taxation from this service may be applied to the less lucrative and perhaps more necessary service in another direction, such, for instance, as baths and wash-houses, locomotion for

working-men, and so on. Thus this class of extra-ordinary public services need never be burdensome, and can always be regulated by principles of public policy. Let it always be borne in mind that when the municipality charges for a service more than the cost of that service, the excess cost is taxation of that portion of the community who are using the service, and there is little fear that unwise experiments will be undertaken. The word "profit" must be eliminated from municipal finances. There is no such thing. When the municipality pays over surplus tramway receipts to the rates it is taxing the tramway travellers for the relief of the general ratepayer. No doubt the policy is a perfectly sound one, but let it not be doubted or hidden from view that tramway travellers are being taxed. And so on in every branch of work. Whenever the municipality takes a comprehensive view of its duties it will see that no service is overtaxed and that every service is adequate to the needs of the community. In ordinary taxation one class of ratepayers pays for the benefit of other classes. In taxation by services a similar principle may be adopted with advantage so long as the principle at work is seen quite clearly and its results properly gauged and understood. Few municipal subjects are of more importance than this. Services may be rendered for the citizens, but the citizens must know the results. At present nothing is known, and it seems to be the intent of officialism and political action to hide up and confuse the issues whenever taxation appears upon the scene. It is a great mistake. The citizen does not mind taxation if he knows that in return he is getting genuine service. He will pay his quota to the general funds which pays for

services of equal value to all concerned, and he will pay his quota to the special funds which meet the services paid for by those who use them. What he will not do, and what he should not be induced to do, is to see all funds jumbled up to such a degree that recognition of any one is hopeless.

There is a great future for municipal development and municipal influence for good. The few notes which I have been able here to put together may have the effect of stimulating those whose influence is great in such matters to see that issues far wider than those of the moment are included in the ideal municipal life which is slowly coming to us out of the growths of the past and the needs of the future—issues as great in the interests of civilisation as many more prominently in the minds of statesmen and philosophers, issues greater by far than many which are sanctified by high-sounding conceptions of the duties which man owes one to another.

ON CAPITAL

BY J. A. HOBSON, M.A.

1. The growth of capital under the "Industrial Revolution." 2. Capitalism not destined to absorb the whole field of industry. 3. The moral implications of "capitalism"—Substitution of the "cash nexus" for the "human nexus." 4. The "humane" employer not free to express his "humanity" in business. 5. Joint-stock capital and the division between capital and management complicates two moral issues. 6. "Absolute ownership" of a business by capitalist employers is ethically indefensible. 7. Labour has a rightful property in business, arising from the personal factors in the giving out of labour power. 8. The growth of moral feeling attested by experiments in co-partnership, &c. 9. The harmony of interests sought and obtained by profit-sharing and co-partnership. 10. Harmony within the business does not suffice while discord in the trade remains. 11. Trade combinations or "Alliances" no ultimate solution of the problem of moralising industry, because profit and wages, not social service, are the ends. 12. The economic defects of the Alliance involve moral defects: antagonism between producer and consumer, between trade and trade. 13. The essentially organic nature of industry invalidates trade individualism and demands recognition of the social origin and nature of capital. 14. Doctrine of the "social trust" requires social institutions for its realisation.

1. IN the development of modern industry there are three features of prime significance—the large and rapid growth of the size of businesses in many fields of industry, the increasing power and importance of capital as an agent in production of wealth, and the growing dominance of a class of employers and directors of industrial operations. The two former are obvious and well recognised in their general character

and bearings; the last has by no means secured the close attention it deserves, even among students of social and industrial questions. A brief statement of the nature of these three distinctive changes is required in order that we may understand how they are related and interact upon one another.

A century and a half ago almost all businesses —agricultural, manufacturing, or commercial—were carried on in a small way by men who worked alone or were assisted only by their family or a few hired assistants, owning the raw material, the tools, and the premises on which they worked, and disposing of the produce in some local market. With the exception of parts of a few industries, such as coal-mining, banking, brewing, shipping, canal navigation, and some branches of the clothing industry, there was little need of large capital or elaborate organisation of businesses.

Power-driven machinery and accompanying division of labour have effected a series of changes so swift and so radical as rightly to be termed an industrial revolution.

Most of the staple manufactures, the transport industry by land and sea, mining, and many sorts of agriculture, require for their successful conduct the co-operation of a large capital, and a large number of carefully organised workers under skilled management. The modern big business—the foundry, mill, mine, brewery, chemical works, or railway—is not merely a larger unit of capital and labour than its predecessor in the olden time, but within that unit capital is relatively more important. Whereas in the simple hand-industries a few pounds of capital was generally enough to enable the artisan to purchase his imple-

ments and materials and to conduct his business, the capital value of a modern well-equipped cotton-mill is several hundred pounds for every man, woman, and child employed, while our railways have a capital of some £2000 for every worker.

But this increased size of business, and this growth of the importance of capital, are by no means confined to manufactures and transport trades, where masses of expensive machinery are used. Wholesale and retail distribution, banking and finance, are largely subject to the same laws of growth, though machinery forms no substantial part of their capital, and favours their growth chiefly by giving increased facilities of transport and communication. Wholesale commerce and finance have long taken shape in large capitalist enterprises, while the most distinctive movement of the last few years has been the rapid fusion of retail trade into similar moulds. In the large centres of population and the staple trades the small shopkeeper is everywhere relaxing his hold upon industrial life. In such trades as clothing, boots, groceries, meat, tobacco, large companies of manufacturers, importers, or wholesale merchants are absorbing every year a larger proportion of the business; even where the small tradesman appears to survive, and keeps his own name over his shop, he is often the creature of a company which stocks his shop, or is merely selling on commission.

In all these industries—extractive, manufacturing, transport, wholesale or retail distribution—keen competition in an ever-growing market-area crushes the smaller competitors or forces them to fuse, and so to take on the shape of the large capitalist business.

2. This is the most salient feature of modern industry, and is sometimes regarded as the expression of a law of development of universal application. From this imputed universality so-called "scientific" socialism often deserves a specious support, representing all industry as inevitably doomed to pass into ever larger and ever fewer forms until an apex of monopoly is reached, which will compel the State, in sheer self-defence, to oust the private monopolists and substitute a public monopoly. That this is the true tendency in many trades, perhaps in all strongly-marked routine industries, can hardly be denied, but a more careful investigation of industrial structure compels discrimination.

All businesses in all trades do not tend towards this large capitalist form, but only the essentially routine businesses where machinery or minute division of labour, or both economies, can be practised with advantage. Even in those trades where the capitalist movement is most evident, certain branches of business resist and still remain in a small and relatively simple form. These are sometimes morbid survivals or even reversionary types, as in the case of the small sweating workshops of the clothing or furniture trades, which present some of the most perplexing problems to social reformers of to-day. But we must distinguish from these a large variety of essentially healthy survivals of the small business. Wherever the material or the process resists the pressure of routine, and demands personal care and skill of treatment, or some human quality of art, the small business tends to survive. Wherever the taste, caprice, or personal fit of the consumer is a potent factor in demand; where skilled personal service is required, as in

the professions and many branches of agriculture; where a delicate adjustment of different processes is involved, as in the manufacture of scientific instruments; where minute personal supervision and attention of an owner is important, as in certain kinds of millinery or specialist shopkeeping—in all such cases the small business tends to survive and even to multiply. If we take a broad survey of the whole industrial field, we may even doubt whether the majority or an increasing proportion of industry is "destined" to take the form of *la grande industrie*. The huge economy of labour-saving machinery may even be destined to employ a diminishing proportion of the workers upon purely routine processes in large businesses, and to liberate an increasing proportion for those more interesting, more skilled, and essentially more individualistic processes of production which evade the law of modern capitalism.

3. This speculation need not, however, here concern us, except that it may serve to check the depression of feelings which sometimes besets us when we contemplate what seems to be the ever-growing magnitude of the problems of capital and labour which cluster round the great industry. It is with these latter and their physical and moral implications that earnest students of social reform are most vitally concerned. In these large, highly-organised industries—coal-mining, shipping, railways, metal and textile manufactures—the rumble of the conflict between capital and labour is seldom silent for long; and recent years have given terrible evidence of the increased havoc, waste, and misery due to prolonged struggles between big and closely-welded masses of the opposed forces.

It is this apparently inevitable conflict that brings home to us at the present time the most urgent moral implication of the capitalist system. When businesses were small, and the employer commonly worked and lived with and among his men, close personal relations were maintained; this close, constant detailed co-operation involved, and even tended to produce and maintain, except in definitely bad natures, a community of thought and feeling which gave an infusion of moral life to the business structure. Men placed in such relations must work in habitual amity, and mitigate the conscious pursuit of purely personal gains by the common pursuit of a common interest. This practical spirit of comradeship among the fellow-workers (including the small capitalist-employer, who either worked with or personally supervised his men) has inevitably given way in the organisation of the big complex modern business to a purely "cash nexus," in which the employer can have little or no personal acquaintance with the great majority of those whom he employs; he may be kindly disposed towards them *en masse*, but, in a large business, he cannot know enough about them individually to impart or to receive any considerable moral influence. The inevitable tendency of the big business is to become as mechanical in its method of organisation as in the processes it employs; and "labour" becomes a "cost of production," represented by a wages-bill with a merely occasional protrusion of the human factor, too frequently in the form of some trade dispute, some misconduct, or some accident.

4. Here and there even a large employer, impelled by genuinely liberal sentiments, succeeds in preserving certain personal relations with large numbers of em-

ployees and in maintaining an *esprit de corps*. But it ought to be observed that, in almost every case, such employers stand in exceptional economic circumstances, which enable them to deal generously with employees, owning or managing businesses which, by the possession of some monopoly of patent, superiority of process, or the virtual control of a market, are in a more than usually fortunate condition. When a firm is closely competing with others, as is the rule, the employer has not the money, the time, or the leisure, even if he has the inclination, to play the philanthropist, or even to pay such wages or secure such other favourable conditions of employment for his workers as he might wish to do. Competition rigorously dictates to him the treatment of his workers; in major matters, at any rate, he must conform, or he must pay the penalty by losing trade, which passes to those who are less scrupulous and less humane.

5. If, then, capitalism merely brought a great growth in the number of workers in a business, it would imply radical changes in the moral relations of employer and employed. But not less significant are the changes in the ownership of capital and the control of business. We too often speak and think of the conflict and harmony of capital and labour as if it were identical with the conflict and harmony of employers and employed. But this is not the case. The actual employer in a large business is seldom the owner of the bulk of the capital he wields, and not uncommonly the functions and the practical responsibility of the employer are divided among a variety of grades of officials, few of whom, if any, are owners even of a share of capital. Although the old order of

moral relations within a business is now no longer possible, most thoughtful business men would admit that it ought to be replaced by new relations of mutual responsibility between capitalist, employer, and employed. But since most large businesses are either conducted with borrowed capital, or are joint-stock companies in which the manager is a salaried official, it becomes more and more difficult to locate satisfactorily the different kinds and degrees of moral responsibility. Where the business is a private firm in which the manager has a large or the largest interest, he may be said to have fairly definite moral duties towards his employees in the matter of wages and other terms of employment, though the necessity of paying interest on borrowed capital may hamper his practical interpretation of these duties. But in the public company, which must be regarded as the type of the modern capitalist business, and which is rapidly absorbing the highly-organised industries, it is extraordinarily difficult to locate the responsibilities of the employer.

In theory, and to some extent in practice, the body of shareholders, an amorphous mass of continually shifting personalities, are the employers; the business is supposed to be "theirs," and to be worked so as to yield them the highest rate of interest for their investment, and they choose a board of directors, which appoints the management and rules the general policy of the business. Suppose that a charge of sweating the employees is proved against such company, who is to blame? *Primâ facie* not the manager, who is paid to manage the business so as to produce the largest net surplus of receipts over expenditure, and who may even show that "sweating" is forced upon

him by competition of other businesses, and that he is faced by the alternative of "fair wages" or "fair interest." Similarly, the directors are appointed by and derive their power from the shareholders, and they may claim that they have no right to indulge their private philanthropic predilections at the expense of the shareholders. When we turn to these last, we find ourselves face to face with a heterogeneous employer, the parts of whom are utterly unknown to one another, who neither have, nor can have, any personal acquaintance with their employees, and who often have no sure means of ascertaining what are the real facts relating to employment. It may be rightly urged that it is the duty of every shareholder to use means to understand the conduct of the business in which he is indirectly engaged. But to educate a majority of shareholders to such an adequate conception of their duties, and to impart to them the intelligence requisite to execute them, will be regarded by all who are acquainted with these bodies as "a counsel of perfection." If one were dealing even with a fixed ownership by original shareholders, it would be difficult to induce them to forego any of the profits, to obtain which they had put their money into the concern. But the actual personnel of a "company" is fluid and elusive; shares are continually changing hands at prices which discount the present and prospective rates of interest; so that an owner of shares in some highly profitable business, paying from thirty to forty per cent., like the Aerated Bread Company, may easily show that the price he has paid for shares recently purchased reduces his real profit to a trifling sum. It is clear that responsibility exists, but to apportion it is a grave problem. In many great

capitalist companies the true or main responsibility for "sweating" really rests upon those who have taken the initiative in forming the company, the owner of some private business, and the promoters who have succeeded in putting the business on the market at an inflated capital value, "sweating" the ignorant investing public in advance, as the latter in their capacity of shareholders sweat their employees. Nor is this all. The complexity of modern business enables sharp business men to pervert the form of the Joint Stock Company to their private ends. Nominally the initiative force proceeds for the shareholders, and the business is created to pay their dividends; actually the initiative proceeds in many instances for a gang of speculators and dealers in profitable notions, who, by specious prospectuses and other wiles, lure the gullible investors into their net, and, in return for hard cash, which they distribute among themselves as founders' shares, expenses of promotion, &c., place a comparatively worthless property in the hands of their dupes.

In many instances, of course, the directors and the managers have the real control and a free hand: the democratic structure of a railway or a large insurance company is a mere pretence. In such cases a certain code of fair conduct and honourable relations may, and often does, subsist between the management and the employees, the virtual monopoly of real control supplying a certain personal factor which would be lacking were the shareholders the real masters.

When a liberal-minded and rich-natured man finds himself in command of a vast industrial concern, wielding control over the destiny of thousands of employees, the very magnitude and the complex

harmony of such a structure may sometimes exercise a fascination which induces him to identify his interest with that of the welfare of all the co-operating units. It is creditable to human nature that, in the demoralising strain of modern competition, there have been many employers who have genuinely striven to infuse principles of justice, and even of generosity and humanity, into the system which they have controlled.

6. But none the less it must be generally admitted that a large elaborate business, motived primarily by the desire to make profit, and only secondarily by a desire to do good work and to confer benefit on workers, is radically defective from a true moral standpoint. This is brought home most thoroughly by the common attitude adopted by the employer or the capitalist when his employees, or the public, seek to bring pressure to bear upon the conduct of business. He is the owner of the business; labour is only a commodity, an instrument of production which he buys; the business exists in order to furnish him an income, and the control must rest entirely in his hands. The dictates either of labour or the public he resents as an encroachment on his rights.

Now the moral deficiency of this attitude is best shown by a cold scientific investigation of the facts of the case. In what exact sense is the business "owned" by the capitalist-employer? What constitutes a business? A disinterested student of industry would find a business to consist of the organic co-operation of various special forms of capital in plant, machinery, and raw material, and various special forms of labour. Is it right to say that the employer, who is the organiser of this co-operation, "owns" all the essential factors? Clearly not. He

does not own the permanent sources of labour-power. Granted even that he is owner of the labour-power after it is sold by the workers, still the persons and lives of these workers are essential factors in the business, and the English employer does not own them. The only industry which really conforms to the claim of the militant employer is a slave industry. The workers who are obliged to live round a factory, who spend the best part of their lives within its walls, give out their personal skill and energy in tending its machinery, who are even more deeply interested in a success or failure, which means food or starvation, than the capitalist, to whom it means riches or poverty—these people have as real a property, as true an "ownership," in the business as the men who bought and set up the machinery. Legally, we know well they have no claim; they may have laboured for generations in the mill, and the caprice or self-interest of the owner may throw them on the street. This purely legal view of property so dominates the mind and imagination of most people, that they cannot bring themselves even to admit that the muscle, skill, industry, and character of a body of workers, which have helped to build up and carry on a successful business, involve any rightful property in that business. Yet this view begs the whole moral question; it assumes that a legal position is morally sound, whereas that is the very issue. If there is any private "ownership" of a business, such ownership will rightly rest upon the effort which has gone to the making of the business and the benefit derived from its function. In both of them the employees have a share. The fact that the employer can sell the name, the goodwill and the premises, or clear away every

stock and stone of the building, is merely testimony to an immoral interpretation of ownership.

7. The capitalist employer is not full owner of the business; the worker has a rightful claim.

That workers have a genuine though not a legally recognised "interest" in the business in which they work is gaining wider recognition every day among thoughtful and right-feeling people. Such recognition, of course, by no means implies a right on the part of the workers to interfere to an unlimited extent with the management of the business, or to absorb the entire profits of the business. It is not here possible to discuss minutely the reasonable limits of the workers' case. It must suffice to say that a sound general distinction may be drawn between the commercial and mechanical ordering of a business, on the one hand, and "the conditions of employment" on the other; and that while the former will be admitted to be the rightful province of the employer, the employees have a clear right to interfere with the latter, since it is their labour-power and their lives that are concerned. While the employer will determine what goods shall be made and what processes employed, will plan the mechanical and economic division of productive power, dispose of the goods, determine the selling prices, and bargain with workers for the sale of their labour-power, he will not resent the right of the latter to say individually or collectively, as they may choose, upon what conditions of price or time, safety and sanitation, they will offer for sale this labour-power.

If labour-power were detachable from the persons of its owners and could be sold in lumps, or by metre, it might be arguable that it ranked strictly as a

commodity or cost of production along with the raw material or coal likewise needed for the working of machinery. But since the giving out of labour-power in work is a physical and a psychical function of human beings, reacting upon every other function, and involving constant necessary reactions upon their whole life and character, the worker's interest in securing good conditions of employment is of unique importance both to him and to the community, transcending infinitely the merely monetary interest which animates the profit-seeking employer. Even were we to deny to the worker any direct ownership or interest in the business, still the nature of this process of personal labour would be a valid ground for that sort of interference which takes shape in a demand to bargain collectively with reference to any condition of employment which affects the well-being of the worker. If, however, we regard the worker as an integral factor in the business which exists for him in the same sense as it exists for the employer, his right of interference in these matters is doubly valid.

8. It is just to recognise that an increasing number of employers, while they may not be prepared to admit even the theoretic joint-ownership, receive the doctrine of the right of collective bargaining in its widest signification.

A few go further and seek to embody in some stable and legal form the economic principle of joint-ownership of a business by capital and labour. To give the employees a definite interest in the business beyond that involved in fair wages and regular employment is the object common to a large variety of schemes, which are known as profit-sharing, co-partnership, or co-operation. The different schemes

shade off into one another, differing chiefly as to the degree of power assigned to the workers over the profits and management of the business. The simplest "profit-sharing scheme merely stimulates increased activity or care on the part of employees by promising a "bonus," consisting of a percentage of the net profits after a fixed rate of interest has been paid. Others make provisions whereby such bonus is invested in shares of the business, so as to secure for workers a part ownership of the capital and a corresponding voice in management. In a few instances a capitalist-employer has voluntarily set his business on a "democratic basis," giving the entire or a considerable control to the body of employees and undertaking to act as their salaried servant.

To harmonise the interests of capital and labour is the chief avowed object of all these schemes. Their first significance lies in transcending the vulgar error, which consists in supposing that because capital and labour are alike essential to modern business, this mutuality of need secures industrial peace. The suggestion that, if capitalists and workmen understood their real interests they would work together in complete amity, is only true when a higher ethical significance is attached to the term "real interests"; it is not true when, as is commonly the case, it is applied to the direct economic interests of the two parties. That the employer and his employees have a certain common interest is obvious enough, and it is also true that much friction and attendant misery is due to an inadequate recognition of this truth by masters or by men. It is never the real interest of the masters, for instance, to press down wages, or to extend hours, to a point which will impair the working

efficiency of their employees, or check the adequate flow of fresh labour-power into their trade. Similarly, it is folly in the workers to impose such restrictions upon the price or the output of labour as to make trade "unprofitable," and so to check the necessary application of new capital and ability of management. But this common ground is not sufficient to secure abiding harmony of co-operation between capital and labour. In the vicissitudes of modern trade there continually arise surplus elements of profit which may pass entirely to capital, or may be diverted to raise wages, or otherwise to improve conditions of labour; and in all such cases a genuine clash of present economic interests is involved, which cannot be abated by general precepts about the ultimate harmony of the interests of capital and labour.

9. All experiments in profit-sharing and co-operative business are based on a distinct recognition of the fact, and an endeavour to provide a stronger community of interest. They differ among themselves principally with regard to the degree of acceptance of what is called the "democratic" or "self-governing" basis of business. In most cases of "profit-sharing" the full control of the business remains with the capitalist-employer, and the "bonus" amounts virtually to a "deferred wage," calculated so as to secure better service from labour, and to establish more amicable relations between capital and labour. Even where the bonus takes the shape of shares of capital, the object is commonly the same; a slight holding of capital by employees is seldom designed to form a bridge to a self-governing workshop where workers own or control the entire business. To an increasing body of social and industrial reformers,

however, the only true full harmony of interests between capital and labour is found in the self-governing workshop, where the workers own or hire their capital, elect their managers or officials, and control their business policy, dividing among themselves on some "equitable" basis the net proceeds of the business.

Sometimes the ideal is approached from the side of capitalism by a gradual extension of ownership and management to the employees; more commonly it is approached from the labour side by the coming together of a number of workers in a trade who contribute their own capital (or borrow it at fixed interest) and organise a business for themselves.

By some such plan alone does it seem feasible to secure full economic harmony between the capital, the management, and the labour factors in a business, and so to heal the moral discord which has been brought about by the modern structural changes in business life.

10. With the strictly economic difficulties which retard the application of this ideal to the larger and more complex forms of business we need not here exercise ourselves. But it is important to ask and answer the question how far the ideal of the self-governing workshops, if attainable, satisfies the right demand for the moralisation of industry. Since capital and labour have their close relations within the compass of a business, it may well appear that to impose moral harmony on these relations presents a sufficient solution of the "labour" problem. But a little reflection will show that there are other aspects of industry, presenting ugly moral issues which remain untouched. We have treated industry as if it comprised a number

of separate self-contained cells called businesses. But this is not the case. The intricate relations of businesses to one another in a trade, involving competition or combination of employers and labourers, entail economic consequences not less fraught with moral import than the relations of capital and labour in a single business. Little, if anything, seems won for the cause of moral organic unity if the closer and more pacific organisation of single businesses is only used to concentrate more energy upon the cut-throat competition of businesses in a market, by means of which one set of employers and employed seek to obtain profits and wages for themselves at the expense of another set of employers and employed in the same trade. The economic fallacy of supposing that this murderous warfare was both necessary and ultimately beneficial, by reason of the stimulation it furnished to the most effective employment of industrial power, has been frequently exposed; and perhaps its most effective exposure consists in the eagerness everywhere evinced by keen business men to substitute some form of combination for such competition. But even were its economic validity, as the best means of producing a maximum quantity of material wealth, still maintained, the moral waste and degradation attendant on such processes would be none the less deplorable; and we should be bound to plead for a certain sacrifice of immediate material wealth in order to secure a basis of moral order essential to the growth of wholesome human character.

11. How to secure industrial peace and effective co-operation between the businesses within a trade is a moral issue no less vital than that of securing these

same conditions for the factors of a single business. Competition growing ever fiercer, more ruthless, and more costly, or combination growing ever closer, more stable, and more effectual; these are the alternatives. Can we hesitate when we are asked which of the two makes for morality? Peace comes by way of combination, and to that we must turn. Why then the hesitancy which is visible in accepting the trade combinations which we see around us as signs of progress and pledges of moral advance in industry? Two obstacles prevent the full acceptance of these combinations. In the first place, they are commonly based upon the fullest and most ruthless assertion of the principle that the business belongs entirely to the capitalist, and that the labourer has no vested interest worth consideration. In other words, the combination is made entirely by the employers with an exclusive eye to profit. Not merely are the interests of labour ignored, but there is a feeling, justified by ample experience, that one result of a powerful combination of employers, though designed primarily to regulate competition among themselves, is to weaken the power of labour in bargaining with capital. A strong "trust," created in a trade where excessive competition has previously prevailed, will commonly be attended by an actual reduction of the quantity of available employment in the trade (a mere corollary of improved organisation), and by diminished freedom of choice in accepting or rejecting such employment as offers itself in a trade where employers are in close communication with one another, and are acting on a common plan. This subservience of labour under a strong capitalist trade combination must be recognised as a grave moral defect, impairing the qualities of

reasonable liberty and individual initiative which are essential to the preservation and strengthening of character. No trade combination is defensible in which the initiative and control of the labour elements are not adequately safeguarded. The only combinations which do not fall under this condemnation are the Alliances formed in recent years in certain metal trades in and around Birmingham, and spreading to other and highly specialised trades in certain midland and northern towns. These Alliances are so constituted as to secure a distribution of the economies of combination, alike among employers and employed, by means of an agreement between the Union of Employers and the Union of Employed, and the confidence and practical initiative of the latter are preserved by the power conferred upon their representatives to assist in ordering the activities of the combination. These Alliances must therefore be regarded as the most advanced step yet taken towards industrial peace. But the moralisation of industry is not yet won. Even these joint combinations of capital and labour contain the radical moral defect of all industry of which the consciously conceived end is profit and wages, not social service. Selfishness and individualism do not disappear when the size of the self and the individual is expanded to cover the whole area of a trade.

12. The economic defect of the Alliance consists in the fact that such a combination has a power of monopoly, by virtue of which it can rack-rent the consuming public through high prices. It professes to be content with "fair" profits, "fair" wages, "fair" prices, but no standard of "fairness" exists, and no power exists to secure the application of any

alleged standard. The fact that high prices check consumption is no more an adequate safeguard for the public under the New Trade Combination than under any other order of monopoly. In many trades it will pay the monopolist to sell a small quantity of goods for a high price rather than a large quantity at a small price. This economic defect also has its moral aspect: a radical discord exists between trade and trade on the one hand, and between producer and consumer on the other hand. An Alliance in the coal-trade, were it formed (and it has been seriously contemplated), would wield a most dangerous power to suck the profits out of the manufacturing trades; high profits for coal-capital, high wages for miners could be secured by cutting down the profits and wages in other trades; and in the present temper of the industrial world such attempts would doubtless be made, arousing bitter animosity between trade and trade, and obliging the State to interpose to check the internecine war. A policy of Alliances, constructed on an ultimately unsound basis of trade individualism, would not abolish industrial strife, but would simply alter the plane and method of the struggle; instead of individual employers or labourers seeking to get their private good out of one another's bane, whole trades would pursue the same policy; the scale and character of strife would be changed, but the net issue of envy, malice, hatred, and all uncharitableness would be as large as before.

13. This is the inevitable result of refusing to face the root facts of industry. That industry is social is no abstract dogma, but a hard, plain fact, driven home to the eyes and hearts of all clear-thinking, right-feeling men by daily experience.

This social character is best watched in the phenomena of "price," which are the subtlest registers of social forces upon industry. We cannot trust competition on the one hand, or combination on the other, to fix satisfactory prices; there is no stability, no constant or reliable relation between services rendered and payments received; palpable unfairness exists, and yet not one can say what is fair. This is inevitable when private interests are left to determine the operation of public forces. An individual, a business, a trade, cannot of and by itself produce wealth; the whole of the industrial community vitally co-operate in each act of production. No one who carefully traces the complex reticulation of the body politic can fail to perceive this truth. Touch but one big business interest and the whole mass of industry quivers. How illogical then, how impracticable, all attempts to deal with the social problems of the business world by allowing each trade to regulate itself in guilds or alliances, based upon a theory of independence which is at variance with the organic facts of industry! But the most patent and complete refutation of this business of trade individualism is presented by looking at the influence of "demand." Mr. Carnegie has just retired from the "steel rail" business with a reputed fortune of forty million pounds. Here is the typical instance of a "self-made" man. How far the industry, skill, and foresight of Mr. Carnegie, how far the co-operation of the inventive and organising minds whose services he enlisted, how far the natural resources of the country in coal and iron, the presence of large supplies of tractable, intelligent labour, the existence of large organised trades subsidiary to the metal industry—how far each of these may be regarded as

important in the making of Mr. Carnegie's millions, we need not here inquire. But the combination of all these factors of production do not serve to explain the use or the value of the Carnegie Steel Company. The growth of a vast civilised society, not only on the American continent, but throughout the globe, developing a growing need for rapid transport of persons and goods, which furnishes a "demand" for steel rails, together with such a general advance in the arts of industry as enables them to make that demand "effective"—this organised operation of distinctively social forces, utterly incapable of reduction to individual action, is needed to explain the origin and growth of the Carnegie Steel Company and the fortune of its founder.

14. The establishment of moral order in industry requires, then, the recognition of the social origin and function of capital. The recognition of this truth is often interpreted to imply that every capitalist ought to regard his capital as a public trust and seek to use it for the social good. This is a just and serviceable interpretation of existing facts upon the present legal basis of rights of property. But it must not blind our eyes to the paramount duty of a constant revision of the terms of the "trust," and a vigilant scrutiny into the origins of that wealth which is employed as capital, to see that it is not acquired by crooked or oppressive ways. It must be acknowledged as a primary duty of a civilised State, acting for society, to see that the powers of property which it sanctions as a "social trust" are untarnished in their origin as well as in their use.

This duty, in its application to industrial capital, will involve on the one hand the stoppage of all

streams of private wealth which have their source in "unearned increments," and, on the other hand, the strict supervision and regulation of all wealth which, by its misuse, tends to endanger or corrupt the body politic, and, finally, the direct public assumption of the administration of all industrial capital which cannot otherwise be effectively controlled.

OF LABOUR

By J. A. HOBSON, M.A.

1. Organisation of labour corresponds to that of capital, but is essentially weaker. 2. Passions of sympathy, justice, and indignation the true sources of "the labour movement." 3. The labour movement not a "social movement" in the full sense of the term—"Individual rights" to the whole product of labour, as a principle. 4. The claim "to the whole product" weighed and found wanting—The claim of interest and wage of mental exertion. 5. There is no individual product; production and value-making are always social. 6. The labour problem not solved by the self-governing workshop. 7. The self-governing trade shows the same uses and defects. 8. The solidarity of a labour movement is no final settlement of industrial order. 9. Moral order requires the identification of the individual worker's end and motive with the social end and motive—The limits of Socialism.

1. THE present status and movement of labour are of course intimately connected with the economic and moral aspects of Capitalism, upon which I have dwelt in the preceding chapter. The disinterested student of industrial facts and laws will trace a close and causally related series of changes in the structure of capital and labour. Labour, like capital, will be seen grouping itself over large areas of industry, in large and ever larger co-operative masses, each unit minutely specialised in some single narrow process contributing to the production of a single class of goods. The conditions of this mass-labour have led to an organisation of labourers, first in the business and then in the trade, local or general, corresponding with the more rigid organisation of the capital.

It is not always clearly understood that capital is, as a rule, far more closely organised than labour, and, in all bargaining, enjoys an immense advantage on this account. The modern business on its capital side is a closely welded mass of pieces of capital, belonging to many different owners, but wrought into complete industrial unity and wielded as a single mass. From the employer's standpoint, the body of employees forms a similar mass of industrial power, only far less tractable because it is not detachable from the awkward factor of personality. But from the standpoint of a labour movement, the best organisation of the employees of such a business is far less complete than that of the capital, while there are very few trades where half the owners of labour-power are even formally enrolled in any union. An association or syndicate of employers, containing the same proportion of members of the trade as a labour union, will be greatly superior in actual strength for bargain or for conflict. But bearing in mind this difference, arising from the fact that personality is directly involved in each exercise of labour-power, we find a structural development of labour following the same course as the development of capital. The absolute bulk of capital has of course grown faster, but the expansion of the business and of the market have been accompanied by the growth of a more or less formal solidarity of labour.

2. But this hard scientific view of growth of structure is a signally defective basis for treatment of the deep human issues involved in the modern conditions of the life of the labouring classes. The sufferings, the aspirations, and the struggles towards a better material and moral life, involved in the modern labour move-

ment, owe little to any scientific view of industry. Indeed a wholesome instinct led most labour leaders to reject or to ignore the repressive dogmas by which a recklessly improvised class "science" of political economy long strove to impress upon the working classes their impotence for self-help and self-development through collective action. Not until quite recent years has any formal economic theory been adopted by any considerable body of labourers; and even now the formulæ of dogmatic socialism, though they drop glibly from the lips of many, cannot, at any rate in Great Britain, be considered as exercising any powerful influence upon thought or action. Reading the public utterances on platforms or in press of labour leaders, one might often be disposed to impute a self-consciousness and a definite purpose to the labour movement which it does not possess. Though many individuals are doubtless driven by some principles of social reform which they wish to realise, the true momentum of the labour movement has ever been the product of certain elementary passions, of sympathy, justice, and indignation seeking expression through the quick remedy of concrete pressing grievances.

How heavy and how manifold these grievances have been and are, how sound and essential the passions stimulating redress, it is hardly necessary to insist. It would be difficult to understand the apathy and the criminal neglect of the first duties of "humanity" exhibited by the upper and middle classes towards the terrible misery and glaring oppression from which the majority of workers suffered in the early decades of this century, when the early Christian Socialists, the Owenites and the Chartists, first formu-

lated the problem of "the condition of the people," were it not for the present evidence afforded by the callous indifference of all save a scant few to the sweating, overcrowding, and other mortal injuries which still remain unchecked over large areas of industrial life.

3. But how shall those who are alive to the necessities of organised social conduct in raising the material and moral standard of life for the labouring classes regulate that conduct? What are the claims of labour, and how shall they be realised? Nature has so closely linked together effort and enjoyment, work and life, that, in a natural or rational order of society, all would labour, and, since co-operation will ever be found most profitable, the scope of the true labour question will cover the whole of the social question. But the actual condition of the labour question and the labour movement is visibly defective in two ways. The labouring classes do not constitute the whole of society; certain classes do no productive work, but live parasitically on the labour of the rest. Secondly, the operation of the labour movement does not adequately reflect the true social solidarity of labour. From the social standpoint these are serious defects which will prevent us from regarding this movement as anything other than an imperfect and provisional instrument of progress.

Since the organisation of labour proceeds primarily from the needs of individual labourers and their desire to redress grievances and to secure advantages which affect them individually, the philosophy of individual rights is implicit in the labour movement as its animating principle. Though mutual support and co-operation for a common end extends the horizon of

self-interest from the individual to the group of fellow-workers, from the group to the trade, from the trade to labour regarded as a single class, the claims of the individual worker still remain to him the paramount consideration, and individual rights rather than social good form the ideal.

Put into economic language, this means that the first object of the labour movement is to secure for the worker what is called "the whole product of labour." To say this does not signify that the average trade-unionist or co-operator has any clearly defined conception of his rightful property in the results of his labour, but that the movement is only rightly interpreted from this standpoint as a historical force, and that its prophets and economists have thus formulated its meaning. It is also true that other feelings and other ideas, some congruous, others inconsistent with this chief end and aim, have disclosed themselves; the sentiment of independence from the control of capitalist employers, and the desire to use the State to secure subsistence and employment for all, and to regulate the conditions under which they work for private masters, are doubtless important factors in the labour movement. But the claim of the right of labour to the product of labour must be regarded as the factor of supreme influence in determining our moral judgment of the labour movement.

4. The claim of labour to the whole product of labour is often invalidated by a too narrow interpretation of labour. There is a decided tendency to ignore both the effort and the importance of much of the mental labour performed by the employing and professional classes. This neglect is due partly to the fact that manual workers often cannot realise either

the effort or the utility of exclusively mental labour, partly to resentment at the excessive estimate which the employing class and their economists set upon the work of organising industry. They justly suspect that the man who spends an hour or two in his office and gives a few orders is often remunerated on a scale grossly disproportionate to his effort or the social service he renders. But though rates of payment have, under present circumstances, a very unreliable relation to intrinsic worth of services, the tendency in the labour movement to confine labour to work chiefly manual is a real defect.

Again, though it is convenient to separate labour from capital, and to distinguish their services, the demand for the whole product of labour is also impaired by the covert or open denial of the legitimacy of all interest on capital. I cannot here argue out the case of capital and interest, but must content myself with saying that so long as individual saving is required in order to furnish capital for industry, and some of that saving involves an effort of abstinence, that effort has as clear and necessary a claim to be remunerated out of the product to which it contributes, as the labour directly put into its making. The claim of labour to the "whole product" is neither economically feasible nor morally justifiable so long as individual saving is a necessary force in production. The fact that a large, and perhaps the largest, share of profits and interests are really "unearned," in the sense that they involve no personal effort or sacrifice on the part of the recipients, must not lead us to a theoretic or a practical position which regards *all* profits and *all* interest as illicit. Even if our ideal society is one in which no profits and no interest need be

paid, but the whole product divided in remuneration of labour, we are not justified in interpreting current facts in the light of this ideal.

5. But suppose the most liberal interpretation is given to "labour," and all who contribute to production are included. Even then the right of the individual producer to the whole product of labour cannot be admitted as a valid basis of distribution, nor can any sound society be instituted upon such a claim. No individual living in society can rightly be said to make anything, still less to make its value; at every point, and in a myriad ways, he is aided and supported by the society of which he forms a unit. He himself, with his strength, skill, knowledge, is a product of social forces; without society he could not have or use the material or the tools with which he makes "the product of his labour"; society protects him while he works, furnishes a market without which his product would be valueless, and enables other products to be made and distributed, so that he may get them in exchange for "his product." All this social co-operation takes place even where a single workman seems to work alone in making and selling anything; much more is it visible in the operations of an organised business with elaborate division of labour and manifold processes. In a word, there is no product of the labour of an individual who is a member of society; labour is social, the product is a social product, and its value is a social value.

But though modern conditions render the claim of the individual to the whole product no longer plausible, in industrial conditions where it becomes more and more difficult for any one to make any article, or to identify it as the product of his labour, the defective

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notion survives in larger forms, and furnishes an ideal to certain labour movements.

6. We have seen in the last paper that the claims of the capital in a business to full ownership of that business and of its products, though legally valid, have no moral, and ultimately no economic, validity. Neither can social or industrial salvation be found in any growth of labour forces which enables a group of labourers, by co-partnership with capital or by co-operation with hired capital, to control a business and to secure for themselves its full product and its value. It would be wrong to deny that the self-governing workshop is a true and a great advance upon the ordinary capitalist business. As an educational stimulus, and as a business training, these schemes are invaluable, to say nothing of the benefits their successful management confer in raising the hopes, the dignity, and the present material standard of life of those who take part in them. Indeed, the greatest of all services is rendered by a genuine and powerful expansion of self-interest, so as to concentrate direct thought and effort upon the good of the group of fellow-workers. This is the great moral gain of the self-governing business; it is a true training in and preparation for a moral democracy. But it is not that moral democracy, even in an economic sense, but only a great step towards it. If the individual worker is not a complete producer of anything, and has therefore no "claim" to the whole product, neither can the group of workers managing a workshop be regarded in such a light. Morally speaking, the gain is enormous where the solidarity of a little group is substituted for the narrow self-interest of the individual; economically, we are still in the region

of an individualism which disregards, and necessarily contravenes, the social claims and the social good. It may appear pedantic to urge that a co-operative shoe factory cannot make a pair of shoes, though the statement is strictly true. But the slightest reflection makes it evident that the net gains of this business, which are to be divided among the workers as wages or profits, are largely determined in amount by outside social forces; and since the demand to the whole product of labour virtually signifies a demand upon this socially determined value, the ultimately unsound economic and moral basis of the self-governing workshop as a solution of the labour problem is apparent.

7. We must regard trade-unionism in a similar light where the object of the combination of wages earned in a trade is to get for the labourers in that trade the whole value of the product, after deducting the necessary payments of capital and management. Here again we must approve a mode of combination which is a true advance towards an ideal of social co-operation, binding fellow-workers in a trade together and inciting them to common efforts for the common good; here again we must approve not merely these moral gains, but the other economic and social benefits workers have derived from trade-unionism, which has undoubtedly diverted into higher wages and improved standard of living large elements of industrial gain that would otherwise have passed, as surplus profit, into the possession of those whose claim to them was far weaker than the claims of labour, and who instead of reaping benefits from them, would have reaped the injury of larger luxury. This diversion of unearned incomes of capital into a

rise of wages may thus be regarded as a rude method of forwarding what is called "substantial justice" to labour. Trade-unionism, thus considered, is recognised to be a most serviceable, and indeed a necessary, stage in social evolution. But the ordering of industry upon a basis of perfect trade-unionism, each trade being independent and exercising full control over the profits of its industry, is subject to precisely similar criticism to that which condemned co-partnership upon the scale of the single competing business. A trade taken by itself has interests distinct from, and discordant with, the interests of other trades and of society, and trade-individualism is not to be regarded as an ultimate social order. It is the more important that this should be clearly recognised, because there is a tendency, particularly among Catholic socialists upon the Continent, to revert to the ideal of a revival of self-governing or church-governed guilds as furnishing the true remedy of social and economic maladies. In England the strength and numbers of a few trade-unions already indicate the dangers which might attend the realisation of this conception of industrial order, especially, as we have already pointed out, if an alliance be entered into with an equally well organised body of employers. Industry is not a mere aggregate of separate trades, and a solution based upon the supposition that it is remains radically unsound.

8. Even were the recurrent dream of a federation of all trade-unions in a nation, or even in the industrial world, so realised as to secure the most powerful solidarity of labour, we should still be confronted by a "class" solution of this social problem. It is sometimes urged that, since society ought to

demand and to receive labour from all according to their capacity, such a solidarity in the labour movement would be genuine socialism. But, taking labour movements and labour parties as present economic and political factors, that ideal identification is not realised. As a present fact, the labour movement, even in its widest significance, is distinctively a class movement, though comprising the largest and perhaps the most deserving class, and, as such, must simply be regarded as the largest form of individualism. Neither the workshop, nor the trade, nor the working class can be considered to have a claim upon "the whole product of labour."

Alike from the side of capital and of labour, a true understanding of the structure of industrial society shows a close and ever-present organic interaction of all the parts, and imposes the necessity of a social government based on this recognition.

9. The moral order of society demands that industry should be worked for the public good, and that the instruments or institutions in which it is organised should, so far as possible, identify, in a plain and palpable way, the interests and motives of the individual worker and the class with this general good, or, at any rate, should not permit trade operations where the private ends of individuals or classes clash with the social good. To apply this broad principle in detail is not here possible. We can only repeat that it does not necessarily imply, as some seem to think, complete public ownership and control of all industry, and complete abolition of "the competitive system." There are certain large classes of productive work, including the finer arts and all industry which is wholesome, interesting, and educative, which can-

not conveniently or profitably be submitted to the essentially mechanical routine of state officialism, and which need not be so regulated, because the competition which they involve, and the individual motives upon which they rely, are not base or demoralising in their operation, and do not set up antagonisms between the individual and the social good. In the case of large mechanical routine industries, where the nature and conditions of the work are commonly uninteresting and frequently degrading, and where the absorbing motive must remain one of individual gain, while the methods of pursuing such gain often conflict with the physical and moral health of society, these businesses and trades must, in any scientific view of the present situation, be seen to gravitate by a natural and moral necessity into forms of public enterprise.

This progressive socialisation of great industry, besides providing remedies against the grave moral and economic evils of class servitude and anti-social competition, will be the only effective way of fulfilling certain other definite social duties of protection of the individual which are involved in the moral conception of the State. Unemployment, excessive hours of labour, unhealthy conditions of work, insufficiency and irregularity of wages—these and other related social questions can only be solved by a growing consciousness of the duties of society towards labour. The moral defence of the governmental policy of *laissez faire* lays chief stress upon the bracing and stimulating influences which the necessity of self-support exerts upon the individual character of the worker. So far as a worker, by reasonable use of his physical and mental powers, is actually capable of such self-

support, it is eminently desirable, alike in his own interest and in that of society, that no other person, out of mistaken philanthropy, and no State machinery, by an interfering policy, should relieve him from the wholesome educative necessity of this exertion. But, if the analysis, above presented, of the social organic nature of industry and of all productive processes be correct, it is evident that no man in society is strictly capable of self-support, even as regards the production of the bare necessaries of physical life for himself and his family. At every step he is dependent upon the support of the entire industrial community, and, in a still closer way, upon that of the fellow-members of his trade and locality.

Perhaps, however, it may be replied that the doctrine of self-support, as used by modern moralists, does not deny the necessity of this mutual co-operation, but merely means that each member should be compelled to do his full share of this co-operative labour as the condition of receiving his share of the socially produced wealth. This, indeed, is the true and only reasonable doctrine of self-support. But the need for securing the conditions of enforcing such a policy is precisely the ground for requiring the social regulation which is denounced as State interference and as destructive of individual character. In two closely related ways the economic and legal structure of present society sins against the sound interpretation of the doctrine of self-support. On the one hand, it enables whole classes to live in comfort without contributing their share to the co-operative labour, the results of which they consume. On the other hand, by securing as private property (largely to these non-producing consumers or their

representatives) the ownership of the material instruments which are needed for the exercise of labour-power, society withholds the conditions of "self-support" from capable and willing labourers. In other words, in order to give validity to the doctrine of self-support, it is essential that every worker shall have the opportunity of acquiring that technical skill required by the conditions of co-operative labour, shall be able to command full and regular use of the materials and tools of his craft, and shall, in return for his output of labour, obtain adequate support for the reasonable wants of himself and his family. Unless society is so constituted as to provide these conditions to the willing worker, he cannot be regarded as capable of self-support. A State policy, which is not really *laissez faire*, but is one-sided interference in the interests of present property-owners, is inconsistent with the theory of self-support upon which its advocates rely. If it be admitted that facilities of regular employment, for reasonable hours, at adequate remuneration, under proper sanitary conditions, are essentials of the realisation of the theory of self-support, the smallest acquaintance with the existing industrial order suffices to convince us that self-support is not at present possible for a large proportion of the people. The slum-bred inhabitants of our large cities, brought up in the bad physical and moral atmosphere of city life, with no adequate means for learning a special trade, or for anticipating future demands of the labour market, are notoriously wanting in the elementary conditions of self-support. But these are only the extreme cases of an all-pervasive rule. No worker, however strong, capable, and willing, has any security of such regular employment

as we have admitted to be necessary to "self-support": a new invention, a foreign tariff, a change in public taste, a miscalculation of his employer, a thousand causes utterly outside his knowledge or control, may rob his skill of its value, and leave him stranded in the labour market. He cannot, either alone or by co-operating with the fellow-workers in his trade, secure for himself the real conditions of self-support. Neither can an employer or a body of employers, though by common action they may steady trade, really furnish the conditions of this self-support. The first real condition of self-support by personal labour is the access to raw materials and instruments, and security for the proper remuneration of labour put into these raw materials.

Since the structure of privately ordered industry is such as to afford no such security, there is a growing demand on the part of labour that the State or municipality shall give validity to the law of self-support by a free, open offer of public employment to those who are unable to obtain properly remunerated work from private employers. This is sometimes described as "the right to labour"; it is also the right to self-support. Its ultimate validity resides not in the claims of the individual, but in the duty of society to furnish, as far as it is able, the necessary conditions of a sound physical and moral life to its members.

The prevailing malady of modern industrial life is its insecurity; no individual or private co-operation of individuals is adequate to cope with this evil. The origin and necessity of this inadequacy is disclosed by our analysis of industry, which is shown to be in essence social, and therefore subject to maladies and maladjustments, which can only be remedied by social

measures. Security is of the essence of a "State," and the present growing insecurity of the first conditions of life in modern industrial societies can be healed in no other way than by a growth of some function of the State. This is a moral as well as a material need, for insecurity of maintenance and of means of regular labour is the great corrupter of individual and national character. A society where some can enjoy luxury without the necessity of labour, while the majority of willing workers have no reasonable security of a regular working life, is a society which has not yet succeeded in realising adequately the moral meaning of a State. Safe, regular, moderate, well remunerated, and universal labour can be secured no otherwise than by institutions based upon a recognition that labour is social in its operations and its results.

II

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

THE HOUSING OF THE POOR

By Rev. J. E. HAND

Introduction—The Housing Question a religious one—The annual rent-roll of London.

Overcrowding—Facts—Scarcity of house-room—One-room dwellers—Death-rate and density of population—The hopeless economic position of the unskilled labourer—The tenement house system—Illustrations of overcrowding.

Overcrowding—Causes—The rapid growth of towns an inevitable economic force of our industrial system—The attractiveness of town life to the rustic—High rents, cause and effect—Demolition of small houses to make room for improvements—Mistaken philanthropy—The demoralising results of Salvation Army shelters—The growth of the modern slum—Insufficient land in the building market—The failure of philanthropic and private enterprise to grapple with the question calls for concentrated and combined corporate action—The ten years' work of the London County Council—Its standing orders criticised—Boundary Street rehousing scheme—Land must be regarded as an asset for sinking fund purposes—The Council's dwellings are good and costly, but do not house the poor—Can the Council house the really poor at low rents?—The very poor cannot be housed at expense of rates—Miss Octavia Hill's work of social endeavour—Results.

The *Legal* aspect of the Question—No definition of overcrowding—Inadequate railway facilities—Cheap Trains Act and action of London Reform Union—Rating of unoccupied land—Town Councils must have compulsory power to take over land wanted for building.

Reform by occupiers themselves—Character and environment act and react on one another—The Jew and good citizenship—Education must do its part—Overcrowding in country villages.

Conclusion—Wanted, *A Housing Policy* from the London County Council—Our own individual responsibility to promote a healthy civic conscience—The Home and Citizenship—Christian Ethics are Social Ethics.

Since the era of industrialism began some hundred years ago, with its new grouping of population in the

towns, we have had great municipal activity displayed by municipal workers to meet the needs of our civilisation as a developing organic growth. Some little activity has been put forth to promote the better housing of the poor, and remedy the old evils of city life in the light of modern science and the development of social and ethical teachings.

Still much remains to be done to make town life more tolerable and desirable for the manual labourer and his family.

It is necessary to bring home to the public consciousness the absolute need of ameliorating the conditions in which so many of our citizens continue to live.

His Eminence Cardinal Vaughan says :—"There is a great social economic injustice to the poor to be repented or to be undone, and the well-to-do have a material and religious debt to the humbler classes that presses for payment with long, heavy arrears of interest."[1]

The action of too many of us in the past has been of that timid, featureless character, temporising with a problem which we dare not openly attack for fear of giving offence to owners of property. We have thought that "whatever is, is right," instead of "whatever is right is the only reality."

Among those social forces that exercise an influence around us, Principal John Caird says that "religion is the mightiest of them all."[2] I believe the housing question to be at bottom a religious question, and that it is necessary to face it in the light of the Christian ideal of life and character.

If we are loyal to the Christ ideal of truth and love

[1] Address to Catholic Truth Society, Stockport, August 28, 1899.
[2] John Caird, D.D., LL.D., "University Addresses," p. 259.

and justice, we ought to take a loving interest in the care-encumbered men, women, and children who live for the most part shut up in little boxes by themselves in the slums, under the "smoke counterpane" of modern London.

It should be the duty of every religious-minded man to take an active interest in civic affairs if they are to be maintained in a healthy efficiency, and do what he can to remove the shamefully inadequate accommodation of our poorer population, which is a scandal and disgrace in a progressive society in this nineteenth century.

The existing accommodation is totally inadequate in quantity, and altogether too low in quality, for all grades of our city toilers.

What patience, what labour, what reforming zeal must be brought into social politics before all classes of our citizens can live in crowded areas in a decent and comfortable home, so that they can educate their children in the way that we should wish healthy human lives to be brought up, under conditions that will allow of the widest possible opportunities being given for the development of their faculties and personality! Thoughtful men and women, who are in close personal contact with the actual problems underlying our social development, and whose civic patriotism leads them to study this question, tell us that, in the environment of the slum, age cannot be reverenced, infancy or manhood respected, and human life held in due regard.

I believe when once the Christian sentiment of the nation is aroused a final settlement cannot be long delayed.

Social reformers must make this question a matter

of first moment in civic government, and "have no pity for the repose of the nation until it is a finished question."[1]

This paper is an attempt to give some definite information upon the housing of the poor in London.

I can only hope that my words upon what I regard as an urgent moral question, will help my readers to make further study for themselves, and possibly assist to remedy this defect in our social adjustment.

London is by unquestioned right the capital of the Empire. She earned her position by her size and wealth, and ever as the Empire gets bigger and richer, huge, overgrown London grows huger and more unmanageable. A few figures will illustrate its growth. The annual immigrants into the County of London are far exceeded by the emigrants; the excess of births over deaths, 1891–1896, was 279,000, the actual increase in the total population was only 201,000. The annual rent-roll now amounts to forty-five millions; the increase in the number of houses for the same area between 1841 and 1891 was 313,000, though many more have been built in place of old ones. Its buildings were in 1870 assessed at £17,108,736 per annum, and in 1898 at £36,434,277. Its railways, which in 1870 were worth £617,780 per annum, were valued in 1894 at £1,317,116 per annum. (Parliamentary Return No. 204, 1895.) Its total municipal expenditure is over twelve millions a year.

The population of London may be roughly divided into half a million of well-to-do folk, with three millions who just manage to make both ends meet, and the remainder very poor.

[1] Swiss address to United States on close of War of Secession.

The significance of such figures cannot be mistaken. "They speak of a growth which is probably unique in the world's history; for it is not a sudden rise from almost nothing to a great city, such as is sometimes found in America, but it is a steady rise, during a comparatively short period of years, from a great city to the greatest the world has ever seen."[1]

Unfortunately, house-room has never grown so rapidly as the population. Our numbers overwhelm us. Overcrowding is a very old evil, and it has attracted increasing attention since the question was raised by the Poor-Law Commissioners in 1838, and by Sir Edwin Chadwick in 1842. There have been many subsequent inquiries, but the most important was that of the Royal Commission which was appointed in 1884, and issued its report in 1889. In 1891 the medical officer of the London County Council reported that 828,141 persons were living in conditions deleterious to health, decency, and civilisation, and that 386,489 of these persons were huddled together in single-room tenements, of whom 215,048 were overcrowded. Mr. George Haw, in a recent series of articles in the *Daily News*, estimates that 400,000 persons now live in single rooms, and that 26,000 live six or more in one room (Mr. Haw's 400,000 is a comparison with 386,000, not with 215,000).

Again quoting His Eminence Cardinal Vaughan :— "Nearly a million of the London poor needed housing. The medical authority had reported against a vast number of houses as insanitary, in which the poor

[1] G. Lawrence Gomme, F.S.S., "London in the Reign of Victoria," p. 126.

were huddled together, from four to twelve and more being in a single room."

Let us realise what it means to use one room for all domestic offices, and for living, sleeping, cooking, washing, playing, working, in sickness and in health; let us remember that in their one room costers must keep their goods (I have known a case in which fowls found their "roost" under their owner's bed), cobblers and tailors ply their trades, fur-cleaners work in an atmosphere of fluff and flue all round, women make match-boxes and artificial flowers;—and we shall begin to understand one of the most pathetic aspects of the formidable problem we are discussing. Such a room cannot be a home; the moral sense of its inhabitants is rapidly lowered and blunted, and they live only too often a mere animal life, regardless of the decencies of sex; and those whom death does not claim as early victims become social inefficients, physical and moral wrecks, the despair of Church workers, charitable organisations, and the Poor-Law officials.

With remorseless precision the death-rate increases with the density of the population, until in the most crowded areas it reaches *double* that prevailing over the whole of the metropolis.

The Registrar-General's annual survey for 1892 shows that in certain districts of London the death-rate bore a direct relation to the proportion of families living in one-room tenements. The districts with the smallest proportion of such tenants had in 1891 a death-rate of slightly over 19 per thousand, while in a district with 23 per cent. of single-room tenements the death-rate was 23.6 per 1000, and where the percentage was 30.6, the death-rate had risen to 25 per 1000. In the parish of St. George, Southwark, the death-rate for

1898 stood at the same point where the London death-rate stood in 1851–60.

From statistical returns made for the Berlin Municipality the figures for the metropolis are substantially corroborated, for it was found that of a total population of 1,315,000, the 73,000 dwellers in one-room tenements supplied nearly one-half the number of deaths, and their death-rate per 1000 for the year was no less than 163.5.[1]

But as has already been suggested, an increased death-rate is by no means the only result of overcrowding. The Royal Commission of 1884 endorsed in a most weighty report, signed, among others, by the Prince of Wales and Lord Salisbury, the opinion of an expert witness that in London every working man and woman lost upon the lowest average about *twenty days* in a year from simple exhaustion, caused by the vitiated air of overcrowded dwellings. Nor do we need expert evidence. Many, like myself, who have been daily witnesses of the lives of the poor, can abundantly testify that overcrowding lowers the general standard of health, that its victims suffer from chronic depression and weariness, and that typhoid fever and consumption follow in its train. And in this, as in so many other questions, we find action and reaction at work on the weakest part of the community, making their weakness greater and more inevitable. For Mr. Charles Booth, in his carefully-drawn picture of the homes of London, says, "The classes of persons who live under the worst conditions as to overcrowding are the unskilled labourer and the irregularly employed." These classes are, of course, in the weakest and

[1] Bowmaker, "The Housing of the Working-Classes," p. 13.

most hopeless economic position, a position which compels them to overcrowd; and then the overcrowding itself so reduces their mental and physical condition, that they become totally unable to rise in the social scale.

The tenement-house system, under present conditions, is responsible for a great deal of mischief. These human beehives were originally constructed for occupation by one family, but gradually each floor, and often each room, has become let to separate tenants; while in the East End, for example, I have often found that a family who were occupying only one small room were taking in lodgers to share with them the floor space at night. In such houses the sanitary arrangements are generally bad, and always quite inadequate for the occupiers. (In Whitechapel district in 1898 forty-one houses were closed as unfit for human habitation.)

To illustrate the congestion of central London, I found in Westminster a few months past a room, let by day to a single young working woman, and occupied by night by a bricklayer. In Whitechapel, on June 13th last, a somewhat similar case came under my notice at the Board of Guardians. When we look into the lives of the people living in such soul-hardening and miserable conditions in this city of contrasts, our habitual calm is apt to be turned into divine discontent that the conscience of a Christian people can allow men and women to live under conditions that rob domestic life of its sanctity, and set at defiance the root-principles of a holy State and a holy Church. We are led to exclaim, "Is this the end! Is this the end of modern growth? Are these cramped and peaked human lives, these abortions of a splendid

possibility, in this land of homes never to acquire a home of their own?"

Not to dwell longer on overcrowding as a fact, let us inquire briefly into its causes. The wonderful growth of London is only the most striking example of what is happening all through the country. While country districts, at least in purely agricultural counties, show a steady decrease of population, the towns increase by leaps and bounds. To some extent this movement from country to town, though regrettable, is none the less inevitable. The virgin soils of the American prairies, the cheap labour of Eastern Europe, of Egypt, and of India, compete for the privilege of providing England with the necessaries of life. In return, the highly paid but efficient labour of English brain and hand exports its products to every corner of the world. The economic forces which lie at the basis of this great international bargaining are too potent for us to meddle with, even if we would. Whether or not we are able to maintain our present pre-eminence among the nations, England lives, and must live, on her commerce and manufactures. These have given rise to her great towns, and are still the cause of their growth. But at the bottom of commercial and manufacturing prosperity lies skilful and economical division of labour, and this is only possible where men are aggregated in cities. It may be that in the future improved means of communication and electrical or other motive power, more easily transferable than steam, will enable our factories to spread themselves over the countryside. Traces may even now be found of such a tendency, and it is a consummation devoutly to be wished. Any economic movement in this direction would tend to do away

with our overcrowding problem, it would add to the health and happiness of our people, and it would react on itself to produce its own continuance; for we find Mr. Charles Booth saying that "in one way or another, effective working life is *ten* years longer in the country than in the town."

But it is not only economic causes that crowd our towns. Men come from the country to add fifty per cent. to their wages, but their extra pay is all lost in extra cost of house rent and in the higher standard of living, which yet does not add to health or happiness. They are attracted by the "contagion of numbers," by the glare and life of the streets, by theatres and music-halls, and shops and crowds. Moreover, it is to a great extent this same reason which makes the poorest prefer to overcrowd in a central slum rather than live in a dull suburb. Still the question may fairly be asked, "Granted that people flock to cities, why should they not find houses enough built for them to live in?" This problem was discussed by the 1884 Commissioners. Drink, dirt, and poverty each helps to supply the answer. Each tends, first, to cause overcrowding, and then to be perpetuated by the unwholesome conditions it has produced. High rents are also both cause and effect. If men who had to live in central districts to be near their work were paid higher wages in proportion all might be well, but it is just such men as casual labourers and costermongers who must live where work is to be got, whose wages show little tendency to rise, and whose employment becomes ever more precarious. There are other reasons why the poor will not leave crowded, high-rented districts, such as local credits, cheap markets, and reluctance to break old ties; while the immigration

from the country to special neighbourhoods, and in London the influx of foreign Jews, tend in the same direction. A still more important cause is the constant demolition of small houses, either to build warehouses or factories, or to make room for railways, roads, public buildings, &c. Many serious cases of rising rents were traced by the Commission to this cause, and a marked and recent example may be found in the neighbourhood of the Boundary Street area, which was cleared by the London County Council without any previous provision being made for the dispossessed inhabitants. Railway companies are now compelled by the Parliamentary Standing Orders to provide accommodation for those whose houses are wanted for railway extensions, although they sometimes evade these orders by causing the late owners to eject the tenants before taking possession, and I think that County Councils should make similar arrangements before clearing slum areas.

To some extent the immigrants into great towns are selected persons. The best men leave the country because they are more energetic and enterprising, or because they succeed in competitions for town posts. But the failures, too, drift citywards, and tramps, beggars, and ne'er-do-wells find town life easier and more attractive. These, with drunkards and criminals, tend to fix on certain localities and to make plague-spots of the most dangerous kind. Here overcrowding is joined to many other forms of evil; charitable institutions, shelters, homes, and the like are set up to offer some relief to the running social sore; but they do but attract more people of the same class by the hope of doles, and the last state of that neighbourhood is worse than the first. The idle loafer lives on

the earnings of the more industrious portion of the community; he attaches no duties to parentage, and readily brings into the world children diseased in body and mind, and quite as readily deserts them. Too often philanthropic shelters at 1d., 2d., and 3d. per night are nothing more than hotbeds for the forcing of mendicity. They are a danger to the community by the spread of infectious disease, and as a further evil they increase the rates of the poorer districts. In the Union which I represent as Guardian (Whitechapel) I find from 1894 to 1898 the number of admission orders given into the Poor-Law institutions reached the high figure of 3359 from four Salvation Army shelters within the Union. Out of this number hardly seven per cent. may be said to belong to the district. Such figures can be corroborated from other London Unions in which these philanthropic shelters exist, yet we hear nothing of new legislation respecting them. In Bethnal Green, when I was a member of the Board of Guardians, the local Salvation Army shelter was a fruitful source to feed the workhouse and infirmary. These shelters, too, become centres of filth and disease. Two years ago a boy of nineteen called at St. Jude's Vicarage, Whitechapel, and asked if I could send him somewhere to be cleansed. He had been living a week in a shelter, and was covered with vermin. Yet this was only one of many cases which came under my notice. When we find Mr. Bramwell Booth claiming that 15,000 people are received nightly into his shelters, we may well urge, if on the grounds of public health alone, that such places should be subject to strict public supervision, like common lodging-houses, and that cleanliness be imperatively enforced. At

present no help is given by the Public Health Act for a standard minimum measurement of air space for each adult. This minimum air space should be fixed at thirty superficial feet of floor space per head, similar to that insisted upon by the Local Government Board for Casual Wards.

I think it is quite time that Borough Councils should have power to stop the opening of more than two shelters in their district. The premises of the shelter may be as clean as possible, but the real evil lies in the people who use them—the massing of dirty and clean people together has a tendency for all of them to get dirty: one dirty man sleeping between six clean men means seven dirty by the morning.

There is no compulsory bathing or baking of clothing, while in some Salvation Army shelters only a few hand-basins exist for washing purposes. (Correspondence in *The Times* with Mr. Bramwell Booth, October 1897.)

I think the hardening of the Casual Ward rules in 1881 has given the impetus to the opening of shelters; previous to that, the veriest tramp in rags was free from vermin, because he practically slept twenty nights out of thirty in casual wards. Now, in the opinion of Mr. W. Stevens of the Ham Yard Hospice, Piccadilly Circus, the better-dressed men who come down in the world are often the dirtiest.

While the creation of slums may be directly due to overcrowding, certainly we must not lose sight of the fact that some people by their dirty and improvident habits will make slums in any habitation. I have known women who never clean their room till it *is* dirty. Landlords know very well that for some tenants no regulations in tenement houses or model buildings

are effective. Unless such people are speedily ejected the tidier tenants are forced to move to fresh quarters, leaving behind the dirty ones, who think little of stopping up sinks, making a coal-hole of baths, leaving cinders in the passages, and letting boys bathe in the wash-houses on the staircases, or in the drinking-water cisterns.

It is difficult in such cases to punish the wrong-doers, and in this direction the law seems to need strengthening; but more can perhaps be done by employing superintendents and rent collectors of discretion and character, and giving such men (or women) a free hand to enforce cleanliness, order, and decency. Both clergy and district visitors should take every opportunity of showing men and women the value of clean and wholesome homes (for filth is the parent of disease both among individuals and communities), as well as the urgent need of efficient sanitation. How can we expect our fellow-creatures to keep their baptismal vows if their homes are overcrowded and all sense of decency is wanting in their habits?

The evolution of the modern slum is largely due to the absence in the past of some such central controlling authority as the London County Council, to inefficient building Acts and legal anomalies, and to the absence of a proper law of public health. More people require more houses, and thus land is wanted. But owners will not part with their land except at extravagant prices. They wait till they can realise £1000 per acre or more; the land must "ripen," as the phrase goes, and the law makes this waiting profitable by exempting the land from rating, or strictly by only rating it at its agricultural value, say £3 to

£5 per acre, instead of at its real value, its building value of from £40 to £60 per acre. Thus our land system enhances the value of sites, and makes new houses costly, while the more it costs to erect additional houses, the greater becomes the value of all existing houses, and the higher rise their rents, so that it grows increasingly difficult for men with small incomes to obtain adequate house-room. The difficulty of obtaining land on the outskirts for the housing of an expanding population makes it profitable to build on every available space within the town, where each landowner stands out for the highest terms, and, unless there is some authority to interfere, back-to-back houses and jerry-built insanitary slums spring up.

Mr. Marchant Williams, Inspector of Schools for the London School Board, giving evidence before the Commission of 1884, stated that forty-six per cent. of the poor pay from one-quarter to one-half of their income in rent. With a population returned in 1891 as overcrowded of 828,141 persons, I think it is high time that public authorities should move vigorously and acquire land to erect working-men's cottages at reasonable rates. After fifty years' experience of "improved dwellings," when some 200,000 people have been housed in "models," it seems to me quite clear that self-interest has proved too strong a force against reform, and that philanthropic action is totally inadequate. The time has come for public corporate action.

When the London County Council was first organised in 1889, the Standing Committee on which the largest number of members desired to serve was that for "The Housing of the Working Classes." "The masterly and methodical inquiries which Mr. Charles

Booth had prosecuted in respect of the housing, the poverty, and all the conditions of labour and employment of the people of London lent both impulse and guidance to the practical studies upon which the Council entered."[1] The reforming zeal of the enthusiasts of the County Council proved contagious, and the medical officers of the various local boards and vestries began to co-operate with efficiency. In 1890 Parliament consolidated, revised, and in various ways improved the body of legislation relating to housing reforms, which had been accumulating in the statute book for forty years. Exercising its powers under the "Housing of the Working Classes Act," 1890, the London Council sanctioned twenty-four building schemes, estimated to cost £374,200, and to house some 16,000 people. Of these schemes many have been carried out, and the rest will soon be finished.

On 18th February 1896 the Council passed a resolution to the effect, that in cases where the Council itself decides to erect dwellings, in preference to selling or letting the land for that purpose, the rents to be charged for the dwellings shall not exceed those ruling in the neighbourhood, and that they shall be so fixed that there shall be no charge on the county rate in respect of such area. The second part of this resolution seems to me to be quite sound in principle, though much pressure has recently been brought to bear to induce the Council to let at a loss, and as a matter of fact this has been done in one or two cases. But the first part, stating that rents must not exceed those ruling in the neighbourhood, is quite unworkable, and in my mind uncalled for. Take, for

[1] "Municipal Government in Great Britain," Albert Shaw, p. 288.

instance, the Boundary Street area. Here the rents of the neighbourhood were at once raised by the demolition of the homes of 5700 persons. The scheme was resolved upon in 1890. In the course of the next few years the area was cleared, but it is only now that the new buildings are being finished. Hence comparison with the artificially raised rents of surrounding tenements would be absurd if it were possible; but it is not possible, for the new tenements are far superior to any in the neighbourhood, and the rents charged much higher. In such cases there is no basis of comparison, and usually the best method of fixing rents is to charge a rent just sufficient to meet interest, sinking fund, and expenses of management. This is practically what is done, except in the few cases where the building would not let at a rent so fixed, which had therefore to be reduced. It must be remembered that when the Council's reports show a profit or loss on a building scheme the account is not charged with the actual cost of the site, but only with its market value, *if ear-marked as a site for working men's dwellings.* The Boundary Street area cost £300,000, and to this sum £49,000 has to be added for making new roads; but the building sites were only valued at £69,000, and it is on this comparatively small sum that the Council's tenements are expected to show a profit, so that there is a net loss on the clearance of about £280,000. This loss is incurred, and rightly so, in clearing a foul slum, but the artificial nature of the site value, which the new rents have to meet, makes it difficult for some persons to see a genuine "profit" attaching to the Council's scheme. It should not, however, be forgotten that the "artificial nature of the

site value" is the price at which it would have to be sold to the Improved Dwellings Company; therefore the Council's profit is as genuine as the Company's would be.

From another point of view the resolution is, perhaps, too stringent, for under it every building scheme is bound to show that the rents it can earn are capable of providing (*a*) three per cent. on the outlay; (*b*) a fund which within a period of between fifty and sixty years shall be sufficient to repay the site value and cost of building. Partly owing to the unnecessary shortness of the redemption period a loss has taken place on the twenty-four schemes sanctioned up to 31st December 1898 of £1891, 17s. 6d., yet in sixty years' time, when the whole capital outlay will have been repaid, the ratepayers of two generations hence will succeed to an unencumbered heritage of nearly £15,000 per annum.

At present the ratepayers of London are placed at a disadvantage, which is artificially created.

The Council has to provide a sinking-fund, not merely for the buildings, which in time will wear out or possibly become obsolete, but also for the land, which will do neither. Not less than one-sixteenth part of the value must be set aside each year. Private persons or companies would certainly reckon the value of the land as their most substantial asset, and would be under no obligation to write off any part of that value. The re-valuation of the Council's land, which is made periodically, is an ample safeguard to the ratepayers of the future, and fulfils all the requirements of sound finance. The fact that the land is ear-marked for working-class dwellings is no reason for treating it differently from other land, because, if in course of

time it should cease to be used for this purpose, its free use would increasingly enhance its value. The Council has unsuccessfully endeavoured to induce the Treasury to allow it to reckon this land as an asset; and in view of the generally recognised necessity of a larger dealing with this question and of the importance of reducing in every legitimate way the cost of housing, is again approaching the Treasury with the hope of obtaining this concession. The Treasury may properly regard it as its duty to safeguard the future ratepayers from having undue burdens placed upon them by the present generation, but this proposal does not involve placing a burden upon our successors. All that is asked is that the present generation of ratepayers should be relieved from the obligation to pay for property of the most permanent kind which will be inherited by their successors.

In consequence of the great increase in the cost of building in London—for there has been an increase of nearly thirty per cent. between 1889 and 1899—it becomes increasingly difficult to comply with the Council's resolution, and there has been some agitation to do away with the standing order and put part of the charges on the rates. On the other hand, the question is being asked if the Council's dwellings are not too good, just as it is also asked of the dwellings, housing 30,000 people, of the Improved Industrial Dwellings Company. The Council's tenements are very good, but very costly. The architect's estimate for the Millbank Estate works out at £108, 10s. per room, and the rents on this calculation will have to average 3s. 4d. per week per room, which compares unfavourably with the 2s. 3d. the average rent of the Peabody Buildings, the 2s. 6d. of the Improved In-

dustrial Dwellings Company, and the 2s. 1½d. of the Guinness Trustees. No doubt the Council's buildings are better, the dwellings farther apart, and the rooms larger. A cheaper dwelling would mean smaller rooms and plainer exteriors. The present average size of the Council's rooms is 120 square feet for a bedroom and 160 square feet for a sitting-room. If, without injury to health, rooms could be built of the same size as those of the Industrial Dwellings Company, viz. 100 square feet bedroom, 140 square feet sitting-room, the present average cost would be reduced from £108 to £90. Mr. David Waterlow, Vice-Chairman of the Housing Committee of the London County Council, and also a director of the Industrial Dwellings Company (founded by his father, Sir Sydney Waterlow), holds that it is in this direction that a change should be made in the Council's policy. For my own part I feel bound to agree with Mr. Waterlow. The problem of to-day is how to house the unskilled worker, earning from 20s. to 30s. per week, and this problem can only be solved by the greatest economy in building. It is proposed that the Council should proceed under Part III. of the Housing of the Working Classes Act to erect cottage dwellings in the suburbs; but it is urged, on the other hand, that in such work the Council would be undersold by local builders, and this is of course possible; but, personally, I should much like to see such an experiment honestly tried. I think if the Council built self-contained cottages and let them at prices calculated to cover cost of erection and maintenance it would be a direct means of cheapening rents, and serve as a sort of safety-valve to relieve the high pressure in Central London.

It is only within the last few weeks that the Council

has learned that, in the opinion of eminent counsel, it does not possess the power of erecting working-class dwellings outside the boundaries of the county. It has been advised that it cannot even build on outside land which has been offered as a gift. If this is so, the only remedy is, as has been proposed, to seek the necessary power by fresh legislation.

In any event, I cannot consider that the Council's past policy has been altogether successful. It has housed a good many people at practically no loss to the rates, but it has not housed the poor, and it has only touched the fringe of the overcrowding evil. The tenants of its block buildings are mostly of the artisan or clerk class; they even include doctors, clergymen, police inspectors, architects, and the like. For such persons there was no need for the Council to provide, yet I welcome their presence to assist in bridging over social differences and subserve the common good. Meanwhile the poorest cannot pay such high rents, and have crowded into surrounding districts, already too full, obtaining of course very much worse accommodation, but in spite of increasing rents still paying less than the (to them) prohibitive sum asked by the Council. It is claimed that the Council's blocks will last for three hundred years, but surely this is unnecessary. "Model" blocks, often built in lofty squares, allowing no free play for wind, with their cheerless apartments and lack of sunshine in lower rooms, are not ideal dwellings; what Miss Octavia Hill calls "their small scope for individual freedom," the painful "uninterestingness of block life," make them at best a necessary evil; it is surely presumption on our part to suppose that three hundred years ahead people will still approve of our "latest patent sanitary

improvements," and such blocks will certainly be expensive to knock down.

The only work that needs the Council's help is—first, the provision of house-room for the really poor at such a rent as they can pay, and then the strict enforcement of the law against overcrowding, which is at present practically in abeyance, because there is nowhere for the people to go. To illustrate the harshness of eviction on the very poor I lately had my attention drawn to a pitiable sight in Chelsea: an ejected tenant's goods piled against a dead wall, while a guileless child sat upon them through two days' rain, with an old sack stitched together over her shoulders to guard the "sticks" while her parents searched the district in different directions for a room. If the Council builds blocks, they must be plain, furnished with no luxuries, as large and no larger than is absolutely necessary for health; and it must be borne in mind that every penny less rent will enable a few more poor families to come out of a foul, hopeless, overcrowded slum into what must be to them a comparative paradise. It is true that many of the poorest do not appreciate sanitary conditions; there are classes of utterly undisciplined people for whom blocks are not suited. For such I doubt if the Council can do anything but steadily enforce the existing law. No social reformer, however dissatisfied he may be with this acute problem of civilisation, can wish to see the dissolute and profligate housed at the expense of the ratepayer otherwise than in the manner provided by the Prison, Casual, and Workhouse Wards. A class of respectable poor above this type may be helped by some such method as that which for many years Miss Octavia Hill has preached and practised. Her plan

was to buy condemned or insanitary houses, to repair them and make them wholesome, and then let them under strict supervision at very low rents to costermongers and others not sufficiently advanced in social civilisation to be fit for "model" dwellings. The essence of the considerable success thus achieved has been personal supervision by lady rent collectors, who have gently but firmly enforced cleanliness and decency, and thus have raised many families to a much higher social and moral level. I doubt if any workers among the poor have done better or more useful work than the ladies whom Miss Hill has thus trained, and I would their work could be multiplied tenfold. The power to undertake similar work was given to the County Council and other local bodies by the Housing of the Working Classes Act, but nothing of importance has yet been done in this direction. Of course it would be impossible for the officers of a public body to do exactly the work of Miss Hill's lady staff, the red tape of officialism and the absence of personal enthusiasm and sympathy would ruin much of the civilising effect, but the present prohibitive cost of building and the urgent necessity of speedy relief in the worst cases of overcrowding certainly seem to suggest the undertaking of some such palliative effort. At present whole streets of slum property are being bought up by "house-jobbers" or "house-knackers," as they are called, the minimum of sanitary repair is effected, rents are raised, and overcrowding is winked at. If the streets were bought by respectable public companies, or by local bodies, health and morality would be improved, and time could be obtained for some of the existing thorny problems to work out their own solution. Let us hope that in London, at

all events, some of the new municipalities will move in this direction. In these matters we must remember that the direct and immediate loss has to be measured against the indirect and future gains. But the former is small compared with the gigantic proportions the latter must assume. Capital rightly spent will soon be returned in the reduced cost of workhouses, infirmaries, lunatic asylums, and prisons, a diminution of disease, a lessening of suffering and poverty, and in the moral gain to the community from the brightness, joy, and happiness of tens of thousands. The process of amelioration is bound to be slow, but it is sure, and is indeed the only alternative presented to an attitude of hopeless despair.

The legal side of the question demands some further attention. Overcrowding ought to be summarily dealt with by law. Each adult requires 3000 cubic feet of air per hour, and most authorities agree that each adult requires 1000 cubic feet air space; yet our local vestries are satisfied with often less than 300 cubic feet air space, or 400 if the room is used for living and sleeping. In barracks 600 cubic feet are provided by the army regulations, and 400 cubic feet in army huts, while the Metropolitan Police have 450 each in their cubicles. The Public Health (London) Act, 1891, does not define what is "overcrowding," so that each local authority fixes its own definition, an obviously bad principle. If overcrowding be defined as the living of more than two persons in one room, then in London nearly 828,141 persons are overcrowded. Unfortunately the local authorities do not enforce their own rules, partly because of the practical difficulty of turning people out who can find nowhere else to go to, and partly because the

law gives no right of entry to the sanitary inspectors at night-time (the only time when overcrowding can be discovered), and partly, I am afraid, because suitable men are not always chosen as inspectors, while often there are not enough of them. In Bethnal Green, in 1893, I started an agitation which ultimately caused the Vestry to appoint two additional sanitary inspectors for the district, which at that time only had one inspector to every 43,000 inhabitants. In connection with sanitary inspectors, I think their status needs improving, and that at least one woman inspector should be on the staff of each London borough.

Every citizen should make it his business to see that sanitary authorities do their work, and do it properly. In too many districts these local authorities are too interested in keeping things as they are. Public opinion, that is in the long run the opinion of earnest, thoughtful, honest folk, should steadfastly set its face against favouritism, bribery, jobbery of every kind; and this means that we must all take a real interest in the various local elections, and look upon the legal use of our vote as a trust given us by God.

Another question, which is partly a legal one, is that of railway facilities. Parliament has done a great deal by means of the "Cheap Trains Act" of 1883 to enable workmen to live out of central districts, but this was passed sixteen years ago, and the workmen's trains on many lines are still insufficient and ill-timed. Since this Act became law the companies have received many millions of public money for running workmen's trains. The railway companies receive remissions of passenger duty for several purposes under different Acts of Parliament, one remission being for carrying soldiers and volunteers in uniform

at less than ordinary rates, &c. The Cheap Trains Act 1883 gives further remission on conditions which appear in Section 3 of the Act, and include the provision of proper and sufficient Workmen's Trains "for workmen going to and returning from their work, at such fares and at such times between *six o'clock in the evening and eight o'clock in the morning* as appear to the Board of Trade to be reasonable." I cannot differentiate the amount of remission received from these several sources, but the total amount received by the companies having termini in London in 1897 was £924,314, 15s. 10d. Of this large sum it is estimated that about three-fourths is due to the remission under the Cheap Trains Act.

The recent action of "The London Reform Union" has shown what can be done by bringing informed public opinion to work, and the inquiry held at the instance of this association before the Railway Commissioners last April brought many interesting facts to light, and obtained an important judgment, ordering the Great Eastern and the London, Tilbury, and Southend Railway Companies to improve their cheap train service in many respects. The circumstances of the Great Eastern are exceptional; but if the other lines could be induced, or compelled under the law, to offer anything like the same facilities, a great stride forward would be made in the solution of the "Housing Problem."

The evidence taken by the Commissioners—in a great measure supplied by the experts of the London County Council—showed that a rapidly increasing number of workpeople, men and women, do not have to get to their work before eight o'clock. This is a most important fact. The railway companies will be

in no hurry to carry out the judgment of the Commissioners and arrange the cheap trains to fit in with that hour, but to the workman it means getting up at a reasonable hour, and having breakfast at home with his family. He can do this and yet live in a suburban district, which was practically impossible when all workshops were opened at 6 or 6.30. This gradual social reform, though it has attracted little attention, is one of the very greatest importance.

We must not, however, forget that the existing railway lines cannot possibly supply all our needs, and therefore much importance attaches to the underground electric railways and the electric trams, or so-called "light railways," that are being projected or constructed all round our great cities. Even as things are now these are urgently wanted, but they become a first necessity if overcrowding in central districts is to become a nightmare of the past. We may not like to see trams along our quiet suburban roads, nor beautiful fields and woods give place to smoke-begrimed bricks and mortar, but our plain duty is to set aside selfish æsthetic considerations when they conflict with changes required to preserve the life and health of the nation.

This brings us to another legal point. The difficulty of finding suburban sites for working-class dwellings at reasonable rents has already been referred to. It does not seem fair to the community that land which is being kept back from building, in order that it may "ripen," *i.e.* that its value may greatly increase, should yet only be rated as agricultural land. It is capital sunk at compound interest, the interest being earned and finally paid by the community, and therefore it seems not unreasonable to ask that unoccupied

areas should be rated, and the community should get the benefit of such increased value. Public opinion will, I am convinced, compel the adoption of this small but far-reaching reform.

Why should we not say to the owner, "Your land is building land, and is wanted for building purposes; if you will not build yourself within some reasonable period, we will buy your land for the community" at a fair price to be settled by arbitration, or from that date you shall pay rates and taxes on the price we are willing to give. Now that the community can borrow at two and a half per cent., they can do many things profitably which private individuals cannot.

So far we have dealt with methods of reforming the houses of the poor from without, but something can also be done by the tenants themselves. Character and environment act and react on one another. Given a decent environment, we have, as a rule, decent people, that *mens sana in corpore sano*, so much needed for personal enjoyment and national greatness; while, on the other hand, if the surroundings are squalid, the people are pretty certain to be squalid also. Speaking generally, the bright and cheery faces are found in bright and cheery homes. On the other hand, bad tenants will go far to create a slum, and it behoves thoughtful men and women, who believe with Carlyle that "the soul of the world is just," to take an active interest in energising the civic life around them, to do their utmost to inculcate habits of cleanliness, decency, and order, and to urge upon their poorer neighbours a high standard of comfort in regard to house-room. The foreign Jews settled in East London do not feel the discomfort and degradation of the

overcrowding which their arrival has done much to create. Even when they can well afford to occupy decent rooms, very many of them will take in lodgers to share fractions of their bedrooms. Residence in England will, it is to be hoped, eradicate this custom, but it will need all our efforts to prevent a similar practice growing along with the rise of rent among our own labouring people.

In these days when hatred of the Jewish race is so intense I must say a word respecting the Jewish population of Whitechapel, in number about 36,000. I have worked for upwards of two years in St. Jude's Parish, which only contains some 165 Gentile families, chiefly fairly well-to-do artisans. I always found my neighbours of the Ghetto excellent citizens. I have been welcomed in some 500 Jewish homes, been invited to their confirmations, attended their synagogue, and joined on various occasions in festivities connected with their social unions.

The Jews are ever thrifty (perhaps to excess), on the other side they are always charitable. Again, they are most law-abiding and moral, particularly the women, and rarely partake of intoxicating liquors. The children of school age are clean and well fed. Boys generally preponderate over girls, and Jewish mothers rarely bear still-born children, or go out to work. A feature in their domestic life is the remarkably low death-rate for infants under five years of age.

In 1898 the deaths of children under five years of age were for London equal to 40.8 per cent. of the total deaths, and 25.8 per cent. of the registered births; and for the Whitechapel district they were equal to 44.0 per cent. of the total deaths, and 22.2 per cent. of the

registered births.[1] Compared with the Metropolitan deaths, Whitechapel for a low infant death-rate occupies almost the foremost position of any Metropolitan district.

From these traits I am led to believe that the Jews have greater vitality than the East Enders whom they have displaced. They illustrate the survival of the fittest. The foreign Jew, fresh from Odessa or Poland, is often wanting in the most elementary ideas of sanitation and cleanliness, yet in spite of these defects, should an epidemic unfortunately visit East London I feel that the Jews would more readily throw it off than their Gentile neighbours.

Returning to the matter under consideration, education must do its part. Whatever else is taught in our schools, let us see to it that cleanliness and order and obedience to authority are insisted on, and that the whole force of our educational system is directed to the upbuilding of character, to the brightening and improving of the lives of our city population, to the production, by whatever instructional methods, of good citizens.

If I have dealt more particularly with town life, it is not that I fail to realise that overcrowding in its worst form is only too prevalent in many country villages. Here the poor are even more helpless, in the absence of sufficient house-room, than townspeople. It will seldom pay a builder to speculate in the erection of cottages, and there are often difficulties in getting land. In two directions we ought to look for help. Many landowners have recognised that it is a part of their duty to the community to provide cottages for labourers working on their estates. The

[1] Medical Officer of Health (Dr. Loane's) Report for 1898, p. 8.

rent will seldom pay for the cost, but the existence of good cottages will, as Lord Tollemache has proved, add to the value of the estate, by relieving farmers from the difficulty of obtaining labourers, not to speak of reduced poor rates and other indirect advantages. Then, too, Parish and District Councils can do their part. It is true that there are some preliminary difficulties in the application of Part III. of the Housing of the Working Classes Act to rural districts. These difficulties can perhaps be removed by Parliament, but meanwhile they can be got over, and reference to Alderman Thompson's recent work ("Housing of the Working Classes," by Alderman W. Thompson, Richmond, Surrey) will show what steps should be taken in that direction.

It must be remembered that all that is done in the country will beneficially affect the towns; for nothing would do more to enhance the attractiveness of country life, and thus reduce the migration to large centres, than the provision of cheap, healthy cottages, with suitable gardens attached.

Many minor, but not, I think, unimportant, points surrounding the main question have passed before us. Let us not, however, lose sight of the wood for the trees. In London, at all events, we are face to face with a gigantic and pressing problem. The difficulty is increasing with the prosperity of trade and the enhanced cost of building. I urge that, in the first place, the situation calls for a prompt, large-minded, statesmanlike policy from the County Council. In the past what the Council has done has been in the way of re-housing schemes. Now the time is ripe for the Council to initiate a vigorous "Housing Policy." We cannot, however, shift our

personal responsibility on to the shoulders of any public body. It is the duty of every reader of this book to take his share of the burden. Let us first study the whole question, and become at least intelligent citizens. Surely our "partnership in the civic Brotherhood of London" claims each of us to exercise a wise and energetic citizenship. "We are members one of another." "The ideal life of one requires others to complement it, and it is by mutual help that the whole develops towards perfection."[1]

We are all interested in an intelligent administration of the law as a matter of religious duty; we cannot expect either administration or amendment of the law to be done effectively, unless we bring home to our representatives the sacred nature of the trust which has been imposed upon them by the citizens. Every principle of justice demands that we should realise the value of each human life in the social organism under which we live, and how the possession of wholesome dwellings would increase the value of such individual life.

Next let us see to it, that so far as in us lies we promote a strong, healthy civic conscience, that will force the hands of lukewarm local and imperial administrators, and will moreover render jobbery an impossibility, and a landlord who connives at harsh practices or breaches of the Health Laws a social pariah. More than anything else motive power is wanted to make municipal wheels run truly, and this motive power only a healthy public opinion—your opinion and mine—can supply.

Remember that the homes of England are at stake. The home, as Mazzini puts it, is the recognised place

[1] J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., "Manual of Ethics," p. 274.

where between the mother's kiss and the father's caress the child's first lesson in citizenship is learnt. Free child life can only develop in its ideal form in the home. We have seen what some of these homes are like, how impossible it is for them to be decent, let alone ideal. The home is more, much more, than the house, but yet after all the character of the people depends very largely upon the sort of houses they inhabit. I cannot conceive a people herded into overcrowded houses remaining, except in name, a Christian people. On this rock our Christian civilisation might founder. I therefore call upon all social reformers, who are linked together in their relationship to a common Lord, to recognise that all lifting power to regenerate our humanity comes from Him. I believe it is His will that Christian men and women should devote more time and attention to Social Politics with a view to bettering the external conditions of their neighbours. It is in the strength of the Gospel of Jesus that we can show moral earnestness enough to lead sustained crusades to improve family life, for, after all, true salvation lies in brightening the homes of our people. The home life of no human being ought to be allowed to sink below a certain minimum standard; any infringement of this principle is not only a danger to the individual, but to the community.

Let us who believe that infinite Love is at the root of all things, and who would suffer with our suffering kind, work with a will to supply good homes to all who need them, and not rest till all our fellow-countrymen are living in a place worthy of the sacred name of "home."

OLD AGE PENSIONS

By G. LAURENCE GOMME, F.S.A., F.S.S.

An economical problem more than a social or political one—Economical laws overweighted by legislation — Old Age Pensions possible if existing conditions brought about by legislation are amended by fresh legislation—Government inquiries—Cost the vital question —Ways and means—Effect on Poor-Law—Able-bodied forced into compulsory military service—How should money be obtained—The economical principle which relieved the famine of 1258 remains the same to-day — How modern legislation has detrimentally affected the poor: (1) Enclosure of common lands — Rights of poor extinguished and the rights of rich enhanced in value—No collective compensation given to the poor for loss of common lands — Parish relief substituted for loss of common land rights— Economical condition of poor due largely to legislation — Justice demands that the deficiency of the Old Age Pension Fund shall fall upon landed and personal property : (2) Charities—How the Charity Commissioners have wrongly devoted these to education which taxes should have paid for—Unapplied charities—A Royal Commission of experts wanted to produce "a counsel of perfection."

IT is necessary in this subject, as in all others of political or economical character, to begin with a clear idea of the conditions under which the problem arises. It is an economical problem far more than it is political or social, and authorities who have discussed it hitherto seem to me to have omitted all consideration of this side of the question. If old age pensions are justly a charge upon taxation, then, whatever the cost, it ought to be borne. If the need for old age pensions had arisen under a system where economic laws had perfect

freedom of action, then I for one think economical laws might have been left to settle the matter without direct legislative interference. But it cannot be too often insisted upon that economic laws have never in Western civilisation been allowed to operate quite freely. In the present period they are, it is true, left as free as possible from the interference of legislation, but they are overweighted by the accumulated mass of legislation which had affected them so deeply up to the beginning of the present century. The Statute-book is full of the unwise attempts of our ancestors to divert the ordinary course of economical development, and this age is suffering from the results. Of course if the effect of legislation up to a given date has been to put all the chief advantages into the hands of one class of people and most of the disadvantages into the hands of another class, it is quite easy for the privileged class to accede to the doctrine that legislation should interfere as little as possible, or not at all, with the ordinary operations of economic laws. For the meaning of this is that future legislation should let things be, and let them run on in the fashion which now obtains.

It is necessary in such a subject as old age pensions to put these considerations thus to the forefront, because, as I view the subject, it is quite impossible to deal with it fairly without having it clearly before us what are the conditions which call for interference now in the provision for the aged poor. Without this I should agree with my friend Mr. E. W. Brabrook, that the provision of old age pensions is an impossibility. It is an impossibility if the existing conditions are to obtain; it is not an impossibility if some of the existing conditions brought about by legislation are amended by fresh legislation. The

first inquiry recently instituted resulted in a careful and able analysis of the various plans submitted, and of the rejection of all because of the enormous cost. The second inquiry under Mr. Chaplin is apparently to result in the recommendation of some plan or other without, however, considering the cost, and already the press have intimated that cost is a deterring force against old age pensions.

Should this be so? The question is a vital one, and one which must be settled before special schemes can be discussed with due regard to practical results. The inquiry should have begun at this end, and if I limit this article to a few considerations under this head, it is because I conceive that no better assistance can be given to the cause of old age pensions than to induce full consideration of the means by which they are to be met. Experts will settle the proper method of administering the pension fund with every regard to economy and to healthful results, to stimulating the forces of thrift and good behaviour, and to holding in check those evil influences which flow from State regulation of personal matters. There is little or no danger of an inefficient scheme of administration being adopted; but there is every danger of every scheme being put on one side as impossible because of the cost, or of being bungled and mangled in the interests of a few because of a limit being put upon cost.

The answer to the question as to ways and means is twofold. First, there is the fully-recognised reduction of the poor-law system to the proportions necessary only to meet actual cases of old age *destitution* which cannot be met by old age pensions. This reduction will eliminate from poor-law

administration both the able-bodied poor and the skulking scoundrels who feed upon the present system. But, of course, these two classes of the population must be dealt with in some manner beneficial to the State. For the male portion of this class of paupers I would advance the claim of the State for their services as soldiers. If they cannot, or will not, find industrial employment, they can and must take part in the defence of the nation. They must fulfil the conditions of compulsory military service which seems to be threatening a far larger portion of the community at no distant date. I will not dwell upon the advantages of this plan, but I have discussed it with intelligent members of the poorer classes, and they have agreed that it is a reasonable plan. If a man able-bodied cannot or will not work, he shall not be allowed to beg or to loaf about, but shall be compelled to shoulder his musket and take part in the defence of the empire. It is neither an ignoble nor a superfluous employment, and it offends against no economical law. For the female portion of the able-bodied poor I admit a difficulty, but I think, with education in domestic economy spreading, this difficulty would gradually right itself, especially as domestic service is increasingly demanded.

With the poor-law system thus cleared of an enormous burden now pressing upon it its cost could be reduced to comparatively very small proportions, and the balance of the present charge for poor-law administration would pass over to the credit of the old age pension fund. But after this credit there would still remain a considerable balance of cost which would have to fall upon some funds, and I unhesitatingly advance the proposition that it should come

from the revenue derived from property. It is a commonplace of English economical history that the poor have always been a charge upon the land. Thanks very much to the unstinted generosity of landed proprietors, much of the poverty has been met by acts wholly outside the Statute-book. But whenever great pressure has occurred, the State has not hesitated to call upon the owners of land to do their duty to the poor. In 1258, according to Matthew Paris, fifteen thousand of the poor perished from famine in the city of London alone, and a proclamation, says the chronicler, was made to this effect: "Go all you who are in want of it and receive a portion of the bread of such and such a noble"; and the herald specified the person and place from whom and where they were to receive alms. Economical conditions of the present day could not, of course, reproduce such crude methods as this, but the principle remains to us, and it ought not to be brought against the nineteenth century that it cannot meet a problem which was met in the thirteenth century by a perfectly just and proper method.

But apart from the doings of such early days as these, there are at least two great interests which have been affected by quite modern legislation to the detriment of the poor, and it is to these that the inquirer into old age pension schemes can profitably turn for help.

The first of these is the great enclosure of common lands at the beginning of the present century. The open common land system of agriculture, descended from the earliest days of our history, had become an anachronism long before the passing of the General Enclosure Act. At the period when Arthur Young

and Sir John Sinclair were guiding the nation into better methods it had become a serious obstacle to progress, and the enclosure of the lands and consequent management by independent farmers was not only necessary, but inevitable. So clear is this to our minds at this date, that one can hardly understand the long and determined fight against enclosures. But when we understand how enclosures were accomplished, and what the results were, the opposition seems not only natural, but singularly mild and uneventful. Land over which the poor collectively had limited but defined rights were taken over by individual owners of the more extensive and valuable rights; and thus, while the rights of the poor were extinguished, the rights of the rich were enhanced in value. The requirements of scientific agriculture demanded the extinction of the peculiar rights which the poor possessed; but these requirements did not demand that the poor should go empty-handed without compensation or reward, without receiving collectively any return for rights which they had held collectively for centuries. Perhaps few more drastic changes have been effected by legislation than that accomplished by the enclosure of common lands, and if we are now only beginning to feel the return wave of these changes, it is due greatly to the ignorance and patience of those who have suffered most. I lay great stress upon the fact that the enclosure of commons enhanced the value of individual ownership and destroyed the collective rights of the poor, for it is the collective rights of the poor with which old age pensions are concerned.

The "General Report on Enclosures," drawn up by order of the Board of Agriculture and published in

1808, is not altogether pleasant reading. From the first year of Queen Anne to the year 1797 no less than three millions of acres were enclosed, and over this territory the former rights of the poor—collectively, not individually held—were swept away. Of course the total enclosures are still more extensive, for the whole of England was practically unenclosed in the reign of the Tudors, and it is now wholly enclosed. These rights of the poor have accrued to the landowners. I do not say wrongfully or unjustly, according to the legislative enactments and economical ideas of the time, but simply that rights once belonging to the poor, capable, if they were being dealt with in this age, of being valued and preserved for the use of the poor, have passed to the landowners.

This is a strong position. All the contemporary literature of the day bears testimony to the hardships that were imposed.

> "But now the commons are ta'en in,
> The cottages pulled down,
> And Moggy's got no wool to spin
> Her linsey-woolsey gown,"

is the cry contained in a popular song early in the present century. But the evidence before the Agricultural Board is direct. There is an appendix to the volume I have just quoted showing "the effect upon the poor of the enclosures which took place during the first forty years of his present Majesty" (George III.), and in respect of the first county there mentioned we have such entries as the following:—

TUTVY.—"To my knowledge, before the enclosure, the poor inhabitants found no difficulty in procuring milk for their children; since, it is with the utmost

difficulty they can procure any milk at all. Cows lessened from 110 to 40."

GOULDROP.—"The condition of the labouring poor much worse now than before the enclosure, owing to the impossibility of procuring any milk for their young families."

Such entries as these are common, but my present argument receives perfect support from many of the entries; such, for instance, as at Letcomb, in Berks, where it is stated that the "poor seem the greatest sufferers; they can no longer keep a cow, which before many of them did, *and they are therefore now maintained by the parish.*" Exactly; parish relief is substituted for common land rights and privileges which enabled the poor to keep cows!

All that I want to point out is that the present economical conditions of the poor are due largely to legislation, and that if these conditions are properly considered, justice will be found in the claim that, at least, the deficiency in the old age pensions fund should be made to fall upon landed and personal property. No more instructive inquiry could be instituted in connection with this subject than one directed to the economical results on all the interests concerned of the various enclosures. The land settlement of England and Scotland is at least as important as that of Wales or Ireland.

Let me now turn to another factor in the case. All over the country, by the generosity of benevolent donors, there exist charities of many kinds. Many of the professed objects of these charities—doles of bread, gifts of clothing, &c.—are no longer of any value to the poor for whom they were instituted. Other objects not directly connected with the poor, such

as fees for preaching a sermon on particular days, are absolutely useless for modern day requirements; and so much has this been recognised by the State, that the Charity Commissioners have revised the charities in several important particulars, and set out the accumulated funds to more practical use. But I contend that the uses to which these funds have been diverted are not proper uses. Large sums of money left in charity are now annually applied to education. Schools are set up in villages where there were not schools before, and institutions are endowed with great liberality. I do not question the good these schools and institutions are doing; I only question the justice of their endowment from charitable funds. Education is admittedly a care of the State. School Boards and technical education authorities are the legally constituted media of education, and they are entitled to throw the cost thereof on to taxation. It follows that, wherever these schools are met out of charitable funds, the poor are paying for them out of funds properly belonging to themselves, and the property-owners are therefore escaping a corresponding amount of taxation. Under the spurious guise of benefit to the poor, schools, which it is the duty of the owners of property to support, are supported out of funds belonging to the poor. Again, let me say, the point is one of mistaken conceptions of what is due to the position, not of wrong-doing, on the part of those in authority. If the moneys now devoted to educational matters out of charity funds not originally devised for that purpose were applied to the old age pension fund, and if, further, the ridiculous and excessive amounts paid for obsolete and unnecessary purposes, for the multiplication of secretaries and

other separate administrative expensives, were saved to the poor out of the charity funds all over the country, there would accrue an annual revenue which would be a substantial contribution by the poor to their own purposes.

I have only indicated a few important facts in this paper, not exhausted the subject. It wants careful consideration at the hands of dispassionate inquirers, who would consider the economics of this great question as a matter of scientific inquiry, and not a matter of politics. A Royal Commission of experts, with instructions to produce a "counsel of perfection," would do more to help forward legislation—and practical legislation, too—than any number of inquiries conducted by party politicians. The politician would come in later. He would have to translate the counsel of perfection into an Act of Parliament, and by so much as he adhered to or departed from the original plan of the experts, by so much would he attain success or failure, and be judged by his compeers.

THE POOR-LAW

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Object of Paper—Election of Guardians—The Poor-Law—Books on Poor-Law—Who is Entitled to Relief?—Nature of Relief to be Given: Out-relief "Prohibitory" Order—Out-relief to the Not Able-bodied—Who is Not Able-bodied?—Out-relief to the Able-bodied—Remaining Provisions of the So-called "Prohibitory" Order—The Labour Test Order—Employment on the Land—When Out-relief *must* be Given—Discretion of the Guardians—Amount of Out-relief—Miscellaneous Provisions for Outdoor Poor—Tuberculosis—Refusal to Accept "the House"—Outdoor Relief Regulation Order—The Relieving Officer and his Duties—Indoor Relief—The "Ins and Outs"—Conclusion—*Post-Scriptum:* The Cottage Homes Bill Report.

THE chief object of this paper is to give a brief account of the Powers of Guardians of the Poor, and to show how important and extensive they are. It is hoped that the effect will be to encourage men and women who are desirous of improving our social condition to accept the office of Guardian, and also to assist those in office in the execution of their duties. I would, however, wish to say *in limine* that, while endeavouring to set out the powers of Guardians, I must not be understood as recommending that these should be always exercised to the full. It by no means always follows that because Guardians may give relief, or relief in a certain way, they would be wise to do so. This remark is specially applicable to out-relief.

Election of Guardians

Guardians are elected under the Local Government Act, 1894[1]—commonly called the Parish Councils Act—by the parochial electors, on the principle of one person one vote. To be eligible as Guardian a person must be either (1) a parochial elector of some parish within the Union, or (2) resident, for twelve months preceding the election, in the Union, or (3) in the case of Guardian for a parish in a borough, qualified to be elected a Councillor for that borough. Spinsters, widows, and married women with the necessary qualifications are eligible. *Ex officio* and nominated Guardians are abolished; but a Board of Guardians may elect a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and two other members, being qualified persons, from outside the Board.[2]

Guardians are elected for three years; in some Unions one-third retire each year, and in others all retire every third year.[3] The parochial electors include the persons both on the Parliamentary and the Local Government or Municipal Registers, thus including occupiers, both men and women,[4] owners,

[1] 56 & 57 Vict. c. 73.

[2] Sect. 20. The "Oxford Incorporation," which Union comprises about half the city of Oxford, is a remarkable exception to this rule. The Board consists of the Vice-Chancellor of the University and Mayor (*ex officio*); 2 Guardians elected by Convocation; 8 by the Heads, &c., of certain Colleges; 2 appointed by Christ Church; 10 by the City Council; 11 by the City Parishes within the Union, *i.e.* 13 "University" and 22 "City" Guardians, making 35 in all. The University and Colleges possess only about one-fifth of the rateable value in the Union, consequently the anomaly is quite indefensible, though capable of historical explanation.

[3] Sect. 20.

[4] Women who would be entitled to vote as owners of property or lodgers or servants if they were men, are still unfortunately excluded.

lodgers, peers, and persons entitled to service franchise. Here, if ever, the power is in the hands of the people, and therefore if great is their power, so also great is their responsibility.

The Poor-Law

Guardians are elected for the purpose of administering the Law. The Poor-Law is contained in about 100 Acts of Parliament, and a very large mass of Orders set forth by the Local Government Board and their predecessors.[1]

These Orders, when duly made, are as much law as if they were themselves Acts of Parliament,[2] and therefore should be carefully distinguished from the circulars, instructional letters, &c., of the Board, or the statements and opinions of the Board, all of which have usually no legal authority whatever, though they are often useful in explaining the views the Department take of the law, or as containing advice which ought at least to be considered. A collection of the Orders of the Board with exhaustive notes and an elaborate index was edited by Messrs. Macmorran and Lushington in 1890.[3] It contains about 1200 pages. Several Orders and numerous circulars have, however, been issued by the Board since this work was published. It is also to be noted that some of the Orders are only addressed to some of the Unions, and there-

[1] In 1834 the Poor-Law Commissioners were empowered to make orders for a variety of purposes connected with the Poor-Law. Some years afterwards the "Board" was substituted for the "Commissioners," and in 1871 the "Local Government Board" succeeded the "Poor-Law Board."

[2] Only, of course, they may be repealed by the Board without an Act of Parliament.

[3] This is quoted below as "Macmorran."

fore do not apply to the others. Moreover, some with regard to the duties of officials only apply to those appointed after a certain date. Again, in a few cases, the Orders themselves are varied in effect by subsequent statutory legislation. Under the circumstances a demand for consolidation of the Poor-Law statutes and orders has sprung up. Meanwhile, most Guardians accept their law implicitly from chairmen and clerks, who are themselves sometimes inclined to confuse the traditions of the Board or the pious opinions of the Local Government Board with the law. There are also some floating sayings or shibboleths among a certain class of Guardians and would-be authorities on Poor-Law that are simply not law. A few of them will be incidentally noted in the course of this paper. When a Guardian is informed that certain relief which he considers necessary is illegal, he should ask for some authority—Act of Parliament, Order, or decision of the Judges, showing that it is illegal. If none of these can be produced, and the objector cannot even show the opinion of a lawyer in a text-book or a statement of the Local Government Board to support his view, it will often be advisable to propose that the applicant shall be left in the hands of the relieving or medical officer (as the case may be) until the next Board day, so as to give an opportunity to the chairman or clerk to look up his authorities. It is wise to regard with suspicion all statements as to the "general principles of the Poor-Law" or "general policy of the law," or vague maxims, such as "the Poor-Law is intended to relieve destitution, not poverty." Also, little books and pamphlets written with a view of trying to dissuade Guardians from out-relief are by no means always reliable in their

statements. Sometimes the giving of out-relief is called a "lax" administration of the law, while the refusal of it is called a "strict" administration; but such a nomenclature is quite incorrect. Where out-relief may lawfully be given, it is just as strict an administration of the law to give it as to "offer the House." In such cases the law puts the two powers into the Guardians' hands, and they have only to use their discretion.[1] (See pp. 171–176, 185.)

I have alluded more than once to the circulars and letters of the Local Government Board. Although they are not in any sense law, they often correctly expound the law. Also, when they state that the Guardians may incur some expenditure, give some relief, &c., it is quite safe to follow them, as the Government auditor will obviously not disallow any expenditure made in accordance with the Local Government Board documents. When, however, the circulars appear at first sight unduly to *restrict* the powers of the Guardians, the matter deserves a little further consideration. In some cases, when they seem to restrict, it will be seen, on a more careful examination, that the circular merely contains *suggestion* or *advice;* and in other cases it will sometimes be found that the phrase used by the Local Government Board, if properly understood, does not really conflict with the law as laid down by Parliament and in the Orders, although at first sight it may seem to do so. Of course if there were a conflict, the circular would so far be *ultra vires* and void. Some further mention will be made of these circulars below (see p. 171).

[1] Let me again say, that I do not in the least approve of indiscriminate out-relief, any more than I do of indiscriminate refusal to grant it. (See p. 171.)

Books on Poor-Law

Persons desirous of information, in a comparatively concise form, as to the chief powers of Guardians, may be recommended Mr. W. W. Mackenzie's "Poor-Law Guardian,"[1] or two brief works relating to (1) the "Duties of Relieving and Poor-Law Medical Officers," and (2) the "Government of the Workhouse," published at the office of the *Poor-Law Officers' Journal*[2] in the years 1896 and 1898 respectively. The great work by Messrs. Macmorran & Lushington, mentioned above,[3] or Glen's "Poor-Law Orders,"[4] should not merely be in the clerk's hands at his office, but be on every Board-room table for reference.[5]

Much useful information is also obtainable from the *Poor-Law Officers' Journal*, *The Justice of the Peace*,[6] and other publications, in which lawyers expert in the Poor-Law reply to legal questions on this subject.

Who is Entitled to Relief?

The first question in connection with an application for relief is whether the applicant (or the person on whose behalf the application is made) is entitled to any relief at all? To reply to this question we

[1] Price 7s. 6d., Shaw & Sons, Fetter Lane, E.C., 1895.

[2] 10 Queen Street, Manchester. Price (post free) 7d. and 1s. 3d. respectively.

[3] See p. 158.

[4] Knight & Co., 1898.

[5] Mention may also be made of "Archbold's Poor-Law," by J. Brook Little, 15th edition, 1898, 45s.; "Symond's Relieving Officer," by J. F. Symonds, 4th edition, 1898, 3s. 6d.; "Symond's Law of Settlements," by J. F. Symonds, 3rd edition, 1898, 7s. 6d.; "Macmorran's Poor-Law Statutes," vol. iv., 1890, 25s., all of which are published by Shaw & Sons.

[6] Shaw & Sons.

must refer, in the first instance, to the Poor-Law Relief Act, 1601,[1] which is the foundation of our Poor-Law.

This statute directs that the parish officers (for whom the Guardians are now substituted) shall

(1) Set to work the children of parents who shall not by the said churchwardens, &c., be thought able to maintain them;

(2) Set to work all such persons married or unmarried "having no means to maintain them," [and] "use no ordinary and daily trade of life to get their living by";

(3) Provide for and towards the "necessary relief of the lame, impotent, old, blind, and such other among them being poor and not able to work";

(4) Put out such[2] children as apprentices.

It is stated by the Local Government Board that no person has a claim to relief from the rates except in case of *actual destitution*. This is not a strictly accurate account of the law, as the statute does not use the word "destitution"; however, if we understand "destitution" to be merely a convenient abbreviation for such a condition of poverty or need as is indicated by the above statute, not much harm will be done by adopting it.[3]

[1] 43 Eliz. c. 2. It has been greatly altered by subsequent Acts, notably by 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, sometimes called "the new Poor-Law," so great were the changes it effected in administration. Still, much of 43 Eliz. c. 2 is yet in force, as will be seen by reference to the "Revised Statutes" (1888), vol. i. p. 546, or to the little book on "Administrative Reform," by the present writer, pp. 80–89.

[2] *i.e.* those mentioned in (1) above.

[3] For good definition of destitution see paragraph 165 of Aged Poor Report, p. 163 below. Compare Macmorran, p. 20 *n.*, and Mackenzie, pp. 116, 183.

Reference may usefully be made to the Report of the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor (vol. i. p. xlvi.) as to the meaning of the word "destitution":—

"165. As regards the general principle, it may be pointed out that the Poor-Law was established for a definite purpose, the relief of destitution. So long as destitution—a word which does not appear to have ever been closely defined, but which may be taken in practice to mean a want of the reasonable necessaries of life, such as food, lodging, warmth, clothing, and medical attendance, according to the normal standard of the times—remains as the test for public aid, it is possible with care to provide adequately for cases that satisfy it without injury to the community. Such a provision is in accordance with the dictates of humanity, and in the case of the aged poor may very properly, as is agreed on all hands, be from time to time improved so as to keep pace with the advance of the general standard of comfort."

In some books on Poor-Law, "destitution" has been defined as "the absence of any available means of support." This is evidently wrong. The writers have been misled by the use of the word "destitution," which, when unaccompanied by other words, suggests destitution of everything. Now a person is entitled to Poor-Law relief if he is destitute of *either* food, clothing, shelter, *or* (if ill) of medical attendance, *or* of any other of the necessaries of life, and of the means of obtaining them. Thus the Guardians may be entitled to grant relief though the applicant is the owner of a cottage and some little furniture.

The Guardians are judges of destitution, though no doubt they would be surcharged if they relieved a person who was *clearly* not entitled to relief. It is

usual and proper in ordinary cases for the Guardians to require applicants for relief (except in cases of sickness, &c.) to come before them to make their own application, but this is not essential.

Nature of Relief to be Given—Out-relief "Prohibitory" Order (Dec. 21, 1844)

If the Guardians are of opinion that the person is entitled to relief, the next question is whether out-relief shall be given, or the person shall only be "offered the House," *i.e.* indoor relief? In most cases the Guardians have the option, though in some only indoor and in a few cases only outdoor relief can be given. Outdoor relief may be given to every one except the able-bodied (and their families), and it *may* be given even to them in very many cases, as will be seen from the following Order which regulates out-relief in the vast majority of Unions:[1]—

Article 1. — Every able-bodied person, male or female, requiring relief from any parish within any of the said Unions, shall be relieved only in the workhouse of the Union, together with such of the family of every such able-bodied person as may be resident with him or her, and may not be in employment, and together with the wife of every such able-bodied male person, if he be a married man, and if she be resident with him; save and except in the following cases:—

1st. Where such person shall require relief on account of sudden and urgent necessity.

[1] For list of such Unions see Macmorran, pp. 40–43. General Orders containing similar provisions have been issued to about eighteen Unions, and special orders containing similar provisions to about fifty Unions.

2nd. Where such person shall require relief[1] on account of any sickness, accident, or bodily or mental infirmity affecting such person, or any of his or her family.

3rd. Where such person shall require relief for the purpose of defraying the expenses, either wholly or in part, of the burial of any of his or her family.

4th. Where such person, being a widow, shall be in the first six months of her widowhood.

5th. Where such person shall be a widow, and have a legitimate child or legitimate children dependent upon her, and incapable of earning his, her, or their livelihood, and have no illegitimate child born after the commencement of her widowhood.

6th. Where such person shall be confined in any gaol or place of safe custody, subject always to the regulation contained in Article 4.[2]

7th. Where such person shall be the wife, or child, of any able-bodied man who shall be in the service of Her Majesty as a soldier, sailor, or marine.

8th. Where any able-bodied person, not being a soldier, sailor, or marine, shall not reside within the Union, but the wife, child, or children of such person shall reside within the same, the Board of Guardians of the Union, according to their discretion, may,

[1] It must be remembered that under 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, s. 56, relief given to or on account of a wife or child under sixteen is considered as given to the husband or father; relief of child under sixteen of a widow is considered as given to such widow.

[2] See p. 168.

subject to the regulation contained in Article 4, afford relief in the workhouse to such wife, child, or children, or may allow out-door relief for any such child or children being within the age of nurture, and resident with the mother within the Union.

Out-relief to the Not Able-bodied

The remarks of Sir Hugh Owen (late Secretary to the Local Government Board) on this subject are well worthy of citation :—

"No regulations have been made by the Local Government Board restricting the discretion of the Guardians in regard to the relief of destitute persons chargeable to the Union, other than able-bodied and their families. The Guardians have full power to grant outdoor relief to destitute aged persons when they think such relief suitable, in amounts adequate to meet fully the necessities of the case."[1]

Who is Not Able-bodied?

Sir Hugh Owen says: "A person for Poor-Law purposes would be regarded as able-bodied if he was ordinarily able-bodied, although at the time of application he was suffering from sickness which rendered relief necessary. An able-bodied person is presumably a person not suffering from such physical or mental defects as to render him unequal to ordinary labour in the labour market. Whether a person is able-bodied is a matter of fact in the particular case, but the age

[1] Per Sir Hugh Owen. App. to third Report of Select Committee on Distress, &c., App. 30, p. 560.

of sixty is usually taken by Boards of Guardians as the limit which, after it is passed, renders a person not able-bodied."

Mr. Billson asked, "May I understand that the Guardians would be in order if they steadily and deliberately gave out-relief to persons over sixty without applying the labour test?"

Sir Hugh Owen: "I think you may say it would be legal, but in strictness the individual cases ought to be considered, because there may be some persons above the age who are practically able-bodied."[1]

It will be seen that Guardians can regard as not-able-bodied, and so give out-relief to, men who, through recent changes in the industrial system, have become "old before their time," and so are unable to compete with others.

Out-Relief to the Able-Bodied

This may be given in the cases mentioned in the Exceptions, pp. 164–166 above. There are two or three points in connection with these "Exceptions" which should be noted. Under the second, if an able-bodied person is out of employment, and also needs relief because his wife or child is ill, the Guardians may give out-relief to him and his whole family.

Under the fourth exception, out-relief may be given to an able-bodied widow for six months, although she has no dependent child; after the six months are over Exception 4 does not apply, but such a widow may, of course, come within some other exception, such as No. 2.

[1] Minutes of Evidence annexed to first Report of Committee on Distress, &c., 1895, No. III., p. 64, qq. 651–653.

Remaining Provisions of the So-called "Prohibitory" Order[1]

It may be convenient here very briefly to indicate the other provisions of this important Order.

Article 2 requires a report or certificate from the medical officer where out-relief is given on account of sickness, &c., to any able-bodied male person or any member of his family. Article 3 forbids relief to able-bodied non-residents in most cases.[2]

Article 4 is as follows:—

"Where the husband of any woman is beyond the seas, or in custody of the law, or in confinement in a licensed house or asylum as a lunatic or idiot, all relief which the Guardians shall give to his wife, or her child or children, shall be given to such woman in the same manner, and subject to the same conditions, as if she were a widow."[3]

Article 5 forbids the Guardians to pay *rent* for a pauper, but it is added "that nothing in this Article contained . . . shall be taken to prevent the said Guardians, in regulating the amount of relief to be afforded to any particular person, from considering the expense to be incurred by such person in providing lodging."[4]

Article 6 provides that if the Guardians depart in any instance from any of the above regulations, and

[1] It is unfortunately named, as it does not *prohibit* out-relief except to able-bodied, and only to them in some cases.

[2] Note the exceptions set out in the Article, enabling out-relief to be given in some cases to able-bodied non-residents.

[3] This also applies to a married woman living separate from her husband, 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 18.

[4] See also p. 175 below.

within fifteen days report the same and the grounds thereof to the Local Government Board, and that Board approves, the relief, if otherwise lawful, shall not be disallowed.

Article 7 forbids relief which is contrary to any regulations in this Order being given by way of loan; and provides that in certain cases relief under this Order may be given by way of loan.

The Labour Test Order

The above-mentioned powers of giving out-relief are supplemented where workhouses are full, or there is an unusual pressure of able-bodied poor for relief, or exceptional distress prevails in any Union, by the issue of a "Labour Test Order." When the Prohibitory Order is so supplemented by a "Labour Test Order," these Orders in conjunction "differ but little[1] from the 'Outdoor Relief Regulation Order'"[2] (see p. 178 below), which, instead of the so-called Prohibitory Order, has been issued to about a hundred Unions. Under the Labour Test Order stoneyards are frequently opened; but the Guardians have, subject to the Local Government Board, wide discretion as to the kind of work. Reference may be here made to the circular first issued by Mr. Chamberlain in 1886, suggesting "useful employments" of various kinds in times of exceptional distress.[3]

[1] As to differences, see Macmorran, p. 295 *n.*

[2] Report of Select Committee on Distress from Want of Employment, 1896, No. 321 (price 4½d.), p. 5.

[3] For usual form of Order see Mackenzie, p. 218; Macmorran, p. 186: for text of circular, Mackenzie, p. 207; Macmorran, p. 296.

Employment on the Land

The Guardians have certain powers of taking land and setting poor persons to work thereon for wages, subject to rules of the Local Government Board. It is believed that the Local Government Board are right in saying that the Guardians can commence to exercise these powers, although no rules have been made. For loans, however, they would have to apply to the Local Government Board, and it would be difficult to embark on any extensive scheme without the Central Board's sanction.[1]

When Out-relief *must* be Given

1. Practically the Guardians must give out-relief when the "destitute" person is too ill to be moved into the workhouse, or when he is suffering from some infectious disease and there is no means of properly isolating the case in the workhouse.

2. They are bound to give out-relief when a married couple (both being over sixty) claim their right to live together, and the Guardians are unable, or unwilling, to provide separate accommodation[2] under 10 & 11 Vict. c. 109, s. 23.

3. In certain exceptional cases[3] where the father is away and one or more of the children is under the age of nurture (seven years old) and so must not be

[1] See 59 Geo. III. c. 12, s. 12; 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 42; 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 59; 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 42; 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 69. I believe that lately some steps in giving employment have been taken by the Croydon Union.

[2] See Instructional Letter in eleventh Annual Report of Poor-Law Commission, and 10 Off. Cir. 109; "Govt. Wor.," p. 61.

[3] Macmorran, pp. 26, 33; 8th Ann. Rep. of Poor-Law Comm., p. 76.

moved from the mother, and the mother does not require relief for herself, but only for such children. If this does not apply to cases within Article 4 (see p. 168), or to a married woman living separate from her husband,[1] it has not a wide scope. *Sed qu.* See *Poor-Law Officers' Journal*, August 18, 1899, p. 665.

4. When the Workhouse is full.

Unfortunately many workhouses are over-crowded, and too frequently the Local Government Board takes no effective steps to compel the Guardians either to build or give out-relief.[2]

Discretion of the Guardians

Many years ago the Local Government Board issued circulars[3] advising that out-relief should not be granted in a considerable number of cases in which the Guardians have, by law, power to award it; and in some cases Boards of Guardians passed resolutions to refuse out-relief accordingly.

It should be clearly understood that neither circular nor resolutions have any binding force in such matters. It is the *duty* of each assembly of the Board of Guardians to administer *the law* according to their discretion.

It is not necessary to set out the contents of these circulars here, for a copy will be found in several of the text-books cited above; and it is also needless to dilate on the disadvantages of *indiscriminate* out-relief, as they have been fully set forth in the Reports of

[1] Divided Parishes Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 18.

[2] Though the Local Government Board cannot say "you must give out-relief," they can say "you must build if you do not provide for some of your legal poor by out-relief."

[3] 1871 and 1878.

the Poor-Law Commissioners of 1834, of the Local Government Board, and of the Charity Organisation Society.

It should, however, be stated that those Commissioners, among their eighteen formal recommendations, made none against out-relief for aged poor.

The Report of the recent Royal Commission on the Aged Poor contains the following recommendations:[1]—

"We recommend[2] that Boards of Guardians, in dealing with applications for relief, should inquire with special care into the antecedents of destitute persons whose physical faculties have failed by reason of age and infirmity; and that outdoor relief should in such cases be given to those who are shown to have been of good character, thrifty according to their opportunities, and generally independent in early life, and who are not living under conditions of health or surrounding circumstances which make it evident that the relief given should be indoor relief.

"We desire to place on record in strong terms our conviction that where outdoor relief is given the amount should be adequate to meet fully the extent of the destitution, and that proper investigation and supervision should be ensured in all cases in which application is made for relief.

"While we recognise that there are many among the destitute aged poor to whom outdoor rather than indoor relief should be given, we have seen that relief in an indoor establishment is necessary in many classes of cases."

I will now deal with some arguments which are

[1] 1895—C. 7684, price 1s., cited in "Duties of Relieving Officer," pp. 5, 6.

[2] p. lxxxiii.

used with a view of preventing Guardians from employing their own judgment. It is sometimes said that Guardians have "nothing to do with character, but only with destitution." This is so far true that the Guardians are bound to relieve a person in need of poor-law relief however bad his character, and they are not *obliged* to consider character in deciding whether to give out-relief or offer the House, but they are most certainly *entitled* to take character into account,[1] and most Boards of Guardians do so.

An idea seems to be prevalent among some Guardians that all "relief in aid of wages" is illegal; and consequently objection is raised when old or infirm people earn a trifle by casual employment, or eke out their rent by taking a lodger. But no such relief is forbidden in the "Prohibitory" Order; so that relief may be given in aid of wages to all persons in need of relief but the able-bodied, and even to the able-bodied if they fall within the numerous exceptions stated above (see pp. 164–166).[2]

Persons opposed "on principle" to granting out-relief frequently use arguments which indicate that they have not yet grasped the fact that Guardians have very wide powers and discretion. Thus, if the applicant lives in a cheap house in a slum, it is said that his dwelling is so bad that it would be kinder to "offer him the workhouse." But the answer is, that the Guardians can inform the applicant that unless he removes they will not continue out-relief, and that if

[1] This was stated by Mr. Stansfield (a President of the Local Government Board), and appears clearly in the above report, and from the Memorandum of Mr. Ritchie (p. xcvi.).

[2] *e.g.* if his wife or child is ill, and, though in work, he cannot afford medical attendance and whatever is needed by the sick person.

he goes to a healthier dwelling they will increase his allowance.

If the destitute woman has a better cottage and takes in a lodger to help pay the rent, the argument is that she is competing (with the aid of rates) against other persons who let lodgings. The reply is that there is no law against such competition; and further, that if the Board thinks it objectionable, they may make it a condition that she shall cease to let lodgings, and (of course) increase her allowance.[1]

As a last resource the objector points out that the usual pittance of the Board is inadequate. But the reply is, that the Board should increase the allowance and make it adequate. Even if the applicant, from age or sickness, cannot take care of himself, the Guardians can give out-relief, and pay a nurse or some neighbour to take care of the person.

Amount of Out-Relief

The amount of out-relief is in the discretion of the Guardians, and the Orders of the Local Government Board impose no condition in this matter. If the sums granted by way of relief were *clearly* in excess of the requirements of the case, the auditor would be empowered to surcharge the amount of excess.[2]

The Guardians are judges of the amount, and I believe that practically they are never surcharged on this head. There is, therefore, no reason whatever why so many Boards of Guardians should adhere to

[1] Sometimes refusal of out-relief results in *increase* of competition.

[2] Per Sir Hugh Owen, Appendix 30 to third Report of Select Committee on Distress, &c., Appendix 30, p. 558; see also p. 166 above.

a miserable "2s. 6d. and a loaf"; and I believe that some give 5s. a week to aged persons.[1]

Article 5, cited above (p. 168), has been misunderstood by some of those Guardians who feel it their duty to spend as little as possible on out-relief. But it has been explained by the Central Board as merely "intended to prevent a practice which prevailed in some parts of the country, whereby the poor rates have been made a fund for the payment of rents directly to the landlords. In all cases where the pauper is so far destitute as to require a lodging *or the means of paying for one*, if the Guardians do not deem it expedient in the particular case to require the party to come into the workhouse, they should supply to the pauper the means of paying for such lodging."[2]

"The Guardians may properly supply requisite clothing in cases where out-relief may lawfully be granted";[3] and in particular cases bedding and other necessaries, or money with which to purchase them.

It may be stated that the Local Government Board (though generally discouraging out-relief) strongly advises that, when given, it should be adequate.

Miscellaneous Provisions for Outdoor Poor

District Nurses.—The Guardians may appoint trained nurses for nursing the sick poor who are relieved by the Guardians otherwise than in a workhouse or infirmary (see General Order, 27th January

[1] See "Old Age Pensions," &c., by Charles Booth (Macmillan, 1899, price 6d.), p. 19.

[2] *Instructional Letter* cited in Glen's "Poor-Law Orders," p. 504. This is really clear from the proviso, p. 168.

[3] 9 Off. Cir. 108, cited Macmorran, p. 291 *n.*

1892, and Circular Letter of 1st February 1892—Mackenzie, pp. 274–283).

Sending them to Hospitals.[1]—Guardians may send poor persons to establishments outside the Union, as hospitals, asylums, schools for blind, infirmaries at the seaside, &c.,[2] and pay for conveyance thereto and relief therein;[3] and the Poor-Law Board held that Guardians might give non-resident out-relief to a sick person going to the seaside for his health.[4]

Sanitary Precautions.—Every district medical officer appointed after 28th February 1879 is bound immediately upon the occurrence of any case of contagious, infectious, or epidemic disease of a dangerous character amongst the pauper patients under his care to give notice thereof to the Clerk or Medical Officer of Health of the Local Sanitary authority.[5] It will be observed that this Order[6] was made long before the Act for the Notification of Infectious Diseases, and this duty must be carried out in districts where the Notification Act has not been adopted, and also as to any diseases of the character mentioned which in the particular district have not become notifiable. It may be doubted whether this useful Order is universally obeyed.

Tuberculosis

A new difficulty has arisen in consequence of recent discoveries as to consumption. So long as

[1] *14 and 15 Vict. c. 105, s. 5*; Mackenzie, p. 81; Macmorran, p. 168 *n.*

[2] *Instructional Letter* cited Macmorran, p. 33 *n.*; so also Maude's "*Relief and Settlement of Poor*" (*Poor-Law Officers' Journal* Office), p. 21.

[3] Macmorran, pp. 27 *n.*, 28 *n.*; Maude, p. 20; Glen, "Poor-Law Orders," pp. 499 *n.*, 458 *n.*

[4] Macmorran, 62 *n.*, citing 9 Off. Cir. 89.

[5] "Duties of R.O. and M.O.H.," p. 50.

[6] General Order, 12th February 1879, Macmorran, pp. 665, 669.

it was thought that this disease was incurable and not "catching," it was reasonable to place the patients with the other inmates of the workhouse, among the "able-bodied," the infirm, or in the infirmary according to the stage of disease. Under present circumstances, however, it seems quite unsafe to place them with other patients (except, perhaps, under careful supervision in an infirmary), and moreover, the confinement and dulness of the workhouse seem greatly prejudicial to the prospects of cure.

On the other hand, the opponents of out-relief point out the danger to others of allowing them to remain in overcrowded and insanitary houses. The provision of public sanitoria has been suggested as the remedy, but to discuss this proposal would be outside the scope of this article.[1]

Perhaps it might be possible to lodge some cases in hospitals, and to allow others sufficient out-relief, under proper medical supervision, so as to give a fair prospect of cure without danger to others.

It is only possible here to state the problem, in the hope that the newly-formed Society for the Prevention of Consumption, &c., may find a solution.

Refusal to Accept "the House"

Where the House has been offered but declined, the Local Government Board have expressed an opinion that the Guardians would not be legally responsible if the man died of starvation, but that "should the circumstances become urgent, all relief

[1] For information as to the endeavour to stamp out consumption apply to the Secretary of the National Association for the Prevention of Consumption, 20 Hanover Square, London, W.

should not be withheld by the Relieving Officer." "The Board think he should be instructed[1] to watch the case and afford such temporary relief in kind as may be necessary during the intervals between the meetings of the Board of Guardians."[2] This question is further discussed in connection with the "Duties of the Relieving Officer," see p. 180 below.

Outdoor Relief Regulation Order

It must be remembered that about a hundred Unions—including those in the metropolis—are not under the so-called "Prohibitory" Order, but under the milder régime of the "Regulation" Order[3] of 14th December 1852, or under Orders containing similar provisions.[4] In these Unions the Guardians have power to give out-relief not only to the not-able-bodied, but to all able-bodied who need poor-law relief. It is a condition, however, as to the able-bodied males (unless they are within a long list of exceptions substantially corresponding to those in the "Prohibitory" Order, see p. 164) that at least one-half of the relief shall be given in kind, that every able-bodied male shall be "set to work" by the Guardians, and that no able-bodied male shall be relieved while he is employed for hire by any person. This last rule does not prohibit relief of a man who is working for wages one day and is out of work the next, if he needs relief.[5]

[1] *i.e.* by the Guardians.

[2] Maude's "Relief and Settlement of Poor," p. 24; so also Mackenzie, p. 118.

[3] Of course this Order does not apply to those Unions who are under the "Prohibitory" Order.

[4] For list see Macmorran, pp. 303-305.

[5] This Order also expressly forbids redemption or purchase of tools by the Guardians, and contains other minute provisions.

The Relieving Officer and his Duties

The Relieving Officer is an officer of the Guardians, but he is also directly responsible to the Local Government Board; and, moreover, besides receiving applications for relief and reporting them to the Guardians and giving the legal relief ordered by them, he is also bound in certain cases, between the meetings of Guardians, to give necessary relief himself.

In every case of sudden *or* urgent[1] necessity he must give relief either by giving an order of admission of the destitute person into the workhouse (and conveying him, if necessary), or by out-relief in kind; and he is liable criminally for neglecting to do so. It is no defence to him to say, in answer to a summons for refusing relief, that he refused it in the *bona fide* exercise of his judgment, should the magistrates be of opinion that the facts did disclose a case for relief.[2] Also, it is no defence to say that the application was not made to him by the destitute person or by the head of the family.[3] He ought to investigate cases brought before him by relatives or near neighbours. A Guardian (away from the Board) cannot *direct* the Relieving Officer, but can give him information or advice,[4] and if evil comes from the Relieving Officer's neglect of such warning, the Local Government Board will deem his conduct less excusable.

A difficulty sometimes arises because the destitute

[1] The Overseer's power to give relief only exists in cases which are both "sudden and urgent."

[2] Clarke *v.* Joslin (1873), 27 L.T. Rep. n.s. p. 762; Macmorran, p. 244 *n.*; Glen, "Poor-Law Orders," p. 449.

[3] *Reg.* v. *Curtis*, 15 Cox C. C., p. 746; Glen, "Poor-Law Orders," p. 227. In this case the Relieving Officer was tried for manslaughter.

[4] See circulars, cited Macmorran, pp. 239–244 *n.*

person, though in urgent need, refuses to come into the "House." However, it is laid down by the Board that "if the offer of the workhouse is refused, it will then be the duty of the Relieving Officer to relieve the destitute person in kind until the next meeting of the Board of Guardians, when he will be required to report the case to the Guardians and take their directions upon it."[1]

And suppose "The applicant having declined the Order for the workhouse and the Relieving Officer having given temporary relief (in kind) until the next meeting of the Guardians, the Guardians at their meeting confirm the relief given and make an Order for the workhouse. If the applicant refuses to go, would the Relieving Officer be justified in refusing further relief?"

This question was put in the *Poor-Law Officers' Journal* of 1st October 1897. The answer was, "The Relieving Officer would not be justified in refusing further relief if the application was caused by sudden or urgent necessity." It will be observed, however, that if the circumstances remained exactly the same the case would hardly be sudden, and that therefore the necessity must be *urgent*. It is, however, the duty of a Relieving Officer not knowingly or negligently to permit a person who refuses to come into the workhouse to die or be seriously ill for want of food.

Indoor Relief[2]

Workhouses with their dependent infirmaries have greatly improved of late years. While the Local

[1] 7 Off. Cir. 226, cited Macmorran, p. 243 *n.*; see p. 178 above; and Glen, "Poor-Law Orders," p. 449.

[2] Space forbids me to treat this part of the subject more fully.

Government Board and their Inspectors have done their best to discourage out-relief, they have also (as a general rule) exerted their influence in favour of better accommodation in the House for all classes, especially for the sick; and during the last few years the Board have made several "Orders" and issued many suggestions for the comfort and welfare of the aged and sick inmates of the workhouse.

Among Sir Henry Fowler's administrative reforms may be mentioned the orders allowing the Guardians to give tobacco and "afternoon tea" to the aged, and that permitting the Guardians to give "dry tea" so that tea may be "made" in the wards.[1] The object of this latter order was, of course, to give a more home-like character to the meal. His order authorising *every* Guardian to visit the House is one of great value. Previously a Guardian who was not on the Visiting Committee could only go over the House *by leave* of the Master of the Workhouse. Also Sir H. Fowler authorised the appointment of lady visitors.

Still more recently Mr. Chaplin issued a circular suggesting to Boards of Guardians classification and more humane treatment of the deserving aged poor in the workhouses.

Special attention should be given to the paragraphs in this circular with reference to clothing, liberty to go out, dietaries, and treatment of imbeciles. Any Guardian who has not had this circular[2] had better ask his Board of Guardians to instruct the Clerk to procure copies for himself and his fellow Guardians. It should be remembered that classification of inmates in the workhouse in accordance with character, previous

[1] For text see "Govt. Wor.," pp. 56–57.

[2] The text will be found at pp. 61–69 of "Govt. of the Workhouse."

habits, or other grounds is encouraged, indeed almost commanded, by Article 99 of the Order of 24th July 1847,[1] though little has been done in this direction.[2] Guardians have generally been content with classification according to sex, age, sickness, &c., according to Article 98, without further subdivisions.

In formally visiting the workhouse, a Guardian will do well to take with him a copy of the Circular of the Poor-Law Board (6th July 1868)[3] on the duties of visitors.

For many years the Local Government Board have been pressing on the Guardians the advisability of having experienced paid, instead of pauper, nurses; and their pressure, though producing very good results, was only partially successful. Now, however, they have issued an Order[4] for trained nurses, which no doubt has had further effect. The Order forbids employment of paupers, even as attendants, in the sick and lying-in wards, unless they are approved by the Medical Officer.[5]

The "Ins and Outs"

Some Guardians appear to be under the impression that there is a rule of law which prevents them from allowing a man to leave his children for a few days in the workhouse or school while he goes out to find work and provide a lodging for them. The great inconvenience and expense of turning the

[1] "Govt. Wor.," p. 8; see circular of 31st July 1896, ibid., p. 61.

[2] For Sheffield Scheme, see ibid., p. 110.

[3] Ibid., p. 70.

[4] 6th August 1897, see ibid., p. 117.

[5] The Report of the Committee on Workhouse Dietaries, 1898 (C. 9002) (price 2d.), will probably lead to further improvement in workhouses.

children out of the school, and then a few days afterwards receiving them again into the workhouse (where they go through the necessary period of quarantine to enable the Medical Officer to pronounce that they are free from infection and may be put with the other children) is obvious.

Fortunately the law is not nearly so foolish as some people imagine. Article 115[1] directs that if an able-bodied pauper having a family discharges himself, the whole of such family shall be sent with him "unless the Guardians shall for any special reason otherwise direct; and such direction shall be in conformity with the regulations of the Commissioners with respect to relief in force at the time." The Commissioners have pointed out that a special instruction to the Master is necessary on every occasion to enable an able-bodied person to leave his family in the workhouse, which instruction this Article enables the Guardians to give. Where the pauper is not able-bodied a general instruction to the Master as to a particular family or even class of families is sufficient.[2]

That the Guardians have this power is quite clear, but there is some reason to think that they possess it even independently of this Article. The children are in need of relief within 43 Eliz. c. 2. The outdoor-relief "Prohibitory" Order is made under the authority of 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76,[3] and does not appear to take away any power the Guardians possess of giving in-relief, or to forbid Guardians to relieve the destitute children of an able-bodied person without the parent. It declares (in effect), that any relief

[1] General Order, 24th July 1847; "Govt. Wor.," p. 19.
[2] See Off. Cir. 301, cited Macmorran, 118 *n.*
[3] Sect. 52, and perhaps sect. 15.

which is given to the able-bodied or his children shall be given in the workhouse (see p. 164). The other construction would involve that the Guardians could not take the man into the workhouse unless he brought into the workhouse with him (1) all his children (of whatever age) who were resident with him, even though they had ample means of support ;[1] (2) his wife, even though she had independent means ; and, of course, the Guardians could not give him out-relief. Such a construction seems unreasonable. As to the argument that, under 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, s. 56, relief given to the wife, or to the children under sixteen, is considered as given to the husband or father ; it may be replied that this means that he becomes a pauper, &c., and is liable for the relief so given. If, however, it is thought that by this Statute they are identified with the father, then the reply is that the relief is given to the parent (through the children) in the workhouse.

Conclusion

It has been found impossible from want of space to deal here with the imbeciles and epileptics[2] or with the children under the care of the Guardians. Reference should, however, be made to the above-mentioned circular (p. 181) as to these persons. A valuable circular mainly intended to prevent the children from becoming "little drudges" in their schools, and to guard both their lessons and play-time from too large encroachments occasioned by the Guardians' desire to utilise their industrial work,

[1] *e.g.* through friends or charity.

[2] See Report on "Treatment of Imbeciles and Epileptics" (*Poor-Law Officers' Journal*, 1897).

was issued on 30th January 1897.[1] It will be hardly necessary to say that the cost of indoor relief has of late years gone up by leaps and bounds, and is likely to increase yet further.

The reader of these pages will see that Guardians can do much to alleviate the sad lot of the deserving aged poor, and that the general powers of Boards of Guardians are far greater than is fully recognised. The Poor-Law is indeed innocent of much blame that falls to its share. The fault is often with the administrators, rather than with the law; and it will be of little service to improve the law unless the Local Government Board and its Inspectors cordially and loyally endeavour to carry out the improvements.

Post-Scriptum.—Since the above was written, a Special Report of the Select Committee, to whom the Cottage Homes Bill was referred, has been published (July 1899, No. 261, Eyre & Spottiswoode, price 1½d.). The Committee point out that the out-relief often given by Guardians is insufficient for the necessities of life (p. 7). They recommend—

(1) Classification of inmates of workhouse according to character and habits.

(2) Children other than infants to be provided for outside the workhouse premises.

(3) County Councils to provide for pauper imbeciles and epileptics outside the workhouse.

(4) "That the aged deserving poor, so far as it is possible, should receive adequate outdoor relief, and that when they are in the workhouse they should constitute a special class, and receive special treatment and privileges."

(5) "Cottage homes within the Unions, or other suitable accommodation, for married couples and respectable old persons whose poverty is not their own fault but the result of misfortune."

The Guardians have, without waiting for any legislation, full power to carry out all these recommendations except No. (3).

[1] "Gov. Wor.," p. 121.

FACTORIES AND WORKSHOPS

By Miss MONA WILSON

Conditions of Factory Life.

Certain voluntary methods to raise Factory Life: (*a*) Fair and Black Lists; (*b*) Consumers' leagues—The difficulties which beset them.

Existing Legislation.—Distinction—Factories and Workshops—Textile and Non-Textile Factories—What constitutes a Workshop—Further distinctions: (*a*) Sanitation; (*b*) Factory and Workshop Act applies to both sexes; (*c*) Effect of regulating hours of women's work; (*d*) Limitations in Non-Textile Factories.

Legislation affecting wages: (*a*) The Truck Acts; (*b*) Particulars clause—Compensation for injuries.

General: (*a*) The public should know the existing law in order to aid the workers to secure the full measure of their legal rights; (*b*) Why workers amongst the poor shrink from inquiry into the conditions of factory life; (*c*) The injustice of breaches of factory law; (*d*) How unorganised workers are victimised.

Special: (*a*) Inadequate inspection; (*b*) Additional Women Inspectors wanted; (*c*) Workers will not always render help to Inspectors; (*d*) The enforcement of the Acts not a remedy for all the evils of industrial life.

Legislation.—More reform wanted—Objections considered—Cases for Legislation: (*a*) Fruit-preserving; (*b*) Poisonous trades; (*c*) Little improvement in Pottery trade since Government inquiry, 1893; (*d*) Proposed abolition of yellow phosphorus in Match trade; (*e*) Further regulation of home work.

Shop Assistants.—Legislation: (*a*) Lack of regulation; (*b*) The Truck Acts not enforced; (*c*) Inadequate local shop inspection; (*d*) The scandal of fines; (*e*) Abuse of living-in system.

Trade Organisations for Women: (*a*) The benefits of Trade Unionism; (*b*) The necessity for women as well as men to combine—The effect of better organisation among women would (*a*) reduce competition, and (*b*) be advantageous from an educational point of view.

The Situation of to-day.—Success can only be attained by active participation in the Trades' Union movement.

To describe the conditions of life in factories and workshops, in all its varying forms, within the limits

of a single paper, is as impossible as to give a formula for "home life in England." If a foreigner wished to study the latter, we should refer him to biographies and novels dealing with family life of all sorts and descriptions. Factory life is also rich in variety. At one mill the working week is forty-eight hours, the premises are light and airy, nothing but thoroughly good work, of which the producers may be proud, is turned out; the wages paid are sufficient for tolerable comfort. At another the nominal hours are sixty, but the workers are kept late into the night, toiling in rooms which even early in the day had become full of hot, exhausted air; they are constantly urged to produce a greater quantity of work, by means of threats of dismissal or diminution of wages—the latter already seven shillings a week, or often less.

Every one is familiar with descriptions of the sweater's den, the well-nigh slavery of shop assistants under the living-in system, the terrible suffering caused by the use of lead in the manufacture of pottery, or yellow phosphorus in the match trade. To no reader of magazines, newspapers, or novels—and in this generation we are all readers of magazines, newspapers, and novels—do such facts come as a fresh shock and revelation—even the sermon reader cannot escape. Many of us are inclined to say, "I have heard enough of all this; I know it is mostly true; and if there were anything I could do to prevent it, I would; but I will not make myself miserable by dwelling on what I can do nothing to mend." The object of this paper is to show that much *can* be done, if those who are in constant contact with the workers, whose main desire is to raise the level of their lives, would not stand aloof.

The idea which usually occurs to people who wish to better the conditions of the workers in factories, is that of some form of voluntary combination to purchase only those goods which are manufactured under fair conditions. With this end in view, fair lists of good shops, and black lists of bad shops are carefully constructed, and consumers' leagues are formed. The present writer does not wish to assert that nothing has been effected by this method, but to point out the difficulties with which it is beset, to contend that it is never likely to be efficient, and that simpler and more effective methods are at hand.

In the first place, let us examine the difficulties which attend the drawing up of fair or black lists. That such lists should be equitable and should fulfil their purpose, it would be necessary that they should extend both to the factories or workshops at which the goods are made, and to the shops where they are sold, and that they should cover all trades. To make this possible, a complete and accurate knowledge is required of the conditions in all departments of the said factories, workshops, and shops. Now nothing is commoner than for "fairness" or "badness" to be partial. For example, a shop may be admirably conducted in all matters relating to the shop assistants; they may be provided with seats, paid good wages—real wages, not a nominal wage, nibbled away by fines and deductions—the hours may be comparatively short, and sufficient time allowed for meals. But in the same building there may be over-crowded, ill-ventilated work-rooms, where the girls are sewing till ten or eleven at night for a few shillings, out of which they have to provide needles and thread, purchased on the premises, at a profit to the employer.

Or again, in the comparatively rare cases where a shop is fair to assistants and to employees in the workrooms, work may be given to out-workers, for whose well-being the employer has at present no sort of responsibility, and who are usually paid starvation wages, below even the standard in the worst shops.

There is, moreover, another great division in factories or workshops where both men and women are employed. How often is it the case that, usually through the instrumentality of a trade union, the men are receiving good wages, but the women are paid on a scale which, with due allowance for the different standard of pay for men and women which exists at present, is far lower. For example, only about one per cent. of the printing-houses in London are "fair" to both men and women. This is almost entirely a matter of organisation. The Women's Printing and Kindred Trades Union is still weak, and there are only two or three houses which pay in accordance with its list, the minimum for time work on the list being fifteen shillings per week.

Further, even when it is taken into consideration that it is often impossible to classify a factory, workshop, or shop as a whole, because it may be "fair" in one department, "unfair" in another—fair to men and unfair to women—it must be remembered that the conditions will be liable to vary. A private firm is converted into a company, perhaps; wages are cut down, and the business is conducted with the narrowest economy, or a trade organisation falls in numbers, and is no longer able to insist on the payment of the union rate. From these considerations it is clear that if fair lists are to have any wide-reaching

effect, an enormous body of constantly revised facts is necessary. How is this to be accurately obtained? Surely alone by the instrumentality of the workers themselves—in short, by means of complete and extensive trade organisation. But if trade organisation were extensive and complete, fair lists would cease to be necessary, and therefore it would be well to devote energy to the perfecting of trade organisation, of which a considerable nucleus already exists.

A like argument holds good in respect of the "Consumers' League." A certain number of people agree to purchase such goods only as are made under fair conditions. In order to ensure this, Leagues must subject the places on their list to constant inspection; this is, of course, voluntarily submitted to; the inspector could have no official status, or right of entry, or of inflicting penalties. But since a system of Government inspection exists, would it not be a less clumsy and more effectual method to perfect that system, to facilitate the discharge of the inspector's duties, and to insist on the appointment of an adequate number of inspectors, both men and women?

The writer of this paper is far from wishing to discourage people from trying to find out under what conditions goods are made, or from buying goods known to be made under good conditions, or avoiding those known to be made under bad conditions. To give custom by preference to trade union houses, to purchase matches and pottery which do not involve risks to the workers, would to people of any imagination perhaps present itself rather as a necessity of personal comfort—it can scarcely be glorified by the name of a duty. But unless the consumer is to go

beyond this, and take his part in the movements described in this paper, this duty is a very narrow one, and, under present conditions, its satisfactory fulfilment impossible. The attempt made without a sufficient knowledge of the facts has often led to the advertisement of firms who little deserved it, and to the production of goods under fancy titles indicative of a harmlessness they are far from possessing.

Another danger of this method unchecked by other knowledge is, that it often leads to sentimental encouragement of inferior goods, which can never secure a market on their own merits. It should be a point of honour with people concerned in working, or even in recommending, factories or shops worked on model lines, that the articles produced should be every whit as good, or better, than the same commodity made under bad conditions. The sentimental and imaginative view will only appeal to a limited number of people; and it is quite possible to do harm by recommending second-rate goods, simply because they are made under good conditions. Buy them yourself by all means, but remember that the strongest argument for lasting reform is that the existing evils are totally unnecessary from any point of view. A man who has been driven to declare that he will buy the "most sweated trousers" he can find, by the endeavours of an enthusiastic wife to provide him with garments of an unstained industrial history, is not likely to take an active part in securing, say, the regulation of "home work"! The association of bad work with fair conditions, which is the result of such misguided enthusiasm, is quite unnecessary, and will certainly damage the cause of reform.

As has already been indicated, it is one of the

writer's objects to attempt to persuade readers who have the opportunity to co-operate with the factory inspectors in securing the enforcement of the laws affecting factories and workshops; it will, therefore, be well to say a few words about these laws.

It is, of course, only possible within the limits of this paper to give a very brief outline of the Factory and Workshop Acts; but probably no one to whom the subject is new will read even an outline without remembering some story of illness, or accident, or over-work, which had come to his knowledge, and realising that such suffering might have been easily prevented.

There is one main distinction which must not be overlooked — that between factories and workshops. The former are—without entering on exceptions of the "cats is dogs, but tortoises is insects" order—workplaces in which machinery worked by mechanical power is used, the latter in which it is not so used. There is a further distinction between textile and non-textile factories, the former being, with certain special exceptions, those places in which the manufacture of cotton, wool, flax, silk, jute, and certain other like materials is carried on.

The definition of places to which the Factory and Workshop Acts apply is as follows: "Any premises, room or place in which mechanical power or manual labour is employed for purposes of gain in making, repairing, altering, finishing, ornamenting, or adapting for sale any article, or in any process incidental thereto;" and the remainder of workplaces so defined are workshops as distinguished from factories. It is often mistakenly supposed that the premises in which such work is carried on come under the head of workshops,

under certain conditions only, but, on the contrary, any place, whether it be a bedroom or a cinder-heap, becomes a workshop merely by reason of being used for any of the purposes above named. Again, there is an idea that a workshop is not technically such unless a certain number of people are employed. This also is an entire misapprehension. It is the nature of the work carried on which constitutes the workshop.

Workshops are divided into three classes—(1) domestic workshops, in which only members of the same family, living under the same roof, are employed; (2) workshops in which no children or young persons are employed; (3) workshops in which men only are employed; (4) ordinary workshops.

These distinctions are very important, as the regulations of the Acts differ for the various kinds of workplaces. I can only mention a few of the more important of these differences. The sanitary condition of workshops is regulated by the Sanitary Authority instead of by the Factory Inspector, although the latter may give notice of defects to the Sanitary Authority, and may take action himself, should such an intimation produce no result. Again, so far as their sanitary condition alone is concerned, all workshops are in the same position, but there is no regulation as to hours for workshops in which men only are employed, and none as to the hours of women in domestic workshops.

Another mistaken idea—and I am constructing this sketch mainly by means of the overthrow of mistaken ideas, with the forlorn hope of thereby rousing an interest in a somewhat dry subject—is that the Acts apply to women and children only, with the rider, perhaps, that the distinction between the sexes thereby

implied is fatal to the interests of women in the labour market. This is far from the truth; the provisions concerning cleanliness, ventilation, overcrowding, fencing of machinery, protection against fire, apply equally to men, as do the Truck Acts, and the section known as the Particulars Clause. The hours of labour for men are not directly regulated, but the effect of protecting women, young persons, and children from excessive hours has been to shorten the hours worked by adult men also. As Mr. and Mrs. Webb show in their "History of Trade Unionism," the limitation of women's hours in the textile trades to fifty-six and a half in the week was the result of a battle fought by the Lancashire men Trade Unionists—a battle described by one of their leaders as "fought from behind the women's petticoats," and they were by no means actuated by purely altruistic motives. The sufferings of women and children were kept well to the front as a matter of policy, but the measure was of the nature of a compromise after the failure to secure an eight hours' day which should apply to men also.

By later enactments the hours of women and young persons have been restricted in non-textile factories and ordinary workshops to sixty in the week. Overtime is only allowed in certain trades, where sufficient reason for it, such as a press of work at certain seasons, or the perishable nature of the goods, was supposed to exist, and times for meals had to be allowed at stated intervals. No well-attested facts have been produced to show that women's interests have suffered by these changes; and the demand for further restrictions is supported both by medical evidence and by expression of opinion from an overwhelming majority of organised women. There is even reason to believe

that the opposition of middle-class women theorists, who have done much to increase the difficulty of obtaining adequate legislation, is gradually dying away.

The amount of wages paid to workers in exchange for their labour is not regulated by law, but it is indirectly affected by the Truck Acts and by a clause of the Factory and Workshop Acts known as the Particulars Clause.

The Truck Acts are intended to secure that workers shall receive remuneration for their labour in coin of the realm, and not in kind, and that this sum shall not be diminished by unreasonable fines and deductions. It used to be extremely common for employers to keep "Truck shops," and give their workers notes on the shops for goods instead of paying wages in coin. This is not unheard-of even at the present time. The women factory inspectors mention in their Report for 1898 a case in which girls in the north of Ireland were paid in packets of tea, tawdry hats, and other articles. The protest of one worker, whose wages consisted in a pair of thin elastic-sided boots, seems very much to the point, "Sure, and what should the likes of meself be after with sichlike ilegance? 'Tis a poke of meal, or the money to buy the 'cess' that I'm after wanting."

The first Truck Act made this illegal. Employers are not prevented by it from keeping shops and selling goods to their employees, but as they have no right of recovery against their employees, they must insist on being paid for all goods purchased in ready money.

Under certain conditions an employer may agree to give a workman special advantages, such as medical attendance, a cottage to live in, or provender for

horses or other beasts, as part of his wages; or may advance money, and deduct the amount advanced from wages.

The Truck Act of 1896 deals with the question of fines, and deductions for bad work, or injury to the employer's property, or for materials and other means of carrying on work. Special contracts must be made in writing and signed by the workman, or a list of the fines and deductions must be posted in a place where it can be easily read. A copy of such a contract or list can be demanded either by an inspector or by one of the workmen concerned. Each time a sum of money is deducted from wages or a payment made to an employer in respect of a fine or deduction, particulars as to the reason of such a deduction must be furnished to the workman.

Only such fines must be included in a contract or list which are in respect of some act or omission which has caused, or is likely to cause, injury to the employer, and which are "fair and reasonable" in amount.

Deductions for bad work or injury to property must also be fair and reasonable, and must not exceed the actual or estimated damage or loss which has been occasioned to the employer.

Deductions for materials, &c., must not exceed the actual or estimated cost to the employer.

Fines and deductions are, unfortunately, liable to great abuse. There are various ways in which the Truck Act can be evaded; and it is strongly contended by the workers—and their contention is supported by the experience of the women factory inspectors—that the only satisfactory solution will be the total prohibition of fines and deductions, an

employer having the right, of course, to dismiss any worker for bad conduct or bad work.

The Particulars Clause applied in the first place to textile factories only, but it has been extended, with certain modifications, to various other trades by a special order of the Secretary of State, and its general extension to piece-work trades is most desirable. It provides that particulars of the work to be done and the wages to be received for it shall be supplied to a workman. This is a great safeguard, as otherwise it often happens that a worker receives far less than he expected in return for the work; he may be well paid on one occasion for a piece of work, and on another he may do a similar piece and yet receive a much smaller sum; or he may find that he is doing the same work as his neighbour for less pay.

In addition to bringing breaches of the Factory and Workshop Acts to the notice of the factory inspector, it is most desirable that any one who comes across a case in which a worker in a factory or workshop has been killed or injured by an accident, should take pains to find out whether any compensation can be claimed by the injured person, or by his or her dependants.

It would take too much space to enter into details of the laws relating to this subject, but the number of cases in which compensation can be claimed has been greatly increased by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Act is, however, limited in its application to certain trades, and many amendments are needed before it can be regarded as a satisfactory piece of legislation.

I have indicated the points on which legislation exists, and cannot too strongly urge readers who are

at work in factories or workshops, or who come into contact with such workers, to make themselves acquainted with the law; or, if they have not the necessary time or opportunity for this, to write down full details of any facts into which they think inquiry should be made, and communicate with the union in the trade, if a union exists, or with such bodies as the Women's Trade Union League,[1] or the Industrial Law Committee.[2] As secretary of the former society, the present writer has received many such letters, some revealing breaches of the Acts, others dealing with real evils, for which there is as yet no legal remedy, and others—but these very rarely—setting forth imaginary grievances. These letters are sometimes from the girls and women, who are themselves sufferers, more often from father, or brother, or lover, and comparatively seldom from clergy or district visitors. They, and such as they, are too often prevented by ill-founded fears from securing for the workers the full measure of their legal rights. This is lamentable, inasmuch as the beneficial effects to be expected from an opposite policy can hardly be exaggerated. Knowledge of evils which is now useless, and often a heavy moral burden to the person who has acquired it, would be utilised for their removal, the further confidence of the workers would be gained, greater pressure could be brought to bear in support of legislative proposals, and a more adequate staff of inspectors.

The reason usually adduced by district visitors and others who shrink from reporting breaches of the law, or causing investigations to be made, is that they are "afraid of stirring up ill-feeling between employer

[1] Offices: Club Union Buildings, Clerkenwell Road, E.C.
[2] Offices: 29 Great James Street, Bedford Row, W.C.

and employed," often adding that they purposely refrain from asking the girls in their clubs or Sunday-school classes about their work, as they think it wisest to leave that side of their life entirely alone. This attitude is perhaps comprehensible, but to any one who realises what that side too often is, and that the only hope of remedy is that it shall not be left alone, but dragged into the light, it seems mistaken and even culpable. Few would be found to dispute the fact that the demands made by the Factory and Workshop Acts on employers are far from exorbitant; the minimum of health and safety they are intended to secure for the workers is decidedly below the standard, in many, or even in all, respects, of the better employers of labour. The law is therefore no counsel of perfection; it has grown up gradually from the beginning of the century, when the public conscience was awakened by the revelation of the awful cruelties practised on the "parish apprentices" in the cotton mills. It is the duty of employers as citizens to obey these laws, and it is the duty of other citizens to bring breaches of these laws to the notice of the proper officials, as it would be if they knew of any other case in which the law of the land was being defied and set aside.

The artificial flower of "goodwill between employer and employed," supposed to flourish under these conditions, and which they are so fearful of destroying, is scarcely worth the expense of its preservation, one would think, at the cost of so much suffering. Such breaches of the just law of the land, committed by one man, should meet with condemnation from all citizens, whether his employees or others. They occur far less often in organised trades;

but unskilled and unorganised workers are often victimised, because there is little possibility of resistance, and the risk of being prosecuted is worth hazarding. The writer remembers the naïve remark on this subject which fell from the lips of a large employer of women's labour, on whom she was urging the desirability of trade unionism for women—"No one outside the trade can imagine the difficulties; one has to contend with Factory Acts, and one has to contend with the Sanitary Acts." Such "contentions" will be supported by no law-abiding citizen, but there are many dark corners where they will be successfully carried on, where there is no power of resistance within and no help from without. Does any one imagine that they are fostering the Christian spirit by telling a girl not to grumble, if she is defrauded of her rightful wages, or obliged to work overtime at the factory, or to bring back a bundle of work, which will compel her—already worn out by a long day's toil—to sit up far into the night? Is it not rather part of your duty towards her to inquire minutely into the justice of her complaints? Two replies may be made to this: It may be said, "But the girls are very much afraid of its being known that they have said anything about their work—they are desperately afraid of losing it." This is perfectly true; but complaints made to the women inspectors are regarded as absolutely confidential; moreover, you need never mention the name of your informant. The practice of the present writer is never to do so, without obtaining express permission, on the ground that it would materially assist the inspector, and this has never been refused.

I have spoken of the need for more adequate inspection. This holds good of the staff of men

inspectors; but the necessity for an increase of the number of women inspectors is much more imperative. It is not generally realised that there are at present only seven women inspectors; these seven inspectors have no settled districts; they are peripatetic. It is their duty to investigate all complaints which reach them, specially relating to women and children; they are, moreover, constantly engaged in making inquiries into the conditions of some special trade or the working of a particular clause of the Act. When this is understood, such questions as, "How many times in the year is the woman inspector expected to visit each factory?" or, "Why has not a woman inspector been seen in such and such a factory for two years?" will answer themselves.

The benefit to women workers from the labours of even so small a staff can scarcely be exaggerated. It is obvious that in many cases a woman inspector will be able to succeed in remedying grievances where a man would fail. The evil may be one which a woman would only complain of to an inspector of her own sex; and in any case it is easier for her to win the confidence of the woman or girl on whose evidence the success of the prosecution depends. The women inspectors note with satisfaction in one of their reports, that their difficulties are much lessened by the growing trust of the workers in their ability to help them. The present writer has had much evidence of this; many entreaties to send down a woman inspector for some factory or workshop, on the ground that "the woman inspector suits us women-folk the best." Great trust is felt in the superior sagacity of their own sex as to the insignificant, all-important details on which health and comfort depend. "*This*

time it's the 'spector *lady; she'll* know all about this show before she leaves," a girl was overheard to say, running in with the news to her work-mates.

I have said that it is necessary for the successful discharge of the inspectors' duties, that the workers should trust them; if they receive false answers to their questions, or false evidence is given in Court, it naturally checks their power to remedy evils. It is not to be wondered at if this is often the case. It is a choice between the infliction of a fine, if you refuse to give evidence, or the loss of your means of livelihood, if you speak the truth. This is one of the duties of a citizen, which may involve a very heavy sacrifice.[1] Women and girls—except in the comparatively rare cases where they are members of a union, on assistance from which they can rely—have little help or encouragement in the performance of this duty. If it were openly recognised by those who have their welfare at heart, they would be better able to understand the temptation to which they are exposed, the yielding to which is a moral degradation.

In advocating the importance of the strict enforcement of the Factory and Workshops Acts, I may have conveyed the erroneous impression that such enforcement is in itself a sufficient remedy for the evils of industrial life. This is far from the truth. There is much which is not fit subject for legislation, and which can be better dealt with by means of combination among the workers, of which I shall speak later. But, apart from this, Factory and Workshop

[1] An Indemnity Fund, administered by the Industrial Law Committee, has been started to indemnify women and young persons who have suffered loss as the result of giving evidence in an official prosecution, and who are not members of a trade union able to so indemnify them. The secretary is R. Balfour, Esq., 33 Bruton Street, London, W.

legislation itself stands in great need of reform. It has taken nearly a century to build up the present system of laws relating to factories and workshops, and the history of its gradual construction reveals much resistance, both political and private, from individuals and associations who genuinely desired the workers' good. A great change has come over public opinion—distrust of legislation, indeed, for its own sake, is out of date—but it is even now a matter of time and difficulty to secure further much-needed reforms. The reason of this is twofold. Although it may be safely asserted that no such reforms are unsupported by the better employers, and that to enforce them legally would merely mean raising the general standard, not introducing a new system, yet opposition is to be feared from employers whose successful resistance to competition is achieved at the expense of their workers. A certain amount of such opposition on the part of smaller employers of labour would, from their own point of view, probably be justified by the event. But it cannot be for the general good that trade should be carried on by individuals on so small a scale that they are unable to pay their employees a living wage, to provide them with the conditions necessary to health, and to indemnify them against the risks inherent in the nature of the occupation. The tendency of legislation must be more and more to stamp out these unhealthy products.

The other fruitful source of objection is the fear of interfering with individual liberty by over-legislation. The said individual liberty is usually a mere creature of the imagination. The young girl eagerly demanding a bundle of work to take home at the end of the factory day, that she may earn a few extra

pounds for her modest trousseau, is doubtless a picturesque figure; but it may be questioned whether her anæmic sister, who has her bundle forced on her as she leaves the factory, with aching head and smarting eyes, is not the commoner in real life. The latter dare not refuse the extra work, although she will receive little or no additional pay, because she knows that it would mean instant dismissal.

Such objectors should remember that individual liberty, in order to be interfered with, must exist, and that it may exist, the individual must be powerful enough to maintain his rights. Surely the most important of the rights of the individual is the right to earn a livelihood under decent and healthy conditions, in return for his labour; and the first consideration should be to give him the means of maintaining this right.

It is true that legislation, at any rate, can only secure a certain measure of freedom, and that the interests of exceptional individuals must be subjected to the interests of the whole body, but the first step must be to secure this partial freedom. The importance of this is not realised, only because the full extent of the present slavery is not realised. In any rank of life, it is only the more fortunate and more gifted individuals who have much choice as to how and where they shall earn their livelihood; if then, a woman or girl has secured a post in a factory, knowing that a hundred others are waiting to take her place if she is dismissed, and that she, and perhaps others dependent on her, may starve before she can find other work, she can scarcely be said to choose under what conditions she will work. Legislation, then, will not interfere with her liberty of

action, but rather make it possible for her to work under the conditions she would prefer had she a choice.

To give an instance. Certain processes in fruit-preserving are at present exempted from the Factory Acts during the summer months. This means that women and girls are working 14, 15, 15½ hours a day; and not only this, but that the processes referred to may be carried on under insanitary conditions, and that proper time for meals need not be allowed. A circular has been issued by the employers in which it is shown that some of the larger employers do not avail themselves of it. This, then, is a clear case for legislation.

Again, the indignation of the public has been roused by accounts in the press of the suffering caused by the use of poisonous materials in the pottery and match trades. These accounts have, in some quarters, been described as sensational, hysterical, melodramatic, untrustworthy; but if this is so, the reports by the Government experts are certainly open to the same censure. Since the Factory Act of 1895 came into force, which provides that all cases of lead or phosphorus poisoning shall be reported to the Home Office by the employer, at whose works the man or woman was employed, or by any doctor attending the case, ten hundred and eighty-five cases of lead poisoning have been reported in the potteries district, of which 607 are women and 478 men. In 1898 4.9 per cent. of the men employed in the lead processes suffered, and 12.4 of the women.

It is impossible here to enter into the question in detail, but the view of the Government experts is that seven-tenths of the work could be equally

well done without the use of the dangerous lead, and that by a change of methods and stricter regulations it would be possible to reduce the risk in the remainder of the work to a minimum. But, in view of the fact that young persons and women under thirty are considered by the doctors who have studied the question to be peculiarly susceptible to the influence of the poison, it is suggested that they should be prohibited from working in processes in which lead is used. In the case of child-bearing women the effect of the poison is to produce miscarriages, and to make the birth of a healthy living child comparatively rare.

A Government inquiry into the conditions of labour in the Potteries was held in 1893. The question attracted much attention, and hopes were held out of a gradual change for the better. Of this inquiry the writers of the Report say: "We therefore, in the first instance, sought to ascertain what steps had been taken in the interval in order to remedy the mischief. All the evidence we were able to collect forced us to the conclusion that very little of an effective character had been even attempted. Certain manufacturers have substituted 'fritted' lead for 'raw' lead in compounding their glazes, and a few persons have made more or less successful efforts to produce or to reintroduce leadless glazes; but no concerted action has been taken by the trade. Beyond what may have been effected by the operation of the special rules issued by the Home Office in 1894, there had been little or no improvement during these five years."

The disease of phosphorus necrosis, known as "phossy jaw," is much less common among the

workers in the match trade than lead poisoning among the pottery workers, but the suffering caused by it is even more terrible. The writers of that Report evidently feel that the only satisfactory solution of the question would be the total abolition of the use of yellow phosphorus, as is the case in Denmark, but that this is not practicable in England at present on account of foreign competition. Meanwhile, they recommend very much stricter special rules; and the prohibition of the employment of children and young persons in places where yellow phosphorus is used.

Many other instances might be given of the need for further legislation in other dangerous trades; but I must not devote any more space to this part of my subject.

One of the most important questions is that of the further regulation of home-work. Employers are apt to evade the responsibility which the law imposes on them for the condition of their factory or workshop, by sending out work to be done at home, and "home" often means a single, over-crowded, dirty, and ill-ventilated room. Legislation is needed which shall make the giver out of work responsible for the condition of places in which his work is done. It may be urged that such legislation would tend to diminish home-work, and drive home-workers into the factories and workshops. This is certainly likely to be the case, and in my opinion this result would be an advantage rather than a drawback. The delights of home-work are a fruitful theme for sentimentalists; it is easy to draw attractive pictures of the different members of a family seated at their own fireside, the mother, with her baby on her knee, industriously hemming handkerchiefs, or creasing collars, or pulling fur, if such

sordid details as atmospheric conditions and cubic space are left out of account. There can be no doubt that it would be much better that home-work should become comparatively rare, rather than that it should be carried on under the conditions which are so common at present.

Another important consideration is, that the general standard of wages among home-workers is lower than that among workers in factories and workshops. The reason of this is, that they have no means of knowing whether other workers are receiving more or less wages for the same work, and organisation among them is practically impossible. Even if, therefore, home-work were carried on under equally healthy conditions, it would always remain more difficult for the workers to secure a decent wage in exchange for their work.

Another section of workers who stand in urgent need of further legislation are the shop assistants. It is not generally realised that shop assistants are in an entirely different position legally from the dressmakers, milliners, and other such employees in work-rooms on the same premises. I have given a rough sketch of the law by which the latter are protected, and, if it is broken, its enforcement can be secured. But there is no similar legislation at present affecting adult shop assistants. Young persons and children may only be employed for seventy-four hours in the week, but men and women are often employed for over a hundred hours. There are no regulations providing that sufficient time shall be allowed for meals at proper intervals; and, except in so far as shops are affected by the Public Health Acts, no regulations respecting ventilation and sanitation.

It is true that the sections of the last Truck Act, relating to the infliction of fines, apply to shop assistants as well as to other workers in factories and workshops; but it does not form part of the duties of either the shop inspectors or the factory inspectors to see that the Act is enforced; and it is therefore practically useless. Shop inspectors are appointed at the will of the local authority; in many places no inspectors, or a quite inadequate number, have been appointed, so that the law restricting the labour of young persons is not duly enforced. It is certainly the duty of citizens to press for the appointment of more shop inspectors; and what has already been said as to the importance of appointing women inspectors applies to shops as well as to factories and workshops.

It is most desirable that shops should be brought into line with factories and workshops, by increased legislation. The hours of work of adults, as well as of young persons and children, should be limited by law, and the provision of time for meals at regular intervals made compulsory. Sitting accommodation should also be provided for the women and girls, and they should be allowed to sit down when not attending to customers. An excellent Bill has been drafted, known as the "Shops Bill," embodying the demands of the Shop Assistants' Union, but it is not likely to become law until the interest and sympathy of the general public has been fully roused.

The extent to which fining is carried in shops is often a scandal. In some shops there are lists of over a hundred fines which may be inflicted on the luckless assistant, and, moreover, the shop-walker may fine at pleasure for any so-called offence not specified in the list. A girl employed in such a shop, who was

considered to be a "smart hand," once told me that she had had as much as eight shillings and sixpence stopped from her wages in a week, a serious bite out of the takings of even a "smart hand."

The living-in system is liable to great abuse, but this is a matter which must be mended rather by the growing organisation on the part of the assistants and by the pressure of public opinion than by legislation. In many shops the young men and women are obliged to live on the premises, sleeping in comfortless, bare cubicles, provided often with uneatable and insufficient food, and under a strict régime which would be suitable for a reformatory school rather than for grown-up people, who require rest and change and refreshment after their hard day's work.

In some shops it is the custom to turn out the assistants from morning till night every Sunday. They are supposed to "spend the day with friends," but there are, of course, many girls who come from country homes and have no friends with whom they can spend Sunday for whom such an arrangement is an unmixed evil. The writer remembers being told by a girl who served in a restaurant, how they lived alone in a house with the manager, and were obliged on Sundays to wait in the street, sometimes into the small hours of the morning, till this man, who was often the worse for liquor, turned up to unlock the door. In some cases the only Sunday's rest for a girl longing for a walk in the fresh air may consist of being locked into a room, in order, forsooth, that her employer may know that she is actually resting.

And now I must come to that part of my subject with which I expect least sympathy on the part of my readers—the question of trade organisation for women.

There are three states of mind in which people are apt to approach this subject. They usually either condemn the principle entirely, or say that Trade Unionism may be necessary for men but is wholly unnecessary for women, or they assert that the attempt to organise women is an absolutely vain and hopeless one.

It is difficult to treat the first objection without impatience, so important is the part played by Trade Unions in the industrial life to-day, and so completely have they justified their existence. It is impossible to read the "History of Trade Unionism," already referred to, without realising this. No one can seriously question the Trade Unionists' contention that it should be possible for employer and employed to make a bargain as to the worth of the labour of the latter, and the conditions under which he shall be employed; such a bargain is impossible between the individual and his employer, since his position is not strong enough either to make or enforce it. He is offered work under certain conditions and at a certain rate of pay. If he refuses, he may not be able to find other work, or only after a long delay, during which he has been in great straits from want of money; the employer meanwhile has, probably, had no difficulty in filling his place, or if he has had any such difficulty, has not found the delay materially inconvenient. "Collective bargaining" must then take the place of individual bargaining, since a limited company, a firm of employers, or even a single employer, is, under present economic conditions, immeasurably stronger than a single worker; and, moreover, it must be remembered that in many trades the employers also are federated, which further strengthens their position.

To many outsiders Trade Unionism merely represents strikes. This is, of course, an entire misapprehension. Trade Unionism does not produce strikes. They are far more common among unorganised workers, but in such cases they are often easily quashed from a want of proper organisation, and the public does not hear of them. When a strong union exists, it is usually possible to come to a peaceful arrangement with the employers, war being to the interest of neither party. It is a safe prophecy that strikes are only a necessary means to the end at an imperfect stage of organisation, and that they will become less and less common.

Another consideration must not be overlooked in answer to this class of objectors. Trade Unionism is not opposed to the interest of, or objected to by the better employers. It is rather welcomed, as delivering them from the competition of those who are able to undersell them by paying their workmen lower wages, and spending as little as possible on repair, cleanliness, ventilation, protection against accidents, &c., in their factories or workshops.

Such objectors also fail to apprehend the moral significance of the movement. They do not perceive the ennobling influence of Trade Unionism. In the first place, Trade Unionism raises the worker at once from the undignified position of obligatory acceptance of any wages and conditions which may be offered him in return for his labour, to the dignified position of demanding as a right that he shall receive an adequate recompense, and work under healthy conditions. Then it makes large demands upon his courage, unselfishness, and intelligence. He must learn to subordinate his own interests to the interest of the

union, or rather he must understand that these interests are really identical; he must take pains to understand the laws which affect his conditions of labour, in order that the union may do its part in seeing that they are enforced; he must study carefully any proposals for fresh legislation which may arise. Nor are the interests of Trade Unionists confined to questions affecting their own trade only. It is very noticeable how ready they are to lend a helping hand to workers in other trades, and how keen an interest they take in any attempt to better their conditions. It may be safely asserted that it is impossible for a man to be a good Trade Unionist without a real moral gain. This is often forgotten, but the mistakes in judgment of Trade Unionists, or their failures to grasp an economic truth, are never overlooked. Considering the narrow outlook and meagre education which has been the lot of the greater number of them, it should rather be a matter for astonishment that these mistakes are not commoner, and that so reasonable a spirit is displayed.

The second position I have alluded to, namely, that Trade Unionism is unnecessary for women, although its desirability for men be admitted, is quite indefensible logically. There is no argument for the organisation of men which does not apply to that of women also. It is indeed essential for the interests of both sexes that women should combine as well as men. In trades where the men only are organised the tendency is for women to undersell the men, and replace them in any work which can be done by women. The proverbial reply of the Post Office clerk who was asked how he managed to get even with the girl who took his place at half his salary, "Oh, I

married her, and now she's keeping us both," points a moral. We have heard a great deal of woman's sphere of late years, but there is no doubt that man's sphere must inevitably become "the home," if this tendency is unchecked.

The effect of organisation will probably be, as Mr. and Mrs. Webb argue, and as is at present the case in the cotton trade, to reduce the competition between men and women by defining certain processes as women's work and certain processes as men's work. The competitive element will not, however, disappear so long as the general standard of wages for women is lower than that for men, as the tendency will be to invent new machinery or processes at which women are capable of working as well as men. This is shown in the Lancashire cotton trade, for although until a few years ago spinning was looked on as entirely men's work, and weaving as women's, ring spinning, which can be done by women, is now very largely taking the place of the old mule spinning.

The importance of Trade Unionism for women, from an educational point of view, can scarcely be exaggerated. It supplies an element which is usually completely wanting in the life of a working woman, by developing her capacity for showing public spirit, and by giving her wider interests; in short, by making her a better citizen.

"But," it may be urged, "this is all very excellent theoretically, but has it not been already sufficiently proved that it is impracticable, by the fact that so few women are members of Trade Unions? Is it not a hopeless undertaking and an absolute waste of energy to attempt to organise women?" No, it is not hopeless. By means of better legislation an improvement

is being gradually effected in the conditions under which women are working, and the time is drawing near when it will be less difficult for them to form stable organisations. This consideration, together with the fact that there is a growing conviction among the workers, both men and women, that their real strength lies in union, makes the outlook not even discouraging. It is true that at present the only trade which can be regarded as in at all a satisfactory condition is the Lancashire cotton trade, from the point of view of the organisation of the women employed in it; and it is also true that in unskilled trades in which the wages are very low and the conditions very bad, it is practically impossible to start a union in the teeth of opposition, because an employer would in many cases find no difficulty in replacing all his hands at a moment's notice. In such cases organisation must be abandoned for the time being, and it is only possible to wait for the time when it will be impossible for these employers to flout a strong public opinion in favour of Trade Unionism for women, as is now to a great extent the case with Trade Unionism for men.

It would be well if the hopelessness of trying to establish a stable organisation among women working under very bad conditions were realised by the opponents of legislation who lay great stress on the value of organisation. If these ladies could be induced to take two or three long, fruitless journeys for the purpose of addressing mass meetings of a single laundress, for instance, they might realise that women whose working day is frequently fourteen hours, exclusive of time allowed for meals, and who, probably, have their shopping and household duties to look after

as well, have not much spare time to attend meetings and consider the arguments in favour of legislation. If they further attempted to live on four or five shillings a week, which is often the total earnings of a woman or girl in an unskilled trade, reserving twopence for payment to a Trade Union, it is probable that their recommendation of organisation alone as a present cure for all evils would be less confident. The successful organisation of women presupposes that a certain minimum of fair conditions is already secured.

Another important element in success is that, in cases where both men and women are employed in a trade, the women should be admitted to membership of the men's union when possible, or, if this is impracticable, that the women's union should be closely affiliated to the men's. The want of such a close connection will prove disastrous if a conflict, or an apparent conflict, of interests should arise, and apart from this, the experience of the men Trade Unionists is most useful to the women. It is very noticeable how keen they are becoming that women should reap the benefits of organisation, though, as in the case of the agitation for the legal restriction of women's hours, their motives are often not purely altruistic.

Although no other trade has so general a female membership as the Lancashire cotton trade, there are various unions which are doing very good service, notably the London Cigarmakers' Union, the London Matchmakers' Union, and the Liverpool, Manchester, and Belfast Upholstresses' Unions. The total number of organised women is about 120,000.

There is no doubt that if all those who have the interests of these women and girls at heart realised the immense benefits of organisation, and made it a

part of their work to persuade the women and girls with whom they come into contact that it is a part of their duty as citizens to belong to a Trade Union, whenever it is practicable, these numbers would soon be doubled and trebled.

Although the writer of this paper can scarcely hope to persuade all her readers to take an active part in the Trade Union movement, she hopes, at any rate, to persuade any who have hitherto belonged to the opposite camp to reconsider and to study the matter.

The spirit in which many Christians approach these difficult questions is often too timid, and even selfish. Their desire seems to be merely to keep their own hands clean by abstaining from all connection with factories and shops which are in an unsatisfactory condition. But if the condition of such workers is to be permanently improved, some positive action is also necessary.

It has been the aim of this paper to point out in what direction such action is possible, and to attempt to show that the objections sometimes urged against it have no substantial foundation.


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THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS

BY THE REV. DR. MORRISON

Dimensions of crime, and causes of apparent increase—Cost of criminal administration — Barbarity of punishments, ancient and modern — Adaptation of punishment to the individual—Administration of the penal code—Immediate causes of crime, and indication of the method of dealing with them.

AMONG the special problems which the good citizen has to consider in the exercise of his citizenship, one of the most important is the best method of dealing with offenders against the criminal law. Owing to the fact that many offences against the criminal law are either unknown or undiscovered, it is impossible to form an accurate estimate of the total annual volume of crime. But we do know the number of cases which come up for trial from year to year before the criminal courts. The number of these cases for trial is, of course, much smaller than the number of crimes committed. Many offenders are never discovered, and, therefore, never tried. But although incomplete, and merely approximate, the yearly number of cases for trial is a valuable index of the criminal condition of the community. According to the return dealing with criminal offences for 1897, the number of persons tried for indictable offences for the five years, 1893–97, amounted to an annual average, in round numbers, of 53,000, while the number of persons tried summarily during the same period reached

an annual average of 647,000; that is to say, about 700,000 cases of a more or less criminal character are tried before the criminal courts of England and Wales from year to year. Owing to a variety of causes, the number of cases coming before the criminal courts tends to increase. Among these causes may be mentioned the increasing density of the population, the concentration of the people in towns and cities, and the growth of social legislation arising out of the increasing complexity of modern life. Although the total volume of offences of all kinds is steadily on the increase, it is difficult to say whether serious crimes against person and property are increasing or not. When the Queen came to the throne in the year 1837, the number of persons tried for indictable offences was less in proportion to the population than the number tried for the same class of offences sixty years afterwards. But against this must be put the fact that there was no regular police system sixty years ago, and it is possible that an offender had more chances of escape then than he has now. But it is also to be remembered, on the other hand, that the growth of large cities has made it easier for a criminal to hide himself than was the case half a century ago. In fact, the more closely we examine the question of comparative criminality, the more difficult and complicated we find this question to be. The figures are no real and accurate guide to the facts. So many circumstances have to be taken into account besides the mere figures, and these circumstances are, in most cases, so difficult to estimate, that it is impossible to say with certainty whether serious crime is greater or less now than it was about sixty years ago.

One thing at least is perfectly certain; that is, the steady and continuous increase of offences of a minor character. These offences increase more rapidly than the growth of population. Taken individually, these offences are not of a serious nature, but looked at in their totality, the figures relating to them are enormous. The growth of minor offences is not a proof that the law-abiding character of the population is deteriorating, as might at first sight be supposed. Within the last fifty years an immense number of minor criminal offences have been created by Acts of Parliament, and almost every year Parliament is adding to the number. Until the passing of the Education Act about thirty years ago, it was not an offence for a parent to allow his child to grow up absolutely uneducated. But when this act came into operation every parent was compelled, under a penalty, to send his child to school. Parents who neglect this duty are now summoned before the criminal courts, and in the year 1897 no less than 71,000 parents and guardians had to appear before the magistrates to answer the charge of not sending their children to school. This is one instance of the way in which offences are created by Act of Parliament. Offences against the sanitary laws, offences against police regulations, offences against the liquor laws, offences against the labour laws, and many other offences of a somewhat similar character have all tended to increase in consequence of the increasing interference of the State with the individual. In many cases where the State has interfered to check the arbitrary action of the individual, the results have been beneficial to the community as a whole. Nevertheless, State interference has its inevitable drawbacks, and one of them

is that it increases the numbers of the population who have to appear before the criminal courts.

In addition to the danger to the community arising from offences against the criminal law, it is also to be recollected that all the machinery involved in the maintenance of law and the protection of society is kept up at a vast annual expense. Prisons, police, judges, courts of law, reformatory and industrial schools, have all to be paid for by the community. The prisons of the United Kingdom cost the country about a million a year. The reformatory and industrial schools cost close upon three-quarters of a million. The police cost over six millions. The cost of police stations, the prosecution of offenders, the maintenance of court-houses, the payment of judges and magistrates, and of all the subordinate officials connected with the administration of justice, have to be added to these figures. In short, the administration of the criminal law alone must cost the United Kingdom, at the lowest estimate, between eight and nine million pounds a year. This is a vast sum, and constitutes a serious burden on the citizen. It is evident from the figures which have just been mentioned that the question of offences against the criminal law is an important problem from a merely financial point of view. Apart altogether from its moral aspects, it is a question which is well worth consideration from a purely economic standpoint. A decrease in the number of criminal offences means, at the same time, a diminished drain on the purse of the community. It means a decrease of taxation in so far as the expenses connected with the administration of criminal justice are concerned. This is a most important matter in an age when public expenditure,

both local and imperial, is going up by leaps and bounds.

In these preliminary remarks I have pointed out the dimensions of crime and the expenditure on crime. I have done this in order to give the reader a general conception of the extent of the problem of crime. Whether we look at this problem from an ethical or from a financial point of view, it will be seen that it is a problem of great magnitude. It is not a subsidiary social question. It confronts us on the highways of social life. It is a question which must be answered in the future much more satisfactorily than it has been in the past, if society is to attain a higher standard of civilisation.

What is the method on which society has hitherto relied for keeping down the criminal elements in the community? This method is an exceedingly simple one, and may be summed up in one word—Punishment. If we look back at the codes and customs of all communities, whether civilised or uncivilised, we shall find that punishment is the one great weapon in which society has hitherto trusted for the repression of crime. Till about a century ago, the penalty inflicted in England on convicted offenders was, as a rule, some kind of corporal punishment. Corporal punishment was inflicted in a great variety of ways. If the offence was at all serious in character, the offender had, in a multitude of cases, to suffer the penalty of death. Hanging, hanging in chains, hanging, drawing, and quartering, beheading, pressing to death, drowning, burning to death, boiling to death, were common modes of punishment in the olden time. It is estimated that in the reign of Henry the Eighth between seventy and eighty thousand offenders

were put to death. In many cases the death penalty was inflicted for trifling offences, which would now be disposed of by an admonition or a trifling fine. In addition to the death penalty there was a variety of other kinds of corporal punishment. The most common of these punishments were whipping, branding, and mutilation. Vagabonds were branded on the breast with the letter V, blasphemers were branded on the forehead with the letter B, thieves were branded on the soft part of the hand with the letter M, to signify malefactor. Mutilation consisted, as a rule, in cutting off the ears, in slitting open the nose, in putting out the eyes, in cutting off the hands or feet, not to mention other barbarities of an even more revolting character. It was a common practice to order prisoners who refused to plead to be pressed to death. The prisoner was placed naked on his back, enormous weights were laid upon him; one day he was given a little coarse bread, another day a little water, and he had to remain under this horrible torture until he died. These brutal methods of punishment had an equally brutalising effect on the population. Every town had its common hangman. If we look at the old newspapers of the eighteenth century we come across accounts of executions such as the following: "Hereford, March 25.—This day Will Summers and Tipping were executed here for housebreaking. At the tree the hangman was intoxicated with liquor, and supposing that there were three for execution, was going to put one of the ropes round the parson's neck as he stood in the cart, and was with much difficulty prevented by the jailer from so doing."

Notwithstanding the severity and the barbarous

character of these old-time punishments, they did little or nothing towards diminishing the amount of crime. If severity of punishment had the effect which it was believed to have of frightening people from crime the atrocious severities of bygone days would have stamped out the criminal population altogether. But it is an absolute certainty that these punishments did nothing of the kind. Crime was as rampant when punishments were severe as it now is when punishment is mitigated. Offences against property were as common when death was the usual penalty for the offender as they now are when cases of theft are purged by the payment of a fine or by a sentence of a few weeks' imprisonment. Facts of all kinds point to the conclusion that the efficacy of mere punishment is very much over-estimated. If punishment by the criminal law were the deterrent which it is commonly supposed to be, its obvious effect would be to prevent the offender from repeating the offence. But it is very remarkable that in most cases it does not have this effect. An official inquiry undertaken a few years ago showed that in many parts of England no less than three-fourths of the offenders for trial before the criminal courts had been convicted and punished before. The returns relating to the prison population tell very much the same tale. From one-half to two-thirds of the prison population have been in prison before, and about a fifth of the men and women committed to prison in the course of the year have been more than ten times in prison before. I remember, when I was connected with the prison administration, asking an old man, who had spent most of his life in jail, why it was that all the punishment he had gone through had no effect upon him in deterring him

from returning to prison. He said to me in reply, "It is your punishments which do make me return. You shut me up in a cell from which you exclude the blue sky of heaven. You keep me in this cell for months together, in solitude and isolation. You forbid your jailers to speak to me. When I first come in you inflict every degradation short of torture upon me. You put me on a plank-bed so as to deprive me of sleep. You torture my mind with sleeplessness and my body with insufficient food. You deny me all human companionship, and you will not allow me the mute companionship of an ordinary book. After enfeebling and irritating me in this manner, if I commit the slightest offence against the thousand and one rules of the prison, I am starved on a punishment diet of bread and water. All these abominations degrade a man. They do not deter him or improve him. They make him worse than he was before." Almost all these accusations are still true with regard to imprisonment as it is practised in England. Brutal punishments brutalise everybody connected with them. They brutalise the officials who inflict them; they brutalise the person on whom they are inflicted; and, finally, they brutalise the community which permits them. In fact, brutalising punishments diffuse an atmosphere of brutality throughout all ranks and sections of the population. These punishments are a sort of legal consecration of the primitive instincts and passions which surge so wildly in the human breast. Crime is the visible outcome of these instincts and passions, and crime is encouraged rather than repressed when barbarities are officially consecrated by the laws of the land.

In connection with the criminal problem, the first

point to be borne in mind is, that brutality of punishment has been tried for centuries, and has been found to be no remedy whatever. It is rather the reverse, inasmuch as it brutalises the population which resorts to it, and creates the atmosphere which produces crime.

I now come to the consideration of another important matter affecting the treatment of the criminal population. In a great many cases, even when punishments are not of a barbarous character, it is a mere accident if they are suited to the offender. A punishment to be effective must be suited to the offender. All offenders cannot be treated in the same way; what is suitable for one person is fatal to another. It is no more possible or rational to treat all offenders in the same way than it is to treat all sorts of diseases with the same drug. Different diseases require different remedies. Different diseases spring from different causes, and must be treated differently. Crime is not a disease in the ordinary meaning of the word, but it resembles disease in this respect, that it arises from a great variety of diverse conditions, and it cannot be effectively dealt with if all classes of offenders are treated in very much the same manner. Get the inmates of a prison drawn up before you, and look carefully through their ranks. Among them you will find all sorts and conditions of men and women, in all the various stages of life. You will find the little fellow who has hardly emerged from school, and the old man who is slowly tottering to the grave. Among the women you will see the stolid, impassive face of the old offender, revealing in every line of it a troubled and tragic history, and beside her you will see the girl approaching

womanhood with a look of childlike simplicity. Carry your inquiries a little further. Visit all these people individually in their cells. You will find that they differ as much in temperament, character, and circumstances as they differ in age and external appearance. It is perfectly futile to punish all these people in the same way. The punishment which is a wholesome discipline for the one is a fatal kind of degradation to the other. The punishment which may have the effect of deterring the one has the effect of hardening and brutalising the other. The punishment cures in the one case and kills in the other. The punishment which arrests one man in his downward course confirms another in a career of habitual crime.

What is the practical lesson to be drawn from these well-known facts? It is a very obvious one. Punishment, to be effective, must be adjusted to the character and circumstances of the offender as well as to the nature and gravity of the offence. Punishment must deal with the criminal as well as with the crime. It must deal first of all with the criminal, and only with the crime in so far as it is an indication of the character and circumstances of the criminal. We hear a great deal in these days of inequality of sentences. Where inequality of sentences is merely the outcome of the individual caprice or bias of the judge, such sentences are of course an offence to the ordinary sentiment of justice, and deserve to be condemned. But unequal sentences for the same offence are not necessarily unjust sentences. Supposing two persons commit precisely the same offence, but the one is a beginner in crime, whilst the other has been convicted many times before; justice does not demand that both these persons should receive the same sentence.

Supposing a man and a woman are convicted of the same offence, justice does not require that the woman shall be kept in prison as long as the man. Or, supposing a juvenile and an adult are convicted of similar crimes, justice may require imprisonment in the one case, but may forbid it in the other. All these cases conclusively show that mechanical equality of sentences is not a practical principle, because, among other things, it is not a just principle. These cases further show that the offender has to be taken into account as well as the offence.

How is this to be done? The only way in which it can be done is by the individualisation of punishment. At the present time the construction and administration of the criminal law is largely based on the principle of attaching certain definite punishments to certain classes of offences. Offences against the person, except murder, are punished by a fine of so much money, or by a sentence of so many weeks, months, or years of imprisonment, according to the gravity of the offence. Offences against property are also dealt with in the same manner—that is to say, the punishment is almost entirely determined by the gravity of the offence. In settling the amount, the nature, and the duration of the punishment, the individuality of the offender is too much overlooked. The value of the punishment as a check upon the person punished depends entirely upon whether it is adapted to his individual antecedents, circumstances, and character. If the punishment is not adapted to the personality of the offender, it will fail in its effects; that is to say, it will not reform nor deter the offender. It will not protect society against him for the future. It will not have its full intimidating force of preventing

would-be offenders from following in his steps. On the other hand, if the punishment is adapted to the individuality of the offender, it will prevent him from offending again; it will in some measure act as a check on would-be offenders, and most important of all, it will serve as a real protection to society against the criminal elements within it.

The individualisation of punishment is a very large question. It is impossible for me to deal with it in detail in these pages. It is a question which concerns every department of the penal law. The penal code, for example, must be so drawn up by the Legislature as to admit of the principle of individualisation. Penal codes are by their very nature more or less general in character. Penal codes cannot take cognisance of individual cases. But these codes can be made sufficiently elastic to enable the judge and the prison administrator to do so. A rigid, inelastic penal code is fatal to the principle of individualisation. But where the code is elastic in character, and allows a wide range of discretion to the judge, individualisation, as far as the nature of the sentence is concerned, at once becomes practicable. The criminal law of England, as far as regards certain classes of offences, allows a wide latitude to the judge. According to the circumstances of each individual case, he can admonish or accept sureties for good behaviour, or fine or imprison. He has the power of adjusting his sentence not merely to the nature of the offence, but also to the personality of the offender. But for some kinds of crime the judge does not possess this power. He does not possess it, for instance, in the case of murder. When a man, or even a woman, is convicted of murder in an English court

of justice, the judge is left with absolutely no discrimination. He must pronounce sentence of death. He may believe that this extreme sentence is not a just one, in view of the circumstances, antecedents, and mental status of the offender. But if the offence comes under the technical heading of murder, the criminal law allows the judge no discretion whatever. The law allows him to deal with the offence, but not with the offender. In murder cases, the judge cannot individualise the punishment.

The individualisation of punishment is a matter which concerns the executive as well as the judiciary and the legislature. The duty of the legislature is to decree the offence, the duty of the judge is to award the sentence, the duty of the executive is to carry out the decision of the judge. The three great functions of the State—the legislative, the judicial, and the executive—all play their part in the individualisation of punishment. In all cases where the decision of the judge involves a sentence of imprisonment and the loss of liberty, the duty of the executive becomes of paramount importance. The administration of prisons is in the hands of the executive. In England the management of prisons is in the hands of the Home Office, and the Home Secretary of the day has supreme control over the treatment of the prison population. All rules relating to the food, the clothing, the labour of the prison population, are made by the Home Secretary. All appointments to offices in the prison administration are entrusted to the Home Secretary. He defines the exact character of the punishment which each prisoner shall receive. He regulates the number of times a prisoner shall be allowed to write a letter to his friends or receive a

letter or a visit from them. He regulates the hour when a prisoner shall get up in the morning and the hour when he shall go to bed at night. He defines the amount of work a prisoner must perform day by day, and the amount of punishment attached to the non-performance of the allotted task. In fact, the whole life of a prisoner during the entire period of his imprisonment is determined for him by the Home Secretary. Officials of various kinds exist in the prisons and at the Home Office to see that these regulations are carried into effect. At the Home Office itself the Home Secretary has a staff of officials whose duty it is to superintend the whole of the penal establishments of England and Wales. Each of these establishments is equipped with a staff regulated by the numbers of the prison population. This staff consists of a governor, a doctor, a chaplain, and a number of warders. All these officials are bound to carry out the rules laid down by the Home Secretary for the administration of prisons. It is on these rules that the value of imprisonment depends. If they consist of a set of hard and fast regulations applicable in the main to the whole prison population, and to all sorts and conditions of prisoners, they are valueless for purposes of individualisation and reformation. If men, women, and children—old offenders and first offenders—are all subjected to substantially the same treatment, you may get external order, but you will not get reform. A rigid, highly generalised system of prison rules is the very antithesis of individualisation, and it is on individualisation that the reformation of the prisoner depends. Of course no large institution can be carried on without regulations of some sort. But when regulations are

made everything, there is no room for individualisation. Officials have enough to do to conform to the regulations.

A few timid steps have recently been taken in the direction of classifying the prison population of England, and thus helping to facilitate the work of individualisation. But the changes are of too trifling and minute a character to accomplish much real good. Until something much more effective is done we shall continue to have the lamentable spectacle of imprisonment doing as much harm as good. We shall continue to see the prisons filled with men and women who have been deteriorated and demoralised by imprisonment. Parliamentary inquiries conducted by men like Lord Kimberley and Mr. Herbert Gladstone have arrived at the conclusion that imprisonment, as conducted in England, "not only fails to reform offenders, but produces a deteriorating effect upon them." This tremendous indictment of our prison methods still holds good. The number of offenders in prison which imprisonment has failed to reform is increasing rather than diminishing. A considerable number of these wretched creatures are the victims of a mindless, punitive system. In many instances their lives are permanently ruined by our existing methods of prison punishment. By the sentence of the judge the offence is considered to be purged when the term of imprisonment has come to an end. But, by the conduct of the executive, the prisoner is so deteriorated when under detention, that he is, in many cases, made worthless for the remainder of his days. In such cases the punishment is altogether out of proportion to the offence. It is not merely an unjust sentence on the individual, but a

blow to the sentiment of justice which prevails in the community at large.

I must now pass on from the question of prison treatment to consider the conditions which produce the criminal population. Like everything else in this life, crime has a cause. It is produced by certain adverse conditions, either in the individual himself or in his moral and material surroundings. In all cases where the individual is below the average of the population, either physically or mentally, he is in more or less danger of drifting into the ranks of crime. People who are physically weak do not get employment so readily as the physically strong. When persons of this type do get work, they are usually the last to be employed and the first to be discharged. In short, it is not so easy for the physically weak to live by the ordinary methods of industry as it is for the physically competent. The result is that a larger proportion of them drift into pauperism and crime. The same remarks apply to the mentally incompetent. Where the mental faculties are below the average, or in cases where the mental balance is defective, employment is either hard to find or difficult to keep. Mental defects produce disastrous industrial results. Want of work, or incapacity to work, often brings criminal impulses to the surface, and many crimes arise from this cause. Even where economic conditions do not come into play, persons of unstable mental composition are apt to drift into crime, and especially crime against the person. A man's character is a compound of thought, feeling, and will, and good conduct is a product of the harmonious action of all these faculties of the mind. Crime, on the other hand, is the result of a lack of mental balance: this

is more particularly the case in crimes of impulse and passion.

But crime springs from social as well as individual conditions. In many cases it will be found that the offender against the criminal law has had no social opportunities. He has been born and bred in the slums of our large cities, in the midst of all kinds of misery and degradation. He is often the child of drunken and dissolute parents. In early life he often loses one or perhaps both his parents; or perhaps he is illegitimate. In any case, his parental circumstances are usually bad, and he does not start life with the parental advantages of the ordinary child. He has not the inestimable privilege of a father's and a mother's care. He generally grows up without a settled occupation. His habits are irregular; he has never had any definite industrial training, and he gets to dislike settled ways of life. About three-fourths of the prison population describe themselves as labourers. These prisoners are not, as a rule, labourers from the country, but labourers from the towns; that is to say, they belong to the most backward section of the community. They belong to a class which has had few social opportunities, and has had to battle through life with adverse social and economic conditions of almost every kind. It is only natural that a considerable proportion of this class should degenerate into criminals.

What light do facts of this character shed upon the problems of crime? Surely they plainly teach us that the true way to diminish crime consists not merely in punishment, but in ameliorating the conditions of the community as a whole. The criminal, we see, is usually the victim of the unhappy individual

and social circumstances in which he is born and has to live. The way to reduce crime is to improve these adverse circumstances. Mere punishment does not and never can have this effect. The criminal problem is, in fact, only one branch of the great social problem —the problem which is to tax the energies of the twentieth century. Crime will decrease as the moral and material welfare of the community increases. Every step forward in the path of genuine social reform renders the problem of crime less difficult to solve. All who are working to improve the conditions of existence for the workman, the woman and the child, are also engaged in diminishing the number of unhappy creatures who spend the best part of their existence in the gloom and solitude of the prison cell.

CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM

AND

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

By GEORGE W. E. RUSSELL

Christian Socialists believe that Religion must regulate our Citizenship—The first object of Municipal duty is the maintenance of the Public Health—Our responsibility in choosing our Representatives in County Council and Vestries—Canon Scott Holland's appeal for a better Home Life—The irony of "Home, sweet Home!" to the Overcrowded—Our duty as Citizens on this question—Social Reform in the Villages needs development—Allotments—Charities—Medical Relief—The Housing of the Labourers—Suggestions for Legislative Action—The Parish Council and Pensions—Conditions of proposed Pensions—The Vestry and Public Morality—Education—Testimony of Sydney Smith and Bishop Butler to Public Education—Free Meals for Ill-fed Children—An ideal for National Education—The Catholic Faith and Education—The Poor Law—Our Guardian Boards must administer the Law in accord with Christian Charity—Dr. Pusey on the duty of the Rich to the Poor—Conclusion: Our Lord and Master has given us the power, and with it most assuredly the duty of enlarging the boundaries of the Kingdom of God by making the lives of the people brighter, purer, and more humane.

Christian Socialism.—Those two words make the key-note of my discourse. Both are essential to my purpose. Neither would set the tune aright without the other. If there are Christians who do not recognise social obligations—well, they are no concern of ours; to their own Master they stand or fall. And Socialism which is not Christian lacks one —to put it no higher—of the most potent incentives

to social service. I address myself then to men whose faith, spiritual and social, I share—to men who believe with all their heart and soul and mind and strength that our Lord Jesus Christ, being Very and Eternal GOD, is also Perfect Man; that He is the King of all human life, secular as well as sacred; and that our loyalty to Him, if it is a reality, must govern our conduct on week-days as well as on Sundays; must regulate not only our Churchmanship but also our citizenship, not only our worship but also our vote.

The vote is, in the Scriptural sense, a "talent," for the right use of which we must one day render an account. Citizenship is a trust confided to us, not only or chiefly for our own advantage, but for the benefit of those who are least able to help themselves. We, as self-governing citizens; as partners, in whatever degree, in this vast empire; as units, however insignificant, in a community great or small —we are trustees for those to whom misgovernment means, not mortified pride or stinted luxury, but pain, and want, and degradation, and risk to their own lives and their children's souls. The non-Christian Socialist recognises this as freely as we do, and we rejoice to meet him on this common ground. But the Christian Socialist knows that, in thus interpreting his civil duty, he is not merely yielding to the persuasions of humanity, but is also obeying the command and copying the example of a Master Whom he believes to be Divine.

Twenty years ago and more, I heard my friend Arthur Stanton, of St. Alban's, say, "I know no Radicalism except that which I sucked in from the breasts of the Gospel," and of his lay friend and fellow-

worker, Theodore Talbot, that "young man of great possessions," who did so much for the social work of St. Alban's, it was written in his "Memoir": "He had wonderful sympathy and love for the working man. He loved him for the sake of the Divine Workman of Nazareth. That was his Liberalism—a pure, unselfish, disinterested love of the poor and helpless."

I have now said enough to indicate the spirit in which we should approach our municipal duties, and I proceed to give my counsel a little more in detail. While setting out clearly the objects at which we ought to aim, I shall not attempt to distinguish very closely between one election and another—School Board, County Council, Board of Guardians, or Vestry. I shall not offer the least suggestion about wire-pulling or vote-combining. I shall not meddle with any of those marvellous mystifications of electoral law by which the governing classes, having failed to "wrest the workman's rights from him by force," have endeavoured (as Burke says) to "shuffle them from him by chicane." All such questions of tactics, and management, and electioneering method I leave to those whose official business it is to look after them. I speak here of the *objects* which, as Christian Socialists, we should seek—lying all of them well within our scope and province as members of a municipality, and attainable through the agency of representative bodies.

Believing, as we Christians do, that Christ is "the Saviour of the body," and that human life is the most sacred thing in this world, we must place first and foremost among the objects to be aimed at the maintenance of the Public Health.

Too often in times past—even, to some extent, I

fear, at the present—public bodies have taken for their motto the sarcastic couplet from Clough's *Latest Decalogue*:—

> "Thou shalt not kill; but needst not strive
> Officiously to keep alive."

Well, our object must be exactly that—"officiously to keep alive," and for the attainment of that end alike the County Council and the Vestries are armed with formidable powers, if only they choose to use them. Much of the sanitary neglect of the past has arisen from the fact that the Acts conferring these powers are generally permissive, and not compulsory. Gradually, I rejoice to think, the London County Council is assuming the position of a Ministry of Public Health, and in choosing our representative upon it we should have careful regard to such questions as this: Will this candidate do what lies in his power towards securing an unlimited supply of pure water for the poor districts? Will he vote for needful expenditure on great systems of main drainage? Will he wage war on insanitary dwellings, wherever he finds them and to whomsoever they belong? This last is a question which may be most pertinently asked with reference to elections for the Vestry. I know not how the case stands now; but, when I was at the Local Government Board, the Vestries of London were a black-and-white patchwork of bad and good; and in the bad ones it was not uncommon to find the Sanitary Committee packed with owners of the most insanitary house-property. The question of the housing of the poor has, of course, its obvious bearing not only on health, but on morals. What chance is there for decency or self-respect where whole families, with

children of different ages, are encamped together in a single room?

"Home, Sweet Home" (I quote from Henry Scott Holland). "Yes! That is the song that goes straight to the heart of every English man and woman. For forty years we have never asked Madame Adelina Patti to sing anything else. There, in that song of Home, speaks the sound Teutonic soul. The Latin Races have not even a word in their languages by which to express it, poor things! Home is the secret of our honest British Protestant Virtues. It is the only nursery of our Anglo-Saxon citizenship. Back to it our far-flung children turn, with all their memories aflame. They may, it must be allowed, lapse into rough ways, but they keep something sound at the core so long as they are faithful to the old Home. There is still a tenderness in the voice, and tears are in their eyes, as they speak together of the days that can never die out of their lives, when they were at home in the familiar places, with father and mother, in the healthy gladness of their childhood. Ah!

> "'Home! sweet Home!
> There's no place like Home.'

"That is what we all repeat, and believe, and cheer to the echo. And, behind all our British complacency about it, nobody would deny the vital truth that there is in this belief of ours. Only, if that is so, what a strange ironical comment on our Creed is the tale that is being told of the Housing and Overcrowding of the Poor in London!

"'Home! Sweet Home!'—with seventeen people huddled into one room! 'Home! Sweet Home!'—in a single room occupied by a double set of

occupants, day and night! 'Home! Sweet Home!'—in Spitalfields, where the beds are rented on the eight hours principle, having three different sets of sleepers in them every twenty-four hours. 'Home! Sweet Home!'—in a single room where babies are born, and the dead are laid out, while father and the children eat and drink and sit and sleep as they can. 'Home! Sweet Home!'—in Kensington, where, in one room let at a pound a week twelve people live, sleep, and work together. 'Home! Sweet Home!'—in Drury Lane, with a small house into which thirty-one people are huddled.

"There are 900,000 of our people in London living in insanitary and illegal conditions; and for all those the word 'Home' has ceased to have any meaning. What memory does it hallow? What moral stability does it foster? What spiritual growth does it permit? What experience does it embody to which we can appeal when we bring news of a Home in Heaven, of a Household of God?

"And let us remember that the case is worsening every day, with a rapidity that has, of late, become terrible. Rent is going up by leaps and bounds. 'Long ago some of our people took to tenements instead of a house, however small. Long ago, some of them gave up tenements and took to single rooms. Long ago, some of them gave up their scant privacy and allowed adult lodgers to sleep in the same room with married people and children. Long ago, some of them gave up single rooms and became content with half a room, dividing the space by a sheet of sacking, with a family on both sides.' So writes Mr. Haw; and, on the top of that miserable process, have come the more startling horrors that he records. Is

it not an astounding fact that rents rise as the district grows poorer and poorer? The crowded houses yield an ever-increasing profit. For all these swarms, there is no foundation on which character can be built. For Home is the base of all citizenship, whether on Earth or in Heaven: and they have no Home."

Surely this awful spectacle of overcrowding in our great cities makes a direct and imperious appeal to the convictions which lie at the roots of Christian Socialism. Our humanity has been consecrated for ever by "the taking of the manhood into God." The Saviour of the Body is also the Maker of the Body, and He cannot, as we believe, look with indifference on His own Handiwork. God wishes His children to be healthy, and He leaves to us the awful responsibility of helping to fulfil or to defeat this benignant purpose. Our plain duty is to do what lies in our power as citizens towards securing healthy surroundings, open spaces, pure air, pure water, recreation and amusement, and some occasional glimpse of the loveliness of nature, for those great masses of our fellow-creatures who are powerless to help themselves. The Church, if she is true to her mission, must be a Fisher of Men—not of their souls only, but of their minds and of their bodies.

As regards Social Reform in the villages, the hopes raised by the Act of 1894 have proved to some extent illusory. The powers were conferred with a rather niggardly hand, and they have scarcely been used to their full capacity. Nevertheless, the Act was a marked step in the right direction, and only needs development and extension, in respect both of the District Councils and of the Parish Councils. Some suggestions,

carefully considered by a committee of experts in rural economy, are here appended.

Land for Allotments and other Public Purposes.—The Parish Council, or (where there is no Parish Council) the Parish Meeting, to have power to take land compulsorily, without any inquiry by the County Council, and subject only to an appeal to the Local Government Board.

Charities.—The control and management of non-ecclesiastical charities (as defined in Section 75 of the Local Government Act, 1894) to be given to the Parish Council, or, where there is no Parish Council, to the Parish Meeting.

Medical Relief.—The receipt of medical relief not to be a disqualification for election on Parish or District Councils.

Simplification of Existing Machinery.—Schoolrooms to be obtainable more easily for purposes provided for by the Act; the Parish Meeting to have certain powers in the case of Charities, and voting by show of hands at the Parish Meeting to be abolished.

The Housing of Labourers in Rural Districts.—In very many districts in England there are too few cottages.

Even where the cottages are sufficient in number, they are in many parishes all held under a single landlord, or let out to one, or, at the outside, two or three large farmers, as, for instance, in many parishes in East and South Wilts. The result is that in some cases labourers have to walk many miles to their work, and, what is perhaps commoner, the fear of being turned out of their native villages makes them subservient to the powers that be, and unwilling to take energetic action on their respective Parish Councils.

There have already been cases where labourers who have combined to secure the return of Progressive Councils have been evicted with their wives and children.

It is obvious, therefore, that the mere provision of allotments, without giving in some way greater security of habitation, is often entirely valueless.

To remedy this it has been proposed to facilitate the operation of the Housing of the Working Classes Act in Rural Districts. The principal Act is divided into three parts. The first and second give power to urban bodies to carry out improvement schemes in unhealthy areas. The third gives power to both urban and rural bodies to acquire land compulsorily, to build on it cottages for the working class, and even to fit out and furnish the same.

By Section 55, however, before rural authorities can avail themselves of the general permissions of the Act, an elaborate inquiry has to be held before the County Council, which causes such delay and expense, that the Act is rarely put in force.

It is proposed to repeal the sections of the Act which relate only to rural districts, and to confer on the District Council (Rural Sanitary Authority) all the powers which can be exercised in urban districts.

This, so far as it goes, is excellent, but there still remain two drawbacks. (1) For the purpose of compulsory purchase of land, in the Housing of the Working Classes Act are incorporated clauses in the Public Health Act, 1875, in which clauses again are incorporated clauses of the Land Clauses Act, 1845. By these clauses, where land is compulsorily taken, the owner has the right, in cases where the value of the

land so taken exceeds £50, to have this assessed by a sheriff's jury, a costly and cumbrous proceeding. (2) The power of building cottages is confined to the District Council.

(*a*) It would be an advantage if the procedure in the case of compulsory taking of land were assimilated to that under the Parish Councils Act; and

(*b*) If the Housing of the Working Classes Act (Part III.) could be included among the Acts which can be adopted by the Parish Meeting and carried out by the Parish Council.

The powers given the Parish Council and Meeting ought not to exclude those given the District Council, but either body should have the power of buying the land and building the cottages.

In Ireland, since 1883, these powers have been exercised by the Guardians, and in Munster 6232, in Leinster 3961, in Connaught 75, and in Ulster 84, cottages have been built during less than eleven years. That is a grand total of over ten thousand cottages. The vast majority of these have been let at a weekly rent of 1s. or less. But it is fair to say that the rents do not cover expenses, the money having to be borrowed at 4½ per cent. by the Guardians. Nor in Munster have even these moderate rents been well paid up. In Leinster, on the other hand, the arrears are small.[1]

The Assistant Commissioners for Ireland to the Labour Commission, while recognising that this letting at less than cost price may have a bad effect in keeping an excessive number of labourers on the soil, yet, in comparison with the previous state of things,

[1] Local Government Board Report, Ireland, c. 7454, p. 39.

have unanimously approved what has been done up to the present time.

In England, of course, a more business-like view would have to be taken of the duties of the local authorities.

Assistant-Commissioner O'Brien reports that, including all expenses, the average cost per cottage is, in Ireland, just under £120.

This might be reduced in two ways in the application to England.

(1) As above suggested, the sites would be acquired in the same way as land for allotments is now under the Parish Councils Act, where compulsion is necessary; and

(2) The County Councils might engage special architects, whose duty it would be to advise the local bodies as to the method of building the best and cheapest cottages.

No doubt in many villages in England, cottages tied to the farm are let at less than their economic value. But

(1) This is most frequently the case in "decayed" districts;

(2) Many of these cottages would be closed as unsanitary, were it possible to obtain better tenements; and

(3) The growth of the class of allotment-holders will tend everywhere in time to raise rents to their market value.

It seems therefore important to give both Parish and District Councils the power to acquire land as cheaply as possible, and on it to erect suitable cottages.

Parish Pensions.—The Parish Council to have power to grant Parish Pensions of five shillings per week to persons over sixty-five, under the following conditions:—

(1) The receipt of a pension not to affect the *status* of the recipient; in particular, not to alter his right to vote.
(2) The Parish Council to have power to grant a pension, even if the recipient has some income, this income not to be reckoned in diminution of the pension.
(3) The qualification for a pension to be left to the Parish Council to settle.
(4) So much of the cost of the pension as is equal to the average actual cost for food, clothes, &c., of an indoor pauper in the Union to be chargeable to the common fund of the Union, the balance (if any) to be defrayed in equal portions out of an Imperial grant, and of the poor-rate of the parish.
(5) The pensioner not to be paid by the Relieving Officer, but through the Post Office.
(6) In towns similar powers to be exercised by a Parish Committee, aided by the Guardians for the district.

Outdoor Relief.—The system of Outdoor Relief to be extended so as to cover all deserving cases, and the Workhouse to be more and more confined to the sick and infirm.

Disqualification by receipt of Poor Relief.—The existing disqualification for voting on account of receipt of Poor Relief to be removed.

Popular Local Control.—All elementary schools in receipt of public money to be subject to popular local control, *i.e.* the Board of Managers in Voluntary Schools to include popularly elected representatives.

So far we have spoken of Rural Reforms; but I cannot leave the subject of Local Government without remarking that there is one department of effort in which the Vestries of London can powerfully serve the cause of public morality—that is, by enforcing the Act of George II. against Disorderly Houses. These houses are often places not only of sin, but of crime, violence, cruelty, and robbery; and "white slavery" is not too strong a name for the condition of the wretched girls—and especially foreigners—who are imprisoned in them. It is for the Church to deal with the *sin*, but the *crime* lies well within the province of the secular authority, and it is our business to promote the election of such Vestrymen as will, on information properly laid, exercise their legal powers to abate the nuisance.

I approach the subject of Education. Here the duty of Christian Socialism is as clear as daylight. We must endeavour to return those candidates who will do the most for the welfare, in the widest sense, of the children.

The pitifullest and meanest outcry which can be uttered is the outcry of the well-to-do classes against the expenditure of the School Board. To put the issue in the vulgarest form, compare what, as a nation, we spend on drink with what we spend on education, and you will have good reason to be ashamed of our national housekeeping. Sixty-two years ago, Sydney

Smith, preaching in St. Paul's Cathedral on the duty of public education, said—

"When I see the village school, and the tattered scholars, and the aged master or mistress teaching the mechanical art of reading or writing, and *thinking that they are teaching that alone*, I feel that the aged instructor is protecting life, insuring property, fencing the altar, guarding the throne, giving space and liberty to all the fine powers of man, and lifting him up to his own place in the order of creation."

Those are not bad words for a dignitary of the Established Church in the year 1837, and we Churchmen may take a reasonable pride in the fact that in the matter of public education, as in so many other spheres of secular beneficence, the Church has preceded and led the State. In the darkest days of a social exclusiveness, the Church was the nursing mother of the poor scholar, and provided of her own free will that career for talent which is now secured by law. Bishop Butler, preaching in 1745, on behalf of the Charity Schools of London and Westminster, anticipated, and rebutted by anticipation, the views of those who, a hundred and fifty years later, should selfishly oppose the demands of popular education. He speaks of the successive changes in the world, and shows how they make certain forms of knowledge necessary which were not so formerly; he urges the hardship of exclusion from them; and he touches with characteristic satire the absurdity and selfishness of those who are "So extremely apprehensive of the danger that poor persons will make a perverse use of even the least advantage, whilst they do not appear at all apprehensive of the like danger for

themselves or their own children, in respect of riches or power, how much soever; though the danger of perverting these advantages is surely as great, and the perversion itself of much greater and worse consequence."

The same great man in the same great sermon says, with equal insight, "Of education, information itself is really the least part." Most certainly it is, and yet, the conditions of life for poor boys and girls being what they are, information is a very necessary part. The struggle for existence, the pressure of competition, the rivalry of foreign nations, make it imperatively necessary that, during the few years that these children are in our hands, we should supply them with such an outfit in the way of hard knowledge and definite accomplishment as will save them from being crushed to death in the struggle for self-support. This much must be secured; and, concurrently with it, there must be the moral education which is supplied by order, discipline, and cleanliness; the sense of membership of a body; the encouragement of honest pride in good work; some provision for the æsthetic sense; some attempt to make good the inevitable shortcomings of the perhaps squalid home.

If this is so, it means, of course, warm, healthy, and convenient schoolrooms; it means something, at least, in the way of artistic decoration; it means the cultivation of music; and, above all, it means a well-paid staff of teachers. No form of public meanness can be more suicidal than that of "sweating" the men and the women who are training the next generation of English citizens. And, for my own part, in choosing a candidate for the School Board,

I would go a good deal further. Physical exercises, such as drill and swimming—the training of the body as well as the intellect—should form a part of any system of rational education. And this leads me to a further point—can all this work of body and mind be done on an empty stomach, or, at the best, a half-nourished frame?

One free meal a day in every elementary school is, as I conceive, positively due to ill-fed children whom we compel to learn; and if any one is found to grumble at the cost, let him ask a Board-School teacher to describe the scraps of food on which, even in the depth of winter, so many of the children subsist; let him compare them with the succession of meals which he deems essential for his own family—and pray God to take away the heart of stone, and give him a heart of flesh.

Information, as Bishop Butler said, is the least part of education. The greatest, I suppose, is the development of the child's natural power to its utmost extent and capacity; and the duty of so developing it must, I think, be admitted by every one who ponders Our Lord's teaching about the buried talent, and the pound laid up in the napkin. Unless we enable and encourage every boy in England to bring whatever physical and mental gifts he has to the highest point of their possible perfection, we are shamefully and culpably squandering the treasure which God has given to England to be traded with and accounted for. And we have no one but ourselves to blame if, as a Nemesis on our neglect, we lose our present standing among the nations of the world. My ideal for National Education is the Golden Ladder, reaching from the elementary schools, by

exhibitions, to the secondary schools, and from them again to the Universities. Only this very year, as in 1897, the highest mathematical honours of Cambridge are won by a man who began life in an elementary school. Let us not rest till we can say to every little urchin raked in from Whitechapel or Soho: "The road lies straight before you; go and do likewise." I will not further labour this point, but will refer my hearers to the teaching of our forerunner in Christian Socialism, Charles Kingsley, in *Alton Locke*.

I should, I suppose, hardly be doing what is expected of me if I omitted all reference to the religious question in Education.

For my own part I believe in the central dogmas of the Catholic Faith as confidently as I do in my own existence; but I do not desire to see them taught at the expense of others who disbelieve in them; and it is no comfort to me to be told that the balance is redressed by teaching false doctrine or "undogmatic religion" at my expense. Two iniquities do not, as some of my clerical friends seem to think, make one equity in this or in any other case; and for my own part I consider that the State, comprising Jews, Turks, Infidels, and Heretics, had better leave the teaching of religion to the voluntary agency of religious bodies. Let the State provide mental and physical training, and let it give all ministers of religion free access to the children, when and as their parents desire. Then the claims of dogma will be amply secured; and they will be secured consistently with the equally sacred claims of justice and freedom.

I approach now a department of my subject which, in a peculiar degree, touches the domain of Christian

Socialism—I mean the elections to the Boards of Guardians.

When we passed the Parish Councils Act, as it was commonly called, I felt, and said, in Parliament and on the platform, that the most important part of it, to my mind, was the reformation—nay, rather the revolution—which it effected in the mode of electing the Guardians of the Poor. Remember that before 1894 no one could be a guardian unless he had a certain property-qualification. The voter had a plural vote, greater or less according to the length of his purse; and the election was by open voting on paper. It was impossible for a poor man to be a guardian, and almost impossible for any number of poor men to return the candidate of their choice. We reversed all that by a stroke of the pen. We made the poorest man in the parish equally eligible with the banker or the squire. We established the principle of "one man, one vote," and we gave the voter the protection of the ballot. Surely, with the aid of this reform, it ought to be possible for us Christian Socialists to bring the administration of the Poor Law into something like accordance with Christian charity.

Our palpable and inexorable duty is to return such guardians as will distinguish between deserved poverty and undeserved poverty. For deserved poverty—the poverty which comes of idleness, drunkenness, thriftlessness, rascality—the workhouse is the proper place. For undeserved poverty—the poverty which overtakes honest, industrious, sober old people, through years and sickness and the loss of children—*provision should be made at home.* When a man has done his level best all through a long life to serve his day and generation

in his calling as a labourer or an artizan, I submit that he is as much entitled to public assistance in his old age and decrepitude as the soldier, the sailor, the policeman, or the Civil Servant. And, till Parliament gives us some rational system of old-age pensions, carefully distinguishing between deserving and undeserving cases, Christian charity demands a much more liberal use of outdoor relief.

Men who, like myself, were undergraduates at Oxford in 1875 will never forget a University sermon by Dr. Pusey on "Christianity without the Cross a Corruption of the Gospel." It had been suggested by a book, just then widely popular among undergraduates, called "Modern Christianity a Civilised Heathenism," and the great Doctor spoke of the duty of the rich to the poor in a passage which I might not have ventured to write, but which I will venture to quote :—

"What shall we have to say to our Lord when He comes down to be our Judge—when we shall behold Him Whom by our sins we have pierced? 'True, Lord, I denied myself nothing for Thee; the times were changed, and I could not but change with them. I ate and drank, for Thou too didst eat and drink with the publicans and sinners. I did not give to the poor, but I paid what I was compelled to the poor-rate, of the height of which I complained. I did not take in little children in Thy name, but they were provided for. They were sent, severed indeed from father or mother, to the poorhouse, to be taught or no about Thee, as might be. I did not feed Thee when hungry. Political economy forbade it; but I increased the labour market with the manufacture of my luxuries. I did not visit Thee when sick, but the

parish doctor looked in on his ill-paid rounds. I did not clothe Thee when naked. I could not afford it, the rates were so high, but there was the workhouse for Thee to go to. I did not take Thee in as a stranger, but it was provided that Thou mightest go to the casual ward. Had I known that it was Thou' —and He shall say, 'Forasmuch as thou didst it not to one of the least of these, thou didst it not to Me.'"

And in a foot-note to the sermon, the Doctor added: "Reliance on the Poor-law interferes with Christian charity; offers, in large towns, a mode of relief which the better poor would rather starve than accept; and in times of suffering, as of an epidemic, offers relief in a way which degrades the poor in their own eyes and of their compeers if they accept it. . . . If the poor, like the lower animals, needed only food and warmth, the poorhouse system provides these, I doubt not. But the poor have souls and loving hearts, more loving than many rich, and to separate those whom God has joined, as the condition of supplying them with necessaries, is un-Christian and anti-Christian. I fear that in the Great Day many even kindly people will find that reliance on the Poor-law has steeled their heart against Christ."

I can add nothing to the solemnity of those searching words; so here I will sum up and conclude.

Our Lord and Master has given us, as English citizens, the power, and with the power most assuredly the duty, of enlarging the boundaries of the Kingdom of God by making the lives of men brighter, purer, and more humane. To that great end let us press forward with a single aim, not merely talking the

language of Christian Socialism, but doing its work and living its life—

> "In the undoubting faith, although
> It be not granted us to see,
> Yet that the coming age shall know
> We have not wrought unmeaningly;
> When gold and chrysoprase adorn
> A city brighter than the morn."

III

SOCIAL AND PERSONAL OBLIGATIONS

THE NATION'S DUTIES TO THE EMPIRE

BY THE HON. W. P. REEVES

Responsibility of Empire—"Little Englandism" and Imperialism: growth and triumph of Imperial principles: the seamy side: vulgar ideals—Good and evil effects of British dominion—Splendid results in the white colonies: colonial loyalty: Imperial-colonial relations—Coloured subjects of the Empire: the Empire's duty to them: Imperial race-problems—Immediate work to be done in tropical Africa: the gin-curse—The negro and the land: White aid, teaching and control: capacity of the negro for self-government: a bright spot on the dark continent—Negro communities—Education and the problem of the Empire—Official administration in tropical dependencies—The importance of the study of tropical medicine—Summary and prospect.

THE duty of a nation towards its neighbours comes, in the case of inhabitants of most countries, under the head of Foreign Politics. With the people of the United Kingdom, however, this is by no means so. They are the rulers of an empire which includes many races and many lands, to say nothing of its dominion over the ocean. The subjects of their Queen number about a fourth of the human species. Whether the British Empire was rightly or wrongly won, whether it is a profitable or unprofitable possession, are matters which may admit of argument, and which certainly cause some of the warmest controversies of our time. But though

able and honest men may differ on these points, there can be, I think, no difference as to the weighty responsibilities and exacting duties which the ownership of her great empire imposes upon Britain.

It is a commonplace of our day that the last thirty years have seen a complete revolution of public opinion about the Empire. Imperialism has triumphed, and the more insular school of politics, whose enemies have cleverly fastened upon it the cacophonous name of "Little Englandism," has, for the present at any rate, been discredited. No "practical" politician will admit being a Little Englander now. The name is of as ill savour as was Jingo after Mr. Gladstone's Midlothian campaign. The triumphant Imperialist usually assumes that the conversion of the public during the last thirty years is due to the successful preaching of certain doctrines which have led to a widening of the political horizon and the national understanding. Probably, however, the growth of Imperialism is not due to any increase in English perceptive faculties, but simply to the existence of a mass of solid evidence which was not at the command of our fathers. Our generation is confronted with an enormous fact in the shape of the Empire as it is. During the first half of the century not only was the Empire much less than it is now, but it was on its trial. Since 1870 its success has been admitted, and, as we know, there is nothing which succeeds like success. Its unprecedented dimensions, its immense and growing trade, its gigantic and increasing population, and the peace and comparative prosperity and content which dwell within its borders, are impressive even to the pessimist. There is a seamy side to it all, not to be ignored. But the justice which in the main

rules the Empire, and the orderly progress which in the main distinguishes it, are realities which the *advocatus diaboli* finds it hard to get over. The statistics of the British Empire to-day are the arguments which have brought round a majority of English people to a respect for Imperialism, if not an unwavering faith therein. Imperialism, without doubt, has its vulgar and barbaric side. Much of the popular admiration for the Empire is little more than megalomania. Many of its prophets think their case proved when they dwell upon the number of square miles, the millions of people, the huge sum-total of imports and exports, the taxes, the revenue, the Navy, and the Armies of the races which hail Queen Victoria as Sovereign. To these people the vast spaces of our raw African empire are inspiring because they are vast, and India is great because its population is numerous. They confuse size with strength and number with efficiency. Literature is on the side of Imperialism, even of crude and violent Imperialism. Kipling's stories have more influence than the speeches of any living statesman, and there are thousands of Englishmen whose notions of colonisation and expansion have their origin in stories of boyhood wherein the butchery of wild men and wild animals is glorified and associated with every heroic and manly quality.

Fortunately there is an Imperialism which is something more than a return to primitive ethics and a glorification of might as right. England's expansion is, thank Heaven! something more than a hypocritical and thinly-disguised hunt after precious metals and forced labour, or the grabbing of lands the owners of which are unable to defend them. Much

as there is in the remonstrances of Mr. John Morley's friends which must go home to the heart and conscience of every right-thinking democrat, it does not follow that pessimism as applied to the Imperial question is anything more than a useful corrective. When the Little Englanders inveigh against useless frontier wars, against trade which takes the form of the sale of gin and gunpowder to savages, against forced labour in any and every form, and against the spoliation of tribal lands, they appear to me to be absolutely right in principle, though their statements, it may be, are sometimes over-coloured. When they appeal to English Progressives not to allow their attention to be diverted from domestic reforms by visions of conquest and dominion, when they dwell upon the huge burden which the continuous growth of military and naval expenditure lays upon the shoulders of the British taxpayer, when they examine with a critical eye the material value of African deserts and swamps, they seem to me to be entitled to the sympathy of every one who values peace, freedom, and common sense. But when they assume, as they sometimes appear to do, that annexation by Britain carries with it if not the extinction, at least the slavery or degradation of every native race that is subjected to it; when they are inclined to take it for granted that every nation with which England has a quarrel must be in the right; and when they go through Africa from the Cape to Cairo and find all barren, I confess that they appear to me to be overdoing a good case. Whilst I confess, for instance, that it seems more than doubtful whether tropical Africa, with the sole exception of Nigeria, will ever be aught but a burden to the present generation of

British taxpayers, it does not follow that their children may not enjoy a highly profitable trade therewith. While the machine-like slaughter of Omdurman is not a thing over which I can grow enthusiastic, and while "gin-soaked West Africa" appears to me one of the darkest blots on our name as a governing nation, I cannot admit that our rule in Africa in the nineteenth century has in the main worked more evil than good to the negro. And if it has not been baneful in the past, still less ought it to be baneful in the future. In Africa, as in Asia, it is the first step of empire which costs most to both sides, and which too often is attended by melancholy blunders and flagrant crimes.

There is one division of our empire as to which Englanders, large and small, are happily united. The White Colonies are justly the subjects of national pride. Forty years ago they were small, and if not altogether feeble, often querulous and troublesome. To-day they are not unworthy to be called daughter nations, and in proportion as their strength and importance have grown, so, happily, has their feeling of affection to the motherland quickened. A generation ago they were almost ready to acquiesce in the truth of Turgot's metaphor of the ripe pears which fall from the tree. To-day they are loyal because they are contented; indeed, the loyalty of their wealthier classes sometimes takes an almost amusingly flamboyant form. At the same time, it would not be well for the Londoner to suppose that the enthusiastic visitor who drinks the Queen's health with cheers in the Colonial Institute is the exact type of the average working colonist as seen in his own land. The holiday-making colonist to be met with every day in the

United Kingdom is, even now, most often a Briton by birth revisiting the haunts of his youth. Moreover, he is usually well-to-do, and often more or less at odds with Socialistic Democracy in his own colony. The mass in the colonies is made up of those whose means do not enable them to take long holidays in the Mother Country, or of those who have been born in the Southern Hemisphere or North America. The loyalty of these is genuine enough, but it is not a loyalty which would stand long against any sense of injustice or irritation. It endures because the White Colonists enjoy almost complete self-government. Though colonists are not politically on the same level as the citizens of the United Kingdom, this constitutional inferiority is in practice so little irksome that most of them do not know that it exists. The right of veto which the Imperial Government has over the laws of colonial Parliaments is sparingly exercised. That colonists are disqualified from taking any share in the foreign policy of the Empire sits lightly enough upon communities like Australia and New Zealand which are surrounded by the ocean, or upon the South Africans and Canadians, who are placed far apart from the military nations of Europe. The more thoughtful colonists gladly accept political inferiority as a cheap price to pay for escape from the distraction of foreign fears and the awful burden of gigantic armaments.

The loyalty of the White Colonists, based as it is upon affection for the Mother Country and admiration for her historic greatness rather than upon gratitude, expectation of favours to come, or a sense of common interests and danger, is a feeling which might be equal to self-sacrifice in moments of enthusiasm, but which would not endure any long-continued

interference. The colonist feels that he makes no great demands upon Britain. The cost of the Imperial Army and Navy may be great, yet he is but in a very small degree the cause of it. Blot out Canada, Australia, and New Zealand from the map, and the Imperial Defence Estimates would not be reduced in the least. Blot out Cape Colony and Natal, and the reduction, though appreciable, would not be great. It is not the White Empire but the Dark, the tropical territories of England, which are the main cause of her great and growing outlay upon her sailors and soldiers. Only last year Lord Curzon said, amid applause, that India was the centre round which England's foreign policy revolved. That is doubtless sufficiently true to warrant the White Colonies in looking coolly upon fervent appeals to their patriotism, invitations to join in supporting the burden of Imperial defence—and aggression. They are not standing upon anything like a common basis with the taxpayers of the Mother Country. Colonists may admire the proportions of the Tropical Empire, but they see in the millions which people it a growing danger to themselves. Immigration of the Dark races into the White Colonies —if permitted, as many Englishmen would for political reasons like—would submerge the White workers. The question may yet strain the Empire, complicated as it must be with the problems of the Far East. In this matter the White Colonies and the Tropical Territories are not only distinct but antagonistic divisions of the Empire. Nor do the Colonies profit by the trade of the Tropical division as Great Britain does. Nor does it minister to their pride, for they do not govern it. Their rights are confined within their own frontiers; they are exposed to the risk of finding

themselves in a state of war with a foreign country over a matter in which they have not been consulted, and which concerns them either fractionally or not at all. Two things only render this state endurable—(1) their confident belief that England's policy is in the main one of peace, and (2) their faith that England rules the seas. Even as it is, they may be excused if they hesitate to cripple their finances by assuming burdens without power, and if they view with indifference the reproaches of Mr. Arnold Forster and Admiral Colomb. The essence of their constitutional position is that both their authority and their responsibilities cease at their own boundaries. It will be time enough for them to fight and pay—as a matter of duty—for the Dark Empire when they are invited to share in ruling it. The despatch of the Australian contingent to the Soudan was an outburst of affection, and must not be mistaken for the admission of an obligation. An Empire, the chief bond of which should be a common army and navy, and nothing more, appears to them chimerical and undesirable. To press Federation for purely militarist objects upon the White Colonies would be the most terrible of mistakes. Partnership in a great work of peace like an ocean telegraph cable is much more likely to attract the members of the Imperial family together and accustom them to co-operation. The Empire, the greatest the world has ever seen, is also the most widely scattered. Anything that governments reasonably can do to utilise the forces of steam and electricity to diminish the distances which separate one portion from another, is obviously among the duties of our statesmanship. He must be a strange kind of Anglo-Saxon who does not believe that it will

be better for humanity in general, and our own race in particular, that the Empire should hold together, and be a united force in days to come for peace and social progress. If the elevation of labour is to go on apace during the twentieth century, it must be because the Anglo-Saxon race, which has taken the work in hand, continues it; and the more closely united the race is, the greater its influence upon the mass of humanity must clearly be. Until, however, British political leaders are prepared to face the question of Colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament, Federation will come very little nearer.

When we pass from the white to the coloured subjects of the Queen we pass from the minority to the majority. The Whites are now less than one-eighth of the Empire's inhabitants. If it were not for their greatly superior efficiency, there might be something in the fears of those who picture the white man swept away before a brown or yellow world-deluge. But the white man is too well equipped mentally and physically, too strong in knowledge, inventive power, wealth, and accumulated resources, to fear competition with any race, at any rate within measurable time. In the British Empire the white man rules because by virtue of strength and ability he deserves to rule. All the greater therefore are his responsibilities. Not much probably remains to be written upon this subject which differs much from views already put into print by thoughtful and experienced administrators. These opinions, however, seem in many cases to be so little known, and the popular views about the tropical empire so out-of-date, that anything like a succinct and clear summary of some of the principles which admittedly ought to guide us in the government

of the tropics may still be useful. That there is in England a warm and sincere desire that the nation should do its duty by its coloured subjects is undoubted. That this feeling is often ignorant and ill-directed is, unfortunately, just as certain. For instance, the belief is still widespread that the inferior races disappear before the march of the white man, and that the problem for the British philanthropist is to preserve the native races of the Empire from extirpation. Yet this is but true to a very small extent. Certain savage races within the Empire are, in truth, on the wane. Such are the Bushmen and Hottentots in South Africa, the Polynesians and Australians, and some of the native tribes in the Canadian Dominion. But these races, never numerous, bear but a small proportion to the black, brown, and yellow myriads which show no disposition to decay under our rule. The Chinaman, the Hindoo, the Arab and the Negro, so far from dwindling in number increase and multiply prodigiously. The Imperial race problem of the future is not how to save them from extinction, but how to provide with any degree of comfort for their multiplying millions. In India our statesmen are already face to face with this question in an intensifying form, and the more successfully they cope with plague and war the more acute does the population problem inevitably grow. What is our difficulty in Asia to-day will be our difficulty in Africa to-morrow. In seventeen years of peaceful and just rule we have conferred solid and undoubted benefits on Egypt. But amongst the results of our administration the most striking fact of all is the addition of over three millions to the swarms which cover the narrow strip along the banks of the Nile. Twenty years of famine,

slaughter, and pestilence in the Soudan have probably been unable to destroy more millions than have been quietly added to the Egyptian population in the same period. Nor is Egypt the only part of Africa in which a growth of population is the sure result of the *pax Britannica*. In South Africa the Kaffirs, Fingoes, and Zulus increase much faster under the Union Jack than when independent. To Natal in bygone years "free" natives fled in numbers as to a land of refuge. Nothing is more certain than that the putting down of the slave trade, of tribal wars, and the provision of a regular food supply will cause a rapid numerical growth in every part of our wide African possessions. There are those who write and speak of the question of the colonisation of tropical Africa by our race as though it were only a question of overcoming climate and disease. But even if a systematic study of tropical medicine should find specifics for malaria and dysentery, it will still be as unlikely that our race will people the great African intra-tropical plateau. There will be no room for us. It is the black man's country, and the more successful we are in introducing health, peace, and knowledge into these territories, the more inevitable will it be that the negro tribes will fill them up.

There is nothing in this population difficulty, ever at our heels in the tropics, to cause surprise to any reasonable mind. None of the lessons of history is clearer than that a population in a low state of development will, if kept at peace, multiply rapidly up to the level of subsistence. We have kept peace in India and the East to a degree unknown there for hundreds of years. Our doctors and sanitary science have done not a little to cope with disease; our laws

have checked murder and infanticide. But we have not attempted to educate our subjects up to anything like a European level of civilisation or to instil into them our ideas of self-respect, or our demands for a high standard of comfort. Hence it comes about that in India, despite all that English justice and Western science can do, vast numbers of the people live within measurable distance of hunger. Our despotism enables them to increase but does not help them to rise, and the population problem in a terrible form is the retribution we meet. If our control of Africa is to be carried out on the same lines as those we have followed in Asia, a generation will not elapse before we shall be met with the same problem there. It remains to be seen whether our administrators will consider it less impossible to educate the negro than to educate the Oriental. In one respect the negro ought to be more plastic material. Except in Nigeria he is an utter savage. He frankly admits our superiority, and has few prejudices of creed, and no rival civilisation of his own to cling to and to make him loathe our teaching and despise our customs. Even his severest critics admit his imitative faculties. The experience of the United States, to go no further, shows that he is neither obstinately averse to be taught nor at all unable to learn.

Meanwhile it may be admitted that there is much rough and ready work to be done in tropical Africa before the machinery of anything like popular education can possibly be set up there. Peace is not yet established; slavery is not yet abolished; the tribes within our spheres are not yet disarmed; the trade in ardent spirits, so far from being suppressed, is on the whole growing. Yet as a sure means of demoralising

the tribes, and as an obstacle in the way of anything like civilisation, the spirit trade is only second to the slave trade. It would be hard to find records more repulsive and humiliating than the figures of our West African imports during the last dozen years. The poor excuse officially offered for these is that our French and German competitors are worse sinners than ourselves, and that if we were to pass a self-denying ordinance the whole iniquitous trade would pass into their hands. The negro would still get his spirits and we should lose our profits. That no doubt was sufficient answer a dozen or fifteen years ago, before the spheres of territorial influence were as clearly marked as they now are. Then, when the greater part of the African littoral was no man's land, smuggling could not be checked. Now it can be, and with all due respect to the official knowledge of the apologists for the West African gin trade, I am disposed to think that one-half the vigour shown by our fathers in checking the slave trade would be sufficient to save the tribes living under the British flag from the irresistible temptations of trade gin. If the law-makers of South Africa, where the Kaffirs live intermingled with or surrounded by spirit-drinking Whites, are not deterred from endeavouring to save the natives from the drink curse, there is less than no excuse for the rulers of tropical Africa to fail to do their best in the same direction. If a considerable amount of success rewards the efforts to administer the law in those portions of South Africa where the attempt is resolutely made, then we might reasonably look for a much greater measure of success in tropical Africa, where the difficulties in the way of prohibition are infinitely less.

To keep the negro peaceful and sober will be much; to save him from losing his land will be as necessary, if he is to thrive. For many years he must be in the main an agriculturist, with a partial exception in the case of the cattle-rearing tribes. Anything like a divorce from the land must entail the wholesale degradation and misery of the tribes. It is true that the negro will work for wages, and work well. But even wage-earners should have the land to fall back upon. Perhaps the happiest results of negro wage-labour in Africa are seen in the case of the Basutos. Between twenty and thirty thousand of these, it is estimated, leave their country to labour in the diamond or gold fields, where they earn and save considerable sums. This money, for the most part, they carry back to their own mountains and valleys, and there settle down as peaceful and industrious peasant cultivators. For under the tribal laws of Basutoland any tribesman has the right to till waste land, and cannot be expelled from his holding as long as he turns it to account. Mention of Basutoland reminds me that there are competent observers who hold that the self-governing powers of the negro are probably greater than most of his critics have been disposed to admit. It may be conceded that Sir Harry Johnston is right when he maintains that no negroid people is capable of rising to any great extent in the scale of civilisation entirely without White aid, teaching, or control. But then comes the question, cannot White aid, teaching, and control be given in some less repugnant form than by an armed and despotic rule? Is it not possible to help the negro to rise without the extreme step of taking possession of his country by force of arms, reducing him to the

condition of an inferior in his native land, and managing him much as though he were an interesting but very idle, troublesome, and dangerous child—a child, moreover, never likely to attain to man's estate? That high-handed occupation and government are not necessary in every part of Africa may be gathered more or less from a good many examples. To me it seems best shown in the case of Basutoland. Here in a small but healthy and beautiful territory are to be found perhaps the most comfortable and hopeful black people in Africa. Nearly two generations ago their scanty African bands took refuge there from the raids of Zulu oppressors. Menaced by Kaffirs on the one hand and Boers on the other, they finally found shelter under a British Protectorate, and after various wars with us (out of which they came by no means ingloriously) they have settled down to lives of peaceful industry and reasonable progress. Missionaries and instructors excepted, Whites are not allowed to settle in their country. The Basutos manage their own affairs, their chiefs are their magistrates, and British interference with internal matters in Basutoland is almost limited to good advice and moral suasion. Externally, of course, the British Protectorate has been of the greatest service to them, as but for it they would now be the slaves of Boer raiders. Education is making fair progress amongst them, and laws, which are not altogether without practical use, forbid the importation of spirits into their country. On the whole, Basutoland is a bright and cheerful spot in the Dark Continent. But not the least cheering feature about it is the extent to which it is self-governed and self-controlled.

If I do not quote the Bechuanas, who have been

fortunate enough to have Khama for their chief, as an equally good example of the aptitude of the negro for self-government, it is because we have yet to see how far their progress will be checked when they lose that very exceptional ruler. The Basutos have lost Moshesh, and there is no reason to attribute any remarkable qualities to their present head chief; but their improvement still goes on. It is possible to find many other instances, not indeed so striking as that afforded by Basutoland, but still not without value as examples of negro capacity. I cannot help suspecting that certain writers have very greatly exaggerated the stagnation of Liberia, in West Africa; and I much more than suspect that the popular estimate of the anarchical and ruined condition of the negro republic of Hayti and the mulatto state of San Domingo is grossly unfair. Well informed observers do not hesitate to say that these last two communities have been less affected by industrial depression and discouragement during the last ten years than any other part of the West Indies. The tiller of the soil and the petty shopkeeper and merchant amongst them live in comfort, and escape the humiliation of being looked down upon by a handful of superior beings. That is much; and if it can be shown, as I believe it can, that the average of comfort and intelligence and information in Liberia and in Hayti and in San Domingo has advanced during the last thirty years, that is much more.

To go back to the value of education amongst coloured races, it may be asked, in what material respect is education to solve the problems that will have to be faced in our empire in the near future? One answer, at any rate, is that education will enable

dark men to produce very much more, and will lessen immensely the pressure of population and the danger of famine and pestilence. As an example of the difference between the producing power of an educated and that of a comparatively ignorant population, we may compare the colony of New Zealand with the so-called colony of Jamaica. The population of the two places is nearly the same, but the external trade of New Zealand is six times that of Jamaica, and the disproportion with regard to products internally consumed is probably quite as large. Doubtless there are other factors to account for this striking disproportion, but the difference between a highly educated and a very badly educated population is not the least important.

I have, in what I have written, endeavoured to make it plain that my ideal of a tropical empire is not to be attained by a mere despotism, however benevolent, nor by a régime of peace and justice which leads merely to the multiplication of childishly ignorant myriads. Nevertheless I am not disposed to close this paper without frankly paying tribute to the personal qualities which, as a rule, happily distinguish English officials both in Asia and in Africa. It is but just that the exceptional cases in which such officials are grossly vicious or incompetent should be denounced and exposed in the English press. But it would be lamentable if a general impression were created in the United Kingdom that these exceptions are the rule. That there always have been, and still are, white men who, if left unchecked, will carry disease, degradation, and virtual slavery with them amongst any natives they can control is unhappily true. But these base Whites, the gun-runners, the gin-traders, and the land-grabbers, are so far from being in league with the white official and the average

missionary, that they are nearly always the deadly enemies of both. In colonies where there is a large white population living side by side with a coloured element you will always find a strong philo-native party amongst the Whites whose opinions in the long run influence the acts of the colony's Government. So in tropical territories, you may count upon the official element doing its best in nearly every case to battle against the more unscrupulous Whites. One cannot help regretting that the condemnation which ought to visit the misdeeds of the latter is not seldom directed in this country against the very missionaries and officials who are doing their best to struggle against them. Such a record as that of Sir William M'Gregor's ten years' rule in New Guinea is something for all right-minded Englishmen to be proud of. It is easy enough to point to instances of failure in our tropical administration, but it does not follow that the fault always or even usually rests with the officials on the spot. These are often handicapped by the ignorance of their superiors in London, or by hopelessly bad machinery—as in the case of the recent difficulties in Samoa, which though not a part of the Empire, is a place which we have taken upon ourselves to manage in partnership with America and Germany. Inasmuch as local knowledge of tropical colonies is never likely to become part of the equipment of political or departmental heads in London, it follows that there is all the greater need of quality in the officers who are sent out to administer in the Tropics. Mr. Chamberlain, in an interesting article on the subject lately written by him in an American magazine, laid stress on the necessity for paying colonial officials well. There is at least as much necessity for making every effort to cope with those frightful climatic

dangers which, far more than low pay, will always deter many first-class men from risking their lives in parts of the Empire. Knowledge of such matters as climate spreads slowly. Up to the present enough has been learned of the climate of Africa to warrant an intelligent dread of it, but not enough to fill us with hope of overcoming its dangers. The heavy toll that it takes every year of English lives and English health seems likely still to be levied. But it is not to be thought that medical science, so triumphant in other fields, will be permanently baffled here; and if the English Colonial Office will continue to foster the study of tropical medicine until success is attained, it will confer one of the greatest benefits on the Empire that can easily be thought of. Meanwhile it requires no further investigation to teach the Colonial Office that a site like that of Lagos is a filthy fever-trap to which it is a crime to send valuable officers to die.

To sum up. If as rulers of Africa we make it our business to wage wars against slavery, drink, and commercial greed; if we make it our chief object to secure to the negro tribes their lands and their tribal self-respect; then the march from Cape to Cairo and the annexation of the great realm of Nigeria may confer benefits on the native races of which Englishmen and their children will have reason to be proud. Land-grabbers and company-promoters may impatiently complain that the development of the Dark Continent does not proceed fast enough. But there is no need to suppose that, though these principles are respected, the prosperity and gradual elevation of the races of Africa will not bring an indirect but ample material reward to Britain in the shape of a great and profitable commerce.

THE OBLIGATION OF CIVIL LAW

By Canon HENRY SCOTT HOLLAND

Law fastens its obligations upon us from within as well as from without—The State which imposes the Law is our social self; and in obeying the Law, we obey ourself.

Law arrives at us from outside. We discover it by running up against it. Its first appearance on our personal scene is in the form of the policeman and the tax-gatherer, signals to us of possible restraints and of fretting compulsion. Behind these immediate menaces lies a vision of red-robed Justice in its Court, encompassed about by complicated legal necessities, incomprehensible, remote, alien, hidden from our ken by some monstrous jargon of their own, which conveys to us no meaning, and appears to us to be based on arbitrary and unanticipated and unnatural interpretations of the most ordinary processes of life. In the Court and round about the Court stand thick the black ministers of irresistible Force, who will, at all costs, assert the Law, however foolish and unfair it may be; and, behind, is felt the dim pressure of the Prison, blind and hard, ready to engulf all private passion and protest in its relentless silence. This is the inevitable semblance which the Law of a State assumes to our individual experience, as we knock up against its provisions, and are pinched by its invasions, and are victimised by our ignorance of

its intricacies, and find ourselves driven unwillingly down its narrow and provoking passages. We only become aware of it at the points where we collide with it; and, as collision forms our introduction, it cannot but seem to us that it is of the nature of Law to be external, repressive, hostile.

It is under the provocation of some such experience that we first ask ourselves, "Why should I obey? What moral obligation binds me?"

And the first answer of the child-instinct, as it takes the plain superficial measure of the actual experience felt, is to say, "There is no moral obligation. I obey because I must. I yield to force." Of course, such an answer is only given in its crude simplicity, at a very early stage, where the instincts are unsophisticated and unabashed; and the natural man is so far wholesome that he is not afraid to speak out his real mind. That is why the Sophist of Ancient Greece is so peculiarly fascinating to us. He blurts out everything that we should like to say, but dare not. He has the wits of the adult man at their acutest, but, in judgment and experience, he is as undeveloped and simple-minded as a child. Therefore, his mind is transparent; everything in him comes to the surface. He exhibits the native impulses of human nature in their unadulterated reality. If he were not so guileless, he would be afraid to utter audacities which sound so shocking. But he says them all at their worst, and so verifies his innocence. The Sophist's answer, then, to our question, when he declared that Law is always the Will of the Stronger, exercised to compel the Weaker to do what is against his own interest, remains to this day the most illuminative revelation of the reasoning which lies

concealed behind the veil of more intricate and subtle answers. All such answers, whatever be the intricacy by which they seek to blur the crudity of the Sophist's formula, yet start from a situation in which the Law and the Individual appear over against one another, as colliding interests. Once leave that situation unanalysed and unresolved, and you will always be in difficulties over the final interpretation of the obligation to obey. If the Man and the State first encounter each other as strangers, they will never quite succeed in forming that inward bond of union out of which obligation proceeds. They may contract reasonable alliances; they may contrive to identify their interests over a large area of life; but still, if a collision were to show itself, and a decision were imperative, it will be hard to say what, in the last resort, compels obedience, except the right of the stronger to enforce obedience on the weaker, the right of the many to impose their will on the one, the supremacy of the general interest over against all that obstructs it.

Such an obligation cannot rid itself of the notion of force. Force is its final justification for asserting itself; and no obligation which rests on force can in itself be moral. It cannot carry conscience with it. The conscience may be induced by moral motives to accept the verdict of force, as when, on the principle of non-resistance, it submits to tyranny, or willingly, for love of God, goes to prison for conscience' sake, and rejoices in giving evidence, by suffering, for the Truth. It may submit to ordinances of man, which it considers unjust, "for the Lord's sake." It may, for many reasons, think it right to yield to decisions which it cannot justify. But any such obligations to obey the law must be found outside the law itself. So

far as the law itself simply says, "You must, because I am stronger than you," it can carry with it no moral sanctions. It has abandoned them by the very nature of its claim.

We may decide for ourselves that it is our moral duty to sacrifice our private interest to the interest of the whole body, or our own happiness to that of the greatest number. But, if so, the motive of the sacrifice does not spring out of the mere fact that they are stronger than we. We should make the sacrifice out of love for our fellows, or out of love for God. The moral obligation would be found in that which made us love man, or God, or in any reason we had for regarding sacrifice as a true law of our life. But the mere weight and mass of superior numbers have no claims to put out which could justify sacrifice, any more than the irresistible momentum of a natural law can evoke it.

It might, no doubt, be *expedient* to yield our judgment to theirs; it might, that is, be our own best interest to follow theirs. But, in that case, we obey, because it is *our* interest, not because it is theirs. This would be the source of the obligation. And so it has come about that a number of theories have been invented, by which obedience to law is rested on the expediency of acting in combination with others if ever we are to attain our own welfare. All Utilitarian schemes are variations on this theme; and some are subtle, and some are full of excellent practical suggestions on the advantage of acquiescence in the public good, and formulate admirably the actual grounds on which the particular form of happiness to be aimed at should be determined. But the delicacy and subtlety of the schemes only

serves to gloze over the inherent difficulty which lurks behind all the practical mechanism. They supply admirable reasons why the man should, for his own sake, consent to come to an agreement with Society as to the aims to be pursued in common, since he is certain to secure his own advantage far more efficiently by co-operation with others than he ever can hope to do alone, even though, in the former case, he has to surrender much of what he would, in the latter case, desire to attain. But, still, the question remains why, if he resists the weight of the arguments, and prefers his own natural interest at any cost, he is not free to do so at his own risk. How can the State, which has hitherto argued with the man on the basis of the man's own interests, finally turn round, on his refusal to be convinced, and exclaim, "Well, if you won't seek your own interest for yourself, I must do it for you. I will compel you to do that which I think best, and which, since I think it best, it must be for your interest to accept and conform to. My policeman must take up the argument at the point where you fail to see its force. If you won't be persuaded, you must be compelled to confess the force of my logic."

Such a finale must always assume the character of a break-down. For if the case for the Law is rested upon the individual's own private interest, he must, in the last resort, be the best judge of that. If he is to be compelled to agree with that which he himself denies to be his true interest, on the ground that it is still his best interest to agree, since it is disastrous to himself to be in collision with the majority, that is only an artificial way of saying that he must agree because he cannot help himself. There is no other

way out of it for him. It had better be done; because, in fact, it must be done. The necessity is proved, but not the moral obligation.

It was the vivid perception of this difficulty which led many great thinkers to imagine that the individual must have, formally and freely, pledged himself, by an act of engagement, to accept the judgment of the majority, or of the Paramount Government, as to what is, and is not, his own interest. He must have signed away his right to hold and to assert his private judgment on the matter. And he must have done it, in view of the personal advantage it is to himself to co-operate with his fellows. Society is expedient for him, for without it he is impotent. But Society cannot exist unless he will abandon his ultimate right to differ from it. Therefore it is personally expedient for him to abandon the right. And having abandoned it, in order to obtain the advantages of Public Law, he cannot retract his act of surrender. He is bound by his own engagement. The supremacy of the public authority over his private will and judgment is in itself an essential element in the bargain. He has committed, once for all, to Society the right to compel him, when he disagrees with it. He has placed himself, by an act of freewill, motived by his own desire for his own good, under an obligation to obey the Law. This is the famous idea underlying "the Social Contract," in all the forms that it has taken since its first rough suggestion by the Sophists, until it culminated in the Leviathan of Hobbes and the "Contrat Social" of Rousseau. Many of these schemes are of the deepest interest; but all of them presuppose that the individual man is, naturally, under no obligation to obey; but that

he has to take some action by which he places himself under this obligation. The character of the obligation springs from the nature of the action by which he brought himself into relation with his fellow-men, in order that they might work for a common good. He would not have had to obey unless he had pledged himself to do so.

This is the ground taken by all; they vary in detail according to the conception they have taken of man in his natural state, before he has taken the step by which he enters society.

(1) This conception may be a very low one, as with Hobbes. Man, in his pre-social condition, has no conscience, no morality: he recognises no obligations; he is selfish, as a wolf; and his life is "nasty, brutish, and short." It is easy to show that it is a personal gain to him to abandon such a condition, and to bind himself never to claim its freedom again. Only when he so surrenders his natural right does he become human, and his life worth living. It can never, under any conceivable circumstances, be to his own interest to return to it. But the difficulty is to see how, if he were merely such as he is described, he ever could have arrived at making a Contract. Where were the faculties by which he recognised the need of combination, and the moral condition which combination would involve? Where was the conscience which could conceive the idea of a permanent engagement, and of a binding obligation? If the sense of obligation is only created by virtue of the contract, what was the motive which created the contract? A contract, which recognised the binding character of moral engagements, could never have come into existence except by presupposing the very

conscience which it was invented to account for. If the natural man was capable of contracting himself out of his natural conditions, then he was already something more than those conditions suggested. The conscience that can keep a contract must have been there to make it; and if it was there already, why is it not sufficient to account for the obligation to obey Public Law, without the artificial intervention of a contract at all?

(2) Other schemes start from the reverse picture of primitive nature. The natural man is taken to be the ideal of all that is true and free. But in order to fight up against the pressure of adverse things, man must combine; and, to combine, he must abandon something of what would be otherwise his ideal liberty. He must be content to pursue only such free expansion as is coincident with the necessities of common action. He can secure only so much of his natural rights as is consistent with the natural rights of the others with whom he co-operates.

This picture of the situation draws vaguely on the language derived from the old Roman Law, which had much to say about the universal and natural Law which was the common groundwork of all particular and national systems of legislation.

It rose to its most alluring and instructive form in the hands of Rousseau, in whom it answered itself. For, though he retained the rhetorical language about "nature" and the "natural man," it became perfectly evident, as he worked out his scheme, that man was not fully himself until he had come into the Social Contract. So alone did he become endowed with his higher spiritual capacities. It was an advance in personal liberty which he attained by co-operation,

not a limitation. The "Moi Commun," which became his by baptism into society, was his truest and highest self. And, if so, then it can be no artifice by which he placed himself under obligation to external law. On the contrary, it must witness to something inherent in his innermost self. To interpret man's nature, we must turn, not to the Natural State which he has left far behind, but to the law of Human Society in which he reveals what it is really in him to be. And why, then, does it require a contract, an artificial bargain, an outward engagement, for man to become capable of Law, when it is only in and through Law that he becomes his true Self? Law is only a witness to what he must have been from the first. "Nature," "the Natural man," can only mean the condition which he was already capable of leaving behind.

Here was the conclusion to which Rousseau's own Work insensibly led. As we read it, we find all the interest of it concentrated on the development of the Society into which the Contract admitted. Nothing can be more admirable than the description of the moral obligations which belong to the identification of the individual with the Public Will. The Public Will is the real and good will of the man himself, now that he has been baptized into the Community which becomes for him his own highest self. What it wills, he wills. He does not yield to a superior Will, out of regard to the personal convenience which can only be secured by giving in to the stronger majority. He, with his best Self, identifies himself with the will of the majority, and makes it his own. The majority, even though it be against him, does not carry its claim to obedience over him by virtue of its larger numbers,

but only because it has served to reveal to him what his true self desires. The entire Body, of which he is a member, discovers or discloses its own decision by the method of a majority.

In all this, we have a deep and fascinating portrayal of the ideal life of a Civilised Society. But the more we are drawn to it, the more obvious it becomes that such far-reaching implications of a man's private conscience with the will of a society can only be possible if they are grounded on the elemental basis of his original being. No outward and artificial Contract between himself and the State could ever account for, or justify, this spiritual and metaphysical union of the one with the many, or this subtlety of inner relationship between the man and his higher self. Such a condition could never come about, if it were not natural. And if it is natural, then man needs no artifice or device in order to arrive at it. Why not drop the Contract, and discover the obligation to obey Law, not in the act by which man imposed upon himself a novel responsibility, but in the radical principle of his nature, which rendered him capable of undertaking the responsibility?

That is the question which the "Social Contract" inevitably suggests. And it is a question which has gained unanswerable force, since Historical Studies have made it absolutely certain that the nearer we can come to the origin of human society, the more remote and inconceivable becomes the existence of anything approaching such a contract. As an historical event, it has been proved impossible: and not only that. It has been proved to be the exact opposite of the motives and the causes which actually are at work upon man, when they first come together. The very

last thought that would ever occur to the original man is that he is an individual, with a personal claim to make good his own existence. Yet only so, can he enter into any contract with other men, by which he volunteers to limit his individual claims in order to make them consistent with those of others. As a fact, he never dreams that he has any individual rights whatever. As an individual, he does not exist. All his claims to exist at all are derived from his membership in some tribe, or clan. He sets no value on himself except what accrues to him from the community. He accepts the authority of custom or law without the ghost of a doubt, as being beyond all criticism. Here is the paramount conception of obligation with which man starts. Only very slowly, and very partially, after endless centuries of experience and experiment and discipline and growth, does he arrive at conceiving himself as a personality with rights and claims of his own, over against the society to which he is attached.

This is the historical fact. And it leads us to review and revise the situation with which we began our discussion. That situation, we remember, gave us an individual man in collision with Public Law. He has discovered, practically, the existence of Law through some variance between its verdicts and his desires. It and he appear as two parties, outside each other, brought together by some external regulation which compels him, by sheer authority embodied in Policeman, Judge, and Prison, to fall into line with other citizens, against his will, and without asking his consent. Starting with these two opposing parties, the question arises, "Why should he obey?" and the answers consist in supplying various considerations why it should

be his interest and expediency to give in, or in trying to prove that he has, somehow, abandoned his natural right to disobey what nevertheless seems to him to be against his own interest. All the answers presuppose that there are two parties concerned, and that the only difficulty is to explain how they have come under obligations to each other to act together.

But what if it be a total mistake to suppose that they are two parties, strangers to one another, who have struck up an alliance? What if they be not two, but one? And what if it be this very unity, underlying both, out of which the moral obligation to obey springs? Let us consider how they arrived at this discordant situation in which we find them. This individual man, who is in revolt against the restraint put on him through tax-gatherer or policeman, through Court or Legislation, has, as history now discloses to us, been produced by the Law which he now frets under—by the Society against which he collides. Only through ages of patient government by Law has he won that robust sense of personality which is now strong enough to assert itself in opposition to Law. Law fostered in him that personal independence. Law taught him to revolt. Human Society, by calling upon him to play his part in national responsibilities, endowed him with self-sufficing capabilities and the dignity of self-respect. His Country, his Nation, have heightened his personal value, have evoked his personal conscience, have glorified his status, have given sanctity to his claims. He has felt himself part and parcel with his fellows, owing himself to them, under obligations to their welfare, long before he ever learned that he was under

obligations to himself, or owed anything to his own private interest and concerns.

This State, then, against which he has collided, is no stranger to him; it is no outward and alien Power asserting its strength against his weakness. It is his own, and he belongs to it. It has made him what he is. He and it have grown by one life. The very power by which he protests against it has come to him through its fostering discipline. He cannot detach himself from it. Without its authority he would never have possessed the individuality or the rights for which he now professes to stand. The State and he have been old friends; he has lived and grown through identification of his life with the life of the Nation. Everything she did was his. Her victories have been his; he glowed with a personal triumph in them. Her moments of peril and of adversity have been felt by him as personal anxieties and personal sorrows, demanding the same sacrifices that he would make for the preservation of his own life. How can he now turn round upon her, as upon a foreign Authority, whose claim upon him has no intelligible ground except in the sheer right of the Stronger to compel obedience? Why, the very strength by which she compels his obedience is his own. She has, by the same strength, given him strength to assert his own value—to compel her to consider his interests. Those Courts, and Judges, and Policemen, and Tax-gatherers, are his as well as hers; for he and she live by a common life. How stupid of him to be puzzling his brain to invent an explanation of how they came together! They never had to come together; for they had been together from the first. Society had never been separate from the individual man, nor the

individual from the Society. They were one and the same fact. The individual only knew himself, only discovered himself, as already the member of a Society. His individuality is the expression and creation of his social relations to his own nation. It draws from these the very sap of its life. An Englishman's sturdiness of individuality comes from his being English, *i.e.* not from his being himself alone, but from his being one with others. His personal independence is typical of a whole race; and that is why it is so independent. He cannot, then, assert it without, by the same act, asserting his obligation to others. The bond which binds him to them is inherent in the action by which he expresses and realises himself. His every word is an evidence of his corporate identification with a whole people—with its story, with its experience, with its adventures, with its responsibilities, with its institutions and laws and customs and character.

This is the one supreme conclusion to which everything is driving us—that it is the individuality itself which is essentially social. "That is to say, a man's relations to his fellows are not addenda to his personality, but are the inmost context and reality of it. He cannot act as a rational being, nor be a rational being, except by incorporating them. Man grows as an individual, he deepens his private personality, by understanding the social medium, by making its knowledge his knowledge, by converting its higher tendencies into his rational purpose."[1]

Once grasp this and there is no need to hunt about for some external justification of the claim put out by human Law upon our conscience. Law has

[1] Professor Henry Jones in "New World," chap. xxvii., September 1898, on "Social and Individual Evolution."

its pivot without ourselves, upon which its authority turns. It is ourself that we encounter in the shape of Law. We are implicated in its obligations. We cannot be what we are without in some measure sanctioning its verdict. We require a system of Public Law in order to realise our own nature freely and fully. Without it we should be maimed of half our freedom; for we should be incapable of vindicating our social life.

We miss seeing this by only recognising Law at times when we come into collision with it. We are not aware of it until we stumble up against it. But, after all, these moments of collision are the rare exception. We ought to estimate the significance of Law, not from the exceptional accidents, but from the normal and permanent conditions. Do we ever recall the immense mass of Customary and Institutional Law which accompanies and pervades and regulates our ordinary life, and which is never noticed, because it is so utterly one with our habits and inclination and expectation? We sum it all up as "what we do in England." And in that phrase rings out the note of personal pride, personal delight. We should never think that human Society could go on in any other fashion, if we did not go abroad and find how strangely different other countries are. And how cordially we pity the poor foreigners for being deprived of our advantages! We could not tolerate their odd Constitutions and Parliamentary methods, and, above all, their Courts of Justice. Their way of conducting a criminal trial seems to us to be itself a crime. We know but too well our ingrained belief here in everything that is English. And, ignorant as such prejudices may be, they are the measure of our

complete identification of our personal instincts with our national system of Law. In English justice, with its judicial methods—with its Judge and Counsel and Jury—we see the expression of our own universal ideal of what is right. It is our own Will, embodied and realised. We can feel this to be no abstract theory, but practically and literally true in regard to that vast body of Law with which we so cordially agree that we are incapable of imagining it changed.

And even when we collide, surely these collisions derive their intensity from the intimacy of the bond which unites us with the Law against which we rebel. We feel so hot and indignant, because we are at variance with ourselves. It is a split in our elemental self. It is the intolerable thing. This Law, which ought to tally with our conscience, overrides it, beats it under. It is a state of unnatural disorder, of violence, of disease. Which has got wrong, we or it? (1) It may be that the Law has failed to embody our true and best conscience. If so, it has failed in its claim to our obedience; but our conscience, in this case, must mean our social conscience, the conscience which we share with all our nation, not some private right of our own. If we refuse obedience, it must be in the name of all, and on the ground that, in our person, the honour of all is at stake. (2) But it may be that, in colliding with the Law, it is we who have fallen below our true standard, below the level of the natural conscience which is ours. If so, in coming under its condemnation, we condemn ourselves. The punishment which it decrees is the fiat that we utter against ourselves.

This is why the Public Law of the Land can never rightly go beyond what the Public Conscience can

recognise as its own verdict. The attempt to enforce anything by law, which has not behind it the authority of the national consent, is doomed to disaster. It cannot achieve a moral result, unless it can win for itself corroboration from within. Even those against whom it is enforced must see in it a justice which they cannot, in conscience, repudiate. As a fact, those whom we know as the Criminal Classes cannot bring a conscience into competition with the Law under which they suffer. They cannot repudiate its right in the name of a higher justice, or as over-riding some personal right of their own. The moral authority of the law is not really questioned by them. They do not say they were right to break it. They broke it through temptation; or because they hoped to escape; or as part of the game that they were playing against Society, a game which strongly attracts their adventurous and Bohemian instincts. But if ever the Law finds itself condemning, as criminals, those who do not practically acquiesce in their own criminality in being condemned, it is paralysed. Not all its hosts can make headway against the resistance of a public conscience which refuses to assimilate its verdict.

We have learned this by bitter experience in the case of the Irish Peasantry, and by provoking experience in the case of Anti-Vaccinators at home. The failure of coercion in Ireland lay simply in the fact that the Law that was to be rigorously asserted had no lodgment within the conscience of those to whom it applied. For them, justice lay elsewhere, in a customary Code which dictated for them the terms on which land could be equitably held. In the strength of this unlegalised Code they defied the ruling Law; and felt that they had their conscience behind them in

their defiance. The legal criminal was, in their eyes, no moral Criminal. The Law asserted was not the embodiment of their own best instincts. Coercion, under such conditions, far from winning gradual assent, outrages the faculty from which assent has to be won. So with the man who in conscience objects to Vaccination. There is no way of getting round him, which does not do violence to the principle of Law. Our impotence in dealing with him is a revelation of the truth to which so much serves to make us blind—*i.e.* that Public Law can only avail so far as it manages to carry with it the moral assent, not only of those who impose it, but of those on whom it is imposed. If our Criminals were once convinced of their virtue in breaking our Laws, Prisons would have lost their efficacy. Law and order would have become impossible.

Once realise this, and the curious antithesis between the "Man and the State" has ceased to have a meaning. The Man is the State; the State is the Man. There is no such thing known as a man who does not, by inherent necessities of his individuality, demand a State for his own proper expression and fulfilment. If he cannot obtain it, he is not the man that he is meant to be. There is no State which does not count on the man, as the pivot of its Law, as the fulcrum of its Authority. Its one aim is to liberate, not to circumscribe, the true manhood in him.

If Man and State collide, it is because (1) either the Man is at variance with himself, and his lower private limited will, which is bent merely on some individual self-interest, is conflicting with his higher social will through which he is a member of a larger fellowship; or else (2) the State has mistaken its

own function, has miscalculated its own resources, has violated its own condition of health. If, for instance, it overlays and overweights the individual conscience by excess of regulation, so that it numbs his vitality or stifles his initiative, this is not merely an offence against the Man, but against the State itself, which can only obtain its own strength out of the strength of the individuals which go to compose it; and which is only healthy and alive by virtue of the freedom and the force which it releases in its individual members. If ever the effect of its legislation is to lower the level of private initiative, or to produce a timid and flabby conscience in those for whom it legislates, then it is the State which suffers in the damage done to them. It has overshot its own mark; and the condemnation of such legislation can be obtained, not merely from consideration of the invaded individualities, but also from consideration of what the State, on its own side, is purposed to achieve.

The State lays us, then, under obligation to obedience, because we are included in the State. It speaks to us in our own name. We recognise in it our own conscience in its wider social scope. Of course, this condition is imperfectly realised in the confused tangle of any actual State. But this is the inner secret of the authority felt to be at work in and through Law. It aims at winning a corroborative response from those to whom its ruling is applied. Even an Autocracy, if it attempts to be anything but a Tyranny of Force which makes no moral claim at all on allegiance, rests its right on the assumption that the Autocrat is his people. The Czar of all the Russias does what he does, as the great Father. In him,

Russia is assumed to see itself, and, to the vast mass of the Peasantry, this claim stands. They recognise him as their embodiment. The absolutism of Henry the Eighth, by which he swept to the ground the Constitution of Church and Parliament, was possible only because, for the moment, in a crisis of history, he stood for England; he was English of the English. Without this, it would be inconceivable how a freedom-loving people tolerated, even for an hour, such an outrage on its honour.

Even Absolutism, then, can only escape from being a tyranny according to the measure with which it can identify itself with those whom it governs, so that, in its will, they can vaguely and dumbly feel themselves represented and included. And every step that a government takes towards Freedom is taken with a view to make this underground truth emerge into clearer and clearer daylight. Liberty is, simply, the ever advancing recognition that the governed are engaged in the act by which they are governed. They undertake the responsibility to which all Social Law is a witness. The moral obligation to obedience is seen to be at its height in a community which governs itself.

Two practical results follow from this. First, the larger the share taken by the governed in fashioning the law which governs them, the greater becomes the quantity of law which a community can afford to pass. For since they themselves put their own will, by means of free representative government, into the law which they obey, they are not demoralised or pauperised by the care that the law takes of them in their homes or in their work. This might damage their own sense of responsibility for themselves, if the law

were a power distinct from them, remote, alien, which, from some unknown height above them, took their lives into its keeping, and fathered them and mothered them, as babes under tutelage. But this moral peril is greatly obviated, if they are aware that the Law only expresses their own sense of responsibility for their own lives and characters. It embodies their own fixed intention to forward the higher interests of their human nature, and to secure for all the health and light and joy and liberty which are essential to the true growth of man. In submitting to its stipulations, they become conscious of the aims on which they are set; they are braced to the task in hand; they gain in self-respect, in worth, in dignity. The feeling that they are cared for, and minutely cared for, in all the tiny details of daily labour, by the nation to which they personally belong, and by the government which is their own creation, lifts them higher in the scale of life, and endows them with the honour of independence. Each fresh law is the evidence to them that they have determined to direct and control their own life for themselves, according to their own measure of its value. The freer then and the more democratic a State is, the more it can venture, with security, to multiply laws. It has, by its democratic foundation, abolished the dread of "the grandmother" in Legislation.

But, secondly, it is obvious that the same principle which permits the multiplication of laws supplies the test of their limitation. Since the Law is authorised by the people to whom it applies, it can never be more than a witness to the level of justice which already exists, as a dominating force, in the living members in whose persons the State has its real

existence. It must obtain from them its obligatory energy and sanction, by being recognised as speaking with their voice, and as finding a lodgment within their wills. If it goes beyond what the main mass instinctively approve, it has lost all driving power. It cannot get to work. It is hung up in unintelligible isolation from its proper ground. And, in speaking of the main mass, this does not merely mean that a majority can be found large enough to carry it and to impose it on a minority; but more. It must mean that the minority on whom it is imposed by the superior vote is in a condition to acquiesce in it when carried, and to regard it not merely as the decision of a majority, but as the law of the Land, and this means, as the declared will of the whole people, minority and majority alike. If once the beaten minority is unable, in conscience, to fall in with the ruling of the majority, then, as we have already seen, there is bound to be a deadlock. This is the standing proof that the authority of Law is never, in reality, confined to the superior power of the majority that carried it; but always depends on the majority carrying nothing against which the minority can pit the force of a resolute defiance, based on moral and conscientious grounds. Law must be able to say: "You may not desire what I assert; you may have fought against its being asserted; you may be indignant still at the forcible assertion of what you have resisted. But, in your heart of hearts, you dare not profess to be standing for a higher righteousness than the Law, in resisting it; you dare not declare yourself bound in conscience to repudiate it; you must own that it is within its right in demanding what it does of you. It may have seemed to you

overstrained, or absurd, or impracticable, but it has not violated your essential integrity as a free citizen in a free State. It is not something which your will, necessarily, refuses to adopt for its own, now that your country has, in spite of your opposition, resolved to will it."

So we become aware of what are the possibilities and what the limitations of Law in a free country.

Law can embody and realise the conscience of the better half of a people, and can force the worser half up to a standard which, without the pressure of compulsion, it would never adopt, but which, under compulsion, it is unable in conscience to dispute.

By such realisation in law, the better conscience itself is strengthened and enheartened, so that it can hope to advance to further efforts. Though the Law cannot go beyond what the better conscience already dictates and sanctions, it does enable that conscience to go beyond itself. Each good law passed releases the energy spent on passing it, and sets it free for fresh advance. The law passed becomes itself the pivot of the new movement. The Social Will can now start from a point further on its course. It begins its work at a higher level. Thus law is always the measure of the social conception of justice which has been already attained ; and also the means by which the conception moves upward.

And, again, though the minority conform under compulsion, it cannot so conform without acquiring a habit which is firmer and higher than its normal standard ; so that it, too, builds up a surer bottom on which the social structure can depend. The bad employer assimilates the conscience of the better employer which has been imposed upon him, or

becomes ashamed of what he had once practised and defended. He learns, by sheer force of habit, that there is a fixed limit set to the conditions under which he is allowed to do business. And the unskilled and ignorant labourer finds himself forbidden to descend into a pit which has always a bottom lower than the last. The worse peril of modern industry lies in its tendency, if natural tendencies are unchecked, to an under-sapping of its lowest levels, to a perpetual sinkage. The process of undercutting, under limitless competition, is ever dragging things down. One of the most effective activities of Law is found in its power to arrest the down-grade, to sustain the standard of living at a minimum, which can become an ever-rising minimum. Law, working on the basis of the best existent public conscience, can evoke and create a conscience in those whom it can drive into line with the main mass. And every such success heightens the possibilities open to a society which has secured the stability of its lowest foundation.

Law, then, is the "codified expression" of the political conscience of the community at large. And the community exists in and by the individuals who compose it. It is no abstraction. It is real in them. They become themselves in it, inasmuch as they are revealed to themselves only through the medium of the society to which they belong. Through its organisation their larger self discovers itself to itself. In this essential relationship to their community lies the secret of their obligation to abide by its verdicts.[1] This relationship, no doubt, often suffers eclipse in

[1] G. Bosanquet on Punishment, in "The Philosophical Theory of the State," p. 226. Punishment is the man's own will returning upon him in the form of pain.

the complicated tangle of a human State, which has, by many an ancient sin, obscured its own verities. But the ideal is there, unslain, behind all the deformities of selfish Statecraft; and still, by being there at work within the worry, it justifies the obligations imposed by Law. For Law asserts the brotherhood of man; it obliges a man to acknowledge as his own the Will in him which is identical with the Will of others. His good is their good; their interest is his interest. Society is not a diplomatic combination of varying individual interests, but is itself the realised witness to each individual of what he is in himself. In this, Human Civil Law is the reflection of that higher Moral Law which imposes its irresistible authority upon the conscience, as the voice of an Eternal Father demanding absolute surrender of will, yet which could never claim that authority if it could not find a voice speaking in response from within the soul that is summoned to obey—the voice of a child whose innermost being corresponds to the demands made upon it from without. The Law of the Divine Will expresses the inevitable conditions of a life of communion between Father and Child; so that to deny its obligations is to deny the childhood, and to obey them is to obey the motions of the Love, which is the Life.

The Church of Christ, which holds, in its own Creed, the full solution of the obligation which binds the conscience to obey the Law of God, should surely be active in bringing this same solution to bear upon the kindred obligation which binds a man's will to the Law of the Society in which he finds himself alive.

In each case the outward Law derives its compelling force from its witness to an inner relationship.

In each case it is made clear that he can only be himself so far as he can identify himself with a larger life of personality than is bounded by his own person.

And how noble and how urgent is the task which the Church might fulfil, if, in secure possession of the secret of obligation, it were to turn its energy to Civic needs! For it would come into play just where the State asks for succour. As we have seen, the Law can only go forward according to the measure with which the general conception of social justice rises. Its advance is arrested, if the public conscience ceases to grow. But if the force of the Church were ever at work upon the general conscience, prompting, evoking, stirring it to higher issues, refusing to allow it to acquiesce in any standard already attained, sustaining it in its forward impulses, redeeming it from its hindering lethargy; then, as man after man was drawn within the finer activities of equity and fellowship, the State would be in possession of the power needed for a fuller development of Law. And this advance might be incessant, and unending, for the energy of God to heighten and widen the range of the human good-will would never be exhausted. Law might be socialised more and more, so that it might lay heavier and heavier demands upon the sense of human brotherhood, and upon the instincts of social fellowship; for always there would be rising, in an increasing number of individuals, the moral response that would be ready to meet the rising demands.[1]

By such a process the public Law of a State might be indefinitely transfigured, so as to embody the most

[1] See review by Dr. W. D. Morrison of Dr. Stein's *Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*, in *Mind*, for January 1899.

intimate and sacrificial obligations which can hold between citizens who consciously feel themselves to be members of one body, living a common life, holding property for a common end, seeking a common welfare.

Our keenest hopes for the realisation of Socialistic Ideals are turning more and more in the direction of some such process, by which the growing sense of human solidarity should inspire and mould the body of Law, and fill it with the soul of fellowship and love. Such a process would be gradual, manifold, immense; and would, therefore, be adequate to the scale and complexity of civilised life. In the face of this complexity, Socialist Programmes are apt to look childish and crude. They too obviously omit at least half of what human nature has now grown to be. They collapse into the dreary flatitude of Mr. Bellamy's "Looking Backward"; or else, while preserving the imaginative and romantic elements which he forgot, they boldly propose, with Mr. Morris, to reduce life to its earlier simplicities. Yet, any attempt to roll back man's history is doomed to the transitoriness and the impotence which are the stamp of all reactions.

But, by utilising Public Law as the vehicle and the instrument through which the quickened corporate conscience of the nation continuously strives to assert itself in richer and finer fulness, Socialism will take the form, not of an artificial programme, but of a natural growth, instinctive, native, organic. It will adapt itself to the soil. It will vary with natural habits and local customs. It will carry with it the experience which the nation has gathered out of the Past, and has stored in its varied Legislation. It will identify itself with the national

temperament"; it will fuse itself with the living mind. It will always be aware of the motive-force which it can at the moment command; for the Public Law will be a steady test of what it can manage to carry. It will feel, at once, how much the National Conscience will authorise and enforce. Law will be, for it, a perpetual experiment how far it can go in the enforcement of Social Fellowship.

Such a transfiguration of the Law is a practical policy, which permits of a limitless advance, if only it can secure a correspondent and co-operative advance in the transfiguration of the personal Conscience. And this transfiguration of Conscience depends ultimately, for its advance, on conditions which lie beyond the range of civil action. It is here that we find ourselves driven to invoke the aid of Spiritual and Religious Agencies which may perpetually invoke, revive, and kindle individual aspiration. So alone can we look for the day when glad Citizens will move in sweet and instinctive obedience to a Law which will encompass them about with infinite obligations, in all of which they will find their freedom, since, in submission to them, they will find their own will fulfilled.



THE CHURCH AND CIVILISATION

By FRANCIS E. POWELL, M.A.

I. The great formative agencies of the world's history: Religious, Industrial, Domestic—Religion a universal phenomenon of mankind—Its truest and most perfect expression in Christ—Christ the vital principle of Christendom—The Church the organ through which He specially acts.

II. The Church's influence on Civilisation—Reasons for her limitations—Civilisation's influence on the Church—Civilisation and the Church both of God—Illustrations of their interaction in history: (1) From Judaism; (2) From Greek and Roman Civilisation—Slavery; (3) From the Teutonic Races; (4) From the Middle Ages; (5) From the Renaissance and Reformation; (6) From present-day Industrial Democracy—Reasons for believing Christianity final.

III. The problems of to-day chiefly economic—The Church's duty: (1) To individuals; (2) To society—The pressing need of Church Reform and Christian Reunion—The Church's opportunity—The world's yearning for practical religion, illustrated by: (1) Sheldon's Stories; (2) The Peace Conference.

"THE two great forming agencies of the world's history," says the Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge,[1] "have been the religious and the economic. Here and there the ardour of the military or the artistic spirit has been for a while predominant; but religious and economic influences have nowhere been displaced from the front rank even for a time; and they have nearly always been more important than all others put together." But a third great and constant moulding agency of human character is the

[1] Marshall's "Economics of Industry," vol. i. p. 1.

domestic; for the family is the oldest institution man has, and is at the base of every other society known. It is the family and not the individual which is the real unit of human society. What the molecule is to the atom in chemistry, the family is to the individual in sociology. The Nation is after all but the expansion of the family, the State the development of the home. The political organon has its root in the domestic hearth. The tendency of man we may then regard as a complex of motives and causes, in which the economic, the religious, and the domestic are chief.

Religion has been defined as "the regulation of life through the idea of God; it is the application to all things and all events of the great spiritual, moral, and rational elements contained in that idea."[1] And that religion is in some form or other a universal phenomenon of humanity is now very generally recognised. A few here or there may have no religious consciousness, just as a few here and there are devoid of the faculties of hearing or seeing. But a striking evidence of the persistence of the religious idea in our midst is its constant recurrence, even in those who have done more or less violence to it. We do not allude to particular instances like that of the philosophic Earl of Shaftesbury, who, rejecting Christianity, found consolation in astrology. But the modern advocacy of the religion of "cosmic emotions" among the pantheistic devotees to Nature, who, awed by creation's sublimity and grandeur, offer reverence and homage to blind forces and beauteous manifestations; or of the religion of humanity which finds its expression

[1] Principal Fairbairn.

in the mystical cult of Auguste Comte; or the more recent development of "Labour Churches"—all alike illustrate the fact that "Atheism is only the attempt not to be religious." History and experience both testify that "human things," as Carlyle characteristically has said, "cannot stand upon selfishness, mechanical utilities, economics, and law courts; if there be not a religious element in the relations of men, such relations are miserable, and doomed to ruin."

And nineteen centuries ago religion found its truest and most perfect utterance. It was then that a peasant girl belonging to an obscure Galilean town gave birth to One known during His short earthly life as Jesus of Nazareth, the carpenter's son. There was nothing apparently to distinguish that Infant from those other babes of Bethlehem, who, St. Matthew tells us, perished on His behalf. Men, however, have since been convinced that there was another element in Him, which His contemporaries for the most part were utterly unable to see. "There standeth One among you whom ye know not," was the testimony of a near kinsman. And yet a fisherman of Bethsaida was afterwards able to declare his conviction—a conviction which myriads have since shared—that he had seen, had looked upon, and had handled that Eternal Life which was with the Father, and was manifested. That "in Him dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" was the tremendous claim made on behalf of One who had not where to lay His head when alive, and who was "numbered with the transgressors" when dead. In Him Christendom believes mankind has a perfect type of what human character and human life are intended to be. Just as Nature is the expression

of the Divine Immanence, so Christ is the translation of God in the terms of human experience.

Never seemed cause more hopeless than the cause of Christ on the evening of the first Good Friday. Whatever hopes and aspirations His few followers had formed were then buried deep within the tomb where they had laid the body of their Master to rest, and

> "black despair
> The shadow of a starless night, was thrown
> Over the world in which they moved alone."[1]

But from that Syrian grave there emerged a new and resistless movement which has changed not only the ideals and lives of individual men and women, but also the whole order of society. Devotion to the living Person of Christ is the distinguishing characteristic of the Christian faith.[2] And yet that conception of the Christian religion is singularly wanting which does not see that the trust in and the surrender to the claims of Jesus Christ must necessarily culminate in the attachment to the society which He founded; for without question Jesus Christ intended to act upon the world through the instrumentality of an organised Church. This society, founded on men rather than documents, has certain well-defined principles which have found inevitable expression in dogmatic propositions,[3] in sacramental ordinances, and in a duly appointed order of officials, which is "the divinely

[1] Shelley.

[2] See Gore's "Incarnation of the Son of God," Lect. I.

[3] "To discard dogma in the interests of religion would be like discarding language in the interests of thought. In both cases the inadequate symbol preserves what we wish to preserve. To discard the symbol would be to run the risk of losing the thing signified."—*Quarterly Review*, January 1899.

provided representative and organ of the corporate priestliness of the Church."[1] "Such an institution," wrote the late Dean Church, "for ever representing on earth the Kingdom of God, open to all men, which by its government, its orders, its public belief and opinion, its varied agencies, should be from the first to the last God's accredited Witness and Prophet to mankind of His purposes and His benefits—such an institution churchmen believe to exist in the world, and to have existed as far as memory can go back. No one can point to the time since our Lord was here when it was not, when it began to be. The Church is to Christian religion what the State is to political doctrine, their public and common embodiment and realisation."[2] And no one can really doubt that, during the nineteen centuries of her existence and survival amid every kind of political and social vicissitude, the moral and spiritual principles, to which she with an admittedly varying consistency has testified, have tended to elevate and ennoble the human race, while countless millions of her children have been cheered with the sure and certain hope of personal immortality which has been part of the privileged message she has felt herself commissioned to convey.

Herbert Spencer has defined life as a constant adjustment of internal organs to external environment. And the life of the Church, as we trace her diversified yet victorious career through history, is an example of this definition. Between the Church and the succeeding phases of human society which she has touched, interaction and mutual modification have been constant. To each age since the Incarnation

[1] Canon Bright's "Some Aspects of Primitive Church Life," p. 58.
[2] "Oxford House Papers," Second Series, pp. 72, 65.

the Christian life or principle has been applied. And each age has been modified, has been bettered through the application. Opponents sometimes complain that Christianity has not done more. But they forget that its present development is really the outcome of a very small beginning, and that relying solely on "the might of meekness," it has had to win its way through powerful civilisations and rugged barbarisms. If, too, it took countless ages to make earth habitable for man, we need not be surprised if it take countless years to make mankind ready for heaven. Moreover, as it is only through men and by men that it exerts any influence at all, it is unreasonable for those who make little or no serious attempt to respond to the call of Christ to complain of the paucity of result. The conditions necessary to enable the Church to realise her ideal have never yet been fulfilled. "At first a persecuted sect, it had not the power; then, when it became established, and gained the power, there burst into it an influx of half-Christianised converts who lowered its moral level or misunderstood its doctrines; then, with the break up of the Roman Empire, it had to tame and civilise the new races of Europe; and finally, the divisions of the Reformation have weakened its witness in the world."[1] The Church has, moreover, to fulfil two functions more or less opposed. While on the one hand she seeks to express the very highest moral and spiritual opinion and conduct, she is bound on the other hand to admit all who in any degree are willing to submit to her elevating discipline. To be at once a centre of sanitation and a hospital for disease, an emporium of saints and a reformatory for sinners, makes it impossible for the

[1] "Lux Mundi," Essay ix., "On the Church."

Church to exert the same kind of influence on society as she might do as an elect and saintly body ; for the Church is first and foremost the sphere for individual moral training and spiritual schooling, a home for the sinful heart of man, however degraded, in which amid his daily care and temptation he may find his God.

In the effort, therefore, of enlightening human society with the divine light she bears, the Church's own light has been tinged. She has received back an impress partly evil, but also partly good, from the checkered life of that humanity she is striving to bring to the measure of the stature of the Perfect Man. And Christ has so vindicated His claim to receive the moral homage of the world, that the one moral standard of the human race which is quickly becoming universally acknowledged is just that which He has given. No other personal standard of righteousness than His is worth having. If this world is ever to be set right, it can only be by carrying out the principles which were incarnated, revealed, and taught in Him. And this, not of course by excluding anything good or useful, whether in philosophy, religion, or civilisation not directly associated with the Christian faith, but by incorporating it, by supplementing it, by showing that Christ is the Vindicator and Justifier of all that is true, and the Reconciler and Unifier of that which without Him must be wanting both in completeness and harmony. What the eloquent Bossuet called "the Christianity of Nature" must be acknowledged as well as the Christianity of the Historic Christ; for, as Butler laboured to emphasise, the God of Grace is the same as the God of Nature. The Head of every man is He who is the Head of the Church. Hence civilisation and public opinion,

as well as Christianity, are influenced by the Spirit of God. All human experience is the glass in which we may see God darkly, who

> "fulfils Himself in many ways,
> Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."

We believe, then, that all the epochs and crises of history are but parts of the process by which the world is being conformed to the image of Christ. And so while we note with thankful tribute to its beneficent power how Christianity has illumed

> "with instance of its fire sublime
> The dusk of many a cloud-like age and clime,"[1]

we also note that through these very ages and climes themselves "one increasing purpose runs," and that the Church herself has been the means of enabling "the soul naturally Christian" to know itself, and also the main vehicle by which

> "the dead Past springs resuscitate
> To enrich the Present with its buried gold."[2]

Let us then trace something of this interaction of the Church and civilisation, and of the preservation of the more salient features of the various phases of human life with which the Church has come into contact. For His first Jewish followers our Lord had to untomb conscience and human sympathy from under the mass of legalism and false nationalism in which they lay buried. The Old Testament in consequence has become a world-wide centre of moral and spiritual influence. There are even traces

[1] Swinburne.
[2] Miss G. Ford, "The New Crusade."

in the Church of to-day of the Rabbinism of our Lord's time. The reading of the Scriptures and their exposition in the assembly of the congregation, the very title of presbyter,[1] and baptism itself present such traces. Confined to Palestine, Christianity, fettered by local and national limitations, would have lingered among the mountain fastnesses of Perea for a few centuries, until finally overwhelmed in the campaigns of Mahomet and Omar. The cradle of Christianity would have been its grave. But "westward the course of empire takes its way." Zealous missionaries —St. Paul, *facile princeps*, among them—proclaimed the Light to lighten the Gentiles, along the shores of the Mediterranean, the highlands of Asia Minor, and even in the heart of Imperial Rome. The Church was now face to face with the great civilisation of Imperial Rome. In this there were two chief elements—that which was of Greek contribution, in addition to that which was peculiarly Roman. There were the philosophy, poetry, oratory, sculpture, and architecture of ancient Greece in her earnest search for truth and beauty. There was also the Roman contribution of law and order, of sovereignty and discipline. But these civilising influences and splendid embellishments of social life which had tended to elevate humanity were in great danger of being engulfed in that awful state of Roman society which was then literally rotting with infidelity, superstition, and gross moral corruption. It would be difficult to find a parallel in the whole of history to the delirium of lust and blood with which that once great and wonderful people of

[1] "Their title was borrowed from the synagogue, but received a new significance in the Church."—Bright, "Some Aspects of Primitive Church Life," p. 28.

the seven-throned hill were debauched, and which was the indirect cause of their failure and decay. And while the fabric of Greece and Rome has passed away, the great principle of obedience to social and political order, and philosophic culture in art and literature, have been firmly stamped upon the character of the race. Roman law can now be traced in every Western system of jurisprudence, Roman ideas of government are now part of all statecraft, Roman principles of strategy are still studied by military authorities, and Roman discipline and organisation have become part of the common heritage of mankind. Now it was unquestionably the Christian Church which saved all that was worth saving in Greece and Rome. For just as these great nations first received their philosophy and art, their moral and political doctrines, under the veil of religious traditions, so the modern world is indebted to the Christian Church for the preservation of the culture and discipline for which the genius of Greece and Rome is severally famed. Primitive Christianity has often been reproached for tolerating slavery. But in the Church's attitude towards what Aristotle regarded as an ordinance of nature, we can see the way in which she has educated public opinion. The Church, no doubt, accepted slavery as a social fact, but from the very first she succeeded in regulating it, while by enlisting herself on the side of the slave, by encouraging and rewarding manumission, she laid the foundation of a system of opinion, which in the present day has led men to regard slavery as the negation of universal brotherhood, and the subversion of moral equality. Mazzini's estimate is true, "Through the vista of history we see slavery and its pagan theory of two races

fall before the holy word of Jesus—all men are the children of God."[1]

The Church in her turn was largely moulded by the great forces enshrined in Greek and Roman civilisation. While the delicate subtilty of the Greek intellect and the sublime æstheticism of Greek art were purified and consecrated to the fuller service of God and man, the Church was enabled by these very means to define her theology with accuracy and precision, and to express her worship in the beauty of holiness. And while Christian morality profoundly influenced Roman jurisprudence, the Western Church laid the foundation of the Papacy in the city of the Cæsars, which, serving at first as a magnificent instrument for consolidating Christendom and for protecting the weak, rapidly degenerated into a tool of despotism corrupted by greed and worldly power. And when the Mahomedan conquests overthrew the Byzantine monarchy, men should have learned that Christianity as a universal temporal dominion was an utter impossibility, and, even were it possible, a grievous disaster. Yet clearer proof was given by the sixteenth-century revolt against the Papacy, however much men may still dream.

Had the Church not conquered the Gothic barbarians when they finally submerged the proud mistress of the world, all we have learned from Roman and Greek civilisation would probably have perished. But the Teutonic hordes of Northern and Western Europe, with their longings for the great hero who should throw open the Valhalla, found them satisfied in the White Christ, whose spirit preserved for the race that which the blindness of uncivilised heathen

[1] Works, vi. 99.

would have doubtless destroyed. The Teutons themselves have impressed Christendom with the value and importance of domestic life and village communities; for family life had always flourished among the German races. By them women were held in peculiar respect, and were more reverenced than by most other ancient nations. The Church emphasised and consecrated this reverence for the domestic relationship and the purity of home life on which all social and national greatness must ever rest. The Christian State too has been influenced by the evangelisation of the German race. For it was from the blood-bond in those early farmer settlements about the Baltic that the first rude forms of English justice were derived. It was these domestic and communal customs which the Church sought further to purify and consecrate to the service of God and mankind *at large*, giving the world "pure religion breathing household laws."

With the decline of the Roman Empire the Middle Ages may be said to have commenced.[1] And just as the Church conserved the best elements of the Roman, Greek, and Teutonic phases of society, wherewith she has laid broad and deep the very foundations of our modern civilisation, so her liberties in the Middle Ages were, as Michelet says, the liberties of mankind. "The Church has many times," wrote Macaulay,[2] "been compared by divines to the ark of which we read in the book of Genesis; but never was the resemblance more perfect than during that evil time when she alone rode amidst darkness and tempest

[1] Hallam applies the term to the period from the invasion of France by Clovis, 486, to the invasion of Naples by Charles VIII. in 1495.

[2] "History of England," chap. i.

on the deluge beneath which all the great works of ancient power and wisdom lay entombed, bearing within her that feeble germ from which a second and more glorious civilisation was to spring." In our own country nearly all old institutions we now so justly prize have their bases in the ages which, with a too contemptuous readiness, are called dark. "From the fourth to the thirteenth century," said M. Guizot, "it is the Church which always marches in the front rank of civilisation." Mazzini allowed that the elective principle of representative government originated with the Œcumenical Councils. It was the unity and organisation of the Church which prepared the way for the unity and organisation of our nation. The Church's synods were the forerunners of our national Parliament, the Church's canons the precursors of our code of law. So far back as King Alfred's reign we find the Church laying the foundation of our national system of education. It was the Church too which gave England her greatest literary treasure—the English Bible, and the worker's priceless boon—the weekly Day of Rest. No doubt the Church has from time to time allied herself with tyranny and despotism. *Corruptio optimi pessima!* But the reigns of the first three Stuarts do not comprise the whole of English history. And even if we add the Hanoverian period, when indifference rather than despotism characterised her, we have still eleven out of her thirteen centuries in which to show her ameliorating and beneficent work for the nation. "That the clergy," says Mill, "were the preservers of all letters and all culture, of the writings, and even the traditions of literary antiquity, is too evident to have been ever disputed. But for them there would

have been a complete break in Western Europe between the ancient and modern world." The Church's legacy of mediæval architecture will ever be the wonder and pride of the world. The present humanitarian spirit had its origin in such orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic, while the hospitals of our land were originally religious houses, which too always reserved a certain proportion of their revenues for the poor. Since the Reformation this spirit of humanity has manifested itself in the endowment of schools and almshouses, in the foundation of colleges and hospitals, in the creation of societies for the reformation of manners and the propagation of Christian knowledge at home and abroad. The state and community have slowly learned these humanitarian lessons from the Church; and our poor-law system—such as it is, our education laws, our factory and workshop legislation, the softening of the horrors of war, the abolition of slavery, the modification of the severities of our criminal code, our myriad philanthropies, are all the result of that love for man which for nineteen centuries the Christian Church has been persistently advocating. "The atmosphere of Europe," wrote Sir John Seeley, "has been saturated for some fifteen centuries with Christian principles." And as the natural man's temperature of passion and strife is thereby gradually lowered, we find an ever-increasing condensation of Christian practice. The Church too has in her turn received a beneficial impress from those feudal times in the correlated authority and subordination which have characterised her.

With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and the consequent revival of the study of Greek literature, the transitional movement from the Middle Ages to modern

times, known as the Renaissance, may be said to have commenced. "It was an escape—at first hesitating, then triumphant—from a life regulated and confined on all sides by ecclesiastical tradition and intellectual tyranny into joyous freedom and unfettered spontaneity." Now was the mind of man occupied with new thoughts, while the discovery of the Transatlantic continent awakened possibilities hitherto unimaginable. But even here the recoil from a narrow and exaggerated ecclesiasticism was due to religious faith, and once again it was demonstrated that civilisation is indebted for the spirit of its progress and culture to religious fervour and zeal. The Reformation was not only the inevitable corollary of the Renaissance, but also the revival of that spirit by which the intellectual movement was sustained. The rights of private judgment and liberty of conscience were asserted, and these blessings to mankind reacted on the Church, and were the means of largely purifying her from superstition and error. Then followed the recovering of national consciousness which the overshadowing absolutism of the Papacy had so largely obscured; and so awakened a sense of a distinct national position, a conception of a distinct national mission, a belief in a distinct national destiny. Especially in our own land was it felt that Christ was leading the nation—"God's Englishmen," as Milton loved to call his countrymen—to see in Him their King. The Puritan resistance to the Stuarts, and the constitutional settlement under William and Mary, gave us that limited monarchy under which England has so wonderfully prospered. Then was

> "the one true seed of freedom sown
> Betwixt a people and their ancient throne,
> That sober freedom out of which there springs
> Our loyal passion for our temperate kings."

And here again the Anglican Church was modified in the presence of these new ideas. At first much to her detriment, when she contended for an unnatural principle of "the right divine of kings to govern wrong." But modern Anglicanism, in spite of this terrible mistake, is succeeding where Gallicanism in France has failed. With Russia, England still offers to the world the spectacle of a National Church in alliance with the State.

The latest phase of our civilisation may well be called Industrial Democracy. The State has come of age, and once more the Light of Christ—the Social Christ—is seen illumining political and economic development. All things are being referred consciously or unconsciously to Him. He animates and penetrates social aspirations and international relations. We seem to hear Him declaring that the kingdoms of commerce and industry are His, and must yield Him allegiance and homage. No doubt the days when the officers of the Church more or less directly controlled government, education, art, and philanthropy are gone, never to return. But so far from regarding this as a weakening of the Church's influence, we may see in it a splendid testimony to the efficient work of the Church in the past, and an encouragement to her to still lead mankind to higher issues in the future. The Church, too, is being greatly acted upon by the quickened environment in which she now finds herself. The modern "expansion of England" and the development of the United States —both as marvellous as they are unique—by means of which Anglo-Saxon institutions and ideals are destined to attain to a world-wide primacy, have been accompanied by a sublime attempt on the part of the

Church to evangelise the non-Christian world. But Socialism affects the Church no less than Imperialism. She is correcting that excessive "other-worldliness" with which secularists have with only too much justice charged her. She has learned to regard every good institution of human society as part of the Divine Order which is being revealed, and sees that the progress of true civilisation is part of the growth of the Kingdom of Christ. In a word, she is seeking to justify her claim to be the moral and spiritual teacher of the race by proclaiming unhesitatingly that "the earth is the Lord's *and the fulness thereof*."

In our necessarily cursory and superficial survey of the Church's history we have seen how, for nearly two millenniums, she has been one of the great vital currents of the world's life, and the greatest of the moral formative processes which mould its character. "Jesus remains to humanity," as Renan has well said, "an inexhaustible source of moral regeneration." Some, no doubt, think, that just as life itself would seem to be but "a brief interlude in the awful æons of the world's history," so Christianity is but "one of the days of humanity," which, having followed others less exalted, will be succeeded by others more sublime. But the aim of Christianity is to build up humanity into a harmonious unity, and to raise it to an eternal oneness with God. What scheme or plan can possibly supersede this ineffable project of making God and Man truly at one in an eternal and spiritual unity?

[1] "Few things in human history wear an aspect of higher moral grandeur than the opening of what are now our great missions. . . . All other enterprises of beneficence must yield to this magnificent attempt to expel debasing superstitions, and convey into every heart the ennobling influences of the Christian religion."—"The Nineteenth Century: a History," by Robert Mackenzie, p. 208.

For Christianity views mankind as one vast family of God, recognising its unity and destiny through the Catholic Church. The idea of the solidarity of the human race is as old as Christianity, and dates from the time when the Word became flesh and the federal Headship of Christ was first proclaimed.[1]

The problem of the immediate past was one of political liberty. The problem of the immediate future is without doubt one of economic justice. Great changes in society are now going on, and the task before philosophers and statesmen is to co-ordinate authority with freedom, and to reconcile individualism and collectivism. Although the work of social amelioration has been entered upon with unexampled zeal and vigour, there are many selfish politicians who would rather attention were not drawn to

> "This deep, dark under-world of woe
> That underlies life's shining surfaces."

And it is to be feared that the present growth of the Imperialist spirit is fostered by many who dread the energies of the nation being directed into channels of social reform. But that industrial system stands condemned which amasses wealth at the rate of one thousand three hundred and fifty millions a year, of which one million persons receive more than twice as much as the twenty-six millions which constitute the manual labouring class. It is inexpressibly sad to think that with the increase of wealth there should be a corresponding increase of want; that one out of every four in our population should die in some public institution or dependent on private charity;

[1] "To the Church," said Mazzini, "we owe the idea of the unity of the human family and of the equality and emancipation of souls."

that overcrowding should be so terribly prevalent that in London alone nearly 400,000—about equal to the population of Leeds — should live in one-roomed tenements, as many as eight or nine sometimes living in a single room, where

> "The mind has no leisure for feeling,
> And thought no leisure to grow";

that infant mortality should be so great that in some districts two hundred and sixty children out of every thousand die before they are a year old. Nor is it creditable to our vaunted love of education that every morning and afternoon about one million of our scholars are absent from school, and that the results are so wanting in thoroughness and permanence. When we think too of the unhealthy and dangerous trades; the excessive hours in which women and children, as well as men, are called upon to work; the decline in the standard of conjugal morality, especially among the upper circles of society, largely consequent upon the passing of the Divorce Act of 1857;[1] the political and social menace we have in our liquor traffic, with its colossal expenditure now nearly equal to one and a half times our national revenue; we think that the vast dome of the Albert Hall might occasionally reverberate with voices other than those of perfervid advocates of a dissonant Protestantism, or of even the stalwart defenders of the Church's tithe and glebe.

For the Church should not evade these tremendous questions, but do her best to secure the enjoyment of

[1] For the five years 1867-71 there was one divorce for every 1133 marriages, for the five years 1882-86 the proportion was one for every 479.

all in the best fruits of our modern civilisation. These social and economic evils need not, and therefore ought not to continue. They can, and therefore must be abolished. What is lacking is not so much legislative achievement as proper administrative power in many departments of local as well as central government. And with the Church rests the duty of developing all the moral and spiritual elements of the national life and character. For what is wanted is not merely—certainly not in the first place—a better form of government, more institutions and laws, but a higher idea of manhood and womanhood, and a deeper conception of the power of individual character as a formative agent of the nation's life. We must learn

> "How small, of all that human hearts endure,
> The part which kings or laws can cause or cure."

Here then is the Church's prime duty—the regeneration of individual character. And this we believe she is doing, if not as well as she might, yet with greater care and zeal than ever. The day has gone by for ever since any one could be angrily surprised as Lord Melbourne was when a preacher insisted upon applying religion to a man's private life. And it is just here that the unity of purpose of all who profess and call themselves Christians may be seen to the best advantage. However divided on matters of speculation and ritual, Christendom has never been more thoroughly united when face to face with the moral shipwrecks of society or the wants of suffering humanity.

And there are ugly elements in our modern civilisation which convince us that "the ape" and "the tiger" in human nature are still enormously active,

and which make this primary work of the Church all the more imperative. The sensuality and excess in our midst are nearly parallel to that condition of Roman society which Froude has described as one of powerful animals with an enormous appetite for pleasure. When we think of the shocking prevalence of drunkenness, impurity, gambling and betting, commercial dishonesty; of the excessive love of sport; of the growing inattention to the graver issues of life; of the evident loosening of religious influence, in which the highest ideals and sanctions are used as incentives to nobleness of living; and of the no less evident weakening of the response to conscience—the Church must relax no effort in her work of applying to modern society the redemptive forces at her command. And considering the frequent inadequacy of our ordinary parochial methods for meeting the necessities of the congested districts in our densely-populated centres of industry, the judicious revival of the religious communistic life might be extended with much manifest advantage to many a town-parish now in danger of lapsing into a condition of practical if not actual heathenism.

But the Church has not merely a message to the individual. She must more perfectly grasp the idea that Christ has a message to society, that the salvation of the race is as important as that of the individual. Her duty too is to transform individual and collective life here, and not simply to prepare for the hereafter. Nor must she content herself with the mere disclosure and affirmation of principles, but must—extremely difficult and delicate as it may prove—embody and apply them in a more organised effort to solve the great social questions with which we are face to face.

But while the Church is desirous of impressing her standard of belief on public opinion, she seems content to take her standard of conduct too much from public opinion. She appears far more inclined to ask what will the world say, than to tell the world what it should say and do. To make public opinion a more perfect expression of the Christian conscience, to handle social responsibilities with discretion and zeal, should not be delegated to the Christian Social Union, but be undertaken by herself. Let her Christianise Socialists by all means, but let her not forget that much of our modern Christianity stands in need of socialisation. That form of Christianity alone will stand the wear and tear of the future stress and struggle which is wedded to all that is high in social aspiration. And by her "established" position the Church of England is peculiarly fitted to be this form of Christianity. In the present rapid socialisation of politics it is seen that more and not fewer national institutions are needed.[1] And if the English Church in any way prove equal to the demand made upon her, we may bid Liberationism "farewell"—its secretary's "occupation gone!"—and Church Defence will prove supererogatory. Fortunately—as our Church Congress reports alone will attest—enormous progress has been made since Adam Smith declared that "the object of religious instruction is not so much to render people good citizens in this world, as to prepare them for another and a better world in a life to come."[2] The Lord's Prayer is now seen

[1] "The Education Act of 1871, as accepted and administered by Nonconformists themselves, has knocked the bottom out of the old Nonconformist contention that the State has nothing to do with the teaching of religion."—W. T. STEAD, *Review of Reviews*, August 1895.

[2] "Wealth of Nations," Book V. chap. i. part iii.

to be almost the exact antithesis to this, and our faithfulness in the "very little" here is acknowledged to fit us best to exercise "authority over ten or five cities" in the great hereafter. It is being increasingly felt how impossible is "good Churchmanship" in one who is not responsible to the community for the discharge of some unpaid social service.

For the Church to identify herself with any political party is to weaken her power of influence upon the nation at large. Preservation and Progress are two fundamental principles of society, and earnest and able men will ever be attracted by them to form two main political parties whose "oppositions of opinions are the conditions of progress." And the Church has a duty to both the parties in which these principles are enshrined. Conservatism is true when it preserves the good; it is false when it prevents or retards progress and development. Liberalism is true where it seeks to make progress; it is false when it despises the old. And much as we may agree with the late Archbishop Magee that Christianity is to act "not by filling the statute book with Christian precepts, but by filling the hearts of legislators with Christian feelings and motives," we may yet deplore that so staunch and devoted an Anglican as Mr. Gladstone, who, notwithstanding the recent sneer concerning his "ghastly attempt to foist a Sunday-school conscience behind the iron ribs of war," did more than any other public man in insisting upon the application of private morals to national and international affairs, and who by his attitude in the matter of the *Alabama* claims, the Bulgarian and Armenian atrocities, the Boer difficulties of 1880 and 1884, lifted the nation to a higher level in its political relationships

and dealings, found a far greater support in the "Nonconformist conscience" than in the officially recognised organ which undertakes to develop and consecrate the moral and spiritual life of the nation. The Anglican Church need not shrink from insisting with at least the emphasis of so high-toned and public-spirited a journal as the *Spectator* or the *Manchester Guardian* that what is morally wrong can never be politically right. Our spiritual peers have made many a mistake in their no doubt conscientious support of privilege and class; the nation would like to see them run a more frequent risk of mistake in their support of those industrial and economic questions in which the masses are so greatly interested. There is no occupation more generally demoralising than to be continually expounding principles one has not the courage to apply. And one of the most striking things in modern society is the shameless contrast between what is proposed and what is done. The Church exhibits this most because she is attempting (in theory at least) to scale the greatest height. She too much resembles a stationary sign-post, pointing without doubt in the right direction, but whose voice is dumb and still; whereas she ought to be the inspired leader, marching in the van, and with living, clarion-like voice urging the world not so much to go forward as to follow after. That individual leaders have not been wanting may be seen by the herculean labours of the present fearless Primate on behalf of temperance; by the Bishop of London's enthusiastic support of the Peace movement; by the Bishop of Durham's eloquent vindication of Christian Socialism; by the Bishop of Chester's energetic furtherance of Public-House

Reform; by such stalwart exponents of Christian Social Morality as the Bishop of Hereford, Archdeacon Wilson, Canons Gore and Scott Holland. But while the attitude of the Church towards such questions has of late enormously improved, the support accorded is far too sectional and isolated.

That there is so little expression of corporate sympathy is due no doubt to the fact that the Church possesses no recognised national synod in which the Church as a whole—clerical and lay—in properly representative assemblies, can give utterance to her matured convictions. The Church Reform League is happily gathering together the many incoherent aspirations of individual reformers after larger liberties and the more autonomous action of the Church. And now that the Leader of the House of Commons has lent his powerful support to this most important and fundamental principle of Church Reform, we may hope that "Home-rule for the Church" will in no very distant future become a question of practical politics. It is absurd to suppose that an institution which ought to be in perfect touch with the people can remain the same as it was before their educational and political enfranchisement. We know that the British Constitution, while still monarchic in form, is now quite democratic in spirit. Its governing power has so adapted itself to the altered condition of things that the proportions of its elective and hereditary character have balanced one another. The Church must show a similar adaptation. Of course no readjustment or alteration must be attempted which would change the constitution she has received from Apostolic times. Judicious respect, too, must be given to much of the undefined custom and usage

which the English Church inherits, and which the conservatism of our English character loves. With these two limiting principles, which we may call the Catholic and the National, the character of every specific detail of proposed reform must be tested. But while no power on earth can destroy the inner life and order of the Church, her present external organisation and endowments—the outer scaffoldings, so to speak, of the building not made with hands—are practically at the mercy and caprice of an electorate which tests institutions not so much by their past history and venerable traditions, as by their present utility and democratic sympathies. Distraught by internecine feuds, the Church of England may yet present an easy prey to the agitator who dangles her endowments as a bait in the eyes of politicians who are wondering how to provide old-age pensions with the minimum of taxation.

It is a matter of common observation that while funds for specific Church objects generally elicit a fair support, there is no such response made to appeals for more general Church purposes. It is not only that there is an absence of assurance that the money will be disbursed with economy and care,[1] but also a very widespread idea that the Church's present resources are not properly husbanded or adequately distributed. In no other department of our national life would such gross anomalies be tolerated. No dull, monotonous equality is, of course, advocated. But if we found a village attorney or a country practitioner with scarcely any *clientèle* drawing the State-guaranteed stipends of some of our clergy, while the London physician and the Queen's Counsel, with

[1] *e.g.* the Poor Clergy Relief Corporation.

enormous claims upon their time, ability, and money, obtaining the miserable pittances of other of our clergy, these inequalities would be ridiculed out of existence before Parliament had passed another session. And it speaks well for the revival of active life among the Anglican clergy when we remember that generally more work by them means less pay for them,[1] and certainly no immunity from a criticism which is too often cruelly unjust and unkind. But when we know that the financial is by no means the sole abnormity which we find in the Church of to-day, we can largely sympathise with one who has recently said that "There must be some Divine providence watching over the English Church, otherwise such a compost of anachronisms and absurdities could not possibly be able to do the good work which she undoubtedly accomplishes."

And it is because we are profoundly persuaded that the Christian Church is the school in which the Christian character is trained and the centre from which public opinion is influenced, "not merely the greatest, but the only great school of virtue existing, the only institution which is distinctively and deliberately such, and the one which inherits the most complete ideal of virtue"[2]—too much attention cannot be given to the enormous task of re-uniting her scattered forces, and of reforming her on the lines of Divine and Apostolic intention, so that she may be adequate to all the varying needs and conditions of human life. A united

[1] Especially is this true of the work of rural deans. While the continual hospitality which incumbents are ever ready to extend to those whom they invite for the good of their people, adds materially to the expense of the "living." Travelling and postage, too, are not inconsiderable items of expenditure.

[2] Seeley's "Ecce Homo," p. xx.

and reformed Church would then indeed be as a city on a hill which cannot be hid, as salt purifying and arresting corruption, as light illumining the world, as leaven permeating with beneficent influence the whole of human society.

When the Christian conscience of England speaks as a whole it is well-nigh irresistible. We recall how the pulpit on both sides of the Atlantic in 1895 powerfully assisted in averting a crisis between the two great divisions of the Anglo-Saxon race concerning the Venezuelan frontier dispute; more recently we have seen the check to an attempt to introduce seven-day journalism into our midst. Is it any wonder that we yearn for the removal of "our unhappy divisions," and long for greater liberties and autonomy in the Church?

Never, we believe, has the Church's opportunity been greater, never has the world been more ready to give her fair play. "The truth as it is in Jesus" can still satisfy the profoundest intellect, appeal to the highest imagination, warm the tenderest heart, and stir the most active will. Moreover, the breach between modern culture and Christian faith has been largely healed; to be an unbeliever is no longer regarded as a sign of a superior mind. While to name but a few men of light and leading—Romanes and Clerk Maxwell among scientists, Tennyson and Browning among literary men, Gladstone and Balfour among statesmen—are sufficient to show that the highest cultivation of mind may coexist with an unreserved and whole-hearted acceptance of the main essentials of the Catholic Faith. No doubt for superficial minds in these days of cheap ephemeral literature it is as easy to become sceptical in an hour as

it is to be philosophical for a shilling. 'But the late Professor Huxley found that his attacks upon the Christian revelation were not evoking that response among thinking men which he seemed to anticipate; and Mr. Morley has acknowledged that "much of the elegant dabbling in infidelity has been a caprice of fashion. The Agnostic has had his day with the fine ladies, like the black foot-boy of other times, or the spirit-rappers and table-turners of our own."

No, the world's quarrel is not with the faith of Christ, but with the practice of the Church. Audiences in England and America which will cheer the name of Jesus Christ will hiss that of the Church. And until the various Nonconformist bodies can assemble without the manifestation of so bitter and hostile a spirit against the Established Church; until the "Protestant"-minded Churchman learns to be more tolerant of views and practices other than his own; until the "Catholic"-minded Churchman realises that the noblest results of the Oxford Movement are jeopardised by loading it with reactionary notions which are repugnant to the modern mind at its best; until all Christians "seriously lay to heart the great danger we are in by our unhappy divisions," and seek to reconcile the "liberty of prophesying" to which Nonconformity has borne such courageous testimony with the sacraments of unity and order which the Historic Church so persistently attests, Christianity's witness to the world of "truth, unity, and concord," and of "godly love," must continue to be feeble and faint and faltering.

The extraordinary popularity of Sheldon's stories is proof of the profound interest which people will take in a really practical Christianity. And yet what

irony is here. When it is seriously suggested that the followers of Christ can and ought really to walk "in His steps," the excitement among them becomes intense! It is an illustration of a remark of Dean Stanley often quoted by Tennyson, "So far from being effete, Christianity is as yet undeveloped."[1]

As we write, the Peace Conference is deliberating at The Hague. Whatever its result, the fact that for the first time in history the whole world should be for a time federated for the benefit of humanity is matter for the deepest thanksgiving as well as ground for the brightest hope. It may be a long time yet before swords are beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks, but the Church has kept the vision of Universal Peace and Brotherhood constantly before men, and not even her crimes and follies have succeeded in hiding the vision from them. If Henri Taine's testimony is true that "there is nothing except Christianity to hold us back on our native incline, or to prevent the gradual slipping downward by which incessantly and with all its weight our race goes back into the depths; and to-day the ancient gospel is still the best auxiliary that social instinct can call to its aid"; if Mazzini was right when he said that "great social transformations never have been and never will be other than the application of a religious principle, of a moral development, of a strong and active common faith"; if, as Fichte still earlier saw, "Christianity

[1] "Tennyson: a Memoir," ii. p. 231: "If the spirit [in which the Primate is dealing with the present Church difficulties] prevails, and God grant that it will, it may make the Church of England not only in these islands, but throughout the English-speaking world, the greatest and noblest instrument that the world has yet seen for preserving true religion and the sacred charities of human life."—*Spectator*, July 15, 1899, p. 80.

is destined some day to be the inner organising power of the State"—then in this International Conference, this first Parliament of Man—the Christian Church has encouragement sufficient to persevere in her noble work of realising "righteousness and peace and joy" in the life of humanity; for we are convinced that the hope of mankind for this world and the next is bound up with the Faith of Jesus Christ.

THE PROGRESS OF MORALITY IN THE RELATIONS OF MEN AND WOMEN

BY THE VEN. JAMES M. WILSON, VICAR OF ROCHDALE AND ARCHDEACON OF MANCHESTER

The subject is a difficult and important portion both of morals and of legislation—It may be studied historically, but if morality in this subject is evolutionary, it is largely prehistoric — Two distinct elements are seen in conflict; and it appears that when stimulated by luxury the degrading element was, in pre-Christian times, the stronger—A third element was introduced by Christ; and its effects on morality and legislation are great, in suppressing unnatural crimes and protecting and elevating women—Our present morality and legislation are due to many causes; to survival of barbarism, the influence of Roman law, of chivalry, of monasticism, and the teaching of Christianity — There are many points that need our attention now, if progress is to be made: the censorship of literature, the toleration of brothels, of seduction, the sanction by the Government of the provision of native women for our soldiers in India, the international White Slave traffic, the overcrowding of our towns, and the inadequate payment of women's work—Above all, public opinion must be raised.

THE relations of men and women form the most important and the most difficult portion of morals and of legislation. This will be universally admitted, and the reason for the fact will be generally understood. They are rarely alluded to in the pulpit, and rarely directly spoken of in schools. There is no subject on which guidance is more wanted, none in which mistakes are so frequent and so fatal, and yet the recognised teachers of morality for the most part observe silence.

Again, of all subjects it is the one on which it might be expected that parents would most clearly warn and teach and guide their children, and yet it is probable that there is no subject more steadily avoided in parental teaching and influence. Too often it is left at first in mystery, and then it becomes the subject of joking, more or less vulgar and coarse and sensual, according to the level of taste and manners of the society.

Of course there are grave reasons for this reticence. When a feeling of reticence is universal it may be assumed that it is not wholly wrong. "This wise world of ours," says Tennyson, "is mostly right." It is the present writer's intention to infringe on the custom only so far as to give a sketch of the progress of morality in this respect, to indicate the influence of Christianity in affecting this progress, and to make it plain what are the points now at issue, and where improvement is to be looked for; and all with the practical aim of urging his readers in their various circles to take the high-minded view, and to contribute as far as they can towards further progress.

In savage nations, among the gradually dying out Indian tribes, there is no morality in these relations at all. There is good reason for believing that anything of the nature of marriage was unknown in many nations in very primitive times. It is certain that it was a common custom for property to descend through the mother from the uncertainty of fatherhood. But these are questions of antiquarianism rather than of history. When we come to historical times and civilised nations, such as the Greeks and Romans, especially in the earlier ages, or in the earlier history of the Jews, it is plain that a vast progress has already taken

place, though its stages cannot be traced. What may be called the physical element in the relation is passing into the background, and the mental and moral element is brought out. It must be borne in mind that in love—in the relation of men and women—there are these two distinct elements; there is the relation which we share with all living creatures, which may be called the physical element; and there is the emotion of love, the devotion, the ennobling sentiment, which is peculiar to human beings alone. That the relation of man and woman should be capable of being glorified by this emotion, this unselfish, devoted love, is a distinctive mark of human beings. In this fact is to be found the origin of all morality in this relation, and the origin of all immorality also. In other words, and to be perfectly plain, if the relation between man and woman is purely the gratification of animal desire, then this relation, among savages, is non-moral; but in a nation like ours, unless it may be in a densely ignorant and degraded population, it is immoral. In the one case it is not seen to be wrong—morality does not yet exist; in the other, among us, it is seen to be wrong, however common is the act.

Now at the dawn of Greek and Roman and Jewish history the emotional side of love has already come to the front. The stories of the patriarchs, or of Homeric heroes, or of the worthies of ancient Rome, are as full of the sentiment of love, the mental and moral element, as are the stories of any later age. How this sentiment grew, if it did grow, out of primitive barbarism and sensuality we know not. It is by no means proved that it did so grow; but at the dawn of history the sentiment of love is as all-absorbing, as

beautiful, as in any subsequent age. The ballads and tales of Greece and Rome turn on love almost as much as do the novels and plays of later ages.

That this sentiment, however, was not powerful enough to restrain human passion, or indeed to prevent it from running into monstrous and odious excesses, even in the most highly intellectual and civilised ages of Greece and Rome, is well known. As Greek or Roman civilisation and art and wealth increased, we have to admit that the position of woman becomes lower, and not higher. Love degenerated into lust. In the first place, women in the age of Pericles were not treated by men with the same honour as they were treated in the age of Homer; or to be more precise, the ancient standard of honour had been abandoned. And in the second place, side by side with this low standard of family and married life, there were those nameless impurities which disgraced all, or nearly all, ancient civilisations. In one of the most interesting passages of Plato, in "The Laws," Socrates is represented as discussing whether there is the smallest hope that these unnatural vices should ever be expelled. Others are in despair. He alone sees hope; and he sees it in the advent of a divine person as a Teacher, and in a possible divine illumination of the conscience of men, that should brand all such actions with a public stigma as "shameful." One little word, he says—"shameful"—will do the work.

This passage is memorable because the method indicated by Socrates as the one hopeful method is actually the way in which it has pleased God to work, and is actually the way in which we can work with Him in expelling other forms of vice. No prediction in the whole range of Hebrew prophecy is more

remarkable in its fulfilment than that prophecy of Socrates. The conscience of men *has* been divinely illuminated; the Divine Visitor and Teacher *has* come; and as a result men *have* branded certain actions as "shameful"; and they are almost expelled from Christian countries, surviving only among the most debased individuals.

In Rome the excitement of great wealth and luxury, and the decay of any constraining and ennobling sentiment, whether of religion or of love, developed the most horrible excesses and extravagancies of lust. Human nature was shown at its vilest. Those who do not know the by-paths of classical literature may see something of what the condition of morals was by turning to the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. No one who knows anything of ancient literature will dispute the moderation and justice of that estimate. It is a fearful picture of putridity.

To sum up briefly a very large subject, it may be said that up to the time of Christ there appear to have been two rival forces, tending, the one to elevate, the other to degrade, the relations of men and women.

The elevating force was this moral and mental element which God has made an integral part of human love, which glorifies the relation of men and women, and fills it with beauty. From it have come the noblest self-sacrifice, the greatest courage, patience, tenderness, chivalry, devotion; in a word, all the excellences and charms of character are either created by, or intimately connected with, love. Who is there that has not felt at some time of his life that love has transfigured him, and given him an unselfishness, a nobleness,

an insight into a worthier life, to which he before was a stranger? The world is filled with a new light, a new glory, to every one who is truly "in love." Happy are those to whom that was not a mere passing gleam, but a steadily burning light of life. Happy those to whom the inspiring love of courtship is but a prelude to the far deeper, stronger, sweeter love of married life. This love was the elevating force.

And the degrading force was the sexual passion which man shares with animals, and which is unnaturally stimulated by the excitement, the food and drink, the crowding, the wild life, the recklessness, the foul literature, the indecencies, the undomesticity of cities and towns. The contest between these two forces constitutes one of the aspects of ancient history. The degrading force has generally proved the stronger. Nation after nation fell, each a prey and victim to its own vices. Thus Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, Rome have fallen. It is the purity of the Jewish race that has given them their wonderful persistency as a nation.

With Christ, or rather from Him, came a new and immense moral impulse towards a better relation between men and women. Hence at the present moment there are, we may say, three forces contending for good and evil. On the one side are the strong animal passions, reinforced in our modern civilisation by all the circumstances that stimulated passion in imperial Rome—drink, wealth, luxury, selfishness, in some classes; drink, extreme poverty, the inadequate wages of girls and women, ignorance, over-crowding, in others; and fostered in all classes by excitement, low literature, debased art, newspaper reports of outrages, divorce cases, and the like; stimulated

also by the pressure of life, the life of confinement rendered unwholesome by want of exercise, which the student, the clerk, the man of business, the shopman, the factory worker, are compelled to lead. An unnatural life—and a life of confinement is unnatural—disorganises us, and makes temptation stronger, and self-control weaker.

On the other hand there still are in boys and men the splendid generous emotions of love, as beautiful, as true, as divine as ever they were, limited to no class; and in girls still the same charm of purity and capacity for love. There is still the possibility that all domestic family life should be an atmosphere of utter unselfishness, of devotion of parents to one another and to their children, of love prolonged, and intensified, deepened, consecrated by each successive year. Surely never was English manhood and womanhood capable of better relations.

And co-operating with this natural love, not universally felt, but intensely powerful where it is felt, is the power of the thought that came into the world with Christ, that we are the children of God, and our bodies verily the temple of the Holy Spirit, and the homes of a Divine Life.

To trace the effects of this latter influence through the later centuries of the Roman Empire on morals and legislation would take a volume. It may be studied in such a book as "Gesta Christi, a historical study, by Loring Brace." This work shows how the Christian theory of the equality of all men and women in the sight of God, the equality of the kingdom of heaven, where is neither male nor female, bond nor free, gradually metamorphosed Roman law. In the code of Justinian, for example, it is expressly attributed

to Christian influence that women are granted certain rights which had been withheld. Again and again under Christian influence legislation, which always follows morals, represses unnatural crimes, divorce, adultery, and concubinage, and all that degrades woman.

But the influence of Christ is even more easily seen on morals than on legislation. Christ's standard of morals is an absolute purity of heart such that no such vices as were and are common can even be thought of by men when under His influence. He requires absolute purity in man and woman; not the purity which some of the Fathers understood as meaning the unmarried state, but an entire sanctity in the married state, such as makes vice before marriage, and vice or excessive indulgence after marriage, equally impossible. The Leader is, here as everywhere, far above His followers, advocating no impossible relation, but simply the noblest and purest relation in marriage itself, thus prohibiting all impurity and all illicit intercourse, and consecrating human nature. Of course it is well known that this teaching was misrepresented, and degenerated into the advocacy of forced celibacy. This practice began with the desire to set the priest free from all ties, and to enable him to devote himself wholly to his work. It was stimulated by the Eastern spirit of asceticism, and fostered by ecclesiastical leaders. But it led to fearful abuses, and was one of the greatest obstacles to real Christianity.

It was Christ's standard of morals that banished unnatural vices. The difference between the Christian and the ancient world in this respect cannot be exaggerated. Crimes whose very names are lost to our

ears and are unknown were both practised and spoken of without shame in public. The early Christians, in the strength of their Divine Leader, set themselves with unflinching sternness against these, and step by step their morals first branded such actions as shameful, and then found their way into the statute books. Let it be remembered that it was confessedly no philosophical or Stoical influence that effected this. Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius avoided these crimes, but did not punish or even denounce them. When the laws on this subject first appear in the legislation of Constantine, and Justinian, and Theodosius, they make express reference to the Holy Scriptures, to the fear of God, to the future judgment, and the intuition of humanity. If Christianity had done nothing else, it has freed Christian races from the most detestable of sensual crimes, which still survive among non-Christian races.

Again, it was the effect of Christ's standard of morals that made the violation of a slave woman an equal offence with a crime committed on a free woman. The legislation to protect the unfortunate women who ministered to the vices of others; to protect exposed and destitute children who were reared for immoral purposes; to protect women in prison; and to insist on the altered view of women as the equals of men, and not as the ministers of their passions—all this extends over centuries, and shows most clearly the working of the new spirit, the spirit that came into the world with Christ. It was the effect of the personal influence of one supremely pure and elevated Person who claimed to be, and has been confessed by His followers as being, the Divine Son of God. In the presence of the thought

of Christ these crimes against nature and outrages against women became odious and impossible.

It must not be thought, however, that Christianity reformed the old Roman and Greek races. No, this was impossible. They were in the last stage of degeneracy: it is possible for individuals and families and for races, by prolonged evil life, to reach such a depth of physical and moral degradation, such foul corruption of the springs of virtue, that there is no human possibility of any restoration or renoyation. It was a world, as Matthew Arnold says, "of deep weariness and sated lust." This is the awful verdict of history. And such degradation is always shown in sexual sin. To this point the old Roman world had reached. It was not, therefore, the restoration and reform of those races that was effected by Christianity, but the protection of the new and healthier northern races which swept over the Empire from being utterly corrupted by the vices they found prevailing. This was really the critical question. Would these hot-headed, passionate, and rude northern races be corrupted by Roman vice, or ennobled by Christian teaching? And the legislation shows far more clearly the effect of Christian teaching on the northern races than on the Romans. For we must not forget that the Roman race, corrupt in its sensuality, was dying out. "Rome fell," as has been well said, "because there ceased to be Romans."

Another large question is opened here as to the position of women in the ancient German and Scandinavian races. On this we cannot enter, further than to say that the position was higher in some respects than among the Romans; but that at first these races fell victims to the vices of Rome, and that it was only

after a prolonged struggle with Christian influence that the modern condition of these relations, such as it is, has emerged. Relics of barbarous and heathen customs survive among us; and there is still a great deal of sheer barbarism in the way some men regard their wives, as drudges to work for them and support them in idleness, or as necessary burdens to be escaped from as often as may be. This is a degraded form of barbarism, untouched by chivalry, or love, or Christianity. And it survives among us still, and that in all classes. The gradual modification of the position of women in the different nations of Europe under the combined influences of ancient national traditions, the romantic ideal of chivalry, the teaching of Christianity, and the example of debased monasticism, is one of the most complex historical problems. In England we have arrived at a certain point. There was a time not very long ago when at common law a wife's legal existence was absolutely suspended, her property was sacrificed, she could earn nothing for herself, nor make any legal contract. In the eyes of the law she was not a person; she was a chattel, a thing. The Married Women's Property Acts of 1870, 1874, and 1882 mark a recent and most important stage of progress in this respect; but they are but stages, and the goal is not yet reached. Barbarisms still survive. The goal is absolute equality. Each human being has a claim to the utmost exercise of his or her capacities, and to perfect equality with all others.

This historical review will give us, on the whole, good reason to be hopeful for the future.

Let us now turn to some points which ought to occupy the attention of good and intelligent men, in

order that they may raise the standard of public opinion within their own circles, and thus affect opinion generally.

One is the circulation of pernicious literature.

The abominations of French literature circulate largely in our country in some underground and secret way. There is also a secret stream of filthy English books.

In France the garbage sold is incredibly pernicious, and it is to be feared that there is no check at all on its sale. In Germany public opinion demands strict supervision. We, with that dreadful and increasing indifference to all that really makes or mars a nation, let the matter drift. When will our nation see wherein its true wealth consists? It allows any one, in the sacred name of freedom, to pollute the minds of myriads for his own sordid gain. The masses of filthy literature and photographs circulated are debasing the nation. The present writer is not without some personal knowledge of the facts, for one such place was hunted out by him in Bristol some years ago, and the whole stock was burnt. There is an Act stringent enough to deal with these cases—Lord Campbell's Act—but for twenty years the administration of it has been lax for want of *public opinion*, and want of sense of responsibility for others. One difficulty lies in the unwillingness of people to prosecute. In other words, the moral judgment of the country is becoming corrupt. It is not strong enough to compel, or even permit, magistrates to do their duty. Yet if our citizens, liable to serve on juries, or possibly as magistrates, knew and felt the immense importance of protecting the nation from the vile stuff that is forced on them by abandoned

people with no moral sense; if they knew how English indifference is degrading England to the level of France, and taking us farther and farther from the old English standard of honour and purity and Godliness, surely they would alter and raise this public opinion.

We appeal to all good citizens not only to hold a sterner and stronger view on the illegitimacy of all foul publications, of all that is rightly called "putrid literature" in novel and newspaper and advertisement; but also, if they have definite knowledge of the existence of any such thing, to make it a matter of conscience to communicate with the head of the police, or with a magistrate, or with some solicitor, that at any rate the legality of that particular publication may be tested.

Another point in which the standard of Christian conscience must rise is the toleration of the fornicator and the brothel. First incest and unnatural crimes are regarded as horrible, and next adultery is forbidden alike by public conscience and law — God grant that the public conscience may never become indifferent to it! (but divorce for adultery is commoner than it was)—and next must come, *shall come*, an equal stigma attached to fornication. We do not yet regard this as an equal sin in both sexes. How many of our readers would say that such a sin in his son would disgrace the family as much as such a sin in his daughter? Yet some one's daughter is disgraced.

Now nothing is more marked in the early records of Christianity, and nothing is more novel, than their condemnation of fornication; and hereafter it will certainly be found that wherever the Christian Church fails to rebuke and condemn this sin, equally in men

and women, through timidity or unreality, there Christianity becomes a mere superstition and loses all real hold. The conscience of the people knows that this is the great sin against which the Church, if it is a divine Church, must wage war.

The philosophy of history declares that nation after nation rises to power and wealth, and thus attains the condition in which sexual relations become degraded. Then the nation fails and perishes. Christianity alone gives the principle which can counteract this ruin of nations. The doom of our nation is certain unless the sin of fornication is checked.

Physiological science shows that in men fornication is absolutely unnecessary for health, and shows and explains the distinct and healthy provision of nature which leaves each individual the power of self-guidance in the all-important relation of sex. But physiological science gives no moral impulse to restrain sexual passion.

Ruskin wrote from Venice some thirty or more years ago that the secret of the ruin of that mighty city lay in one word—fornication. "Fools tell you," he goes on, "that it was the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope. It was the defiance of the laws of God."

Fools will tell you that Germany defeated France because of the genius of Moltke and Bismarck. The cause lay far deeper, in the comparative purity of the German race.

But the sentiment of England is far from sound on this point.

Seduction is not yet visited by society with the social penalties that it deserves. It is probably the blackest spot in English morality at this hour. No crimes of violence or of dishonesty seem to us so utterly base

as the crime of the seducer. It is notorious that in a family, a respectable family, if the daughter were seduced by the footman, it would be shame and grief to the household; but if the son seduced a maid-servant, the sense of disgrace would be comparatively slight.

We shall not reach an approximately right standard until the seduced and the seducer are equally disgraced by the verdict of society, and until there is absolute chastity before marriage, and in marriage the self-restraint that alone prevents it from degradation.

There is also a crime against morality to which the English nation has been recently committed by our Government of India, in what is practically the re-imposition of the Contagious Diseases Acts in the military cantonments, and the provision by military authority of native women for promiscuous concubinage with soldiers. There is a section, moreover, of English society so indifferent to morality, or so blind to real and ultimate expediency, that it is working secretly with the view of re-imposing these Acts in certain districts, or even in the whole, of England. The utmost vigilance and intelligence is needed. It is far too large a subject to be dealt with here; but information on the whole matter can be obtained from the Secretary of the British Committee, 17 Tothill Street, Westminster.

Again, the public indifference to the welfare of those who contribute to their amusements is another of the crying evils against which right-minded men will protest. While the public tolerates, for its own amusement, the antics of children as acrobats and dancers, and cares not a straw for the children themselves how they are being brought up and educated,

what may be the effect of their surroundings on health and morals, so long these amusements will go on. We ought to enjoy no amusement which is won at the cost of injury to others, nothing indeed which we are not satisfied is won without that cost. In Rome till Christian times there were gladiatorial shows. They were put an end to by Christian feeling. So will exhibitions of children trained to performances which interfere with wholesome education, and tend to degrade morals.

Another point that demands attention is the making of the prosecution of offenders much cheaper and easier. At present if a girl is wronged there is great difficulty. The poor and friendless go without justice. It should be known that the National Vigilance Association, 267 Strand, will take up any such case and give any legal information. The secretary, Mr. Coote, received a handsome gift from the German Emperor for his gallant defence of German girls decoyed into England. Such a society needs, and deserves, the support of all right-minded men.

There is also a systematic traffic, even an international traffic, in women for immoral purposes on a scale which must be wholly unknown to most of our readers. On June 20–23, 1899, an international Conference on "The White Slave Traffic" was held in London, the report of which is of great importance. When I mention the names of the Duke of Westminster, the Bishop of London, and the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster as among the speakers, and the Emperor of Russia, the German Empress, the Queen of Sweden, and Lord Salisbury's secretary as among those whose letters were read, it will be understood that this was not the Conference of a

few faddists. To check this traffic is also the work of the same Association.

Another object to work for is the improvement of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in several important particulars, such as the extension of the time within which prosecution may take place, and perhaps the extension of the age of protection.

An obvious cause of the low level of morality is the crowding of people in our towns. There are returns accessible to every one, published again and again, showing how our people are herded together, but they are glanced at by indifferent eyes. Down one street in Whitechapel a few years ago an inspector visited fifty rooms. In those rooms two hundred and thirty people were sleeping, mostly adults of both sexes. From the recently published report of Dr. F. J. Waldo, medical officer of health, we learn that the population of the parish of St. George the Martyr in the Borough shows a density of 212 per acre. The inhabitants number nearly 64,000. The parish contains just over 5900 houses, and there are nearly 13,000 tenements. The proportion of tenements to houses is more than two to one, and of the tenement occupiers one-third live in two rooms and another third in a single room. The same conditions exist in selected areas in almost every district of London. Little or nothing on an adequate scale has yet been attempted to mitigate this horrible evil. In Manchester, Glasgow, and in most of our cities there is similar overcrowding. It needs no argument to prove that in such dwellings all the barriers of modesty and decency are broken down from childhood; they breed corruption and concupiscence; the boys and girls alike lose the very idea of purity. It is simply impossible that the message of

the Gospel that we are the inheritors of a Divine Life can be delivered to people who, as some one said, were damned into the world rather than born into it. Why do we not as a nation in the interests of the nation, as a city in the interests of the city, insist that our permissive Health Acts shall be compulsory? We submit the inspection of our schools, of our factories, our mines, our explosives, to inspectors appointed by a central authority and responsible to them; why do we not do the same with our medical officers of health? Because as a nation we are indifferent to the effect of such dwellings on morality, because we know that the local medical officer will not be ready to condemn the property of men connected with him by all sorts of ties, or be induced to regard as insanitary that which he has seen and smelt as long as he can remember in his native town.

It is obvious, it may be added, that efforts to unite women in Trades Unions, and similar organisations, for protection against injustice, and to secure reasonable wages and conditions of labour, are efforts which indirectly tend to promote morality.

There is no space to add more. If either the sentiment of manliness and chivalry has a place in a man's heart, and impels him to protect women from wrong; or if an enlightened and far-seeing patriotism, based on historical knowledge, teaches him that in purity alone lies a nation's true strength; or if any echo of Christ's teaching, any love for our fellows, any thought of them as being the temple of the Holy Spirit; in a word, if love or patriotism or religion moves us, then we shall care intensely for all that concerns progress in morality in the relation of man and woman. It is only those

to whom love has degenerated into lust, by whom patriotism is regarded as a foolish sentiment, and religion as a contrivance for insuring our souls, if we have any, against damnation; it is only to such that these questions are not of infinite moment. To such as these what is left for pleasure except the gratification of the flesh and the death of the soul?

The whole question is one that demands a more elevated public morality; and be it never forgotten that an elevated public morality, apart from faith in God and belief in our divine sonship revealed by Jesus Christ, is a chimæra; there is no such thing. There is no permanent morality apart from the fear and love of God.

WOMEN IN SOCIAL LIFE

By Mrs. R. C. PHILLIMORE

Characteristics of the movement—Plain speaking not relished—Lack of intellectual guidance—Bibliography—Its importance out of proportion to the lack of literature—Generalisations belong to the future—Poulain de la Barré, "The Woman as good as the Man"—Its historical importance—Mary Wollstonecraft's "Vindication of the Rights of Women"—Education the concrete outcome of her abstract principles—The mid-century movement—To-day women are fighting for equity in economic and social conditions—Politicians adverse to enlarging the sphere of women's work in social life until they know what her work is—The social careers of women—Motherhood—Industry—Public work—Women must make the best of her present opportunities.

"I like your frankness much. God knows I had the humour of plain dealing in me from a child, but there is no doing with it in this world."—Mackenzie: "Man of Feeling."

THERE is no question on which plain speaking is less relished than that of woman's work in social life. The actual concrete details of the work of an individual woman can be passed over lightly in general conversation; the most confirmed hater of the public woman does little more than sniff, her most ardent supporter little more than smile in congratulation, when mention is made of any woman who serves on a public body or lives a life of constant committees. But when the principles which underlie such work are touched, one reaches the bed-rock of prejudice which forms the basis of the character of the ordinary person. And realising the amount of boring necessary

to get through this solid foundation, in self-defence one desists from discussion of abstract principles.

But though after so many years of agitation the subject is still a difficult one for mixed society, there are of course many circles in which there is speaking in plenty. The circle which severely considers woman's sphere the home—the circle which is of opinion that woman *qua* woman, can do anything as well as man—these revolve at the extremes; other circles, each with modifications of either or both the extreme views, all speak within themselves with sufficient force. Unfortunately in most cases it is force derived from within the circle itself, and seldom owes anything to a thoughtful consideration of the point of view of any of the other circles. And prejudice, which one of the earliest writers on woman's rights defines as "opinions passed upon things without true Examination," runs riot through all the circles, whether they be for or against the movement. Prejudice is an inevitable accompaniment of all movements, and can therefore be dismissed from consideration as unimportant. But the lack of thought is another matter. This lack of thought is perhaps the most striking characteristic of the whole woman's movement, a lack quite as apparent in the advocates of woman's publicity as in its opponents. There have been few historical movements in which there has been so little intellectual guidance. None of such rare importance in which the notable literature on the subject could be contained in such small compass. Talking there has been in plenty, but crystallisation of vague talk there is but little. Of books published within the last hundred years, what are there? Answering off-hand, one thinks at once of

Mary Wollstonecraft's "Vindication of the Rights of Women," of J. S. Mill's "Subjection of Women." If one considers carefully the bibliography of the movement, a few suggestive essays by Karl Pearson, a few books, or chapters in books on women's mental or physical development, Campbell's "Biological Differences between the Sexes," and a scattered crop of articles in reviews, sum up the important modern non-medical writings.

Compared quite fairly by the average cultured person interested in history with any other movement of equal importance, it would be admitted that epoch-making books do not exist in the same proportion as in movements in which men have chiefly been interested. And even in the books which have been written there is little appearance of progress. There is only the slightest intellectual growth. The arguments which served in the seventeenth century would serve in the nineteenth—do serve.

The importance of the movement is out of all proportion to the lack of literature. The question is now developing into a phase which demands serious attention and scientific investigation.

The generalisations which ought to guide the race in this matter have yet to be made, after a close investigation and accurate balancing of facts. The significance of this intellectual poverty, after more than a century's agitation, seems to be, either that those interested in the movement have been too much engaged in active work to be mindful of the intellectual side of the question, or that they have not realised that there is an intellectual side.

The absence of works of scientific value can be proved by any one interested enough in the subject

to wade through the ocean of shallow mediocrity in the books and pamphlets in the British Museum. A historical survey of this literature will probably convince such a student of the lack of continuity in such work as there is.

The earliest writer, or one of the earliest, is Poulain de la Barré, whose principal book, "The Woman as Good as the Man; or, The Equality of both Sexes," was translated from the French, and published in England in 1677.

His excuse for discussing the subject at all is most ingenious :—

"There is nothing more nice and delicate, than to Treat on the Subject of Women. When a Man speaketh to their advantage, it is presently imagined a peece of Gallantry, or Love: and it is very probable, that the most part Judging of this discourse by the Title, will take it at first for an effect of the one or other; and will be glad to know the truth of the Motive and designe thereof, Take it thus : The most happy thought, that can enter into the minds of those who labour, to acquire a solid Science after that they have been instructed, according to the Vulgar Method, is to doubt if they have been taught aright, and to desire to discover the truth by themselves. In the progress of their inquiry, it occurs to them necessarily, to observe that we are filled with prejudices (that is to say, opinions past upon things without true Examination); and that we must absolutely Renounce them, to attain to clear, and distinct knowledge. In the designe of insinuating so important a Maxime, we have believed it the best, to choose a determinate, and famous Subject, where every one takes an interest; to the end, that having demonstrated that a Sentiment

as ancient as the World, of as great extent as the Earth, and as Universal as Mankind, is a prejudice or errour, the Learned might at length be Convinced of the necessity of Judging of things by themselves after having examined them, and not to referre themselves to the opinion or Credit of other men; if they would avoid being deceived. Of all prejudices, there is not any to be observed, more proper for this designe, than that which men commonly conceive of the inequality of the two sexes."

The whole book is an interesting plea to give women equal chances with men, so that they may prove their equality, and concludes with this exhortation :—

"We may (then) with Assurance exhort Ladies to apply themselves to Study; without having Respect to the little Reason of those who would undertake to divert them there-from. Since they have a Mind (as well as we) capable of knowing of Truth . . . they ought to put themselves in conditions of avoyding the Reproach, of having stifled a Talent, which they might put to use, and of having detained Truth in Idleness and Pleasure."

It is difficult to estimate the exact historical importance of the book or its influence on contemporary thought, but from the date of its publication to the present, the central principle of the movement has been the same. When Poulain wrote, the doctrine of natural rights had not emerged from the mist of vague political opinions, but nevertheless one can trace through his book the feeling, "La femme est née libre, et par-tout elle est dans les fers." When the doctrine was once clearly stated, "that philosophising serpent," Mary Wollstonecraft, was clever enough to

see that if man had national rights, so had woman, and it is this doctrine which is the key-note of her "Vindication of the Rights of Women," and which more or less consciously or clearly has been at the bottom of the movement ever since.

From the first stirrings of agitation centring round Mary Wollstonecraft, through the middle period having J. S. Mill and Lydia Becker as centre figures, down to the present when the movement has grown so complex that the central interest is no longer round individuals but associations, the intellectual basis has been the same. Women still stick to their abstract rights, even although male politicians have long since abandoned the doctrine as unseaworthy. And the cry is still the same. "Give us a chance and we will prove our equality."

Now this cry was more than justified at the end of the last and beginning of the present century; but ought it not to have become obsolete now? The actual character of the conditions which led to the women movement have vastly altered since Mary Wollstonecraft wrote.

Before the nineteenth century individual women, or groups of women, had from time to time risen to eminence. Such women have been credited with great ability and constructive power, with how much truth, future historians must decide. But these women were accidental. They were historical "sports" made by their circumstances, and for all the notice taken by history of the ordinary woman, she might never have existed. It is little wonder that Mary Wollstonecraft, considering as she did, "Independence . . . the grand blessing of life, the basis of every virtue," and personally determined to secure it, "by

contracting my wants, though I were to live on a barren heath," it is little wonder that she writhed when she saw the abject dependence in which most of the women of her day lived. And seeing that their independence was impossible without education, she made the necessity of education the concrete outcome of her abstract principles.

The result of her writings was that, by the time the second period, of which J. S. Mill was the spokesman, was reached, public opinion had been sufficiently educated to see that women were under grave disadvantages with men.

And therefore J. S. Mill was able to say in a speech in the House of Commons on the Suffrage, that he was not going to argue the question of women's rights on abstract justice, but expediency. And admitting expediency, though the mid-century movement did not result in suffrage, it changed and improved the legal position of women, and outside Parliament resulted in the growth of educational facilities for women.

Both these early movements have succeeded, because though they "stood on abstract justice, backed by possible expediency," the consensus of public opinion accepted the expediency and ignored the abstract justice.

But the third movement—that of to-day—is a different one.

At the end of the nineteenth century women as a class are historically interesting as they have never been before. In 1792, when Mary Wollstonecraft's "Vindication" was published, the industrial revolution had scarcely begun, and political economy was in its infancy. It was still biologically correct to hold that the origin of the human race was in Adam and Eve,

and it was believed that the doctrine of self-abnegation applied particularly to women.

In 1899 women are fighting for equity in economic conditions as well as equality in social, and fighting under acute industrial competition. The physiocratic political economy has given place to the modern political science which has travelled far from the first crude notion of natural rights. And the growth of opportunity is teaching women that self-abnegation is of little value, unless there has been a realisation of the self which is to be abnegated.

The result of this enormous growth in industry and thought is that now amongst women there is a general movement extending over the world, with a common object, and with a more or less general and conscious undercurrent of revolt, against the established order, and a more or less conscious recognition of citizenship and its responsibilities. This new movement is crude because it is young, it is ignorant because its mind is badly fed, it has no clear perception of what it is, or to what it is ultimately tending; but it is there, and it is a factor which it is folly in the legislator to treat lightly and the biologist to ignore.

Seeing this new development, and realising the complexity of modern conditions, it is obvious that the principles which moved the pioneers of women's freedom are entirely out of place in dealing with a new phase of the movement. A rule of thumb of an individualist nature is well enough for a young movement affecting one sex, and only a small part of that. But more exact measures become necessary when the movement has grown so much that it affects both sexes, and threatens to affect the future of the race.

And so far there is no indication that any

attempt is being made to supply the exact measure which is needed. "The guides are all talking; they are settling the affairs of the Universe. They never cease."

In the meantime the movement grows. The gradual rising of the standard of life is pushing more women into industry; industrial competition is leading to more political agitation. And what shall it be in the end thereof?

Before any clear thinking is possible on this question, the Jonah of abstract right must be thrown overboard, and women must understand that it is not immoral to believe that in politics expediency is more important than abstract principle.

The modern State cannot be run on any abstract principle. Individual men and women may rule their lives on principle, but when the different principles meet in a Parliament, business would stand still if the members spent time in endeavouring to legislate on the greatest common measure of principle.

The reforming politician who, in his first enthusiasm, bases his arguments on abstract justice, finds the complexity of every modern question forcing him back on expediency as the only safe guide. And as ultimately most Parliamentary problems resolve themselves into bread-and-butter legislation, speaking for an oppressed class, he must show that it is suffering under injustice which interferes with its industrial fitness. If the question were an industrial one only, it would fall mechanically under the same process, and be solved by the same means as ordinary Parliamentary problems. But the sex factor is the one which upsets the calculation, and makes politicians adverse to enlarging the sphere of woman's work in

social life, until there is further light as to what her work ought to be. And the woman politician, instead of supplying the light, has hitherto contented herself with hammering the Parliamentary wooden head with a flabby opinion that in politics there is no sex. The result, as embodied in recent transactions, is one which, "though it may make the unskilful laugh, cannot but make the judicious grieve."

The root of the difficulty is, that in her work in social life her sex has always made a woman a casual labourer. There are three social careers now open to women—Motherhood, Industry (mental or physical), Public Work. Like the casual labourer, woman passes from one work to another, or tries to combine all, according to circumstances. And therefore her standard of work is less high than that of the skilled mechanic, and because she is a Jack-of-all trades, she is master of none. And the woman problem will remain unsolved until it is decided whether this is simply due to circumstances or whether it is an inherent necessity due to sex.

The question now waiting for an answer is whether, given the same training, women in afterlife can do men's work as well as men, or must their sex inevitably lower their standard. And the further question lying beyond this one is, whether, even supposing women can attain men's standard, it is advisable they should do the same work? Will throwing open other careers to women divert the main energies of the majority of women from carrying on the physical continuity of the race? Will not intellectual snobbery lead them to prefer to attempt work now more highly esteemed?

While we wait for an answer to these questions there is one great moral obligation lying on all

women. They must have the moral courage to face the fact that, so far, they have been Jacks-of-all-trades, and that in a complicated society where the doctrine of the expert is daily gaining ground, it is perfectly reasonable to distrust the amateur who claims to have a voice in affairs. And they must see that the best way the modern woman can help to solve the difficulty is to cease to be an amateur.

Women must drop the futile cry of Give us a chance, and must make the best use of their present opportunities. In educational matters and in medicine women have realised this, and are doing more for the freedom of their sex than any other classes of women.

The other classes of women must follow.

The working woman (of any sect), fighting for equal wages with men, must give equal work and develop equal *esprit de corps*.

The woman who is a mother must cease to think that she is a mother because she has not had intellect to demand another career, and must cultivate an efficiency which will enable her to look with scorn on those who imply hers is an inferior profession.

The political woman, wishing not only the comparatively unimportant vote, but the power of legislating also, must understand that she will be a danger instead of a help to the State, unless she has humility enough to begin at the bottom of the political science ladder, and work her way up.

And all classes of women must cultivate more deliberation in choosing their professions, and more self-control in sticking to them when chosen.

For the individual woman who has realised and acted on this there ceases to be a woman question.

First-rate ability is so rare in the world that it can command its price anywhere. And the effort to reach the highest standard is in itself enough to sink minor considerations.

"He doeth much that doeth a thing well. By little and little, and by patience, with long-suffering . . . thou shalt more easily overcome, than with violence, and thine own importunity."

THE WORK OF A LADIES' SETTLEMENT

MISS ETHEL M. PORTAL

The economic structure of Society—The aim of St. Margaret's Women's Settlement is to influence the character of individuals: (*a*) of their own residents; (*b*) working-women outside the House—Methods: Clubs, classes, games, meetings, &c., and assisting by friendly helpers — The philanthropic Societies of the district — Special difficulties in the way of women failing to consider themselves as part of a great whole in the economic structure of Society — The attempt to awaken a factory girl's social conscience—Results.

IN one of the C.S.U. leaflets issued by the Oxford University branch, it is stated "That the economic structure of Society is formed of many strata. The manual worker, the capitalist employer, the wholesale trader, the shopkeeper, and the customer are linked together by a chain of bargains. In each of these bargains a great strategic superiority is possessed by the buyer over the seller. Thus, at one end of the chain the isolated workman cannot make a 'free' bargain with his employer; he has not the same knowledge of the market, and cannot afford to wait; and so on, till at the other end of the chain, the like advantage is possessed by the individual customer, who can buy when and how he chooses, whereas the shopkeeper depends on his quick turnover. The individual customer is thus the ultimate source of the pressure which crushes the small capitalist or the isolated workman," and the author goes on to say

that the capitalist tries to evade this pressure by means of patents, contracts, fresh markets, &c., while the workman tries to evade the same pressure by means of Trade Unions.

This very able leaflet seems to me to point us straight to the very root of evil in our economic relationships. It is the individual that is at fault—the individual customer at one end of the chain, the individual workman or workwoman at the other. Both of them need to realise how gravely their own action affects their fellows, and how often it may be their duty to forego immediate advantage for the sake of ultimate progress.

The aim of a Women's Settlement is, from beginning to end, to influence and raise the character of individuals—that of the "individual customer" on the one hand, and of the individual workman or woman on the other. The first character that needs raising, and the one that perhaps needs it most, is that of the resident in the Settlement. As a rule, residents when they first come have hardly awakened to the fact that they have a social conscience at all; and among the many beautiful and cheering sights in settlement life, there are few more beautiful and more frequent than the sight of the development and sturdy growth of this side of the resident's character. The scores of women who during the last few years have passed through a Settlement, and left it immeasurably richer in character than when they joined it, must be a cause of profound thankfulness and hope to all who have witnessed or experienced the fact.

But besides this most important part of the work, a Women's Settlement tries to influence the character of the factory girls and working women in their

neighbourhood. They, too, are terribly inclined to measure their obligations by the limits of their family or friends—their Trade Unions are proverbially difficult to keep alive—and the signs of growth and development in them are not nearly so marked and so rapid as in the case of residents. But being convinced that this must be the object of our work, and also that the Christian Social Union provides the natural lines on which to attempt that work, it may not be amiss to give some account of one Settlement which for many years has been striving in this direction.

St. Margaret's House in Bethnal Green is the ladies' branch of the Oxford House; and this, as is well known, is a Church Settlement.

The principal Residents of St. Margaret's form a group of the Christian Social Union, and in the work carried on by our House we try to keep the objects of the Union before us, and, so far as we can, to advance them.

In considering those amongst whom we live, in whatever rank of life, there is perhaps nothing that startles and saddens us so much as the glaring disparity between their religious principles and their social practice. People whose religious or ethical principles are clear and lofty only too often do not apply them to their commercial and social dealings with their fellow-men. It is natural that this should be difficult. A sense of a duty towards individuals comes to birth long before the sense of a duty towards a community, and is kept alive by the actual sight of the relations between actions and their results; whereas, in our dealings with the community, we have to determine on our duty, and then act upon it in faith,

without probably ever seeing any good consequences of the high-minded action, or any evil consequences of the individualistic deed.

Recognising the fact of this low standard of the public conscience, the Christian Social Union sets forth as its first object "To claim for the Christian law the ultimate authority to rule social practice." The need for such a Union is daily apparent. In many, perhaps in most, cases, our private conscience is far in advance of our public conscience. We consult it as to our dealings with our next-door neighbours, and consider the effect of our actions upon them, far more carefully than we consider the effect of our actions on the whole community.

As has been well said by Professor Caird, "The essential contradiction of the attempt to divide human life into two halves, and to determine definitely what was Cæsar's and what was God's, showed itself in the logic of facts. . . . The problem is not to divide the world between God and Cæsar; or as we should now say, between God and humanity; but to give all to God in giving all to humanity, humanity being conceived, not as a collection of individuals, but as an organism in which the Divine Spirit reveals Himself." That is to say, our duty to God and to humanity is one duty, extending to every aspect of life, and including all our dealings with our fellows; claiming that nothing in life is beyond the province of conscience—neither the purchase of sweated goods, nor the shilling given to a beggar. Our conscience is not very enlightened yet. We do not, as a nation, always make it a matter of conscience whether or not we will rush off to buy a "wonderfully cheap bargain," or whether we will supply amateur work or services to the

exclusion of the struggling professional. Our social conscience immensely needs educating, and this is the second object of the Christian Social Union, "To study in common how to apply the moral truths and principles of Christianity to the social and economic difficulties of the present time." At St. Margaret's House we try to achieve this by a reading union, meeting weekly to discuss social and economic questions, generally in preparation for the monthly Christian Social Union meetings. To help its various groups in this matter, the Christian Social Union have lately started a library, out of which they lend books recommended for the study of its members, and in this way it is hoped that even in the busy life of East London, time can be found to study those fundamental questions, the *results* of which are daily before our eyes as we go about the streets of Bethnal Green.

In the same direction is another attempt originated by the Ladies' Oxford House, namely, a federation of Women's Settlements in London, meeting three or four times a year to discuss methods and compare experiences.

The third object of the Christian Social Union is, "To present Christ in practical life as the living Master and King, the enemy of wrong and selfishness, the power of righteousness and love"; and the very wording of this is perhaps a sufficient reason why our Settlement should base its social work on a Church foundation; because, to quote Professor Caird again, "Religion does not lift man *out* of the practical struggle for good, but, in a sense, it lifts him *above* it. It turns morality from the effort after a distant and unattainable ideal, into a consciousness of a divine

power within and without us, of which *all things are the manifestations.*"

It must not for a moment be thought, when it is said that our Settlement is on Church lines, that all work done there is distinctly religious, or that any sort of religious test is imposed on those among whom we work. Our various clubs resemble everybody else's clubs. We have a complete chain of them—a children's guild for those still at school, a junior club for those passed out, and more than one senior club for girls over sixteen. None of these are parochial. Their occupations vary from night to night. Sometimes only games are being played, sometimes it is musical drill and dancing, sometimes classes—dramatic, singing, dressmaking, or drawing; and a cheering sight the big clubrooms are when filled with those eager, cheery factory-girls, whose high spirits are a perpetual surprise when the drudgery of their long hours of work is considered. And a cheerful body are the residents at St. Margaret's, too; some of them permanent residents, some coming for a few months at a time; all of them realising and appreciating the happiness of their life in common, the strong feeling of loyalty to "the House"—that *esprit de corps* which has always been the tone of the Settlement, and proves the higher meaning of the word "family life."

There are many different branches of work carried on by the residents—visiting, whether in hospital or workhouse, or in different surrounding parishes; nursing, supplying workers to the C.O.S., the C.C.H.F., and the M.A.B.Y.S., and helpers in mothers' meetings, and clubs and classes other than those of the House. And here I may add that, like most other

East-Enders, we are always ready to receive more support, whether it be new workers or subscribers, and that all applications should be made to the head of the House—Miss Harington, St. Margaret's House, Bethnal Green.

Our hope and our ideal in working among the women of East London is to get them to apply the principles of the Christian Social Union to their own lives; to consider themselves not merely as individuals, but as parts of a great whole; to get them to apply these principles to the work they take, and the conditions under which it is carried on.

Women's work—I suppose no one will dispute this much—is in most departments miserably underpaid, and in many factories miserably circumstanced. We know that there are employers who do all in their power to remedy such evils, and who treat their hands with the greatest fairness and kindness. All honour to them for their action. But it is the employers themselves who tell us that they are hampered in their efforts by the fearful pressure of competition, by the constant demand for cheapness (wherein we consumers are to blame), and by the fact that any *less* conscientious employer, offering lower pay in order to turn out cheaper work, finds a never-failing supply of girls ready to take it, and here it is that the girls need educating. We sometimes hear it said that these subjects do not come within the scope of our work, that "our business is to try and raise the morals of the girls, and not meddle with what concerns *only their work*."

I need hardly say that I differ profoundly from any such views, as I differ from the tradesman who told me, "I like to keep my business and my religion

separate"; and who, therefore, went to holiness meetings on Sundays and declared himself saved, whilst in the week he kept his shop open on early-closing nights, and kept his shop-boys at work, to pick up the custom lost by those who did close early. A religion that is shut up in a separate compartment by itself, and has nothing to do with the shop or the factory, is hardly the one that will make us a righteous nation; and, therefore, on Christian Social Union principles, we *wish* to influence our girls as to their work, only bearing this in mind, that it is not *views* we aim at influencing, but *motives*. We would like to get every girl to look upon the conditions of her work in the light of conscience, and to act as that conscience shall direct her.

First, as to her acceptance of work. Wherever we look we find girls, in times of distress and poverty at home, taking work in factories at a lower rate than before, with the frequent result of bringing down the level of pay for all the other workers in their room. We have heard girls say to ourselves, "With mother so ill as she is now, I would take the work at anything I could get it for. *There's plenty will take it if I don't.*" Now, do not let us hurry to say whether she ought or ought not to take it; do not let us, off-hand, ask of her a sacrifice that we might well hesitate to make ourselves; but do let us work as best we can to alter the dormant state of public conscience that makes it so very hard for her to take the highest line; and do let us get her to apply her conscience to the question, considering not only *her* family, but the families of all those whom she may impoverish by her action.

Or we may find her taking in work at home,

which comes to her through the hands of one, or two, or three middle-women. We have plenty of them in Bethnal Green, making cardboard boxes at 2¾d. the gross, out of which they find their own glue; or covering staybones at about the same price; or trouser-finishing at 2¼d. apiece—taking it, that is, at such a price that a girl *can* perhaps just "keep the house together" by getting her little sisters or a neighbour's child to help, but which she knows means, in the case of many, many other girls who have no one to help them, that they can only keep themselves, and perhaps a sick parent, by supplementing such starvation wages earned through the day by other wages less honourably earned by night. Again I say, do not let us lay down the law to her—"you ought, or ought not to take it"—but do, for God's sake, let us try to make her apply her own conscience to the case, and decide according to its dictates. It is *her* social conscience that we want to awaken, that *she* should claim for Christian law the ultimate authority to rule social practice.

Then, as to the conditions under which her work is carried on. We all know that there are factories where the sanitary arrangements are a disgrace, where the inspection is a farce, and where the petty tyranny of a foreman is a moral *danger* as well as a terror. We all know also that such abuses are sometimes entirely against the will of the employer; and we have heard, both from employers and from inspectors, that their chief hindrance in righting such wrongs lies in the cowardice of the girls themselves. "If I was to say a word, I should get the sack—and that's all that would happen." But, once awaken their social conscience, once let them realise that their own

safety may mean the peril of others, and believe, *from their own experience*, that if even one member is suffering, all must suffer together, and we shall see them by degrees coming to acknowledge one authority, and one only, to rule their social practice every bit as much as their private life. We want to see a change of personal pronoun: to get rid of "*my* rights, *my* grievances, *my* profits," and to hear instead "*our* welfare"; to see the principle of the Christian Social Union so carried out, that individual gain at the expense of social wrong shall be looked upon as in no way different from pocket-picking; that the girl whose conscience would not allow her in private life to steal, or cheat, or lie, should find her conscience just as peremptory about stealing overtime, conniving at concealment of it, paying illegal fines, and all the dozen other ways in which it is most important that she should look upon herself as only one of many, weakening *their* hands by trying only to strengthen her own.

I know a girl who gave up good employment because an awakened conscience forbade her to go on pasting on to bottles what she knew to be fraudulent labels. Other work was obtained for her afterwards, at less pay. Was she a loser or a gainer by her action? If we consider her simply as an individual, she lost by it; but if we think of her, as she had grown to think of herself, as one fragment of a large body, a fragment whose life was only a part of the life of the whole, we must admit that she gained, because she contributed to the quickening of that social conscience on which the health of the whole body depends. This then is what the Christian Social Union would aim at for these factory-women: to set their own

consciences working; not to work ours *for them;* not to try and make them accept our views; not to mind if they come to conclusions that we think utterly wrong, so long as we are convinced that those conclusions have been arrived at by the light of conscience, applied to the case, not of an individual seeking to "better herself" alone, but of a member of a world-wide sisterhood, the cause of one of whom is the cause of all.

I have given but a very inadequate account, either of the Christian Social Union, or of the Ladies' Branch of the Oxford House. I have not pointed to any glowing results, nor triumphant calculation of successes. Nor do I think this is possible. We try to acknowledge our debt to our poorer neighbours, and to pay it in person, by living among them, and doing what we may to break down those barriers of distrust which generations of class prejudice have raised, and of such work statistical results are not to be expected.

But this much we can say, that every year at St. Margaret's House increases our love and strengthens our ties with our neighbours; that we can count many real friends among the girls in the clubs, the mothers in the mothers' meetings, the fathers, and whole families in the district; and that we long to welcome others to join us in the work that brings so much happiness in the doing, so strong a realisation of the brotherhood and sisterhood of the whole race.

WOMEN'S WORK ON VESTRIES AND COUNCILS

By Miss ALICE E. BUSK

Absence of public spirit in London Local Government—Men of administrative capacity too busy to undertake the work—Women of leisure and ability available—Some already serving on all Committees—Survey of women's work in one poor parish—Suggestions of urgently needed reforms in the Metropolis—Scope for the co-operation of women on Rural Boards.

When the Local Government Act of 1894 was passed, women were for the first time in clear and definite terms admitted to take part in the work of London Vestries, of Urban and of Rural District Councils, and of Parish Councils.

As a member of a Vestry since November 1894, I propose, first, to consider how this invitation to work —if such it may be called—has been responded to by women in London; and, secondly, to give such detailed information as I have been able to gather as to the way in which the same work has been taken in town and country districts.

There were not wanting women who realised soon as the Act was passed, that a wide field usefulness had been opened to them, and elections a certain number were returned the country. It is to be regretted that did not avail themselves of the offered; this was probably due

public at large hardly realised the scope of the work dealt with by these local authorities. There prevailed a general idea that Guardians dealt with persons, and that Vestries and Councils dealt only with things, and that the details of official work were wearisome, because the results were not commensurate with the labour involved.

No heresy is more dangerous. The bane of local self-government in London is the lack of interest on the part of the Electorate. The well-to-do shut their eyes to their municipal responsibilities, despising the day of small things. They have the fear neither of God nor of Tammany before their eyes. The working-class are so ignorant of the extent to which local self-government may improve the circumstances and conditions of their lives, that they will not even take the trouble to vote. Such would appear to be the main reasons which actuated the Legislature in introducing its London Government Bill.

The Government decided (quite rightly, as I think) to try by some extraordinary means to arouse in the minds of Londoners some interest in their own local affairs, in the hope, I suppose, that if the local authority were given a new name, that public spirit which is to be found in Boroughs might be born in London. So far none of us can object. It is a laudable aspiration with which all must sympathise; though we do expect very much result, we may smile complacently as a first step towards reform, they have been content to exclude women altogether, as though there were a plethora of administrative ability waiting for employment at the hands of the locality. In fact, administrative capacity is rare, and commands a high salary in the open

market, because, as administrative capacity begets money, shareholders and directors are willing to pay handsomely for it. The result is that, if a man has real administrative capacity or experience, he has so many openings that he will not undertake local administrative work; such work is unknown, it is unnoticed and unrewarded; it is dull, it is humdrum; it leads nowhere, neither to knighthoods nor peerages. How badly soever the work is done, the well-to-do Londoner's pocket is not seriously affected, and there lies his conscience: the society of his colleagues, he tells you, would not be congenial; he does not choose to have flung at him the gibes of the little local newspaper. Such excuses are common. Most men of position and influence are too sensitive, too highly-strung to face this kind of thing—they cannot and will not put up with it; and we know that, as it brings no tangible reward, so of course they have no time to undertake it. All these excuses we accept. But now, be it observed, the most capable women may not take part in this work—though the most capable men will not touch it! We did not ask that the electors should be compelled to return us, only that they might be allowed to do so if so disposed.

I am anxious not to exaggerate the latent capacities of my own sex, but I do not hesitate to affirm that there are women with administrative capacity and leisure who would discharge, with credit to themselves and benefit to the community, such duties as come within the scope of a local authority.

It goes without saying that the method of procedure upon all public bodies must be thoroughly learned by all who propose to take a part in their

deliberations. One of our most experienced Vestrywomen relates that for some years previous to her election she had regularly availed herself of the ratepayers' privilege of attending the meetings as a listener; and to this no doubt may be attributed the grasp which she now has of all the subjects with which the Vestry deals. Candidates must also make themselves familiar with the various powers that can be exercised under the different Acts of Parliament affecting their work. There is no need to labour the point, for the old adage holds true on Vestries as elsewhere, "Knowledge is power."* The solution of some difficulty, the defeat of some unscrupulous opponent, often depends on familiarity with the Act or bye-law dealing with the particular case.

The ideal candidate of the future will be one who takes so real an interest in the welfare of the community that he knows by personal observation the conditions which surround the lives of his constituents, and who will devote a large share of his time and thought to the work of the various Committees. For we must bear in mind that if other interests lead him to shirk the Committee work, much of the power will lapse into the hands of officials, and the ostensible object of the new Bill be defeated.

Facts speak for themselves, and that women have proved useful members of their various Boards cannot be doubted, for we find that they are serving in every department of Vestry work. They are members of such Committees as the following: Finance, Public Health, Works, General Purposes, Lighting, Parliamentary, and Parish Boundaries. They are, besides, Commissioners of Public Libraries, and of Baths and

Wash-houses, and Trustees of Parochial Charities, and one woman has been appointed an Overseer.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies once described Local Government as "offering the widest possible field for beneficent activity. By it," he said, "you can bring to all those opportunities, necessaries, and luxuries which otherwise would be but for the enjoyment of the few; by good Local Government you can improve the condition of the people, and confer on them health, comfort, recreation, and education."

I will now touch on some of the recent work of my own Vestry, to show how, in a little known part of London, we have been trying, however imperfectly, to reach out after this ideal.

Mr. Charles Booth, in his "Life and Labour of the People," describes the neighbourhood of St. George the Martyr, Southwark, as the poorest in London. The district is flat and low-lying, being situated below the level of the Thames high-water mark. The population is 212 to the acre, and the death-rate, though diminishing, is still far too high.

First, as regards the poverty of the parish. Feeling the futility of the existing system of Christmas doles, the Vestry drew up a scheme for the reform of the Parochial Charities. This scheme has been accepted almost in its entirety by the Charity Commissioners, and henceforth there will be the permanent benefit of pensions for the aged. A certain sum can be annually spent on nursing for the sick poor, or perchance it may bring within their reach the new scientific treatment of phthisis.

A very congenial work now brought to a successful

issue has been the erection of the Public Library for this poor parish. In consequence of the generous offer of £5000 from Mr. Passmore Edwards, the parish was polled on the question of the adoption of the Public Library Acts. The canvassing was largely carried out by ladies, and resulted in a majority of over 1800 for the adoption of the Acts. Commissioners were appointed by the Vestry, and in the first three months that our library was opened 1600 persons enrolled themselves as members.

In such a parish there is a vast amount of detailed work for the Sanitary Authority to do; and women on the Board who are in touch with the poor, and understand all the questions from their point of view, can give valuable help in various directions. Our disinfecting department has been completely re-organised; and the Vestry has built, on the advice of the Medical Officer of Health, a Reception House for the use of the relatives of infected patients. When a patient is removed to Hospital, the home whence the removal has taken place must be disinfected; and the dwellers in one or two-roomed tenements are invited meanwhile to make use of the Reception House. They can remain there for two nights if necessary; baths are provided, and their clothes are thoroughly disinfected before they return home. As there are no compulsory powers in London, we feared that our Reception House, like so many others, would have proved a failure; but we have happily succeeded in establishing such an *entente cordiale* with the poor that they really like their temporary home, and are willing therefore to use it.

The same friendly spirit has actuated us in the work of our tenement inspection.

Contrary to received notions, we appointed, in 1896, a woman inspector to measure up and place upon the register our lowest-class houses let in lodgings. So successful has she been in preventing overcrowding, in instructing the tenants in cleanliness, in insuring ventilation, and in getting the landlords to keep the tenements in proper condition of repair, that we have just appointed an additional woman for the same work; and the question of adding a third to our staff has already been mooted.

The infant death-rate per thousand is excessive; the services, therefore, of kindly and highly-trained women are much wanted in our crowded courts and alleys, to teach the simplest lessons as to how children should be fed, washed, clothed, and reared. Much suffering and death would be prevented were the Sanitary authorities to provide such instruction. Liverpool has already eight women employed in such ways as I have described, but in London generally the need does not seem yet to have been recognised.

Two disused burying-grounds were our only open spaces; but to these we have just added a real garden, and when some of our condemned courts are pulled down, we hope to gain yet another open space.

For all our blocks of dwellings—and we have more than our share—we need further powers. The staircase question is one that presses: where staircases remain open from the street, lights should burn all night, and gates, as far as possible, should be closed at midnight.

Owners, too, should be made responsible for proper supervision of their dwellings by night as well as by day. Evidence on this matter has been collected by women, and much more could and should be gathered.

Either the police should control the staircases, or the landlord should be forced to provide night watchmen.

Surely we have had the question with us long enough, for were we not startled into knowledge of it in 1888, when on the staircase of a block of dwellings was committed the first of that series of terrible crimes known as the Whitechapel murders? I speak from my own experience, inasmuch as it was my lot to take over the management of the building the week after that event had taken place. Yet the condition which made that possible still prevails; and, to the fear and misery of our respectable poor, their staircases and passages are often taken possession of at night by the lowest outcasts of the city.

As the Bill was originally drafted, the control of common lodging-houses was transferred to the Borough Councils. This change has not been effected; the supervision still rests with the County Council. How the existing authority has come short in grappling with this difficult subject we know. For instance, what can be more degrading than that men and women should use one common washing-place, and this, sometimes, a shed in the yard, open on three sides? Yet, according to latest official report, not in Southwark only, but elsewhere in London, this is often the case—Kensington heading the list with nine common lodging-houses, in which no separate provision is made. I will give but one illustration of the need of reform. Last year, in a lodging-house in my own ward, a young woman was kicked to death by the man with whom she was living, and this under the eyes of two innocent girls of thirteen and fifteen, who had drifted into the house.

Had women a voice in the matter the so-called

"doubles", would speedily be abolished, separate houses would be opened for women, women deputies would be appointed, and stringent regulations would be enforced to prevent the young frequenting these houses.

Had women been on the bodies that control these houses, what a strong helping-hand they could have held out to those voluntary workers—the very salt of the earth—who face the horrors even of common lodging-houses in order to help out of them one here and there.

These facts have been given in detail, because it is desired to show that there is a very real need in London of women's help in administrative work.

To sum up, I refer again to four much called-for reforms which we may regard as a first instalment of what women would have concentrated their efforts upon. First, house to house teaching of the most elementary laws of health; second, the responsibility of owners as regards the supervision of tenement property; third, the lighting of open staircases at night; fourth, complete reform of the conditions under which women are received into common lodging-houses.

It has been asked, as philanthropic work is always open to women, "Why is there any need for their election to the Boards?" But surely it should be evident to the meanest capacity that long-standing evils can only be eradicated by strong measures; and reforms, to be effectual, must have the authority of the law. In the House of Lords, in ordinary times, the influence of the Prime Minister is sufficient to determine the fate of a measure; yet the fact that the London Government Bill empowered women to

continue to take part in administering such laws, produced the remarkable spectacle of the Lord Chancellor leading the opposition, despite the earnest pleading of the Prime Minister; whilst in the House of Commons a Government whip was issued in direct opposition to the known opinion of the Minister who was in charge of the Bill.

I pass now to the consideration of the work of District Councils, for I rejoice to think that here, at any rate, women's work as citizens has an insured future.

As no lists are published of the members of District and Parish Councils, I have found it a little difficult to gather information. For such details as I have received of work throughout the country I am indebted to the courtesy and kindness of various individuals.

The principal functions of Urban Councils are "to look after the health and comfort of the inhabitants by enforcing the sanitary laws, providing pure water, good roads and footways, proper lighting at night, and regulating the erection of dwellings and the width and construction of streets."

So far very few women have offered themselves for election, though the work is much the same as on the Rural Councils. I feel I cannot do better than quote the opinion of a lady who has had four years' experience. She says: "On Urban District Councils there is plenty for a woman to do." She was herself on the Sanitary, Fire Brigade, Hospital, Common Allotments, and Housing of the Working-Classes Committees. Being an Irishwoman, she even took special interest in the building of the stables and

the choosing of the horses. She found the work fascinating, and during her four years of office allotments for working-men were secured, and workmen's dwellings were erected. So well satisfied was she with the administration of the Isolation Hospital, that at different times four of her children were sent there as inmates; and she pronounces the duties to be performed on an Urban District Council to be so many and varied that there must be some work to suit every one's taste.

Rural District Councils were brought into existence by the Local Government (England and Wales) Act, 1894. Prior to the passing of this Act the Elected Guardian became, by virtue of his office, a member of the Rural Sanitary Authority; but under the new order of things the Rural District Councillor is elected, and thereby becomes a member of the Board of Guardians.

As far as I can ascertain, there have been about one hundred and fifty women thus returned in England and Wales, and they appear to be throwing themselves with persistent energy into their duties as Guardians; but of all that they do in that way, and as members of Boarding-out and School Attendance Committees, I am not qualified to speak.

A smaller number have realised that, by taking part in the sanitary work of their neighbourhood, they can dig down to the root of some of those evils with which as Poor Law Guardians they must deal. To quote the words of one very experienced member: "The Rural District Council is the preventive agency, the Board of Guardians the curative. Common-sense tells us which is the more needful—may I make bold to say the more sacred work."

Those of us who live in cities are thankful to feel that our sisters in the country are being brought face to face with the difficulties of housing, so that they may realise how year by year they have been allowing the burden to slip off their shoulders on to ours. Out of two hundred Rural Districts, of which I have some particulars, in portions of fifty-three more cottages are urgently needed. Such an outlook is indeed serious when we remember the depopulated districts of England, and how little attraction our rural populations need to induce them to migrate to the towns. In questions of rural sanitation, I am informed, a laywoman's ideas are generally in advance of a layman's, though he be neither a farmer nor a landlord. But so great seems the innovation, that one medical officer could only say, in the strictest confidence, that in many ways women's help is much needed. When women assume their proper place on these Councils, what work do they undertake? Let me attempt to describe it in a sentence. They are responsible for the maintenance of the high roads, for the drainage of the district, for the proper sanitation of the houses, for providing a pure water supply (and in this way much has lately been done); they are charged with enforcing bye-laws with regard to new dwellings; they have to supervise Isolation Hospitals, &c. Here especially one feels how useful they may be. All arrangements for nursing should be their special work; and when one hears of an Isolation Hospital sometimes so overcrowded that boys and girls have had to share the same ward; when it has been known that two boys of fifteen and twelve have had, when fever patients, to share a bed two feet six inches wide; when a nurse takes night and day duty, and cooks also for the

patients; surely Mr. Boulnois would admit that even women might with advantage look into these matters. One lady speaks of the work of the Council as "plodding and useful." Another says how helpful it would be if "thoughtful outsiders would stay for a short time in the villages to offer suggestions and to brighten every one up." A third, speaking from experience, recommends that Sanitary Inspectors should be constantly moved from district to district; and in truth one can see the force of this, for to do any good they must make themselves unpleasant to landlords and to farmers alike. And it is not easy even for a man to be doing day by day, and week by week, those things which his most powerful neighbours regard as amounting to personal affronts.

Of Parish Councils it is difficult to get many particulars, but I gather that something under a hundred women have been elected to serve upon them.

In many places the interest in Parish Councils flags. The heart is taken out of them by the single fact that the community is small, and that the vote is taken by show of hands. This, in a gathering composed of employers and employed, must reduce the vote to an absolute farce. It is sometimes said that the powers of Parish Councils are so small, that it is hardly worth any one's while to serve; but I confess I am inclined to hold a different view. Those who are willing to think out patiently how they can help their neighbours seem to find that they can do much indirectly by putting other forces into motion, and not a little directly to improve village life. The administration of the Parochial Charities, the management of village-greens and recreation-grounds, the preservation

of footpaths, the appointment of overseers, the administration of any of the Adoptive Acts relating to Lighting, Baths and Wash-houses, and Public Libraries, are in the power of the Parish Councils.

Where much has been accomplished by any Council, it seems to have been generally by the leading of one individual. There is one active Parish Council which has succeeded in carrying through the Housing of the Working Classes Act, Part III., for Rural Districts. The Act is difficult to work, for not only has the consent of the District Council first to be obtained, but the County Council must also hold an inquiry before the Local Government Board will, after a final inquiry on its own account, give sanction for raising a loan to purchase land and build. The same Parish Council has provided allotments, and has secured from its District Council analyses of water when required, and has also had transferred to it the power of providing Isolation Hospital accommodation.

These country ladies as Councillors are serving the highest interests of their fellow-citizens—they are imbued with the kindly, the hopeful, and the earnest spirit. Women of such "sweet reasonableness" are a strength to the nation and a bright example.

But to revert to London's needs. Only those who like myself have served on a Vestry as the representative of a large number of poverty-stricken, little-educated, and therefore voiceless people, can realise what power for good throughout our great Metropolis the Church has in the past thrown away by her apathy in local affairs; but her "day of grace is past and gone"—for remember, by the New Act her official

connection is abolished. Women after five years of successful work may no longer share in local administration. Will not Christian Teachers of all denominations try to awaken in their men hearers a sense of their responsibilities, and the obligation of civic service?

THE OBLIGATIONS OF SOCIAL SERVICE

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Ethics more than individual—Morality a social growth—Human solidarity the base of social obligation—Personal justice—Social justice—Duty of knowing—Duty of active efforts—Inequality of opportunity—Every man his due—Service—Christian claims—Practical methods, individual and combined—Duty in politics—Danger of indifference—Moral obligations of wealth—Luxury—Poverty—Faith—Character.

THE science of Christian Ethics embraces more than the duty of man to man. Even in dealing with mere individual Ethics we cannot leave the social obligations of the individual out of sight. The very character of the individual is largely due to inheritance and to environment. Both inheritance and environment demand from Ethics an analysis of social duty. Further, no individual lives the life of a Crusoe amidst the complex relationships of modern society. Men and women are all inter-dependent. The very world is now one market, and may ere long, for certain of its interests, be discussing, through an international Committee, supreme questions of peace and war. The mere individual is, in fact, discredited in modern thought. His political economy has been found out. His doctrine of self-interest as the most effective motive for good in economics is exploded. Few believe now that the sweating master-tailor will necessarily confer the

greatest possible benefits on his workers as well as on himself if only you give him time enough. Selfishness turns out after all, notwithstanding the blessings of earlier economists, to be nothing but selfishness. Some are even bold enough to question the right of a man to do "what he likes with his own," and that too on the ground that a man has, after all, so little that can be called his own entirely.

Man, indeed, is social from the first. The social Ethics that claim command of his conscience are prior to all individual Ethics. He does not choose his family or his home. Long before he "comes of age" he has incurred a debt that he can scarcely repay to home, family, and neighbourhood. The independence of the individual can only be established as a theory by wiping out the most human memories of his childhood. Just as he does not choose the associations of his cradle, so too he does not choose, either, the environment of boyhood. If, as a man, he chooses freely his profession, it is only because some one else's successful labour, inherited, freely given, or appropriated, has made it possible. Most men are what they are because they have been compelled to become so. Few, it may be said, would always have preferred the work that life has set them to do. And in what work they are doing they largely depend on others for success and even for life. The whole of England, not to say humanity, is bound together by one inseparable chain. The "one loaf" of St. Paul is a symbol not only of Church unity, but of human brotherhood.

Without the interaction of man on man morality can scarcely begin. Moral life is developed within the society. The very word Commonwealth, of which

we all are members, implies something far deeper than a commercial partnership with very limited liability. The Commonwealth is an organic combination, which has its roots in far-off history, out of which it has grown. It is in all respects not a state of contract, but a growth. It refuses to be poured into any mould, such as contract. It refuses, so to speak, to stiffen. It will not be petrified. It is evolved; subject to law, but not to mechanical law. The laws of social life are analogous rather to the laws of biology. Even classes are a growth; and if classes had always recognised a common mutual duty, it is very possible that class distinctions would endure much longer than seems now likely to the political diviner.

Inter-dependence, then, is a law of human life. There is between men and men a solidarity that no individual denial can undo. Hence arise for us primary social obligations. It is surely impossible, or at least immoral, not to pay our social debts. The man who sends his mother to the workhouse, being himself above the line of famine, is worse than a savage. Why is the man any higher in the scale of humanity who sends to the workhouse those members of the industrial army who have done good service in their day, but who, in the increasing stress of industrial life, find themselves at (say) sixty without work and without friends?

The highest primary obligation in our social life is justice. Of course we must be just ourselves. No one will deny that. The man who defends the rights of property above even the claims of love always does so on the grounds of justice, either to himself or to other men circumstanced as he himself is. The just

man at least pays what he has undertaken to pay, keeps his pledged word, and does unto others as much as the social conscience has recognised and embodied in the laws of to-day.

But the duty of justice is not yet then fulfilled. A man who in this sense has been just has not been just enough. He cannot wash his hands of his authority and influence. He has a duty to make things just in the world, so far as he can influence it. The mediæval knight rode through the forest and across the fen to succour virtue in distress. The satirist called him Don Quixote, and laughed at him; but he was just fulfilling an elementary social duty to common justice. The modern knight who runs round a corner and disappears when some one is being bullied by a mob is a coward, of course; but he is also immoral. His receipted bills will not acquit him before a greater Judgment Seat than the County Court. Each one of us is responsible for some portion of the injustice that grows out of inhumanity. Whatever thus grows out of inhumanity, humanity in us must rectify.

It is no defence to plead ignorance. *Ignoratio legis non excusat.* Have we inquired? Have we studied how to help our fellows? Have we sought to hear the logic of the unfortunate, and, be the cost what it may to ourselves, to see real justice done? It is no longer possible for any man to say that he has never heard of the social problem or the evils of great cities. Be his interests what they may, be his party what it may, be his press-organ what it may, he must have heard of them. With hearing begins responsibility. He is a voter: how does he vote? does he vote on principle? does he resolve to compel his party to be just? A party never, save by the inspiration

of some exceptional spirit, rises above the average man of its side. Is our citizen moral enough to act upon the average man and lift him on to a really moral level? "Out of sight, out of mind," is an old saying. "Out of sight, out of morality," is some men's rendering. Because the slum, which human nature in the slum, assisted by the licensing laws, the land laws, and the wage contracts, is creating—because the slum is out of sight, it seems to have no further connection with morality. The respectable citizen of the neighbouring square, whose comfortable income is derived partly from ground rents, partly from trade profits, and partly from the dividend of a brewery company, has never seen the slum or the slum tenants, and is unconscious of any injustice towards them. So once were we Englishmen unconscious of our social duty to Africans who were kidnapped and transported into slavery under cover of our flag, because, forsooth, we did not form the captain and the crew!

Undoubtedly the duty of personal justice involves the duty of helping to make things just in the world. Hence comes the duty of either active effort or practical sympathy in social reform, even though the solution may call on us for surrender of our superfluities. Somewhere or other in the struggle will come the conflict between personal advantage and social justice; and the road we then take will be the test of our personal morality.

This duty of social justice involves a truth beyond. We are bound to remedy injustice to others, because every man, besides ourselves, and, of course, including ourselves, has his due. There are, we allow, great inequalities between man and man. Some of these

are grounded on differences of nature which seem beyond our present control. It would be dangerous to say that even these are wholly beyond our control. There is a vast difference between a healthy Italian or Austrian noble and a peasant crétin. Yet there is a cure for the crétinism of the Alpine valley. So too there are cures within our reach for many of the diseases of mind and body that afflict our fellow-men. Even if the present be irremediable, the future is ours. But a great many more inequalities are the result of history. They grow out of inequalities of opportunity, which it is perfectly within our power to remedy. Every human being has as much a natural right, as we have a natural or an acquired right, to make the best that he can of the faculties that he possesses. A moral State must make it possible to house and educate its citizens, and so to organise itself as to enable them to feed themselves. If any one is living a less than human life, because nothing more has been offered him, and if this failure be due to our selfishness or our indifference or our preoccupation, then we are neither more nor less than immoral. We may not, of course, be breaking the law, but that is only because the law is no more moral than we. Law expresses a compromise between average men; it is often only just that amount of justice that can be at any time secured by compromise.

Every man has his due; that is an elementary principle of social morality. Such a claim has obviously an endless scope. It covers almost the whole ground. Whatever we thus claim for ourselves, we must accord to others. Whatever we desire for ourselves, we must surely equally desire for others. Whatever we would fain see our children enjoying,

how can it be moral to be indifferent about in the case of the children of others? There is no social evil that, in the light of such a truth, we can leave alone. We may not be able—of course we shall not be able—to eliminate the personal equation at the bottom of all evils. We cannot force the dirty to wash; but he is not responsible for his dirt if we are the monopolists of soap and water, and refuse to supply him with either, save at a price that he cannot afford to pay.

In old pagan days, as we all know, even advanced philosophers held a kind of social Calvinism. Society consisted of the select few. The mass were enslaved for the benefit of the elect few. The law of slavery appeared to be grounded in nature and not in history. Is there not still something of this creed remaining? A few are still amongst us who talk of economic laws as laws of Nature against which it is useless to fight. They appear to think that the present distribution of wealth is as much the effect of natural law as the present distribution of sea and land. They too hold that every man has his due, but in a very different sense to the claims of ethics. Their conception of personal justness never rises above the observance of contract; and contract, in their view, is necessarily and wholly conditioned by the struggle for existence.

Given social morality, as we have broadly defined it, and given, further, social problems to be solved, there arises a moral obligation of social service. Morality forbids us to live either an individual or a family life out of relation to the needs of our fellow-men. Our citizenship must be exercised for others as well as for ourselves; so too must our recreation, our education, our wealth. If we are employers, we owe

a duty to our workers; if workers, to our employers; "each for all and all for each," the watchword of co-operation, is the best expression of our creed. Yet social morality, like all other morality and law, is in itself a comparatively powerless thing. Law, and even moral codes, cannot give life. There is needed an inspiration and a living method of action. That inspiration comes from a sense of brotherhood; that living method is the way of personal sacrifice. These two are the tests of the upward bend of social development. Without the sense of human brotherhood our present social problems could only issue in a struggle of classes; without the method of personal sacrifice no faith in our sense of brotherhood can be brought home to the alienated. At the best the solving of our problems will often bring disappointment and weariness; nothing but the old virtue of brotherly love will conquer pessimism when disappointment comes.

To a man who believes in the Christian creed and life both the motive and the method for doing social justice will appear as, above all else, Christian. Christian morality is a code of principles for members of a body: it is alike social and individual; it is individual only in direct relation to the society. Every principle we have been contending for is distinctly and especially Christian. In the New Testament we may readily allow that we have no precise development of political and social duties. It is easy to see why. There was no such complex political or social life in Galilee and Jerusalem as we have about us today. There were even fewer problems than forced themselves in Corinth on the Apostle of the Gentiles. Yet St. Paul found no difficulty in applying his

principles to the new and more complicated state of things. The Gospel has been well said to "have been a gift to man's commonsense," and wherever sanctified commonsense has applied it, men have found in it ever fresh opportunities of guidance. The problems that we have to deal with are intensely complex. But the principles of their solution are unaltered. The details need greater patience doubtless; but where evils are visible and are largely due to organisation, we must reorganise our common life in the spirit of Christ. That spirit is not the spirit of mere law or mere morality. It is the spirit of love and of sacrifice. Social morality and the social principles of Christianity are one and the same.

The obligation of social service is moral, Christian, and personal. How is it to be fulfilled? In the first place, we must enter actively and personally into the life of the community. Human society has still claims on us when our business and our pleasures are alike over. We are debtors to our fellows, and we must pay the debt. University Settlements and religious centres can organise both our money and ourselves. Their members could be multiplied tenfold at once if, as a class, the well-to-do members of the community recognise the obligation of personal service. Clubs, games, lectures, classes, all kinds of useful societies, all need us. Endless links may be forged by our presence and sympathy between rich and poor. Married couples might, if without family ties, have an east or south London lodging from which, as from a base of operation, good work might be done. What is wanted is not alms, but personal contact; not merely Christianity, but Christians. Some may prefer the Settlement to the Church, others may be free-lances, but all

could do something. Toynbee Hall, the Oxford House, the Maurice Hostel, College Missions, the Mansfield Settlement—there is no lack of secular or religious opportunity. Nor need a man be idle before he can be useful. The man who can give one definite evening a week, the woman who has only one afternoon to spare, both can be worked in. All that is needed is just the sense of moral claim to inspire the spirit of mission.

Secondly, we must make full use of our citizenship. Be our political party what it may, we must demand that effective social reform shall be its serious business. If our sympathies do not attach us to any definite party in the State (if indeed any political party can now any longer be said to be defined), we must at least, as we help the pendulum to swing, see that we do so, as far as possible, in the direction of dealing with those human ills which neither intellect nor conscience can deny. Nor let us forget that good citizenship covers a much wider field than mere political loyalty or preference. The public life of city, town, and village calls loudly for men with pure aims and disinterested enthusiasm. Human nature in England is no better than human nature in Tammany if we eliminate such men from the public service. Sanitary abuses, over-crowding, profitable rings, licensing interests—if we shrug our shoulders and refuse to have our ease disturbed—these will prosper and grow stronger.

Evil is more easily organised than good; there is an organic unity in political and social disease and disorganisation as much as in growth; into this battle we must go down and fight, with just as much resolution as our forebears have fought for liberty. There

is nothing more deadly to the health of the community as the indifferent good, the men and women who consider everything "so shocking" save their own decent apathy. That which might be a leaven in the social body, if they had courage, is taken, put upon a shelf, and locked away. There it grows stale, withered, and finally itself corrupt.

The truth is, that under politics and under commerce lie deep moral obligations. It is the death of the moral obligations below that spreads mortification to the visible surface. A bill against illicit commissions is necessary because commerce has ceased to be moral. Because European politics had ceased to be moral, the Armenian people could be slaughtered with impunity. The greed for money, and for place as a protection for money interests, is the danger at our doors. The wealth of America, made by the many and held by the few, is rapidly organising itself into Trusts, whose common interests will assuredly organise themselves sooner or later into one capital. This is a "social and political menace," of which our English liquor trade is merely a branch. The Trust is outside morality. It is essentially piratical; and, it is quite certain, that unless common measures are taken to control irresponsible and immoral capital, the final Armageddon will not be religious or political, but economic. The obligation of social service calls on us to take our side. In these days American Trusts to-day are English Trusts to-morrow. The vote of an English Parliament on the flash-point is due to the influence of the Standard Oil Trust over sea.

If politics and commerce must rest ultimately on a moral basis, this amounts to saying that there is

a Christian political and industrial conscience. The problem of to-day is to educate it. It is out of a true education that the solution must largely come. There is no greater social service than spreading economic knowledge. The true life of all classes in a great city needs to be branded on the hearts of men. And as the facts in their true colours are visibly placarded for all to read, we must strive to lay bare to ourselves and our fellows the far-reaching causes. Those of us for whom our present organisation has done much will have much required of them. The educated have a duty beyond others. To share gifts is nobler, more difficult, yet far more effective for good than to share money. While some already carry their gift of art or song or literature amongst the less well-endowed, it would be well if all who know the facts and know something of the causes would teach their equals what they know. Societies, like the Christian Social Union, have done a great deal. Why have they not done more?

Surely, the answer is undoubted. "He went away sorrowful, because he had great possessions." Those who have most, as a whole, do least. The one condition of improvement, the condition of simpler living, is utterly unacceptable to what is called Society. Luxury is king. Wealth is a passport not only to pleasure, but to honour. It is almost a condition for all. No *novus homo* can succeed without it. Art is sweated, intellect is sweated, the Church is sweated; the millionaire triumphs. Yet luxury is neither good for the luxurious nor good for the trade that supplies it. Why does it persist? Why does the Trust persist? Why does the millionaire persist? Because the words "danger to property" are used to-day, as

Buonaparte's name was used by our grandfathers' nurses, to frighten those who do not yet know better. Such an interpretation of property as creates or justifies the Trust cannot be the true or final interpretation. Simple living for the individual, all that art and literature can do for the common life, surely that is a truer and sounder conception of property. So far as our laws make the latter possible, property is a blessing; so far as the Trust becomes easy, wealth is a curse. It is an obligation of social service to promote a juster distribution. No permanent tenure of property is possible that does not base itself on justice.

There are two things that alike destroy the spiritual life of men. One is luxury, the other is poverty. By luxury a man becomes material. He cannot help it. He lives too soft a life for high thinking. He eats and drinks more than is needful. He is therefore a source of waste. On the other hand, poverty is wasteful, and is material. The man below Mr. Booth's city-line of poverty, or even the man upon the line, is necessarily concerned with the struggle for food. He cannot help neglecting all interests but the lower necessities of living. To relieve the poverty-stricken and the casually employed and the under-paid from the care that degrades and destroys, and the need that wastes, and to deliver the luxurious from the superfluity that equally wastes and equally degrades—this is in part a problem of social organisation; it is an obligation of social service to solve it, if we can.

But the problem of poverty is not limited to the provision of bare necessities. It includes the duty of satisfying new wants. The growth of new wants is a test of progress in our civilisation. It is a danger to the community if our city multitudes develop no

new legitimate wants as opportunities increase. The generation that does not do this is stagnant. It may be even degenerating. It is the best service we can do for our country to arouse such new needs when they are dormant. An educated man or woman who spent her life in awakening, in classes lower down the social scale, desires for higher states and higher knowledge, which in their present condition they would find it difficult to satisfy, would nevertheless be conferring a great benefit on the community. Discontent is not always an evil sign. It may be but the growth-pains of a good time coming. A civilisation that begins and ends with privilege contains the seeds of its own destruction.

The millennium is a very long way off; it will still be a long way off, even when we are fulfilling our social obligations. In the dregs of the bitter cup of anxiety, that so large a section of humanity has to drink, are found the weakness and failures of that humanity itself. Character is largely conditioned by environment; but at the back of character is the personal will, often without spring, often warped, never flawless. The environment indeed we, the community, may alter; but at the bottom of all we shall still find the personal equation. Unsolved social problems too will still remain; and out of them will grow fresh necessities for action, fresh demands on sacrifice and on love. A programme of reform, a code of social obligations, that leaves out the service of religious faith, is foredoomed to failure. Wherever society, high or low, have accustomed themselves to forget the claims of faith in the ideal and the divine, certain ugly features grow to remind us that there is an atavism of race as well as of individual. We still

want a new Juvenal for Piccadilly and Paris, a new Telemachus for the bull-ring and the prize-ring. Modern freedom of divorce shows no secular security for the institution of the family. The lust of power and the greed for money is alarmingly indifferent to life itself. Our own colonial experiences do not prove that Englishmen on the look-out for gold or diamonds are necessarily, and always, the natural friends and liberators of the slave. Our acquiescence in the political and social supremacy of the drink interest is a strange comment on our resentment of charges of "unctuous rectitude"; for it is just unctuous rectitude that deplores drunkenness and leaves the temptations to it as they now are. What we want is not less but more religion, more absolute sincerity, more prophetic out-spokenness, a still closer alliance between the churches and the advocates of social service. Thus only will be reached the individual problem, which will still remain even if all social problems are said to be solved.

Whether we be individualists or no, we shall at least agree that the aim of individualist, as of socialist, ethics must be the raising of personal character. Changes of environment are sought by the social reformer because of their effect on character. Luxury and poverty are, for the same reason, alike deplored. Christianity gives a value to every human personality. That is why social service is an obligation. It is an obligation laid on each of us to help raise our brother man, and to lift the whole community through lifting the individual. But it is this ultimate individual problem that will prove the chief difficulty. It cannot be fully dealt with if social life and social claims be neglected; yet, even when all that can be done for

social claims has been done, the age of gold will not necessarily have arrived. Men will still both make and mar their own fate. But we may then surely hope that those who will to mar it may find fewer helpers down the slope to ill. They will at least choose the evil in face of better knowledge, in neglect of better homes, in contempt of ideals more completely embodied in the tone and character of lives and institutions about them. They will cease, these preferences for degradation, to be bred, by men's injustice, selfishness, or indifference, in their fellow-men. The fulfilled obligations of social service cannot fail to make a healthier body, political and social, which will largely isolate and neutralise, where it fails to rescue, the exceptional and the base. To think otherwise would be the death of faith in human progress, the surrender to pessimism, the beginning of a spiritual glacial age. There may be, there are, prophets of a future such as that; we at least will spend ourselves in making it impossible.

THE CHURCHMAN AS A CITIZEN

By Canon BARNETT

The City conceived as a Symbol of the Invisible Church—Practical Effect of such a Conception: (1) A Healthy City; (2) A Happy City; (3) A Grand City; (4) A Holy City—The Use of Voluntary Associations—The Use of State Agencies—Need of Reform of State Agencies—Conclusion.

A CHURCHMAN as a member of an invisible spiritual society—the Church—desires to set up some visible representation or symbol of that society. He designs, therefore, a building which shall be suggestive of the invisible order, and because it is in little what the spiritual society is in large, he calls it "a church." He establishes an ecclesiastical organisation, with its hierarchy of dignitaries, its doctrinal hedges, its mysterious relations of present and past, its priests or presbyters, and its people, and again, because it is an earthly picture of the heavenly idea, he calls his ecclesiastical organisation "the Church."

It is the object of this paper, without combating the wisdom or the expediency of such symbols of that society of which Christians are consciously members, to suggest that another and perhaps more satisfying symbol is the city.

THE CITY CONCEIVED AS A SYMBOL OF THE INVISIBLE CHURCH

The mind of man grows larger with the centuries, and he needs larger dresses for his thoughts. The

Christian is not now satisfied that life in a monastery represents life in heaven, or that the services in a church are an adequate echo of the service men are to render through eternity, or that archaic forms and ecclesiastical names and claims of ancestry make a law court especially spiritual and typical of the supreme divine court. His conception of the spiritual society to which he belongs refuses any longer to be limited to the members of one race or to the professors of some doctrinal distinction, and however he may value what he calls "his Church," he is not satisfied that either a building or a homogeneous organisation is the best possible symbol of his conception.

He is not less conscious than his forefathers of membership in an unseen spiritual society. There never was a time when such consciousness was more lively. People are everywhere tingling, as it were, with sympathy for the great human society of which they are members; there is nothing human, even though it be sin, which is alien to their interest; they find it hard to believe in evil, even if it is in the thief; and they give and give again because they cannot allow to themselves that an applicant is undeserving. Party spirit may be invoked by rival sects to get support for churches or chapels, but the keenest partisan does not dare to think that his opponent will be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. People seem to see, as Amyas Leigh saw, a vision in which those divided by opinion and race are alike acceptable to God.

The churchman of to-day is a member of a society larger than that of the churchman of old days; he is by a thousand signs reminded of his membership, even if he cannot allow that the bounds of his

old society have been moved. His sympathy with strangers, his protests against narrowness, his unrest in his own forms, his zeal for them and against them, are all hints that he breathes a fuller air than he knows.

His mental picture of the heavenly Jerusalem is too large for the old canvas, and the suggestion of this paper is that it might help him if he tried to paint it on the city in which he lives.

The Christian indeed, when he does think of the society of which he is a member, thinks of a city. The progress of mankind, it has been often noted, is from an ideal garden to an ideal city, from Eden to the city of God. The Christian, therefore, when he thinks of the Church, of which different material forms are only passing representatives, does not think of some haven of rest, some secluded building shut off from daily work, nor does he think of an imperial hierarchy, with its dignified office-bearers and its conditioned favours; he thinks rather of a city into which nothing enters which is unclean, where there is no complaining in the streets, in which no one hurts or destroys, whose buildings are palaces, and where God is King.

If this picture of a heavenly city dominates a Christian's mind, and if—as a Christian ought, led by the Spirit into new things—he frees himself from the conventional representations of that picture, looking for himself with his nineteenth-century eyes at the things revealed to him, he will possibly be led to set himself to make his own city the representation of the city of God. He will strive for its beauty and order as his fathers strove to make beautiful some great cathedral, or to perfect the ecclesiastical order with power and glory.

The churchman has thus a special motive for his citizenship. Sanitarians, economists, reformers, and architects may be moved by the thought that better arrangements mean better health, and that better health means lower taxes; they may be active lest disease spread from the poor to the rich; and they may in pride spend money to make their town striking in the eyes of strangers. But their motives are soon exhausted, while the motives of those who live within sight of the heavenly city, and know that its glory and delights have been framed by God for man, are never exhausted. Social reformers grow weary; they tire of the schemes they advocate as they see old abuses appearing in the new forms; they do not altogether believe in the work of their own hands and brains; they lose faith as thing after thing drops from their tired hands, and they dream of nought beyond their prison wall.

Churchmen, on the other hand, need never grow weary; the city they aim to represent is always present to their minds. It is perfect; in it God's will is done, and on earth God's will also must be done. They go on, therefore, passing failure after failure, turned aside by no disappointment, never doubting that the best is possible.

The social reformer is enlightened by experience, the churchman is inspired by knowledge. The one stands on his own feet, and falls when he is tired; the other is conscious of being sent, and feels behind him a force which never tires. The churchman is a citizen in the commonwealth of God, where service is simple righteousness, and where patriotism is inextinguishable love of perfection; he is indeed a citizen of no mean city.

Practical Effect of such a Conception

The churchman as a citizen is bound to work into his city what he knows of the city of God.

1. He will therefore make it healthy, taking care that every inhabitant shall have abundant air, water, and light. He will endure no close districts into which the sun cannot shine; no house which is not helpful to the growth of the body, the mind, and the manners of its occupants. He will have frequent open spaces, not only for children's play, but for old people's rest; and he will secure that work be done in workshops where there is ample security for the lives and limbs of the workers.

2. He will also aim to make his city happy. He hears in a season of calm weather sounds of joy coming from the unseen city, and he sets himself to make joy possible among his neighbours. Every child must have his chance of being himself, his school must be so arrayed as to bring out his character and his capacities. Every one must have the means of using such capacities. There must be common gardens, common picture-galleries, common music-halls. No one must starve or die uncomforted, and there must therefore be relief for the poor and hospitals for the sick.

3. The city must, too, be grand. Human nature demands that forms be worthy of the spirit, and every one who has a great thought or a great feeling is concerned to give it fitting expression. The churchman, therefore, who has this great thought of the city of God will strive to make his own city grand with ordered streets and stately

buildings. He will as a citizen be sparing in private expenditure that he may be lavish in public expenditure. He will wish, not indeed for the flash of golden streets and jewelled gates, but rather for lines of buildings to lift up the thoughts of wayfarers, and abundance of colour to render their hearts glad.

4. But most of all he will strive that the city be holy, that the people abstain from evil and do good, and that God be honoured in word and in deed. He will therefore look for teachers and for places of worship; he will aim that every one who falls be helped to rise again, and that they who stand be comforted. And as it must be that some resist all efforts, he will require that there be law, police, and prisons as a terror to evil doers. In the unseen city Christ is King. He moves about its streets, and His will is done, and He draws all hearts to Himself; so in the city which His followers are busily building to be the symbol of that city in which their life is laid He must be preached, and He must be worshipped. Somehow or other the people must be taught of His presence, made to feel that it is He and not some political leader who teaches the children, feeds the hungry, increases joy, and does justice. He must be revealed as the King, behind all other power and authority, till worship be spontaneous, and nothing seem too precious for His service.

The Christian who is a member of the kingdom of heaven, and himself lives in the city of God, is constrained to model his own city on what he sees and hears around himself. His affection for his continuing home is a motive for the reform of his passing home. It is an easy and a familiar thought to imagine the blessed looking over the battlements of the city of God into the city of man, looking out from its happy

homes, its peaceful joys, into crowded, squalid courts, over the feasting and the drinking. It is easy to imagine their passion. The churchman who in heart and mind thither ascends shares their passion, and seeks some way to make the copy nearer the original. He finds the strongest instruments to be voluntary associations and local government.

The Use of Voluntary Associations

Voluntary associations have been, and are, powerful. The National Society for Education, the Society for the Improvement of Dwellings, entertainment and temperance societies, the Salvation Army, and other missions, have, with a hundred other kindred societies, served to purify the city. Their best work, however, has always been in their beginnings; voluntary effort is good for the start, but often fails in the long, unbroken drudgery of continuous service. The enthusiasm which made the first promoters face mountains of opposition is not called forth when all men praise the efforts, and so it sometimes happens that voluntary associations become rigid and narrow in their activities. They seem then to be dead bodies out of which life has gone, and which are now moved by very expensive machinery. The work they were created to do is done by other and more complete agencies, and instead of being aggressive against evil, they spend much strength against those who are also fighting evil.

The face of the country is encumbered by shells out of which the life of charity has passed. The shells have a beauty of their own, and retain a memory of former devotion which makes them precious, but they have ceased to harbour the life which will serve

the present generation. There are, for instance, relief societies, with committees, officers, and offices, which were started to meet a need. They contributed to the formation of a new public opinion, and the need is now met by carefully-given State relief. There are educational institutions and orphanages which, still existing and absorbing much money, actually hinder the further development of the interest they were the first to create. They who build the sepulchres—honouring their founders—are of the same spirit as those who persecuted the founders. The Charity Commissioners find ample occupation in bringing into order old charities, but outside their reach are many others which are no longer in touch with a living will or a living environment.

A churchman, therefore, who is concerned to reform his city, and who looks around for the most effective instrument for his purpose, will only join a voluntary association if it is pioneer or supplementary to the State. He will join, for example, a relief society if it is framed to meet needs not yet recognised by other agencies, or an education movement if its aim is for a higher view of education, and for experiments in other methods of teaching, or a league which has been started to stir up and restrain the Government, but he will not join associations whose work is now undertaken by others. Charity is often lost in competition.

The Use of State Agencies

The churchman will turn rather to the other of the two means he has seen to be effective for reform, to the machinery of local government. Every year sees a development of that machinery, and a sign of

the times is the passing both of power and of interest from Parliament to local boards. Such passing is indeed the next step in representative government. The people who were roused to win the suffrage, and whose use of that suffrage has resulted in some of the great reforms of the century, are now conscious that their votes given in elections have very small legislative effect, and that a candidate's promises lack performance. An elector wants something done which affects his own home, and his five or even ten thousandth part in a member of Parliament is not sufficient. People to-day desire representation as their fathers desired representation, but they desire something nearer and more easily affected than Parliament; they who look for reform turn, therefore, to local government, while those who are against reform instinctively dread its development.

The churchman, because as a practical man he wants to accomplish something, will therefore attach himself to local government. Boards and Councils have at their command money and knowledge. They can levy rates on the mean and generous, they by their organisation are able to reach the darkest corners of the district, and they draw their life from the people they serve. Their doings are known to have a direct effect. If they spend foolishly, their neighbours become personally aware of the fact; if they spend wisely, the same neighbours see the result in pleasanter homes and happier lives. Thus members of public bodies are both checked and spurred by their responsibilities.

Local government is an instrument prepared and sharpened for the social reformers' use. The churchman who feels called to make his city healthy attends therefore to his County or District Council. These

bodies could condemn the houses from whose close and fetid air the inhabitants go out to be enlivened by drink; they could stop the smoke whose black deposit wears out the housewife's energy till the whole family is content with dirt; they could secure that houses built for people should be fit for people's habitation, well supplied with everything necessary, at any rate, for a healthy and a decent life; they could provide open spaces within reach of an old man's or child's walk, where there might be rest for weary ears and refreshment for weary eyes; they could bring books, pictures, and music within every one's reach, and make it more possible for those buried in the brick tombs of city streets to pass out to country sights.

The churchman who seeks health for his city attends to the County and District Councils, and he who seeks its happiness attends to the Board of Guardians and the School Boards.

The School Board has the power to give to children not only the training which will fit them to earn a living, but, what is more important, the training which will fit them to use well their life, their leisure as well as their working hours. Schools are very different to what they were twenty-five years ago, but they might be infinitely improved along lines accepted as good. Classes might be much smaller, teachers might be more liberally trained; curiosity, tastes, and feelings might be developed as well as power of observation, and so possibilities of happiness increased. The School Board has the power through its continuation schools of further training the intelligence it has started through its elementary schools. It can in these schools familiarise growing boys and girls with the discoveries and the thoughts of great minds, give

them technical training, and by physical exercises strengthen their bodies. Such means may indeed fail of making happiness, but it is no slight contribution to this end if more people have subjects for conversation outside their own shop or trivial personalities, if the sum of possible pleasures be enlarged, so that the country is recognised to be attractive, not only as a place for games, for "knock 'em downs" and drinking, but for its beauty, its historic association, and its richness in scientific interests. If, too, friendships are made not only by kinship of pursuits, but by kinship of ideas, these also have been increased as expression for ideas has been found in the language of literature. School Boards, by opening the eyes of the blind and the ears of the deaf, by loosening the tongues of the dumb, have already increased happiness, and they might do more on the same lines.

Boards of Guardians can at the same time prevent misery. There is nothing harder than to give relief. It seems so easy to give the poor man the gift or the weekly allowance for which he asks. As a matter of experience, such a gift is likely to produce a crop of misery. The recipient himself, mingling with others less worthy, will soon think himself unfairly treated, and his neighbours will grudge, because they too are not satisfied. Guardians, therefore, who have to administer relief must see to it that they prevent, and do not increase misery. Guardians must not affect to be judges of desert; they have not the knowledge to discriminate and say that a man who seems respectable is worthy, and that one who seems poor is unworthy. The respectable man's respectability may be the outcome of a hard and selfish life; he may have neglected his duties to the weak and old: the

poor man's poverty may be the outcome of a generous, self-forgetting life; he may unconsciously have fed the hungry and clothed the naked Christ. Guardians may reduce misery if they adopt principles of relief which will be accepted as fair and considerate, if, for example, they say, "We give no out-relief to foster idleness and provoke ill-will, but we make our infirmary as good as skill and comfort can make it; we put our able-bodied inmates to no degradation, but give them work which will fit them to become earners; we will help those who will to emigrate, and we provide for the children the nearest possible approach to family life, where they will get what is more valuable than discipline, the training which comes of contact with neighbours' children, where their resourcefulness and independence will be developed, and the faint embers of love be cherished. We administer our institutions with unfailing regularity, but we keep in close touch with men and women of good-will, who discriminate where we cannot discriminate, who help by gifts and by service, and do good one by one." Guardians who adopt some such policy as this do remove many causes of misery, and so the reformers who are concerned for a happy city must attend to the working of the Poor Law. Improvements have been made, but the vast undone shadows the done.

The churchman, however, is not content that the city shall be healthy and happy; it must be holy if it is in any way to reflect the pattern in the heavens. He finds many organisations concerned for its holiness, many which are voluntary, and one which is a State organisation. Some of the same reasons which operate to make him work with officials rather than

with philanthropic societies operate now to make him work with the State Church. He finds that the voluntary organisations sometimes try to represent the spirit of past leaders, and that they are often bound to be aggressive. He finds, on the other hand, that if these faults exist in the Church, they are accidental, and not essential. The Church organisation is meant to be national; it is by law under the control of the people, and is bound to be aggressive only against unrighteousness. The State Church, it is easy to see, with its buildings in every parish, its historic associations and its wealth, might become the most effective teacher of holiness, and provide forms of worship suitable to all tastes. The churchman, therefore, believing in what the State Church has done, will set himself to fit it to the changed times, so that it may provoke the people to holiness.

Need of Reform of State Agencies

The churchman as a citizen will thus concern himself with local government, secular and ecclesiastical. He will, as he uses the instrument to his hand, naturally wish for its improvement.

He will be struck, for instance, by the confusion of duties. County Councils and School Boards both deal with education. The School Boards and Guardians and Councils have to consider the poor. All draw from one purse, and are often rivals in spending money.

Obviously the better plan would be for one representative board, the County Council in each locality, to have supreme authority. The County Council could then, by means of committees on which experts could

sit, manage the various departments as the Parliament now manages its great departments. The members elected on broad grounds would not be tempted to serve some narrow interest, as is often now the case when members, indifferent to general administration, look after the interests of trades-unions, of teachers, of anti-vaccinationists, or some sectional concern. They would represent the general mind of the community, they would decide in what department money could be best spent, they would see that all worked together, and they would be responsible for the suitability and grandeur of the public buildings. It is vain for a churchman to hope that his city will have palaces till there is one supreme authority conscious of its own dignity and with the control of the whole expenditure.

A County Council holding the authority now shared with the School Boards and the Guardians, and having the direction of all new buildings, would be more likely to make the buildings conform to some idea of the importance of the city life. The city being at unity with itself, would express that unity in its streets, its offices, and its institutions. The churchman, with his eye ever on the towering forms in which he tries adequately to clothe his thoughts of the city of God, would, as a practical citizen of his own city, strive to secure a unity of government, that its forms too might be more worthy of its life.

Conclusion

The churchman then, as a citizen, will attend to local government. He will regard an election as his fathers regarded the building of a church or the choice of a

bishop. He will, as an elector, take pains to secure as a representative a person whose aim is the health, the happiness, the holiness, and the dignity of the city. He will beware of representatives of sectional interests, even when those interests are worthy. He will work among other electors, striving to raise in them a conception of the interests involved, and never descending to secure their votes by appealing to their selfishness or their vanity. He will, if possible, offer himself as a candidate, giving up, it may be, work on some voluntary association. He will almost go so far as to think that it is the sin of schism which makes citizens leave the care of the city while they devote themselves to some sectional church or chapel institution. If the ardour, the devotion, now given to the little creations of kindly philanthropy were given to the city, Christianity would have a wider justification. He will, as a member of a board, urge his views, he will meet with apathy and indifference and ignorance, he will make hardly any progress, and he will often find himself wondering if another and easier way is not possible, but he will always be supported when he retires into the spiritual society of which he is a member, and is again inspired to set up a worthy copy of his heavenly pattern. He will, under the influence of such inspiration, take even a harder path; he will, by residence, qualify himself for election in some neglected suburb, where the inhabitants are too much worked or not sufficiently instructed, and there, against greater obstacles, fight the same fight. The future of our cities—and that means the future of our country—the health, happiness, and holiness of the people depends on local government, and under past neglect great populations have been allowed to gather,

in which the elements of city governing are wanting. The over busy, who are eager to move from the trenches which do for streets in our industrial quarters, the broken-hearted and broken-backed, who have given up hope of moving, do not make an electorate from which any manipulation will get an enlightened and an enlightening authority. The churchman, therefore, in his passion for a worthy city will go to reside in such a quarter, and offer himself for election.

Besides his duties as an elector and as a member of some local governing body, he will, of course, find it necessary to keep in touch with voluntary associations. A good citizen cannot keep aloof from good works. There are charitable and educational societies which do what official bodies cannot do, there are associations whose members supply personal help, there are leagues and unions which agitate for reform, there are bodies he will join because of the help they give in the making of the city, there are also bodies with which he will keep in touch for the sake of his own soul—his own church, for instance—with the minister or the form of worship which suits his needs.

The object of this paper is not, as was before said, to combat organisations which individuals find useful, but rather to show how churchmen, retaining their position as Episcopalians or Presbyterians, Tories or Liberals, might, by means of local government, establish on earth a city which shall be a satisfactory symbol of the city all alike see established in the heavens; each individual will have a ritual of worship which he prefers, each will have his own political opinions which will often seem to be opposed. The churchman as citizen may be Roman Catholic or Quaker, Tory or Liberal, but in his own way his concern will be, by

local government, to make the city healthy, happy, and holy. It might indeed be fair to adapt St. James's words, who did not probably mean to substitute philanthropy and morality for the praise and prayer of the house of worship, and say "Pure ritual is in helping to reform and ennoble the city."

THE ECONOMIC DUTY OF THE CONSUMER

By Rev. J. CARTER, M.A.

The need for more attention to the ethics of expenditure—Why neglected in the past—The moral obligations of the consumer—Social efficiency the test of luxurious expenditure—Certain things ought not to be bought at all—What is a fair price?—At all events not determined by the mere higgling of the market—The Christian theory of trade—Normal price or value—Especially as determined by the just remuneration of labour—Mr. Lilly's opinion—Statement by the Bishops—The standard regulations for a trade—The principle of preferential dealing as adopted by the State—By certain other public bodies—And by private persons—Examples of particular codes of rules—Preferential dealing a duty for the poor as well as for the rich—And advantageous to the employers as well as to their workpeople—Statement by the Bishop of Durham.

THE ethics of expenditure must still be regarded as a rather neglected department of economic science. We have all been so intent, both students of political economy and practical men of business alike, upon the production of wealth, that comparatively little inquiry has been made into the effect upon the conditions of industry, and upon the well-being of society in general, of the various ways in which people spend their money. And yet, from the moral point of view at any rate, it is far more desirable to use what is already in our power to the best advantage, than to discover and develop the most effective ways and means of increasing our possessions.

It is true that, in recent years, economists have been more and more realising the necessity of paying attention to this division of their special subject. Thus Professor Marshall, for instance, has promised to consider the ethical aspects of the consumption of wealth at the end of his elaborate treatise on economics.[1] The Christian pulpit, too, has never ceased to echo from time to time the old denunciations against luxury and wasteful expenditure.[2] But, in view of a progressive national standard of living,[3] it would seem that such general exhortations to recognise our moral responsibility for the right use of our money have for the most part, probably owing to the lack of anything like definite and practical guidance, fallen on unheeding ears. It should also be remembered that we have had a Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Sweating System, whose report a few years ago made a profound impression on the public conscience.

[1] "Principles of Economics," p. 182 (first edition).

[2] See, for instance, Dr. Pusey's sermon, preached in 1847, on "Chastisements Neglected, Forerunners of Greater":—"Whatever amendments there may have been among us, luxury and self-indulgence have been increasing among us; no class has been contented with the expenditure of their forefathers; new luxuries have invaded us; luxuries have become comforts, and comforts have become necessaries and our idols. In its turn, luxury is the parent of covetousness; and covetousness, of unjust gain, and of the grinding of the poor. We *will* not limit our self-indulgence; and so in order to obtain it cheaply, we pare down the wages of our artisans. They who have seen it, know that full often the very clothes we wear are, while they are made, moistened by the tears of the poor. How has the same desire of cheapness, to vie with others, impaired the character of our trade, and made practices common which our forefathers would have counted, what they are, dishonesty!"

[3] "The average money income of the people has more than doubled; while the price of almost all important commodities except animal food and house-room has fallen by one half or even further."—Marshall, "Principles of Economics," p. 45.

But although that investigation has helped, perhaps more than anything else, to convince people of their responsibility for the conditions of industry, yet, apart from the action taken by the Government in regard to its own contracts, which has been followed by a certain number of local authorities throughout the country, very little has been done by individual consumers to rectify their conduct in this respect.

Possible reasons for such neglect may readily be suggested. Direct personal duties, however trivial and unimportant in themselves, always demand some immediate sacrifice. The individual must be at some pains to discern his own particular duties, and then must be prepared to perform them in the best possible way without waiting for some one else to set him a good example. Moreover, it is obviously a much easier and more exciting occupation to discuss large measures of social reform, which aim at putting the rest of the world to rights, than to take in hand the humble and prosaic task of setting one's own household in order. To advocate a universal scheme of old-age pensions, for example, or the State ownership of all the means of production, offers great scope for a generous enthusiasm. But, however sound in theory, however attractive the promises of social amelioration which they hold out, such schemes do not tax our capacity for self-sacrifice so much as the little homely duties which come closest to the individual. For a man to retrench his personal expenditure in so far as he is unable to justify it as promoting his social efficiency; or to refuse to buy something which he would like to have, lest he should thereby be guilty of causing cruelty to animals or of exposing human life to dangerous risks; or to be willing to pay more

than the lowest competitive price for a particular article, in order to be sure that it was made under proper conditions—these are duties for which the man himself has to pay the whole cost, and which therefore have a peculiar ethical value.

Of course this does not imply any disparagement of national aims and great public enterprises. We should be the last to discourage an intelligent zeal for some noble and comprehensive ideal of social reconstruction. But we do contend that no amount of enthusiasm for public objects can atone for the neglect of private duties. It is in the diligent fulfilment of their immediate obligations that men find the best training-ground for, and the most effective guarantee of persistence in, their public functions. And forgetfulness of this truth has probably been one of the contributory causes of the present very noticeable slackening of interest in social questions. There has been a great deal of really earnest and honest talk about large schemes for reforming the nation as a whole and in a hurry; but it has not always been accompanied by practical efforts on the part of each individual to do at once all that he might do, and ought to do, in the direction of reforming his own little corner of the world. At all events, it is with personal duties of the latter kind that this chapter is concerned.

In a book on Good Citizenship there is, of course, no need to apologise for introducing the conception of duty. And the gospel of duty, if it is to be honoured at all, should be taken to apply to every kind of economic relation between man and man. It is concerned not only with the mutual relations between the capitalist-employer and his workpeople,

but also with each and every business transaction between the consumer and those with whom he deals. We shall take it for granted, therefore, that the good citizen ought to make it a matter of conscience how he spends his money, and should frankly admit that in so far as he makes use of the services of other men he incurs moral obligations towards them. Thus, at the very least, he should recognise first, that some things ought not to be bought at all if, for instance, any expenditure upon them is seen to be thoroughly wasteful and extravagant, or would involve gross cruelty or injustice in their production; and secondly, that there is a right and a wrong way of purchasing even what he may legitimately require for the purposes of an active and useful life.

With regard to the question, What is luxury? a few general remarks must suffice in this place. Luxury is a purely relative term, and it is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to the exact limits of justifiable personal expenditure. Any expense which conduces to make a man's life more vigorous and effective as a factor in the progress of society may be perfectly legitimate, assuming that other and higher claims are not ignored, and may even be regarded as necessary. But some such justification ought to be forthcoming in every case. It is by no means enough merely to observe the primary duty of keeping within the bounds of one's income, and so at the very least to avoid running into debt. And although this test of efficiency may appear at first sight to be somewhat defective by reason of its elasticity, and exposed to easy evasion, yet, if honestly applied by each individual, it would certainly produce some astonishing results. For, if we may accept

Professor Marshall's statement as approximately accurate, "Perhaps £100,000,000 annually are spent even by the working classes and £400,000,000 by the rest of the population of England, in ways that do little or nothing towards making life nobler or truly happier."[1]

As for things which, for one reason or another, ought not to be bought at all, we shall only allude to them here in so far as they serve to emphasise what lies at the root of the whole matter. They illustrate very clearly the fact that the consumer is ultimately responsible for the making of the things which he buys. He is in a real sense the creator of all that is bought and sold in the market, for it is obvious that without any public demand for certain articles they would cease to be supplied. The recent attempt to introduce the American plan of issuing a newspaper on seven days of the week is a case in point. The public protest against this wholly needless invasion of the Sabbatical day of rest, and still more the public determination to boycott any journal which ventured to offend the public conscience in this respect, have fortunately prevailed to check what otherwise might have become an extremely dangerous and anti-social development. Similarly, if ladies would resolutely refuse to wear egret plumes, the annual supply, which for London is said to amount to 80,000 plumes a year, would soon show signs of shrinking. Or if people would insist on using only safety-matches, and wait patiently for the invention of some innocuous process of manufacturing ordinary matches, we should hear less of phosphorous necrosis. In short, to buy a

1 "Principles of Economics," p. 731.

thing is, in the last resort, the same as to order it or get it made. The consumer must share with the producer the responsibility for having that particular thing made at all.

We now come to the most important part of our subject—the purchase of articles which may at least be regarded, to use Professor Marshall's convenient phrase, as conventionally necessary, and which constitute by far the largest amount of the world's expenditure. What is the duty of the consumer in making such purchases? or, in other words, is there such a thing as a fair price for a particular article, and how can it be determined?

We shall dismiss at once, as unworthy of serious consideration, any plea on behalf of the consumer that he is free to make the best possible bargain for himself, and may buy whatever is offered for sale in the cheapest market, irrespective of any loss or injustice which may accrue to the other parties concerned in the transaction. The old assumption that competition and the higgling of the market may be trusted to fix prices with reasonable fairness has, in actual fact, proved extremely fallacious. And, even apart from the results of a system of more or less unrestricted competition, if we are content to scrutinise the ordinary methods of buying from the ethical standpoint, the claims of justice must be taken into account. Neither party has a moral right to try to over-reach the other, and any business between them should be of the nature of a fair exchange to their mutual advantage. No doubt the consumer may reasonably claim the right to justice in exchange for justice, and to receive full value for his money. But, to apply Mazzini's political principle in a somewhat different form,

economic rights are only the correlatives of economic duties. The consumer has a right to demand an article which fairly corresponds in quality and workmanship with the price at which it is sold only when he is prepared to pay a just price for what he requires.

This, it should be remarked, is the Christian theory of trade. It was set forth in elaborate detail by the mediæval moralists, who were the first systematic students of economic questions; and, moreover, it was brought by them into direct practical relation with the commercial conditions of that period. According to this ideal, trade, like every other social institution, exists for the common benefit of mankind, and every incident of buying and selling ought to be equally advantageous for both the contracting parties. Therefore, they maintained the doctrine that all goods should be bought and sold at a fair price. Applying the principle of the Gospel—"Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them"—they taught that it was manifestly unjust to buy a thing for less than it was worth, or to sell a thing for more than its value, except perhaps under certain special circumstances which were precisely defined.[1] And for Christians, at all events, this should still be the true ideal of trade. After making every allowance for the almost complete change of economic conditions since the fifteenth century, and for the intricate and world-wide methods of modern commerce, the moral principle of a *justum pretium*—that every man ought to receive a fair price for his services—still holds good; and it is the bounden duty of

[1] For a full account of this theory, see Professor Ashley's "Economic History," vol. i. part i. chap. iii.; part ii. chap. vi.

Christians to find out its right application to any and every detail of the economic life of our own time.

Now, as a matter of fact, the normal price or value of a thing is always largely determined by the cost of its production. This includes, not merely the cost of the materials used, but also the wages paid to every kind of labour engaged, directly or indirectly, in producing the article, and the profit or interest which is the legitimate reward for the capital employed. The problem, then, is to define what is a fair remuneration for capital, including business management, and for labour respectively. And, under present circumstances, since capital is quite competent to look after its own interests, the immediate practical question before us may be narrowed down to the conditions of labour. It would be interesting to discuss what is a fair price to pay for the mere use of capital, which perhaps would require a maximum rather than a minimum limit; or to consider the remuneration of business capacity and enterprise, which, of course, should be rewarded on a generous scale; but for our present purpose the other question has the chief claim upon our attention.

To state our conclusion at once. It is a plain duty of the consumer to pay such a price for the things which he buys as will enable the retail trader to be just towards his workpeople. "It is a duty of strict justice," writes Mr. W. S. Lilly, "for the employer to give to his workpeople a *justum pretium*. The violation of this duty is reckoned by the Catholic Church among the sins that cry to heaven. And the measure of the *justum pretium* is the means of living a decent life, morally and materially; which includes not merely food and clothing, house and home, but leisure and

spiritual cultivation: not merely, as the schoolmen speak *bona naturæ necessaria*, but also *bona statui necessaria*. But the very notion of a *justum pretium* has well-nigh died out of the popular mind, which sums up its code of commercial morality in the maxim: 'Buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest:' a maxim involving a principle that would justify the most atrocious forms of 'sweating' and 'rackrenting.'"[1] Christian opinion, say the Bishops of the Anglican Communion, "ought to condemn the belief that economic conditions are to be left to the action of material causes and mechanical laws, uncontrolled by any moral responsibility. It can pronounce certain conditions of labour to be intolerable. . . . It can press upon retail purchasers the obligation to consider not only the cheapness of the goods supplied to them, but also the probable conditions of their production."[2]

But, it may be asked, how can these duties be performed? Here again we appeal to actual facts. All the more important trades in the country already possess a definite code of regulations, which represents, in every case, a mutual agreement between masters and men as to what is fair and practicable at the moment. These standards, of course, are by no means absolute and unchangeable. In recent years they have been for the most part on the upward grade; but perhaps, owing to the exigencies of foreign competition, it may be found necessary to reduce the scale of wages, or modify other conditions, for a particular trade. However, all we wish to contend for here is simply that,

[1] "On Right and Wrong," p. 195; *cf.* Marshall, "Principles of Economics," p. 124 *note*.

[2] "Report of the Lambeth Conference," 1897, pp. 139, 140.

wherever such an agreement exists between capital and labour, the consumer ought to give a preferential custom to those tradesmen who observe the standard regulations.

This principle of preferential dealing is now regularly applied by the State to all public contracts, in accordance with the following resolution, which was unanimously passed by the House of Commons on February 13th, 1891: "That in the opinion of this House it is the duty of the Government in all Government contracts to make provision against the evils recently disclosed before the Sweating Committee, to insert such conditions as may prevent the abuse arising from sub-letting, and to make every effort to secure the payment of such wages as are generally accepted as current in each trade for competent workmen." In the absence of any existing standard of wages, the Director of Contracts may proceed to issue price-lists to govern all contracts. This is not done arbitrarily, but according to the following system, as explained by Mr. Nepean, for the War Office stores: "I have not the least doubt that the masters will be able to come to some sort of idea of what the fair price is to pay for the various operations in the production of that equipment, and that they will be able to tell me, by positive statistics, what is the average rate of pay, not the highest rate, of course, which any special workman or workwoman can get, but the average rate of pay that men and women can respectively earn. Having got that, I then propose to take the working-man's own view about it, and to ask him whether he agrees with the views of the masters; and if he does not agree, I propose to put the workman and the master in conference, and

that they shall concur in something they can present to me as a clear agreement in the trade as to the prices to be paid. I do not want to regulate them myself, but, if possible, to induce masters and men to regulate them for themselves. Then, when our tenders are issued for accoutrements, or for harness and saddlery, we shall have this result, that the man of capital will be probably the man who will be able to carry the contract, who undoubtedly is the man better able to do it, and he expects to get better work for better wages."[1]

Similarly, one hundred and sixty-three urban districts besides London, which together comprise an aggregate population of about thirteen millions, impose conditions as to "fair wages" in their public contracts. The conditions required vary considerably from place to place. They may demand, for instance, the payment of current wages, or wages recognised by trade unions, or wages mutually agreed upon by associations of employers and employed, or wages prevailing at the date of the contract, or wages specified in the contract itself; but the principle of action is the same in every case.[2] The London County Council and the Board of Trade also insert a clause in all their contracts to guard against home work, which, as is notorious, allows the greatest facilities for the worst forms of sweating. Thus, by the clothing contract of the Board of Trade, "the contractor undertakes that all garments included in this contract shall be made up in his own factory, and that no work shall be done at the homes of the workpeople. Any infringement of this condition, if proved to the

[1] "Fifth Report on the Sweating System, 1890," No. 62, p. xxxviii.
[2] "House of Commons Return," 1898, No. 47.

satisfaction of the President of the Board of Trade, shall render the contractor liable to a penalty not exceeding £100 for each offence."

With regard to the scope for preferential dealing on the part of private persons, we may quote last year's report of the Christian Social Union, which for some years has been trying to organise and direct the economic influence of the ordinary consumer.

"There are now five towns—Oxford, Birkenhead, Leeds, Leicester, and Manchester—where general lists" (*i.e.* lists of firms which observe the standard regulations for each trade), "comprising a variety of trades, have been published, and at least as many more which have lists of particular trades. In one instance this experience goes back for a period of eight years, and in every case more or less satisfactory results have been secured. Thus the Birkenhead list was published in October 1896, containing 260 firms, and will shortly be re-issued with a number of additions. The Leeds list, which was published in September of this year, contains 464 firms, divided among seventeen different trades. The Leicester list represents one result of the Annual Meeting of the C. S. U. last year, and contains the names of 235 firms, besides the whole of the building trade. The Manchester list includes over 700 firms, divided among some forty different trades."

"In regard to the Oxford list there is only one new fact to be mentioned. It will be remembered that a successful attempt was made a year ago to deal with the unorganised bakery trade, when a code of rules was unanimously adopted at a joint meeting of master bakers and journeymen. This standard has now been in force for one year, and will be revised at the end of

another year's trial. As a result of this improvement in the conditions of the trade, which involved both the raising of wages and the reduction of the hours of labour, the trade has been impelled to become more efficient. A technical class has been formed, consisting of both masters and men, who are receiving instruction in scientific methods of baking at the Technical School under the direction of the Oxford Town Council."

The great need for this application of preferential custom, in order to maintain and improve the conditions of industry, may be shown by mentioning the details of one or two codes recently adopted. The codes selected for this purpose are directly due to the active influence of the consumers, who have taken the initiative in these affairs without the intervention, or even the existence, of a trade union. And although the standards are by no means satisfactory in every particular, yet they represent a considerable improvement upon former conditions; and, what is even more significant, they have not yet been adopted by a majority of the trades in question.

The first code has to do with the drapery and dressmaking trade, and contains the following simple regulations:—

(i.) Hours.

A. *Indoor*—

(1) Not more than 60 a week.
(2) Two weeks' holiday, with regular pay.

B. *Outdoor*—

(1) Not more than 60 a week.
(2) One week's holiday, with regular pay.

(ii.) WAGES.

A. *Indoor*—

(1) Not less than £20 a year.
(2) No fines.
(3) No deductions for occasional illness.

B. *Outdoor*—

(1) Work-girls, after an apprenticeship of not more than two years, at least 5s. a week.
(2) Skilled workmen over 18 years of age, not less than 4d. per hour; over 20, not less than 6d. per hour.
(3) Errand boys over 18, not less than 9s. per week.

(iii.) (1) Seats shall be provided, and their use permitted during slack times of the day.
(2) Overtime shall be paid for at not less than the regular rates.

The other code was drawn up for the baking trade, in the following form:—

(i.) HOURS.—The maximum number of hours per week (excluding time for meals) shall be—

(*a*) For journeymen only employed in the bakehouse—69 hours during six specified months, and 63 hours for the rest of the year—*i.e.* an average of 66 hours for the whole year.
(*b*) For those also employed as deliverers—81 hours during six specified months, and 75 hours for the rest of the year—*i.e.* an average of 78 hours for the whole year.

(ii.) WAGES.—The minimum wage per week for all over 20 years of age shall be—

(*a*) For journeymen only employed in the bakehouse, 22s.
(*b*) For those also employed as deliverers, 21s.

(iii.) OVERTIME.—Overtime shall be paid for at the rate of 1d. per hour extra.

(iv.) APPRENTICES.—The number of apprentices employed in the bakehouse shall not exceed the proportion of one to every two journeymen; but if only one journeyman is employed, one apprentice shall be allowed.

These standards seem modest enough, and, indeed, leave much to be desired. But, in fact, they have so far only been adopted by a minority of each trade; and the majority will probably continue to work on at a lower level until a good many more people have developed a conscience about the way in which they ought to purchase things for themselves.

It should be quite obvious that preferential dealing is just as much a duty for the comparatively poor as for the well-to-do classes. In the former case, no doubt, there will be a much larger element of self-sacrifice; but the influence for good or for evil which they can exert by sheer force of numbers is extremely important, and cannot be dispensed with if sweating is ever to be abolished.

It should also be pointed out that preferential custom of this kind is equally to the advantage of the employers as of their workpeople. Under the severe and increasing stress of modern competition, it is becoming more and more difficult for old-fashioned tradesmen, who are scrupulous about the quality of their goods, the welfare of their workpeople, and the general methods of doing business, to maintain their honourable position. And, therefore, for their sake also it is very necessary to educate retail purchasers to resist the temptation of mere cheapness, and to give their custom by deliberate preference to those tradesmen who set the highest standard.

In conclusion, some recent words by the Bishop of Durham will serve to sum up with greater force and authority the claims of the particular duty to which this chapter has been devoted :—

"Hitherto I have considered citizens as producers only, but they are consumers also, and consumption profoundly affects the conditions of labour. Thus the whole nation is, in a large degree, responsible for the organisation of industry. The general character of the popular demand determines the direction in which industrial forces are turned, the nature of that which is made, and indirectly the circumstances of the makers. Purchasing good or bad articles, made under good or bad conditions, is in itself doing a good or bad act. The purchaser suffers himself by buying what is bad, and also inflicts injury on those who minister to his wants. He is finally responsible for the conditions of production as well as for the conditions of distribution. He must make it clear, when purchasing, that he is anxious to be answered on these points, and the answer will be provided if it is required. The description of the drapery trade in a late number of the *Economic Review* shows how much there is to be done in retail dealing by friendly conference and combination. Consumers' leagues have accomplished an excellent work in the large cities of America without friction. It is, no doubt, a troublesome thing to satisfy the claims of our responsibility; but it is something to acknowledge them. And then we must not seek to quiet our conscience by adopting any mechanical rule for our guidance. We must give thought, the most precious thing which we can give, to the fulfilment of our duty. If known evils continue, the fault is with ourselves."[1]

[1] *Economic Review*, April 1899, pp. 153–154.

CITIZENSHIP IN POETS

By Rev. RONALD BAYNE, M.A.

Citizenship of Greece and Rome reflected most clearly in their poets—The poet precedes the practical reformer, making his work possible—Beginning of the modern sense of responsibility for the poor in George Crabbe's "Village," 1783—It pleads especially for the country poor—William Blake's similar perception of the distress of the town poor—After the era of the Napoleonic wars and the rise of England's industrial activity Thomas Hood speaks for the poor of England in the "Song of the Shirt" and "Bridge of Sighs," 1843—Miss Barrett's "Cry of the Children," 1844—Her "Aurora Leigh," 1856, summarises the social ideals and aspirations of the century with admirable faith and passion—Narrowness of the social reformer who despises the poet—Reason why the greater poets seem to stand aloof from particular social problems.

If we consider the poems of Pindar and of the Athenian dramatists, tragic and comic, it must strike us that the wise reader receives from them a very definite and vivid conception of citizenship in ancient Greece. It is of course on its emotional rather than its practical side that these writers present it. They realise for us what the Athenian citizen was inwardly, rather than outwardly. His ideals and instincts, social, religious, moral, and æsthetic, are focussed. We perceive a type of citizenship more homogeneous, more definite and clear, than could have been perceived by any individual alive when any one of these poems was composed. Similarly from the works of Horace and Virgil the citizenship of the Rome of Augustus is

revealed to us, so that we distinguish it at once from the citizenship of Athens, and find it equally impressive and important. Like the citizen of Pindar and Aristophanes, the citizen of Horace and Virgil is one of the main facts of the world's history. Without comprehending him, we cannot comprehend ourselves. All our modern life presupposes these earlier realisations of citizenship, and is built upon them. But in this volume we are concerned with to-day. Pindar and Horace are mentioned merely to remind us that in the future it will be from our poets—from our great imaginative writers—that our citizenship will be understood and appraised. And while to us our own time seems complex, confused, and transitional, to our descendants it will be as clear and characteristic as we find the Roman or Athenian. Our poets will reflect us if we have in us anything worth reflecting. It is worth our while, therefore, to inquire what our poets say of us. It is true that we look for our poets blindfold, and cannot tell the great from the small, but they enable us to see ourselves typically, as our descendants will see us, and such vision we need for our guidance.

The object, therefore, of this paper is to inquire what help has been given by poets to the ideals of citizenship, so minutely described in this volume. To treat the subject exhaustively would demand a second volume, but it will be useful merely to glance at it, if only to remind ourselves that prosaic details of vestry organisation, workhouse management, and urban sanitation, are not in real life isolated phenomena. They jostle with poems and pictures and novels. They are related by many links, both obvious and obscure, with these other human activities. Very often the sanitary

bye-law is the last result of inspirations and ideals which could not begin to be realised until they had been first heard of, and then understood, and at last loved by a whole nation. The great poet sometimes reveals to a generation its own aims—reveals them with startling and passionate intensity; and continually great poets and little ones concentrate and educate the thoughts of their generation, and make it at last possible for the practical man to get his scheme carried out.

If we are asked to fix upon a single beginning of the social aims and instincts which make up the citizenship of to-day, we name "The Village," by George Crabbe, in 1783. The passion of this first characteristic poem of Crabbe's is its most noticeable feature. His soul is full of the misery of the poor. The insipid absurdities of pastoral poetry afflict him as outrages on truth. "The real Picture of the Poor" has not been attempted by any poet. Even Goldsmith is dishonest.

> "Since vice the world subdued, and waters drowned,
> Auburn and Eden can no more be found."

The languishing swains who

> "in smooth alternate verse
> Their country's beauty or their nymphs rehearse,"

are like nothing in nature. They make English poetry ridiculous.

> "Yet still for these we frame the tender strain,
> Still in our lays fond Corydons complain,
> And shepherds' boys their amorous pains reveal,
> The only pains, alas, they never feel."

Instead of this silly insincerity, Crabbe will describe the life of the English rustic as it actually is; as he has himself known it and almost shared it. In "The Village" Crabbe describes his native place, Aldborough. It is not prosperous. The soil is poor and barren. The people are joyless and brutalised.

> "But these are scenes where Nature's niggard hand
> Gave a spare portion to the famish'd land;
> Hers is the fault, if here mankind complain
> Of fruitless toil and labour spent in vain;
> But yet in other scenes more fair in view,
> When plenty smiles—alas! she smiles for few—
> And those who taste not, yet behold her store,
> Are as the slaves that dig the golden ore—
> The wealth around them makes them doubly poor."

Nor must we suppose that health consoles the poor man for his poverty—

> "Go then and see them rising with the sun,
> Through a long course of daily toil to run;
> See them beneath the dog-star's raging heat,
> When the knees tremble and the temples beat;
> Behold them, leaning on their scythes, look o'er
> The labour past, and toils to come explore;
> See them alternate suns and showers engage,
> And hoard up aches and anguish for their age;
> Through fens and marshy moors their steps pursue,
> When their warm pores imbibe the evening dew;
> Then own that labour may as fatal be
> To these thy slaves, as thine excess to thee."

The homely, healthy fare of the peasant, "plenteous and plain," is another delusion—

> "Oh, trifle not with wants you cannot feel,
> Nor mock the misery of a stinted meal;
> Homely, not wholesome, plain, not plenteous, such
> As you who praise would never deign to touch."

In this hard, bitter life those who live to be old are most to be pitied—

"Oft may you see him, when he tends the sheep,
His winter charge, beneath the hillock weep;
Oft hear him murmur to the winds that blow
O'er his white locks and bury them in snow,
When roused by rage and muttering in the morn,
He mends the broken hedge with icy thorn:—
'Why do I live, when I desire to be
At once from life and life's long labour free?
Like leaves in spring the young are blown away,
Without the sorrows of a slow decay;
I, like yon withered leaf, remain behind,
Nipt by the frost, and shivering in the wind;
There it abides till younger buds come on,
As I, now all my fellow-swains are gone;
Then from the rising generation thrust,
It falls, like me, unnoticed to the dust.
These fruitful fields, these numerous flocks I see,
Are others' gain, but killing cares to me;
To me the children of my youth are lords,
Cool in their looks, but hasty in their words:
Wants of their own demand their care; and who
Feels his own want and succours others too?
A lonely, wretched man, in pain I go,
None need my help, and none relieve my woe;
Then let my bones beneath the turf be laid,
And men forget the wretch they would not aid.'
Thus groan the old, till by disease oppress'd,
They taste a final woe and then they rest."

The "final woe" is the workhouse. The first book of "The Village" ends with a description of "the cold charities of man to man"; of the squalor and misery of the house "that holds the parish poor"; of the conceited heartlessness of the parish apothecary, "whose most tender mercy is neglect"; of the indifference of the hunting,

whist-playing parish priest; and, at last, of the miserable pauper's funeral—

> "Now once again the gloomy scene explore,
> Less gloomy now; the bitter hour is o'er,
> The man of many sorrows sighs no more."

To read this short poem, and reflect that it was written more than a century ago, raises mixed feelings in the mind. We have moved forward a little. We demand a higher standard of duty from all our officials. Our buildings are no longer ruinous. Our methods have improved. We have accumulated knowledge and experience. But between us and Crabbe there is the whole industrial development of England, with all the complicated problems this development has occasioned, and that is perhaps why we are still fumbling at the knot of old-age pensions. Book I of "The Village" presents that knot for untying,—presents it so clearly that, as we read the poem, we are ashamed that the task has still to be done.

Crabbe inherited his literary form from Pope. Book I of "The Village" satirises the borough of Aldborough, just as Pope satirised the world of fashionable and literary life in London. It is strange to find the epigrammatic couplet, which was native and natural to the artificial culture of Queen Anne's London, trying to describe and to criticise the sordid, slow, inarticulate mind of the Aldborough labourer. Crabbe is Pope in worsted stockings, not so much in style as in subject. His matter of necessity modifies his style, making it slower and sadder than by rule it ought to be. But the sense of a mission, so obvious in "The Village" and "The Parish Register," is in

Crabbe's case truer and deeper than in Pope's. The town satirist wrote to show his own wit; Crabbe wrote for the sake of his poor. "The simple annals of the village poor" needed telling; Englishmen knew less than nothing about them. The satiric element, therefore, in Crabbe tends to recede into the background. He does not need to scourge or to criticise; he can produce his best effect by mere truth—

> "No longer truth though shown in verse disdain
> But own the Village Life a life of pain."

Another poet must be named along with Crabbe as having in him all sorts of sympathies which the end of the nineteenth century understands better than they were understood by the end of the eighteenth century. William Blake's "Songs of Experience" were issued in 1794. While Crabbe, in his poetic form was conservative and conventional, Blake was an innovator and a law to himself. While Crabbe was a realist with his imagination kept rigidly subordinate to his judgment, Blake was an idealist and a visionary so entirely dependent on his imaginative powers, that the world calls him mad.

That two poets so different as Crabbe and Blake should connect themselves with social reform need not surprise us. We have continually with us two types of social reformer. We have the idealist who finds things as they are impossible, and by the vividness and beauty of his ideals discredits the actual and destroys it. Frequently this reformer discovers, when he has pulled down his house, that his impatience does not help him to build it again. The other type we call the practical man. Patience is his weapon. Loyalty to fact, and the virtues of accuracy and punctuality, are his

special characteristics. It is impossible to say which type of reformer is more necessary to the world's salvation. Either without the other is helpless.

Blake, the idealist, did not, like Crabbe, speak for the country poor. He was the first to hear London's "bitter cry." All the laborious effort presided over by Mr. Charles Booth, and much more besides, might be said to begin in the short poem "London," published 1794.

"I wander through each chartered street,
Near where the chartered Thames does flow,
A mark in every face I meet;
Marks of weakness, marks of woe.

In every cry of every man,
In every infant's cry of fear,
In every voice, in every ban,
The mind-forged manacles I hear.

How the chimney-sweeper's cry
Every blackening church appals,
And the hapless soldier's sigh
Runs in blood down palace walls.

But most, through midnight streets I hear
How the youthful harlot's curse
Blasts the new-born infant's tear,
And blights with plagues the marriage hearse."

Blake does not concentrate himself upon the condition of the town poor as Crabbe does upon the country poor. His interests as a poet are much wider than Crabbe's. He gives us no "human documents"; but just for that reason a poem like "London," standing among others quite different in subject, is the more

impressive. The poem had to be written. It found a place in the work of a poet whose subjects came to him from without, and are never hunted up by his own ingenuity. The thoughts of such a poet are prophetic in an extraordinary manner. What he can hear clearly the world of men will hear in the years to come. In the mystical "Milton" (engraved 1804) Blake gives us another reformer's hymn, even more exquisite than "London":—

"And did those feet in ancient time
Walk upon England's mountain green?
And was the holy Lamb of God
On England's pleasant pastures seen?

And did the countenance Divine
Shine forth upon our clouded hills?
And was Jerusalem builded here
Among these dark, satanic mills?

Bring me my bow of burning gold!
Bring me my arrows of desire!
Bring me my spear: O clouds, unfold!
Bring me my chariot of fire!

I will not cease from mental fight,
Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand,
Till we have built Jerusalem
In England's green and pleasant land."

One other remark about Blake this poem suggests. He was by training an artist rather than a poet, and in his works we perceive a connection between the imaginative world of the artist and the actual world of the social reformer. Our own day has made this connection plainer. The artist apparently for his art's

sake must be a socialist. William Morris is anticipated in Blake's epigram—

> "When nations grow old,
> The arts grow cold,
> And commerce settles on every tree;
> And the poor and the old
> Can live upon gold,
> For all are born poor."

Crabbe and Blake are both English, and both, on the whole, earlier than the great school of writers who connect themselves with the French Revolution. Scott, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, and Keats—these writers all belong to the Revolution epoch which culminates in the Napoleonic wars. Keats represents the first reaction. He is the first non-political poet. Our own private social questions all these authors include in the larger European questions, and therefore they do not seem so close to us to-day as do some smaller and more insular poets. Moreover, this school precedes the industrial development of England, which has occasioned so many of our own peculiar difficulties. This paper, therefore, will not attempt to estimate the citizenship of Scott, of Wordsworth, and of Shelley, or to relate their ideals to ours. Three spirits more splendid, more august, manly, and magnificent, could hardly be chosen from any century. That we have their voices in our ears, their teaching in our blood, ought to make all our tasks easier. We stand upon their achievements as upon a platform. Each of them adds his cubit to our stature. Looking on, therefore, beyond Keats, we come to a poet like ourselves in Thomas Hood. In *Punch*, for Christmas, 1843, appeared his "Song of the Shirt." Here we

have our underpaid, unemployed workers at last articulate. It is impossible to estimate the influence of such a poem. The "Lady's Dream," the "Pauper's Christmas Carol," the "Lay of the Labourer," were similar in style and aim, but not so direct and simple as the "Song of the Shirt." Except for the couplet—

> "But evil is wrought by want of thought
> As well as want of heart,"

they are forgotten. The "Song of the Shirt" cannot be forgotten. Hood's peculiar gift of humour, always closely allied to the pathetic or the terrible, is in this poem. His ever active imagination forces the needle-tired seamstress to sing exactly such a swift, monotonous jingle as expresses her ceaseless toil. It is the imagination of the poet that gives the poem its life and its high rank as poetry. The "Bridge of Sighs," with its motto from "Hamlet," "drown'd, drown'd," was written a few months after the "Song of the Shirt." The mind and feeling of the whole nation could not fail to be permanently influenced by two poems so true and holy in their emotion, so simple and direct in style, and so inevitable in their metrical effects. Hood, like Blake, was not an expert in social questions. His attention was not absorbed by this one subject. What he says therefore we must listen to, and our attention is not weakened by too much appeal.

Hood was born 1799. Elizabeth Barrett, afterwards Mrs. Browning, ten years later. Her "Cry of the Children" in 1844 must be placed beside Hood's two poems in its effect upon the public conscience. Such a poem supersedes a great deal of argument. It is not so great a poem as the "Bridge of Sighs," but

it is individual, and the individuality is a woman's. Our citizenship cannot to-day be masculine only; it must include ideals and aspirations that women originate and which women must work out. It is significant that "Aurora Leigh," the most considerable poem on the social ideals of this century, should have been written by a woman. It appeared in 1856, and contains a record of the social aims and efforts of the middle of the century. The brave sincerity of the poem, its honest enthusiasm, its youthfulness, surprise us when we remember that the author was thirty-seven. One or two points we may touch upon which stamp the poem as of our own age. The poet knows London and describes it—

> "Or I saw
> Fog only, the great tawny weltering fog,
> Involve the passive city, strangle it
> Alive, and draw it off into the void,
> Spires, bridges, streets, and squares, as if a sponge
> Had wiped out London."

She feels the inspiration of London—

> "But sit in London at the day's decline,
> And view the city perish in the mist
> Like Pharaoh's armaments in the deep Red Sea,
> The chariots, horsemen, footmen, all the host,
> Sucked down and choked to silence—then, surprised
> By a sudden sense of vision and of tune,
> You feel as conquerors though you did not fight!"

Feeling that poets—"half poets even—are still whole democrats," she expresses over and over again what has been for the last thirty years the trouble of

all conscientious citizens when brought face to face with town slums—

> "Here's nought to see
> But just the rich man and just Lazarus,
> And both in torments, with a mediate gulf,
> Though not a hint of Abraham's bosom. Who,
> Being man, Aurora, can stand calmly by
> And view these things, and never tease his soul
> For some great cure."

Sympathy with every kind of social injustice throbs through every page of the book. We can hardly dare to claim to-day that we are as brave and keen and hopeful in facing our social responsibilities as the generation was out of which this poem came! It forces us to confess its own saying true—

> "The world's male chivalry has perished out,
> But women are knights-errant to the last."

The central conviction of Aurora herself is that—

> "It takes a high-souled man
> To move the masses even to a cleaner stye;"

or expressed more elaborately—

> "'Tis impossible
> To get at men excepting through their souls,
> However open their carnivorous jaws;
> And poets get directlier at the soul
> Than any of your economists: for which
> You must not overlook the poet's work
> When scheming for the world's necessities.
> The soul's the way. Not even Christ Himself
> Can save man else than as He holds man's soul;
> And therefore did He come into our flesh,
> As some wise hunter creeping on his knees
> With a torch, into the blackness of a cave,
> To face and quell the beast there—take the soul,
> And so possess the whole man body and soul."

This main teaching of the book may lose some of its force to-day because a woman speaks—a Christian woman, moreover, quite incapable of keeping her religion in the background. The vital question of the relation of religion to citizenship cannot be discussed in this short essay, but it may be pointed out as one conclusion from our discussion that it is the poet who gives his faith to the social reformer, and keeps it alive for him, whatever it be. And the citizen who ignores and despises his poets is in danger of becoming a materialist.

In many matters of social reform to-day we are all agreed that something must be done. To do it is our difficulty. While we do nothing we are disgraced. At such a juncture we seem not to need the poet, and are in danger of despising the faith and imagination which have brought us so far on our way. Our souls are for the moment concentrated on the one point of practical achievement. It is natural that the man who is thinking out the details of an old-age pension scheme, or building a block of workmen's dwellings, should despise the spiritual, and suppose that morals and religion have nothing to do with his aims. We put the thing done before the doer, and mind before matter. Material conditions seem to us to make men, just at the moment when we are straining our hardest to control material conditions.

That we have touched upon the work of only four poets—Crabbe, Blake, Hood, and Mrs. Browning—may seem to some readers capricious. Nothing has been said of Tennyson and Browning. Nothing has been said of the increasing band of imaginative writers who prefer to deliver their message in prose. Our ideals of citizenship have been influenced by Carlyle and

Mr. Ruskin more profoundly than by any other writers of the century. Such novelists also as Dickens and George Eliot co-operate with the practical reformer. They suggest, they criticise, they maintain his work. But we must be content to stop. Tennyson and Browning are greater poets than Hood and Mrs. Browning. Just for this reason their work has not such an obvious relation to the daily work of their age. Tennyson's "Locksley Hall" and "Maud," and less obviously but more intimately his "Idylls of the King," have many points of contact with our ideas of citizenship, which would require a special essay for adequate treatment. Just as the religious poets as a body are weak, so the social poets who write for some special cause are weak too. They take a side, they bind themselves by a creed or formula, and their poems therefore serve a temporary purpose only. Even such a handicraftsman as William Morris could not write poems to order. No doubt a future generation will find in Browning's poetry a true image of English citizenship. To us his poetry seems more universal, more aloof from our temporary aims and hopes, than his wife's is. But both Browning and Tennyson represent on the whole in their poems a later decade than is represented by "Aurora Leigh." That poem reflects for us the first eagerness of our modern social warfare—the first flush of the conviction—

"Whoever fears God, fears to sit at ease."

And finally, poets remind us that the social reformer is only one side or aspect of the citizen. The citizen without this side to him is a continual danger to his country—responsible for its failures and sins. But the ardent social reformer, with his eye fixed

upon one or two reforms, is apt to forget that the citizenship of a great country is older, and deeper, and wider than the aims and ideals of any party in it. His own programme, after all, is a mere breeze on the surface of a great ocean. As a citizen he is apt to be narrow, noisy, and aggressive, forgetful of what binds him to his fellows, because in one or two matters he thinks he can make them better. The great poets and imaginative writers give us ideals of citizenship at once truer and kinder than those which we develop as County Councillors or Guardians. Of that humanity which underlies and causes our social institutions and habits, their imaginative passion gives us the most intimate account, and to that humanity, more directly than the economist or philosopher, they steadily and powerfully appeal.

ART AND THE COMMONWEALTH

By Rev. A. G. B. Atkinson, M.A.

Artists out of touch with the growing democratic spirit—The dignity of common life—Art feeling crushed out by the commercialism of the age—The work of William Morris—Workmen must be artists, not contractors' "hands"—How great work in the past has been achieved—Baleful effect of subdivision in the Arts—Obstacles to the attainment of a great National School of Art—Men divided in opinions and ideals, this reflected in Art—Responsibility for improvement rests with others besides the artist, *e.g.* the capitalist, the railway company director, &c.—Relations between the State and Art, no trace of the imperialistic conception—The municipality and Art—Vandalism of the "practical business man."

To discern the hidden beauty which underlies the material world and to depict it for the enjoyment of his fellow-men is the function of the artist. Those who have eyes to perceive it find that there is nothing altogether prosaic and unpoetical in nature. The faculty of perception, however, is not universal, and it is a commonplace that want of appreciation of the beautiful is a national failing. This lack of general interest in Art may partly be due to the failure of the artist, who should be the national interpreter of everything beautiful in the national life, to put himself into harmony with the great growth of the democratic spirit. Conceptions of the classic or mediæval age are not suited to the democratic stage of mankind. Yet, for the most part, artists still find their themes in imitation or in working out classical and feudal ideas

already overwrought. A glance round the picture-galleries will show that the subjects treated are in the main reproductions of well-worn conceptions. We have yet to learn what kind of Art is best suited to the democratic state, and what themes are furnished by the democratic spirit which have not been already presented in a classic or mediæval garb.[1]

In those countries where Art has taken a leading place in the life of the community it has been closely in touch with the feelings and aspirations of the people. In Florence the populace, proud to possess a great artist, carried Cimabue's "Madonna" in procession through the town. Art is only really great which gives expression to some emotion or feeling of the human soul relegating mere manipulation to a secondary place. The real artist is he who makes manifest invisible realities. If it be the portrait, then he will discern the standard from which the sitter is a deviation, the ideal which he could and should have reached; if it be the landscape, then something of "the light that never was, on sea or land," must shine throughout it. If a great national school of Art is to arise in England, its leaders can only be those who have understood and sympathised with the new social ideals which are stirring in our midst.

The fresh views which science has taught us of the world will be found to extend their influence to the sphere of Art. No longer thought of as presided over by an absentee Director, the universe is for us the outflow of the abundant life of God, who is immanent in all His works. The outward world is the embodiment of inward realities, and designed to teach deep spiritual lessons. Thus all is seen to be sacramental, and we

[1] J. A. Symonds, "Essays," vol. ii. p. 55.

have to extend our conception of the divine, which is concerned not with the extraordinary but with the ordinary, dignifies the cottage and its denizens, and lends a grace even to the humblest occupations. Instead of relegating the divine to some remote sphere or golden age the Christian finds it lurk even in the apparently commonplace. In the democratic state, then, the artist need not explore the fables of mythology, or ransack the history of feudal times to find themes for the pencil which are ready to hand in the humbler walks of life, seen now to be every whit as heroic and divine. It is true that such themes have been attempted, but the dignity of common life has not been sufficiently understood or expressed. The Dutch painters, for example, who have portrayed domestic scenes, have struck only a lower note, and often marred their work by the introduction of the mean and ludicrous. Art has not yet, as literature has in a measure done, come into contact with the aspirations of the people, and is out of touch and sympathy with new ideals. Divorced from the democracy Art tends to become increasingly the perquisite of a select few rather than as it should be the possession and enjoyment of the many. As little as the privileges of education and the franchise should Art be restricted to the few. We must have artists and a school of Art closely in harmony with the civic life.

Never was there an age in which appreciation of the beautiful was more needed, and more calculated to have a wholesome effect upon the minds of the masses than the present. And it is especially amidst the toilers of the town that the elevating and purifying influences of Art are needed. The country has compensating

charms of its own; but in the town the dull monotony of dingy streets, with acres of houses built after the same pattern, begets a depression inevitably born of ugliness. The dreariness of modern commercial life has crushed all feeling for the beautiful from the heart of the working-man. It is forgotten that rest for heart and mind which the arts afford is as necessary as bodily repose. Joy and happiness are an essential part of the civic life, and these it is the business of the artist to provide. The man who has it in him to open the eyes of his fellows to the loveliness of creation or to the dignity of toil has rendered more service to the community than he who has amassed a fortune by commerce or speculation. The eyes of the worker are closed to the perception of the beautiful, and a great gift of God has been filched from him. He knows nothing of the desire for beauty, which is an essential element in life, and thus existence is for him stunted and maimed. How are we to secure it, that a fair proportion of this enjoyment is to be brought within the reach of all; how to convert those indifferent to beauty to a sense of its extreme value? Here is scope for education in a direction in which little as yet has been achieved. The wealthy can escape at intervals from depressing surroundings and evil sights and sounds, but this is denied to the poor man, who little understands that anything beyond the necessities of the body is essential to happiness and a full life. The love of beauty naturally implanted in the soul is the mainspring of all Art, and this must be fostered and taught. It is difficult, unfortunately, to reconcile machinery and the dreary round of commercial industry with the beautiful. But it is melancholy to notice that such small portion of artistic treasure as

is theirs already the people are unable properly to enjoy, and seldom does the townsman visit the country landscape without marring and polluting it. In the town Art is debased on the hoarding, and streets are made hideous with aggressive pictorial advertisements, offensive alike to eye and taste. It cannot but be felt as a serious blot upon our civilisation when man is seen to be thus out of harmony with the world in which he dwells.

There are many causes which have tended to this degradation, and which hinder the development of Art. The large use made of machinery in so-called artistic products tends to kill all artistic feeling in the mind of the workman. Any intelligent appreciation of his work and rational enjoyment in doing it is impossible in one who is always engaged in producing only one small portion of the whole. The artisan so employed can take no interest in the general design, and so has no opportunity of turning latent faculties to account. Another cause of artistic deterioration is the enormous multiplication of the cheap illustrated paper and magazine. Rapidly produced without thought, and as rapidly struck off, this endless reproduction of the same designs tends only to debase the popular taste, because it requires no intelligence or intellect to understand. Past centuries have left us treasures of immeasurable worth; it is doubtful whether the present age will leave much that is worthy of preservation. Again, the curse of speculation has entered into the domain of Art, and collectors invest their money in pictures as in stocks or shares, with an eye to future gain. The hot-house civilisation of the present day, and the utilitarian spirit of the age, leave little room for that almost childlike simplicity

of nature which is the characteristic of the artistic temperament.

It is true that of recent years, largely owing to the work of William Morris, there has been some improvement in domestic art and the embellishment of the home. Ideas upon internal decoration and furniture are being remodelled. It is felt that Art is not a thing which ends with the studio and the gallery, but is concerned also with the wants of the household. The old-fashioned drawing-room of forty or fifty years ago, with its wax flowers, stuffed birds, and gaudy antimacassars of Berlin wool, was hideous enough. Amongst the rich at any rate more æsthetic tastes now prevail, and there is an increasing desire for more beautiful surroundings in the house. This demand has extended also to the decoration of our churches, and there is a growing appreciation of more ornate and artistic forms of service. The man who furnishes at Liberty's is naturally averse to worshipping in a barn, till only a few fanatics are left who object to pictures in churches or desire to maintain puritanical forms of worship.

For past devotion to the ugly it must with sorrow be confessed that religion has had something to answer. Puritanism is responsible for an uneasy feeling that beauty is somehow akin to sinfulness, and beautiful things a snare and hindrance of the devil. This idea is passing away, and beauty is seen to be a helpful adjunct to worship. A new society, "The Clergy and Artists' Association," has been formed with the object of bringing the clergy into direct contact with the artist, and so abolishing the middleman in the shape of the ecclesiastical upholsterer. All such attempts to beget original work, and avoid the mere

repetition of conventional forms and patterns, are welcome. The old spirit of the craftsman has died out, and the artisan engaged on the work of decoration is usually content to multiply indefinitely in the stone or marble a few scrolls or leaves after the same pattern. For the accomplishment of great work in the sphere of decoration great workmen are essential. St. Paul's Cathedral might conceivably be decorated without the aid of great "Committees of Taste," or even without the assistance of a great artist, but not without workmen of culture and imagination properly disciplined. Wren knew this, and for the mosaic work in the dome intended to procure from Italy four of the most eminent workmen in that profession. It is not designers of patterns but great workmen who are wanted. The artist himself must be the master workman, moving amongst his men and inspiring them with his own ideals, not a draughtsman setting up plans in a distant workshop. A genuine delight in good work, for its own sake, was once the common property of all craftsmen. The workman, free from the intervention of the contractor, took a pride and pleasure in his work. He was himself an artist, not a "hand." Now he is merely the contractors' man, and too busy in amassing money for other people to have any time for the production of works of art. In other words, as Morris said, "slavery lies between us and Art."[1]

We cannot now revive the guild system of the Middle Ages, but there is no doubt that it had an abiding influence on Art. The boy was bound as apprentice to an accredited master, who gave definite instruction to his pupil, and stood to him in the

[1] "Signs of Change."

relationship of parent as well as teacher. It was by studying in the workshop of his master, and helping him in the more elementary and subsidiary parts of his work, that the mediæval painter acquired his craft, and carried on the tradition and ideals which he had imbibed. Moreover, he had the inestimable advantage of seeing how great works of Art were conceived and got themselves executed, a privilege denied the art student of to-day. It was in this way that all great Art has been produced. Morris endeavoured to revive the system, and though head of a great firm, refused to act as the mere contractor. He was the master workman, executing as well as designing. In his evidence before the Royal Commission in 1882 he said, "It is a thing to be deprecated that there should be a class of mere artists who furnish designs ready made to what you may call the technical designers. I think it desirable that the artist, and what is technically called the designer, should practically be one."

The infinite division of labour which obtains in all departments of industry has affected the Arts with disastrous results. There is too great a separation between the various Arts. The architect who has built a hotel or house is not concerned with its decoration or furniture. That is a matter which he hands over to the contractor. Glass window manufacturers, who exercise their fancy to the detriment of our churches, keep different operators—they cannot be called artists—who, when the cartoon is drawn, deal with different portions of the figure. One executes the head, another the hands, a third attacks the drapery, after the manner of the children's game, "head, body, and legs." Something of Morris's success might be perpetuated if artists formed schools after

the mediæval pattern and condescended themselves personally to supervise the manufacture of objects of daily use in the household. Even though great painters might be few and far between, yet much improvement might be brought about in the humbler sphere of decorative and industrial Art.

Thus far, then, we have seen that there are two desiderata if Art is to take its rightful place in the Commonwealth. We need a school of artists who are in touch with the new social aspirations of the people, and who have understood and can express the dignity of common life and the nobility of honourable toil. These men will find in the life and labour of the people themes capable of artistic treatment, which shall touch the heart, and are lacking in the glitter of the ballroom or the pageant of the court. And, secondly, we need workmen who are themselves artists, who shall enjoy freedom in the execution of their work, and be not merely machines and slaves of the sub-contractor. Whether this latter be possible under present conditions is a question outside the scope of this article, and must be left to the economist to deal with. I must be content merely to point out that unless we have workmen who are themselves artists no great work can be accomplished, however eminent the designers whom ecclesiastical and other bodies may engage to provide schemes of decoration.

That there are serious obstacles to the attainment of both of these indispensable conditions for the rise of a great national Art I am well aware.

There is at present in the nation no unanimity of ideal or creed, no overmastering emotion which animates all men; and while this is so, there can be no great national Art. It is above all things difficult

in this age to tell men exactly what to strive for; and when society is vague and aimless in its purpose and ideals, Art must of necessity be the same. It was otherwise in the two epochs of history when great Art flourished, that is, in Greece and Italy. Amongst the Greeks the polytheistic faith, coupled with a great love of nature, animated all men. Again, the culture of the human body, and of everything which tends to make it beautiful, was a real part of education. The gods were human beings deified, and there resulted a great ennobling of the actual physical form, if we may judge from those specimens of sculpture which have come down to us. With the Italians in the other great art epoch, religion engrossed the attention of all. It found constant and paramount expression in the national life. Art took inspiration from it. Society is not now moved with any such leading ideas or emotions. Men are hopelessly divided by differences of thought and ideals, and in this condition of the national life great Art is impossible. There is room, however, for hope. The spirit of fraternity is growing. If the great idea of a human brotherhood upon earth, founded upon the belief in a divine fatherhood, gained possession of the national mind; if class barriers and prejudices were broken down, and men became inspired with the democratic spirit, then a school of great Art might arise. And there is reason to believe that such a spirit is extending. There is a school of thought at any rate moved by social aims and aspirations, and though confined to the few, yet it must capture and control the many. There is no staying the onward march of democracy, and when the democratic spirit is paramount, it will find expression in the national Art. Meanwhile, artists may do

much to open the minds of men to the beautiful, and redeem life from the trivial and the ugly.

But there are others besides the artist with whom the responsibility also rests. The millionaire or capitalist who takes a pride in his private gallery, and gives large sums for pictures, may be, and often is, the man who in his business is employed in multiplying hideous articles of domestic use. The railway company director, to take another example, has large opportunities, if he would only rightly use them, for directing the artistic tastes of the people. Criminally negligent of these, he erects some monstrous structure, which thousands are forced to enter daily, thus debasing the national taste, and putting a stumbling-block to improvement upon sounder lines. Yet there is no reason to suppose that the average man or woman is by nature insusceptible to things of beauty. On the contrary, the instinct of adornment is latent in the people, whether it take the form of cheap prints upon the wall, or feathers and ribbons in the hat or dress. It needs, however, direction and guidance into right channels.

This paper would be incomplete without some inquiry into the relations between the State and the Municipality and Art. It is hard to realise that not much more than fifty years have passed since the Government began to concern itself seriously with matters artistic. To the historical painter, Haydon, is due much of the credit for the initiation of the movement. In 1823 Haydon petitioned Parliament for money for the decoration of public buildings, and kept up the crusade even when lodged in a debtor's prison. We had no National Gallery until 1834, and it was not until 1841 that there was any public

commission for works of Art, when a competition for the frescoes for the new Houses of Parliament was instituted. There were at that time no schools of design and no State department of Art. Progress during the past fifty years has been rapid. During that period we have acquired a National Gallery full of priceless possessions; the South Kensington Museum has been established, and picture-galleries and museums in provincial towns have become common. Added to this there are large numbers of art classes, and drawing is taught in the public elementary schools throughout the country. The great school of historical painting, however, which it was Haydon's dream to see established, is as far off as ever. The historical style of Art and the grand method do not flourish in England or find a congenial soil in the hearts of Englishmen. Were the ideas of imperialism strongly rooted in the minds of the people it would inevitably find an expression in national Art. When artists for the most part deal with genre and domestic subjects, it is safe to conclude that this is not the case. Certainly an impartial survey of the present condition of Art, to which we must look at all times and in all nations to find expression of the national feeling, does not lead us to the conclusion that the desire for extended empire has that dominant place in the minds of the great mass of our countrymen which some politicians would have us suppose. The State may do a great deal to encourage Art by means of judicious application of public money, and State subsidies might with advantage be considerably increased. The occasional distribution of honours to leading painters also helps, no doubt, to raise the status of the craft in the eyes of the multitude, since it was not so very

long ago that to be a painter was scarcely considered respectable.

But after all, the sphere for State interference is limited, and it is rather to the municipality and kindred public bodies that we must look for help in this direction. The city companies, for example, might apply more of their great wealth towards furthering the progress of Art. The old Metropolitan Board of Works allowed the speculative builder to play havoc with the public thoroughfares. There is reason to hope that its successor, the London County Council, is more alive to its responsibilities to the citizens in this respect. It would be difficult to imagine a collection of men with minds more impervious to Art culture than the average London Vestry, and probably the mere suggestion made to any of these bodies that they should endeavour to make the outer surroundings of their district more picturesque, would excite nothing but derisive laughter. The new Councils which the London Government Bill will create will do something, I believe, to create a better civic spirit, and if in each district men who possess Art knowledge and taste could be induced to come forward and lay it at the disposal of their fellow-citizens, much improvement might be achieved; for it is not merely by founding picture-galleries, or making provision for teaching, that the municipality may further the cause of Art. Art must be made to permeate the daily life of the masses of the people. Civilisation need not spell ugliness. In all places devoted to the work or recreation of the citizen, in the factory and the public garden, the need of the beautiful in life should be remembered. There is no reason why the office or the manufactory should be hideous in plan and

execution. In some departments of life the idea is happily gaining ground that the citizen owes something, not only to himself and family, but also to the community in which he dwells. This feeling has not developed in the sphere of Art. It must be pressed home that the individual is in this, as in all else, bound to think of the common interest. Heretofore, when a new street has been laid out or new buildings erected he has been allowed far too free a hand, from the Englishman's dread of interfering with the sacred rights of property. The growing recognition of a corporate civic life must be directed into the channel of a civic Art, and the æsthetic faculty cultivated amongst the many. The right of the individual to spoil the appearance of the public ways by the erection of hideous structures must be fettered, and his blatant vulgarity restrained. A wary eye must be kept upon the gentleman who styles himself the "practical business man," and who is ready to destroy buildings of æsthetic value for the sake of larger rents. A beautiful building is an incentive to live a beautiful life, but the community is at present powerless to prevent the multiplication of the "brick box with the slate lid." Were there a corporate recognition of Art as part of the civic life the individual freedom in this direction would be restrained. Art infallibly expresses the thoughts that possess the minds of a nation, and show what objects the people as a whole deem most worthy of pursuit. It has a lively sympathy with and responds to every social change. An increase of the social and civic spirit must inevitably find expression in the national Art. Acts of vandalism are not now so easily perpetrated as was the case twenty years ago. And this growing civic spirit artists must grasp and

understand if they would produce work that will touch and purify the hearts of the people. The objects of exquisite beauty which we treasure in our museums, and are the envy of the age, were, let it be remembered, at the time of their production not rare at all. They were the common household goods of earlier days, produced not by artists with large incomes but by the common working man. So with those specimens of ecclesiastical or domestic architecture which have come down to us. They too were the handiwork of the people. Similarly we must endeavour to teach the necessity of making Art a part of the daily life, in touch with every man, and understood by all, beginning, as Mr. Ruskin said, by "getting our country clean and our people beautiful."

THE END

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